Beyond NJ 9842

by Nitin A Gokhale

  Nair remembers one more episode very clearly even after all these years: “I must mention one very memorable incident with regard to battle field leadership which I had witnessed. Our Commander then was Brig Nugyal. He had come to visit the forward positions. He came in and enquired about us. After some time, a helicopter came in and he flew out. Later, the CO asked me about the Commander and whether he had mentioned that he had been injured. It came as a complete shock, for Brig Nugyal did not utter a word about his own injury when he was visiting us. He had apparently been injured in shelling. During his visit he never mentioned to me or the men that he was in pain and required any medical aid!”

  Brig Williams concludes: “As per Pakistani reports and signal intercepts, the enemy suffered a loss of approximately 300.” Raj Chengappa, then writing for India Today, reported in October 1987: For days the Indian Army pickets stationed at Bilafond La, almost 20,000 feet high and overlooking the frozen wastes of the Siachen glacier, were expecting the Pakistani troops below to attack. Through their binoculars they had watched with consternation as the Pakistanis brought in more men and arms than ever before. The Indian commanders even informally sent word to their counterparts, warning them not to launch an offensive.

  But the Pakistani soldiers paid no heed, and around noon on September 23 started shelling the Indian pickets with mortar shells. Said a senior Indian officer just back from the fighting: “They came to us from all fronts, firing mortar shells. shooting long-range missiles, hoping to inflict heavy casualties. But we were ready for them.” The Indians were well prepared and pounded the ridges below with medium range gun-fire and mortars inflicting heavy casualties.

  The battle raged well into the night, and the Pakistani raiders were beaten back, but continued their attacks for the next two nights. On September 25 after the Pakistanis finally withdrew, the Indians claimed that they had killed at least 150 of them, injuring an equal number. While Defence Ministry sources said that only around 20 Indians were killed, others put the toll at roughly 50. It was easily the biggest offensive by Pakistan since India first established its pickets at strategic points near Siachen in 1984. Said a senior Indian Army officer: “It seemed a do or die attack by Pakistan, and for them it ended in a die and not a do.”

  While Indian Defence Ministry officials announced the successful repulsion of the attack, Pakistan disputed it immediately. Rana Naeem Mahmood, Pakistan’s minister of state for defence, said: “Reports of the encounter as disseminated by the Indian side are highly exaggerated and the casualties reported on the Pakistan side are preposterous.”

  The key question is why did Pakistan choose to launch its biggest offensive to date at this particular moment? One answer is that was timed when India was busy dealing with Sri Lanka, and serious trouble brewing on her northern border in Tibet. Also, President General Ziaul-Haq was under pressure from the Opposition to establish Pakistan’s claim over the region.

  Although both countries have vowed not to use force, and to sort out any dispute in the Siachen region amicably, this has been continuously flouted. Indicative of this breakdown is that despite there being a hot line between the directors of operations on both sides, there was no communication. Pakistan, in fact, tried another abortive attack on Indian posts in the first week of October. This too was repulsed.

  The Indian Army is confident of defending their posts in the region and a senior officer said: “We are on top of them now and I mean that literally. We are in full control of the region. If Pakistan wants to dispute it, they would have to do so with casualties and they would have to pay for it dearly.” But that is hardly going to deter Pakistan from trying again.”

  If the battles in 1987 and another one in 1989 in the southern glacier remained out of the public domain at large, it was because all of them were fought in remote, inaccessible areas where even the military reached with great difficulty.

  The loss of Saltoro heights in 1984, and the subsequent defeats in 1987 and 1989 continued to rankle the Pakistani military brass. Pervez Musharraf, who as a brigadier had planned and executed the September 1987 attack that resulted in the loss of over 300 Pakistani soldiers in the suicidal battle for Quaid post (now renamed by the Indians as Bana top), had by October 1998 become the Chief of the Pakistani Army. He conceived the Kargil intrusions in 1999 along the LoC starting from Zoji La to the very edge of Siachen, up to Point 5770.

  By May 1999, the Indian Army had realized the extent of Pakistani ‘creep’, and the 8th Mountain Division had been rushed into the sector to evict the intruders and reclaim Indian territory. Over the next two months, fierce battles all along the LoC followed. Kargil War, as the localised conflict came to be known, is generally seen as the first ‘televised conflict’ in the sub-continent’s history since the media, including me, reported from the area for over two months, bringing the stories of incredible valour and sacrifice of the brave Indian soldiers to the Indian people.

  But none of us managed to get to the extreme eastern fringe of the conflict beyond Partapur (the HQ of 102 ‘Siachen’ Brigade) and Turtuk. Most of us concentrated at the easily-accessible Kargil-Drass sectors and reported from there. The Batalik-Yaldor-Chorbatla – Chalunka-Turtuk sector remained totally under reported. I myself remember managing to go up to Batalik in the first few days of landing in Kargil but being turned back.

  Soldiers of 27 Rajput after capturing Pt. 5770

  But away from the media glare, and dare I say, even from the gaze of the higher military authorities too, a major victory was achieved by 27 Rajput in May-June 1999. For unexplained reasons, the incredible action by 27 Rajput that summer in wresting back a key peak in the Turtuk-southern glacier area – thus saving the Shyok River Valley which was won by the heroic exploits of Major (later Col Rinchin) in 1971 (see chapter III, Getting Ready) – is not seen as a major battle victory during Kargil. It was an important breakthrough, because had the western approaches to the Shyok Valley been exposed, the Thoise airfield and the entire Nubra Valley would have been threatened, rendering, in one stroke the holding of Siachen glacier and the Saltoro ridge untenable.

  Pakistani maps captured subsequently, showed a straight line drawn from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass and even DBO, showing Pakistan’s continuing interest in Siachen. But, in the initial stages of the Kargil war, no one, least of all, Indian military planners took Pakistani advance in the Turtuk sector seriously. It was only when Pakistani artillery fire in the area intensified, and the sorties by Pakistan’s Lama Helicopters increased, that Pakistani intentions became clearer.

  By the middle of May 1999, once the extent of Pakistani intrusions was realized, the Siachen Brigade Commander, Brig. (later Lt. Gen) Prakash Katoch told Col K. H Singh, then commanding the 27 Rajput and deployed under 102 brigade to check out the spread of Pakistani presence in the area.

  Singh, who in February 2014, became the first north-easterner to attain the rank of Lieutenant General in the Indian Army’s combatant stream, sent out a reconnaissance patrol, only to discover that the Pakistanis had indeed occupied Point 5770. By 2 June, Singh received concrete evidence of the Pakistani presence on the peak when his unit patrol was fired upon. Fortunately, there were no casualties.

  Singh, a jovial but firm and inspirational leader had to motivate his soldiers, mostly drawn from the desert state of Rajasthan and neighbouring Haryana, to climb altitudes they had never seen in their life, leave alone climbed such heights. Not only climb, but fight and capture the peak.

  Singh of course had one advantage: there was no media to scrutinize the operation and he could prepare taking adequate time. Evicting the Pakistanis from the vantage point of Pt 5770 was easier planned than achieved though. For it meant launching an almost vertical attack, climbing the 1800 feet 90 degree incline to the top of pt 5770 which itself was located close to 19,000 feet. Conventional wisdom said, there would be heavy casualties in what looked like a suicidal attempt. But, neither Singh nor Brig Katoch was even thinking about that.

  The ca
ptured booty (top and bottom)

  “We were totally focused on the job. Any action in the mountain requires thorough preparation and accurate reconnaissance. We had done the recces earlier. Now, we were focusing on getting the boys ready both mentally and physically. They were well acclimatised and raring to go. But I wanted to plan the operation meticulously so we took our time,” Singh told me in February 2014 as I took him back 15 years in time.

  Singh selected Major Navdeep Singh Cheema to lead the company for the attack. Cheema’s company was supported by a team from HAWS led by Capt Shyamal Sinha and four soldiers from the local Ladakh Scouts. Their first task was to fix ropes for the team to climb the 1800 feet vertical cliff. This was done on two successive nights on 17-18 June, silently and successfully.

  Thereafter, soldiers took a week, to get prepared. In the intervening night of 23-24 June, the company started climbing, but 200 feet short of the top the weather deteriorated, with a blizzard blowing across the region and day break just an hour away. Singh, in constant communication with the assault team from a vantage position, decided to call off the attack.

  The next day another attempt was launched—in day light. Again, climbing up silently wasn’t easy, but as two columns under Cheema and Sinha made their way up, a lot of time was consumed. It was already getting close to sunset and Singh did not want to risk fighting in darkness. Fifty feet from the objective, the team was called back!

  The two columns who attempted the first two attacks were by now exhausted. A fresh team was selected, but the officers leading them remained the same. At 3 am on 27 June, the third attempt to capture Pt 5770 began. It was a Tuesday, considered auspicious by the God-fearing Rajput troops. Moreover, it was 27 day of the month, the battalion’s number in the Rajput Regiment! Soldiers are nothing if not believers. They believed it was going to be their day. And so it was.

  Capt Taimur Malik’s letters

  Around 2 pm, nearly 11 hours after they started climbing, the first assault team was poised just below the big rock on which a Pakistan soldier was sitting, perhaps writing a letter. As Singh gave the green signal to rush the objective, the sentry was silenced and the bunkers were attacked. The Pakistanis were utterly surprised, and could offer just token resistance. Capt Taimur Malik and 10 soldiers of the 3 Northern Light Infantry were killed. Miraculously, the Rajputs did not suffer a single casualty!

  The Indian Army had achieved its first success against Pakistani intruders, but Turtuk was far away from where the media was, and the top brass too was busy concentrating on evicting intruders from Tiger Hill, Tololing and the areas around the Kargil-Drass sector, for anyone to notice this tremendous success without artillery or air support! The battles of Tololing and Tiger Hill became a matter of folklore in later weeks, as media was at hand when those successes were achieved at heavy cost.

  All these thoughts were far from KH Singh’s mind. After capturing the peak, his men buried the fallen Pakistani soldiers with full military drill, and then proceeded to consolidate their position in the area, even as war raged elsewhere along the LoC.

  A humane gesture

  Col (now Lt Gen) K H Singh with Tipsy

  There is a postscript to the story. Exactly two months after the capture of Pt 5770, KH Singh and his troops were exhuming the bodies of the killed Pakistanis and sending them back to Pakistan through Post 43 in Kargil!

  As it happened, the young Pakistani captain killed in action belonged to a well-connected family. His grandparents, based in London, got in touch with the Indian Defence Attache, requesting the Indian officer to try and send his body back to Pakistan as a special gesture. Phone lines burnt at the highest levels, and it was decided to exhume Capt Malik’s body to be sent back to Pakistan (See the report by Gaurav Sawant for the Indian Express of that time). But KH Singh, ever the officer and gentleman, insisted that all Pakistani soldiers who laid down their lives in the battle for Pt 5770, and not just Capt Taimur must get the privilege of being sent home. And so it was. A true soldiers’ code: respect the enemy and respect the dead!

  Col K H Singh with his victorious troops

  Years later, KH would command the 25 Infantry Division that guards a large portion of the LoC south of Pir Panjal in the Jammu division, and is now poised to command a Corps, exactly 15 years after he took on the Pakistanis in Siachen! One of the abiding memories he has from the Turtuk stint was the company of a local dog he named Tipsy. “She was my constant companion and a valuable asset. At least on a couple of occasions, Tipsy alerted us on suspicious movements and continued to stay with us.”

  THE CITATION

  Nb Sub Bana Singh, 8 JAK LI (JC-155825)

  Naib Subedar Bana Singh volunteered to be a member of a task force constituted in June 1987 to clear an intrusion by an adversary in the Siachen glacier area at an altitude of 21,000 feet. The post was virtually an impregnable glacier fortress with ice walls, 1500 feet high, on both sides. Naib Subedar Bana Singh led his men through an extremely difficult and hazardous route. He inspired them by his indomitable courage and leadership. The brave Naib Subedar and his men crawled and closed in on the adversary. Moving from trench to trench, lobbing hand grenades, and charging with the bayonet, he cleared the post of all intruders. Naib Subedar Bana Singh displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and leadership under the most adverse conditions.

  A DOCTOR REMEMBERS

  I was inducted on the Northern glacier in July 1987 for a four month tenure. Reaching Kumar (15000 ft), where the Battalion HQ of 8 JAK LI was located, one heard stories of the heroic capture of Bana top (22000 ft) by the brave soldiers of this battalion about a month ago. The battle was codenamed OP RAJIV, after 2/Lt Rajiv Pandey, VrC of 8 JAKLI and the son of an AMC officer, who was martyred while establishing a rope base under the nose of the enemy. In the officers shelter at Kumar, was pasted the birthday card sent by Rajiv’s sister which sadly reached a day after his martyrdom. One must admit that as a young 25 years old doctor, the experience of reading this card after knowing the circumstances, left one teary eyed.

  The Medical officer whom I was relieving, narrated the bravery exhibited by 8 JAKLI in which the entire battalion volunteered for Op Rajiv. He told me that while he handled a lot of gunshot wound injuries, the casualties due to severe frostbite far outnumbered the actual battle casualties. This was because the men had been fighting endlessly at Minus 30 degrees celsius at 21000 ft for three nights.

  After acclimatization, I was moved to the 18,500 ft at Bila base. This was selected as the location of the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) of the RMO because it had a helipad (for casualty evacuation), and also was the confluence of two routes of evacuation, the first one being OP75 to Bila top and the second from Ashok/ U Cut to Bila saddle to me. The deployment on these posts was essential to defend the Saltoro ridge. The Company Commander of the area was located at Bila saddle for strategic reasons, as he could monitor the Forward Defended Localities (FDL) at Ashok and U Cut. It was here that one learnt the strategic significance of the Saltoro. The one who controls this ridge, controls the northern glacier.

  As September came, a festive mood engulfed the jawans of 8 JAKLI. And why not? The Army Chief, Gen K Sundarji, had visited us and conveyed his appreciation of the battalion’s grit and determination in capturing the Bana top. Moreover, 3/4 GR was being inducted to replace them by late September. 8 JAKLI had done its bit and was in the process of handing over charge of the northern glacier to 3/4GR.

  Things however changed dramatically around 20 September. On that night, I received my first two war casualties. OP75 a post ahead of BILA TOP was hit by an artillery shell fired from an enemy held HMG RIDGE. Two soldiers were brought at around 10 PM with severe splinter injuries all over. However, as the RAP had a bukhari, I could start an IV line and render the necessary medical aid. At first light the next day, the brave AIR OP pilots landed their helicopters at my post and evacuated these casualties to the Advanced Dressing Station (ADS) at base camp. At that point of time, our helicopters did not
have night flying capabilities. We witnessed heavy shelling over the next few days, with one shell landing barely 50 m ahead of our RAP hut.

  On the night of 22 September, my Sepoy/ Nursing Asstt Ram Sewak Ojha located at bila saddle called me on the telephone to convey that the senior JCO of 8 JAK LI had been grievously injured in enemy shelling. He urgently required an IV drip, and it was impossible to do the same in the snow bunker of his RAP, where the temperature had dipped to –40 degrees C. Therefore, despite the intense shelling, he was moving to a tent which had a bukhari so he could maintain the lifeline till morning, when he could be sent to me for further management and evacuation. I could only marvel at the bravery of this 21 year old AMC nursing assistant, who was prepared to put his life at risk to maintain the IV lifeline of the Infantry JCO. On 23 Sep at around 0300 hrs, he informed me that the JCO was recovering and he would be sending him to me soon for further management. I was overwhelmed by the professional skill of this young paramedical worker. My joy was shortlived. Around an hour later, the Company Commander rang me up to tell me that a shell had fallen on the tent in which the casualty was being treated and Ojha was seriously injured and bleeding profusely. I requested him to tie a tight shell dressing across the wound and evacuate him to me immediately by snow scooter, or a sledge for further management. Both the casualties were managed at my location and evacuated at first light. Despite acute pain, the eyes of Ojha lit up when I told him that it was only because of him that the injured senior JCO will live. RS Ojha was awarded the Sena Medal (Gallantry) for his exemplary courage and professional skill, in saving the life of the JCO.