Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  The Opponents

  ALTHOUGH THROUGHOUT HIS REIGN he shifted alliances when he deemed it necessary, Frederick’s primary opponent was Austria. Whereas his forebears had subordinated themselves to the emperor in Vienna, Frederick realized that to strengthen the security of his territory he needed extra land to fill in the gaps between his holdings. The most necessary land was Silesia, the pathway from Bohemia into Brandenburg. Although Brandenburg and Prussia were politically a single entity, in 1740 they were not joined physically; West Prussia (under Polish control) lay between them. Thus, Frederick’s overall goal was both defense and unification. With the death of Charles I in Vienna just a few months after Frederick came to power in 1740, the confused situation in Austria invited Frederick to begin his project. As Charles’s successor was his daughter, Maria Theresa, it was an open question how many European powers would recognize her as a legitimate ruler. Over the previous several years all the major powers had signed the Pragmatic Sanction agreeing to recognize a female successor, but just how many would come to the aid of potentially weak twenty-three-year-old queen? Frederick had demanded cession of the Duchy of Silesia as his price for honoring the agreement. The law there did not allow a female ruler, and he claimed a relation to the last duke of Silesia. Frederick seized the opportunity.

  He was correct in assuming Austria was fragmented and unprepared for war. “He was wrong, however, in his assessment of the energy, strength and wisdom of the new Austrian ruler, by far the most distinguished monarch the Habsburgs ever produced, and in the fervent support she was to receive,” Albert Seaton asserts.43 The first assistance for Maria Theresa came from Hungary, a nation recently at odds with Austria but befriended by Maria Theresa’s father, Charles. A standing Hungarian force protecting the southern frontier from Turks provided 39,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. Coupled with the existing Habsburg army, which had recent experience against the Turks, the Austrian resistance proved stronger than Frederick had anticipated. However, the Austrian infantry’s method of fighting was no different than that of any other country: linear warfare. The cavalry trotted forward in a line, then at twenty paces fired their pistols and spurred their horses. Neither had the discipline or speed of the Prussians. The Austrians’ edge was in their light troops with superior scouting and harassment abilities, but on the battlefield they used muskets and bayonets like all other European armies.

  At first Frederick’s December 1740 invasion met little resistance, with the Prussian army occupying just about every city in Silesia before the Austrians could react. Frederick hoped that a fait accompli, followed by his reassurance of support for Maria Theresa’s claim to the remainder of Habsburg lands, would be sufficient to keep her from reacting. But, Ritter asserts, “[h]e did not know that this woman possessed more courage and a greater sense of honor than all the men at her court. That she had been robbed of Silesia without so much as a warning made it impossible for her to acquiesce. She would rather risk extreme peril than accept such an insult. In her person, Habsburg’s ancient imperial pride rose up against the faithless vassal.”44 It only got worse for Frederick, as the other countries he expected to move in and grab parts of the empire, such as France and some of the Germanic states, failed to do so. The diversions he expected never materialized, and Maria Theresa was able to focus her military efforts on him rather than on her western frontiers.

  In the spring of 1741, an Austrian army under Field Marshal Wilhelm Count Neipperg marched out of Bohemia with the intention of severing Frederick’s army from its supply bases in Berlin. In desperation, Frederick marched north to avoid being cut off, but ran into the Austrian army at Mollwitz on 10 April.

  Frederick had wanted to avoid such a situation. Earlier reports of Austrian forces in Bohemia motivated him to pull his forces back and together. On 29 March, however, he was convinced otherwise by his senior advisor Kurt Christoph Count von Schwerin, who believed that the better idea would be to keep the troops dispersed in order to maximize foraging. When Frederick concentrated his forces and began moving he had a numeric and qualitative edge: 21,600 Prussians to 19,000 Austrians, of whom 10,000 were infantry and most of those recruits. An infantry battle should certainly go Frederick’s way, but as he was deploying his forces early in the afternoon of 10 April his right wing was struck by an overpowering cavalry attack that not only sent the Prussian horse flying but threatened to crumple the entire army. Frederick himself was in imminent danger of being captured. “No one expected anything like it,” Ritter notes. “How long had it been since a Prussian ruler had personally fought in battle? The fate of Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII may have flashed before the eyes of the Prussian generals, and the natural excitement of their young commander-in-chief probably interfered with their tactical dispositions.”45 Frederick took his senior commander’s advice and fled, with Austrian hussars hot on his heels. The remainder of the Austrian cavalry, however, re-formed and prepared to charge the Prussian lines. The years of discipline paid off; neither cavalry nor infantry could make headway against the immovable Prussian lines. The Austrians withdrew at dark, losing the battle but winning the campaign, for Frederick halted his invasion.

  The young king wasted no time identifying mistakes and addressing them. He observed the strength of the infantry and the poor quality of the “damnably awful” cavalry. His own mistakes? He allowed the army to remained scattered when he should have concentrated it; he allowed himself to have his lines of supply cut; and he spent too much time deploying before the battle. Deciding to keep his army in camp at Mollwitz, Frederick immediately began making improvements. He depended on Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau and his sons to keep up the infantry training while he turned to the cavalry. He began to look to a hussar officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hans Joachim von Ziethen, whose “skill in light cavalry tactics was such that his hussars led the way for the total regeneration of the Prussian cavalry.”46

  As Frederick worked on his army through the quiet summer of 1741, Bavaria, Saxony, and Savoy went to war against Austria. This obliged Maria Theresa secretly to promise to leave the Prussians in Silesia in return for a cease-fire, but she reneged on her promise within two months. In the spring of 1742 Prince Charles of Lorraine led an Austrian army against the Prussians. At the Battle of Chotusitz in mid-May, the Prussian cavalry initially gave a good account of themselves but were scattered by a counterattack while trying to re-form. On the Prussian left Prince Leopold held the village of Chotusitz in bitter fighting before he was finally forced back. During his withdrawal, Frederick, on Leopold’s right, brought his men out of a hollow where they had lain unobserved and launched them at the now-exposed Austrian flank. At this surprise, the Austrians broke and fled.

  This defeat led to the Treaty of Breslau in mid-June (ratified in late July) whereby Maria Theresa ceded Silesia in return for an end to hostilities. Apparently, neither she nor Frederick really believed this would end the fighting for that province. However, as Theodore Dodge observed, “Frederick had learned good lessons. He had gained self-poise, and a knowledge of the hardships of war, the meannesses of courts, and the fact that he could trust no one but himself and his devoted legions. He was disenchanted. War was no longer glory, but a stern, cold, fact.”47

  With some breathing space from his Austrian opponents, Frederick watched political events and worked on his army. For two years he built his treasury back up and expanded his forces to 140,000 men. He also introduced a new innovation: peacetime field maneuvers.48 In the meantime, Bavaria—a Prussian ally—had been losing continually to Austrian forces, and the pro-Austrian alliance grew larger when England joined the Dutch and several Germanic states to fight the French. In the summer of 1743 Frederick renewed Prussia’s alliance with France, which, under the leadership of Louis XV, was eager for some more glory. Hoping for a Franco-Prussian offensive into Austria, possibly even threatening Vienna, Frederick broke the Peace of Breslau and led his armies into Bohemia in August 1744.

  The Prussians quickly captured Prague an
d continued south, but unfortunately for Frederick the French did not keep the Austrians busy. With sufficient allies to keep an eye on the less-than-aggressive French, the Austrians moved their army eastward to deal with Frederick. Everything went against him all at once: bad weather, breakdown of supply, harassment by the enemy’s light troops, epidemic. His generals thought he was going too far too fast, but they could not influence him. He finally took his army back to Silesia late in 1744 in bad shape, with at least 17,000 desertions along the way. “Totally demoralized, the proud army finally returned to Silesia,” Ritter observes. “Every weakness of troops trained to unquestioning obedience but incapable of independent action had been laid bare.”49 Indeed, the confidence the First Silesian War had given him took a major blow as well, and Frederick was learning to balance his own views with considered advice. He could not depend on subordinates alone, as he had at Mollwitz, but he could not ignore them as he had done on this campaign.

  With Frederick’s army severely weakened and the ego of its leader bruised, Maria Theresa saw her opportunity to punish Prussia and regain Silesia, and in 1745 sent her army out of Bohemia under the command of Charles of Lorraine. He had overseen the recovery of Bohemia, but he had had the expert advice of the veteran field marshal Count Otto Ferdinand von Traun, who was now in command of forces facing France. Still, Maria Theresa thought him just the right man for the job. Reed Browning asserts, “What was needed in Silesia was not cunning or brilliance, but rather the conventional skills of a seasoned commander. These Prince Charles could muster—and he [as her brother-in-law] could bring too all the prestige that attaches to relationship to royalty.”50

  The Battle of Hohenfriedberg

  CHARLES HAD A GOOD PLAN. With 55,000 Austrian and 20,000 Saxon troops at his disposal, he would put the bulk of his troops in Bohemia into a drive on the Silesian capital of Breslau, a secondary force would feint from Moravia to draw off some Prussian troops, and a screen of light troops would harass the Prussian supply lines. Charles also had spies alerting him on Prussian plans and movements. He confidently looked forward to finding a demoralized enemy whom he could sweep from the field.

  The Prussian intelligence service, which was always one of Frederick’s primary weaknesses, outdid themselves this time, however. One of Charles’s spies was actually a double agent and Frederick took full advantage of him. Not only did Frederick know the Moravian force was a diversion, but he also used the spy to pass on the disinformation that he planned to withdraw toward Breslau, just as Charles already assumed. Frederick led Charles to believe that the Prussians would behave as they had done in 1744, retreat to the north to avoid being cut off from their supply base at Breslau. To strengthen this idea, he evacuated part of southeastern Silesia. In reality, Frederick intended to go on the offensive with 70,000 men as soon as the Austrians could be lured down to the plains of Silesia.51

  When Austrian forces crossed the mountains from Bohemia into Silesia at the beginning of June 1745, they met no resistance. That Frederick would not contest the passes further confirmed the Austrian notion that the Prussians would not fight anytime soon. Thus, when the army debouched onto a plain facing east toward the Striegauer River and the town of Striegau52 (their goal for the following day), they made no particular effort to secure their perimeter. After all, the Prussians were miles away and the Austrian troops were tired from their strenuous climb. The 19,000 Saxons encamped on high ground near Pilgrimshain, and the lines stretched roughly south-southwest to Günthersdorf, with the 40,000 Austrians deployed down to Thomaswaldau, then southeast to Halbendorf.

  Frederick had observed the Austrian positions firsthand. He endeavored to do this before all his battles in order to exercise what he termed coup d’oeil. “The coup d’oeil of a general is the talent which great men have of conceiving in a moment all the advantages of the terrain and the use that they can make of it with their army,” Frederick wrote. “The coup d’oeil is required of the general when the enemy is found in position and must be attacked. Whoever has the best coup d’oeil will perceive at first glance the weak spot of the enemy and attack him there.”53 In this case, Frederick decided to hit the Saxons on the high ground first, then drive south into the Austrians. The 59,000-man Prussian army began a night march in complete quiet. The normally active Austrian Croat light cavalry were not on patrol. The Austrians were blissfully ignorant of the approach, Frederick’s double agent having assured Charles that the Prussians were not within striking distance. The Prussian forces reached the Striegau at midnight, caught their breath for a couple of hours, and then moved across the stream and onto the plain. Duffy describes the Prussian plan: “The columns were to pass the Striegauer-Wasser in the region of Striegau, Gräben and Teichau and make northwards in the general direction of Pilgrimshain until they had covered enough ground to be able to form a line of battle. The Prussians were then to advance to the west, with the right leading in a staggered echelon of brigades.”54 The cavalry was primarily deployed on the right and it was their mission to hit the Saxons at dawn to start the battle. The infantry for the most part faced the Austrians, intending to launch their attack as the Saxon wing crumbled.

  First contact came at 4:00 a.m. when leading elements of the Prussian cavalry stumbled into some Saxon grenadiers on the Breite Berg, a hill between Striegau and Pilgrimshain. The Saxons quickly fled, leaving the Prussians with good ground for artillery. Rather than allow the retreating grenadiers to rouse the defense, the Prussian cavalry pressed the attack. The Prussian cuirassiers found themselves facing stiff resistance and called for support from the dragoons and hussars, who were glad to assist, “and within a few minutes dragoons, hussars, cuirassiers and enemy mounted grenadiers were engaged in a deadly hand-to-hand combat, swirling about like a swarm of bees.”55 After two charges the Saxon cavalry broke, but they had bought some time for the infantry to form up. Meanwhile, Prince Leopold Max was bringing twenty-one Prussian infantry battalions directly from the line of march into attack formation. Under Frederick’s philosophy that cold steel was more important than firepower, the Prussians advanced with shouldered muskets, through intense musket and artillery fire, until they saw the whites of the Austrians’ eyes. The Prussian attack did not break the Saxon infantry immediately. Not until 7:00 a.m. did they abandon the field.56 Frederick supposedly told his men to show the Saxons no quarter, “an order thoroughly congenial to troops now possessed by what one of them called a ‘demonic bloodlust.’”57

  The Saxons received no assistance from the Austrians, slowly emerging from their tents. Prince Charles had heard the firing and assumed it was the Saxon assault on Striegau. Not until retreating Saxons approached his headquarters did he learn differently. Charles ordered his cavalry on his far right flank into the battle, but they were engaged immediately by Prussian cavalry so could not aid the Saxons. The cavalry battle on the southern end of the battlefield swayed back and forth. A dozen Prussian cuirassier squadrons found themselves cut off from the rest of the army when a bridge across the river collapsed, but quick action by Ziethen’s hussars finding and crossing a ford saved the day. The Prussians finally gained the upper hand and the Austrian cavalry broke. “By 7:00 a.m. the Prussian situation was truly enviable,” Browning notes; “they had shattered the allied cavalry on both wings and had put the Saxon infantry to flight. Only the Austrian infantry still contested the field, stripped of its ally and exposed as never before in the war.”58

  The Austrian infantry bravely stood in their lines and exchanged volleys with the Prussians. As the Prussians advanced, a gap appeared in the middle of their infantry. Following along behind the infantry all morning was a Prussian cavalry unit, the Bayreuth dragoon regiment. Seeing the widening gap and fearful that a counterattack might exploit it, they exploited it themselves. Over a fairly short distance they broke into a trot and then quickly into a gallop through their own lines and into unsupported Austrian infantry. A quick volley was all the Austrians could loose before the horsemen were in their midst
. Dennis Showalter describes the result: “In less than half an hour the Bayreuth Dragoons took no fewer than sixty-seven colors—a far greater tribute to the force of their charge than the five guns that could not be withdrawn, or the 2,500 prisoners who compared their maximum foot speed to the pace of a running horse and sensibly threw down their arms.”59

  That, for all intents and purposes, marked the end of the battle as the rest of the Austrians either fled or surrendered. The battle was over by 9:00 and no serious pursuit was launched, for the Prussian infantry had no more strength and the cavalry could not be quickly re-formed. The casualty count uncharacteristically favored the Prussians, who lost some 900 dead and 3,800 wounded; the Austro-Saxon dead numbered more than 3,000 and the wounded some 10,700.

  The success at Hohenfriedberg came about as a result of Frederick’s approach march followed by a deliberate attack. There was little exploitation or immediate pursuit, owing to his ongoing fear of desertion; indeed, so ingrained was the order against breaking their lines that the Prussian troops cleared the field of enemy forces without a man engaging in a single act of looting. Frederick fulfilled all the characteristics of the offense in this battle. He gained surprise through both disinformation and the secretive night march. He hoped to implement the oblique order in this battle, with stronger forces on his left facing the Austrians while the cavalry and fewer infantry struck the Saxons on the left flank with the intent of a “swinging gate” movement onto the Austrian position. He was in control of the tempo of battle, even though the enemy infantry put up stout defenses. Had he used his firepower on the advance this probably would have been even more to his advantage. Although the two armies had roughly equal numbers, Frederick showed his audacity by acting completely against the expectations of his foes; by not pausing at any point but quickly reacting to changes on the field, he gave the defenders no opportunity to do anything but defend.