Beyond NJ 9842

by Nitin A Gokhale

  Bana Top as seen from Bila Saddle

  On 18 April 1987—almost three years to the day when Operation Meghdoot began—a medium machine gun on the Quaid post opened fire on the Sonam post, about 1500 metres below and killed two Indian soldiers of 5 Bihar regiment then posted there. The Indians were caught by surprise. Now helicopters ferrying supplies to Sonam and the neighbouring Amar post, started coming under frequent fire from the Quaid post. Indian presence at Sonam and Amar looked increasingly untenable.

  Quaid post had to be eliminated. The question was: How?

  The sheer 85 degrees incline for over 500 metres was impossible to climb silently and without detection, when the Pakistanis were sitting on top of the peak; helicopter gunship operations could not be contemplated in that rarefied atmosphere and on a narrow peak. What was the alternative? A frontal, almost suicidal attack seemed the only answer. Brig. CS Nugyal, then commanding the 102 brigade, conferred with his battalion commanders and formulated a plan. A supremely fit soldier, Brig (later Maj Gen) Naugyal was a Sikh regimental officer, known for his impeccable integrity, courage and professionalism. As the second commander of 102 Brigade, Brig. Naugyal had major tasks in hand: consolidate Indian positions and eliminate any possibility of Pakistanis getting the upper hand anywhere on the Saltoro.

  Snow, snow everywhere

  April is still winter on the glacier as we know from the first ascent in 1984. It was also turnover time. The 5 Bihar battalion was being replaced by 8 JAK LI (Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry). Aware of the Quaid post, Brig. Naugyal and Col AP Rai, CO of 8 JAK LI, decided to send a recce party and get ready in anticipation of the clearance from the highest levels. Second Lieutenant Rajiv Pandey, on his first posting, was chosen to lead the nine-man reconnaissance team to Sonam. It was flown in from the Kumar base. The effort to fly the nine member team was herculean. One Cheetah trip could at best carry one soldier with his personal weapon at a time. Even the kitbag of the soldier had to be carried in the next trip, so severe are the restrictions on carrying weights to the 20,000 plus post. Helicopter pilots recall that it took some 35 sorties to fully transport the 9-man team! It took almost three weeks to build up resources.

  Finally, On 29 May 1987, a 10 man patrol under the extraordinarily brave, resourceful and gutsy 2/Lt Rajiv Pande left for the post. Facing this dynamic young officer was a 90 degree climb on slippery ice walls that were 1500 feet in height, which had to be negotiated to reach Quaid Post. On top of that, the weather was abysmal and visibility more so. This young man’s bravery has never really been given its military due. It was his tenacity, cold courage, high morale in sub-zero conditions, where every step was an ordeal, especially when it came to fixing ropes against a vertical ice wall under intense shelling, surviving for over 48 hours without water and food, that really laid the foundations of the success that eventually followed. Unfortunately, nearing Quaid, they were detected by the SSG commandos and eight Indian soldiers, including Lt Pande and his JCO were killed. The officer was posthumously awarded a Vir Chakra.

  Though the death of 2/Lt Rajiv and his men was tragic, the CO was now even more determined to succeed. What rankled the officers and men of the battalion, was that the bodies of the dead lay for three weeks in front of them; unrecoverable because of the shelling and Pakistani visual domination.

  The peaks rising above the glacier

  Launching an attack on a well-fortified post which has the advantage of height was not going to be easy. It needed reconnaissance, preparation and more importantly, volunteers who were willing to go into battle knowing fully well they may not return. Evicting the enemy would almost certainly involve hand-to-hand fighting and even use of artillery which meant escalation on the glacier. So Northern Command had to keep Army HQ informed too. Army HQ and the then Army Chief, Gen K. Sundarji took the matter to the Cabinet under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Some accounts of the time suggest that he had to do a lot of convincing at the political level to get his way. Although the rumblings in Sri Lanka were getting louder, fortunately India had not yet got embroiled in the island nation’s war.

  After the patrol had observed the area, the battalion started gearing up for the eventual assault. But there was a problem: Every soldier wanted to be part of the operation! Writes Brig. Rajiv Williams: “When volunteers were asked to raise this force, there was not a single person who remained silent; everyone wanted to participate and take revenge. The objective had to be captured, and the Pakistanis had to be put in their place. Since the men were distributed at various posts in groups of 10 to 15, with a mix of personnel from supporting services, it was not possible, since it was not possible to get personnel from just one company…After a quick, deliberate selection process, keeping the factor of immediate availability, a force of 50 men was selected with Major Virender Singh as ‘Task Force’ commander and Capt Anil Sharma as his 2IC (Second in Command).”

  By end of May 1987, the Task Force had moved to the administrative base about a km from the target, the ‘left shoulder’ at Bilafond La. It had taken the Cheetahs over 200 sorties to ferry troops and their equipment to Amar and Sonam posts. Both the posts were reinforced and readied for the eventual assault. Just ahead of the Sonam post, Capt Ram Prakash located a ledge that could accommodate a medium machine gun and a rocket launcher to be used in the final assault. Capt. Balraj Sharma with his seven man team occupied Amar and like near Sonam, this team also built an observation post. The Pakistanis on the Quaid post could see the Indian movement, and gradually realised they were being isolated. The Quaid post was left with just one route to replenish supplies.

  Now primed for attack, the Task Force Commander, Major Varinder Singh launched Operation Rajiv (in memory of 2nd/Lt Rajiv Pandey) on 23 June to capture the Quaid Post. A total of 62 people participated in the final operation. The team included two officers, three JCO’s and 57 jawans. Among the JCOs was Bana Singh.

  Born on 6 January 1949 in a Punjabi Sikh family, at Kadyal, a border village located in RS Pura, the famous basmati rice-growing belt outside Jammu, Bana had enrolled in the Indian Army on 6 January 1969 into 8 JAK LI. He was considered a keen, enterprising and intelligent soldier by his officers, handling diverse responsibilities. He had also been trained in mountain warfare by the High Altitude Warfare School in Gulmarg and Sonamarg and was eminently combat fit; in other words he was, at a young age, an all round combat soldier whom his officers and peers respected.

  The platoon sent on 23 June under Major Varinder Singh, Bana’s aggressive and bold company commander, had to unfortunately come back half way, losing two soldiers in the bargain. A month before this attack, Lt Pande had managed to fix ropes on the sheer ice wall that would lead to the Quaid post, but due to heavy snow fall, the ropes were untraceable. The ropes had to be fixed all over again.

  The second platoon led by Subedar Sansar Singh with 10 jawans, made an attempt on 25 June. This time, there was no problem with the ropes, but due to a communication gap with the controlling headquarters, the mission had to be aborted. Col Rai, determined to succeed at all costs, had conveyed his determination to his command: “I don’t care what sacrifices we have to make, but Quaid will be captured!”

  So, Naib Subedar Bana Singh, hand-picked by his CO for the challenging assignment, led the last attack, along with Riflemen Chunni Lal, Laxman Das, Om Raj and Kashmir Chand. It was exactly at eleven minutes after noon on 26 June 1987, when the final phase of “Operation Rajiv” was launched in heavily snowing conditions and gathering darkness. A strange thing had happened the night before. Recalls Bana Singh: “one day before the assault, I was feeling depressed. So I started praying. I heard the voice of Guru Gobind Singh, who said said: ‘I was only testing you.’ Then my depression disappeared. It is the first (and last) time that I had such an experience.”

  When Bana Singh and his men started to move towards Quaid, the heavy, persistent snowfall and the poor ambient light conditions, made the soldiers wonder if it was day or night. On top of that, the Pakistanis knew
something was going on, because of the artillery shelling that the Indians had started from the gun areas in the base camp, which forced them to put their heads down and remain confined to the bunker.

  As Bana and his team started the torturous and silent climb on the 85 degree incline, all their limbs were aching; they were longing for rest, some rest but aware that this was their last chance, they kept climbing one foot at a time, resting every 10 minutes to give some respite to the aching arm and legs, catching their breath. The snow was falling steadily. They seemed to be heading to certain death, especially if the Pakistanis on top of that feature were to be alerted. Mountaineer Harish Kapadia, who had spoken to some of the participants of Op Rajiv, describes the 500 m climb in his book Siachen: The Battle of Roses: “To reach the post they (Bana and Co.) had to use a mountaineering technique called jummaring up. You ascend a slope by using a clip named jummar. A jummar, when attached to a rope, slides only upwards while you stand on slings attached to it. As it goes up and is released from pressure, the lever in the jummar locks and does not allow it slide down. You have to push yourself up with a heavy load on your back—it is hard work that even a fit mountaineer finds strenuous. Progress is slow and precarious, as great balance is required to stand on the attached slings. The soldiers put hot water bottles in their jacket so that after a few feet of climbing on the rope, they could warm their hands enough to hold the cold jummar clips. Even 50 metres of jummaring when everything else is quiet, is a challenge—here they had to jummar up 500 m where the enemy could fire upon them.”

  Some of the bravehearts who took part in

  Op Rajiv, Bana Singh (bottom left)

  Ardous climb

  Foolhardy? Perhaps, but only the Indian soldier could have carried on in such adverse circumstances.

  Bana Singh remembers there was a single, deep bunker on the top, as they crested the peak. The Pakistanis must have become complacent because of the foul weather, and the heavy snowfall, and their success in warding off the previous two efforts by the Indians to capture the post. Manning the post was Naib Subedar Atta Mohammad from the Shaheen Company of Pakistan’s elite commando force, the Special Services Group (SSG).

  Three days of attacks by the Indians had not yielded any result, but as Bana and his men silently climbed the top of the Quaid post, he opened the entrance door of the bunker, threw his grenades inside and closed the door. Bana and his men set up their light machine gun on a single shot. In that extreme climate, the automatic weapon could fire only single shot. As the surprised Pakistanis rushed out of the bunker, a short but intense close quarter battle took place, killing six Pakistanis, two or three in hand to hand combat.

  Naib Subedar Atta Mohammad and his men too fought bravely, but were overpowered. Apparently, a couple of injured Pakistani soldiers fell off, or jumped off the cliff, and survived to tell the tale. Brig Williams writes: “His (Naib Subedar Atta Mohhammad’s) part of the story would never have been known had it not been for these men. They vividly described their last days on the Quaid post. “Naib Subedar Atta Mohammad was everywhere. When we saw the enemy (Indian soldiers) climb the towards our post, despite bleeding profusely after being hit by an enemy burst, our Naib Subedar kept going around and assuring us that reinforcements would soon arrive. The reinforcements never came, but we stood our ground and delayed the capture for three days till our ammunition finished…”

  For his bravery, Naib Subedar Atta Mohammad was posthumously awarded one of the highest Pakistani gallantry awards.

  Bana recalls that following the protocol and ethos of the Indian Army in treating the dead, the bodies of the six SSG personnel were brought back by the Indians, and later handed over to Pakistan during a flag meeting at Kargil.

  On the morning of 27 June 1987, the Brigade Commander, Brig CS Nugyal who had been intimately involved with the planning and execution of the operation, arrived by helicopter at the battalion’s launch base. Fiercely hugging Bana and his soldiers, he announced that hereafter, the 21153 feet (6749 metres post so brazenly taken away from Pakistan by Naib Subedar Bana Singh and his men, would be called Bana Top in his honour; a decision that a grateful nation and a very proud Army indeed, have accepted for posterity.

  Naib Subedar Bana Singh was awarded the Param Vir Chakra, the highest wartime gallantry medal in India, for conspicuous bravery and leadership under most adverse conditions. “Operation Rajiv” overall, resulted in the award of one MVC (for Subedar Sansar Singh), seven Vir Chakras and one Sena Medal, besides the PVC. The CO and the Commander were awarded UYSMs. 8 JAK LI and 102 Infantry Brigade had reason to be proud; very proud indeed, for their stupendous skill at arms in the toughest high altitude terrain the world has ever known so far.

  Sub (later Hon. Capt) Bana Singh

  As Gen Raghavan wrote: “The operation required an amazing degree of commitment from the troops and outstanding leadership from the officers. The battalion and brigade commanders were on the Saltoro themselves, directing, controlling and fine tuning the whole operation. There is no parallel in military history of an attack of this kind conducted at over 21,000 feet.”

  But losing the ‘left shoulder’ now named Bana top to the Indians, did not stop Pakistan’s (mis) adventure. In September 1987, the SSG launched yet another attack on Bilafond La. Literature and news reports of the time suggest that this attack was planned by Pervez Musharraf, then a brigadier in the SSG.

  Codenamed Operation Qiadat, the attack was aimed at capturing two posts named Ashok and U cut, north of Bilafond La. In September 1987, Ashok was manned by just eight soldiers led by Naib Subedar Lekh Raj. In the third week of September, Pakistan intensified artillery and mortar attack on all posts around the Bilafond La area, and particularly on Ashok and U Cut. Those who were there, remember the entire area becoming black with shells exploding in soft snow. 8 JAK LI was about to complete its tenure and 3/4 Gorkha Rifles was about to take over responsibility of the Northern glacier.

  War Memorial built by 8 JAK LI at Siachen Base Camp

  On 23 September 1987, the Pakistani attack on Ashok post commenced. That time, no one knew who participated from the Pakistani side. Later, it came to light that soldiers of the 1 and 3 Battalions of the SSG and the 2 Northern Light Infantry were involved, in what turned out to be a suicidal mission.

  Brig. Williams, then a Major posted at the neighbouring post of Sonam, and the seniormost officer at Bilafond La at that time describes the battle: “At precisely 5.55 am, the brave, young and courageous men of Pakistan’s elite SSG obeyed orders of their commander, and at the break of dawn were seen trudging along the narrow ridge leading to Ashok. The deployability along the ridge was no more than two men abreast, and therefore we could observe scores of rows following one behind the other. The attack had commenced…Ashok Post was held by a only a weak section of 8 men of 8 JAK LI and later strengthened by reinforcements from 3/4 Gorkha Rifles…

  “Having waited for the attack till close to 3 am, we had barely slept on the night of 22-23 September, when I received a radio communication from the JCO positioned at Ashok, saying that the Pakistanis were coming on to the post in large numbers. Initially, I thought the report was not correct , because who in their right mind would venture an uphill assault in the early hours of the morning. However, the report was correct and the enemy was climbing that steep ridgeline and could be observed distinctly—a delightful opportunity for target practice for our troops. The Pakistanis were appropriately welcomed by Lekhraj along with seven other men. The (Pakistani) numbers swelled, but Lekhraj kept assuring us that nothing would happen to the post as long as he was alive…It was not more than 15 minutes after he spoke with me over the radio set when a TOW missile fired from the enemy fire base hit the bunker directly and killed the JCO instantaneously along with two other men.”

  Over the next two days, as India reinforced the Ashok post and used artillery extensively, the battle raged on. India’s counter-punch was codenamed Operation VajraShakti. As Suresh Nair, who was a young arti
llery officer then posted on Siachen with 314 Field Regiment, recalls in an interview to me: “The 314 Field Regiment was a very young unit having been raised only in 1984. Immediately on raising we were sent to the glacier, and believe me we could not have got a better training ground.

  On razor’s edge

  In this Operation, artillery proved to be the major battle winning factor, due to speed, accuracy and quantum of fire brought down on the enemy. The arty fire was expertly handled, and was brought down at the right time and place exerting decisive influence in the battle.”

  Suresh Nair continues: “On 23 September when the attack began early morning, and as the section located on the Ashok post kept fighting gallantly, we in the artillery started firing our medium, light and field guns on the enemy positions. By 1130 am the enemy had to withdraw and take cover behind the Tola hill and the HMG ridge. The arty duel carried on with deadly salvos of air burst and ground burst ammunition. Mainly air burst ammunition was used with great effect. The adversary once again started shelling, Ashok and U Cut on the night of 24 September and seen approaching Ashok in a platoon strength with some civilian porters. The platoon was followed by a whole batallion in four columns. Our artillery fire was readjusted on these advancing columns and they were stalled.

  “During this battle we employed three 130 MM guns, three 105 MM LFGs and three 120 MM Mortars. Artillery in the three nights fired over 3,000 rounds of ammunition, which must be a record for firing from the small number of guns. One 130 MM gun burst on the last night due to the intensity of firing, as also the large number of rounds fired. An intercepted radio communication revealed a Pakistani company commander telling his superiors that that no movement was possible due to the very heavy and accurate artillery shelling.”