Masters of the Battlefield

by Davis, Paul K.

  Hohenfriedberg was Frederick’s most impressive victory thus far.60 Frederick here showed that he was rapidly transforming himself into a great general. He had learned from his mistakes in previous battles and began showing the characteristics for which he would be best known. The oblique order may or may not have been attempted here; if he intended to use it the deployment in the dark surely hampered it. Further, with the quick movement of infantry marching toward the fighting being redirected toward the Austrians, as other units were deploying in the southern area, implementing the oblique certainly would have been a challenge on the parade ground, much less on the battlefield.

  In the wake of the battle the Austrian survivors quickly re-formed and conducted a safe withdrawal back across the mountains, with the Prussians close behind. For the next three months Frederick’s goal was to feed off Bohemian crops for his troops and fodder for his horses. This would lessen the demands on his logistics as well as deny those same supplies to the Austrians should they try to reenter Silesia. Frederick’s army skirted the western side of the mountains up to the Elbe, with the Austrian force following slowly along behind. Hohenfriedberg had not disheartened the Austrians; indeed, Maria Theresa’s husband, Prince Francis, was elected Holy Roman emperor. Frederick, as elector of Brandenburg, voted against him, but promised his support in return for (not surprisingly) full claim to Silesia. Maria Theresa was still not ready to agree, so her armies tried one last time to defeat Frederick and drive the Prussians away. Charles stole a march on Frederick in September 1745 and placed himself once again athwart the Prussian lines of communication.

  At first glance, what became the Battle of Soor (Sohr) was Hohen-friedberg in reverse. The Austrians staged a night march through heavily wooded terrain, emerging before dawn and seizing high ground overlooking the Prussian camp. Frederick was overconfident of the enemy’s lack of resolve and laid his camp out without paying attention to security. In particular, he neglected to occupy or even place guards on the high ground to the Prussians’ right, which was the route of his line of march back to Silesia.61 The Austrians, outnumbering Frederick’s 22,000 by two-to-one, were poised to strike a killing blow but held their hand. Charles would not attack into the early morning fog and mist, and that gave Frederick’s quickly reacting troops time to deploy. Frederick threw a cavalry attack around the far right flank of the hill atop which the mass of the Austrian force was located. The Austrian cavalry stood still, firing at long range, when Frederick’s cavalry emerged from a narrow valley and attacked uphill against a force twice their size. They succeeded in seizing the hilltop as Prussian infantry attacked from the opposite side. The rest of the army advanced all along the line, and the Austrians soon were retreating back into the woods. The Prussian discipline and drill of so many days and months in camp proved the deciding factor as the Austrians failed to take advantage of their opportunities. “From this day on dated [Frederick’s] European reputation as a military leader, and the belief in his invincibility,” remarks Ritter.62

  A few other minor battles took place through November into December, with Frederick’s hussars doing good work in harassing the Austrians and seizing supplies. As the year came to a close, Maria Theresa had had enough for the time being. On 25 December she signed the Treaty of Dresden, in which she accepted Frederick’s recognition of Francis as Holy Roman Emperor in return for ceding Silesia. Frederick went back to training and drilling his army.63

  Fighting between Austria and France continued for some time after Prussia left the war, but Frederick was intent on getting his army back up to strength and preparing for whatever future conflicts might arise. He had no illusions about the permanency of Austria’s cession of Silesia. He also saw the rising hostile power of Russia as a threat he would sooner or later have to face and recognized that the Prussian army would have to adapt in order to do so successfully. In the decade after Silesia’s acquisition Frederick wrote his directives on warfare, known today as The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His Generals, finished in 1747. It was revised in 1748 under the title of General Principles of War. A confidential set of instructions and meditations on war, one copy was sent in 1748 to Frederick’s successor with a request that it should be shown to no one. In January 1753, an edition of fifty copies was printed and sent to a list of his most trusted officers. Frederick ordered each recipient on his oath not to take it with him in the field, and should the officer die arrangements should be made to have the book returned whole and unharmed.64 In the book, Frederick advocated principles he saw as necessary for successfully conducting a campaign. The book’s first chapter addressed the Prussian army’s main problem, keeping soldiers from deserting. There followed chapters on planning for a campaign, reading enemy intentions, conducting the campaign, and conducting a battle, including his oblique order. Duffy summarizes some of the elements covered: “In the final articles, Frederick dealt interestingly with the element of chance in warfare, the evils of councils of war, and the cost of a winter campaign, returning in Article XXIX to his new battle tactics, a system ‘founded on the speed of every movement and the necessity of being on the attack.’”65

  In his personal life, Frederick became famous for his work ethic, rising at 4:00 a.m. to work on matters of state. After a modest lunch he would study and work on his musical skills until evening, finish up more paperwork after supper and retire at 10:00. He built his army up to 150,000 men and maintained the vaunted Prussian training and discipline. The number of cannons doubled, and the cavalry expanded almost as much. He also instituted war-gaming maneuvers in the field to observe and perfect his oblique attack. “In a comprehensive test of overall readiness, Frederick assembled the Army once a year for maneuvers,” write A. S. Britt and colleagues. “The generals, as well as the troops, demonstrated their proficiency. Marches, tactics, logistics, and new equipment were subjected to the King’s scrutiny. Every detail went through his exacting inspection.”66 Two of his generals on their own initiative began experimenting with all-arms divisions. Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick developed a concept of marching in four separated all-arms columns; although it was never perfected in Prussia, it would enjoy major success when redeveloped by Napoleon.67 Frederick also refilled his treasury. All these exercises proved necessary when, by 1756, his enemies had massed against him.

  Meanwhile, spurred by the embarrassment of losing Silesia, Maria Theresa began improving her military, introducing drill and discipline in the style of the Prussian army and upgrading artillery. General Leopold von Daun oversaw a commission to implement Prussian-style tactics and write new regulations, as well as implement summer maneuvers as Frederick had done. Her army expanded to 200,000, but the improvements were just beginning when the next war arrived. In spite of their numbers, plus that of the allied armies that would soon join in, Austria wisely adopted an overall defensive strategy that would play on its major strength over the Prussians: their light troops. As Daniel Marston recounts, “These troops, also referred to as Croates and Pandours by contemporaries, were made up of soldiers from the Balkan frontier regions. … The Austrians used this military corps as light troops, employing them to reconnoiter, forage, and skirmish. They were deployed on the flanks of the army as it marched, and would report on the movements and dispositions of the Prussians before battle. During battle, they would attack the flanks of the Prussian lines, trying to get them to fire and break ranks.”68

  As was often the case in European history, peace was merely a temporary break in the action between wars. Grudges from the War of the Austrian Succession still festered, but new alliances were necessary to gain revenge or protect possessions. The only constant was the Anglo-French hostility, primarily played out in North America with sideshows in India and the Caribbean. Maria Therese wanted to regain Silesia and, if possible, reduce Prussia to the minor state it traditionally had been. Frederick’s goal was to hold on to the gains from the last war and, if possible, conquer Saxony. The Russians were afraid of Prussian desires along the Polish
frontier, which they were interested in conquering.69 To achieve their goals, or to watch each other’s backs, Austria allied itself with Russia. Fearful of this powerful new alliance, Frederick concluded an alliance of his own with Britain, whose primary Continental concern was the German state of Hanover, home of the new English royal family since George I’s accession in 1714. This Treaty of Westminster, completed in January 1756, so outraged the French that after their ten-year alliance agreement with Prussia lapsed in 1757, they formally joined the Austro-Russian alliance, along with Sweden and Saxony. Haythornthwaite points out that “[i]t was an alliance in which all except France had designs on Prussian territory, designs which if successful would have reduced Prussia once again to a minor principality.”70 As Russell Weigley observes, other powers in Europe ganged up on Prussia as they would Germany almost two centuries later, fighting against a state aiming at military dominance.71

  With Austria and Russia both focused on him, Frederick decided on a preemptive strike against Saxony. In late August 1756 he marched 63,000 men (less than half his army) into Saxon territory. The Saxon army numbered a mere 18,000, and it quickly withdrew into a strong defensive position at Pirna. Frederick’s goal had been to make quick work of Saxony, then use the Elbe River valley to advance into Bohemia. He had no time for a siege if he was to strike Bohemia while Austrian forces were still dispersed, so he left a covering force at Pirna and marched south. The Austrians responded by sending a relief force under Irish immigrant Maximilian Browne, who encountered the Prussians at the Eger River.

  After a week of skirmishing, Frederick staged a flank march on the Austrian camp at Lobositz. He launched a cavalry assault in the early morning fog and saw it repulsed, as was a second. Improved Austrian artillery took its toll against both cavalry and infantry when Frederick committed them, but finally superior Prussian discipline broke the Austrian line. The Austrian troops withdrew in good order under artillery covering fire. Both sides started with roughly 30,000 men and ended the day with roughly 3,000 casualties. The Austrians demonstrated their improved training, but Frederick held the field. The besieged Saxons in Pirna soon surrendered, and Frederick achieved his first goal as the fighting season of 1756 came to an end: Saxony was his. He relieved all the Saxon officers but forced the remaining soldiers into the Prussian army. This proved an unwise move since he did not scatter them throughout his own units but left them in their existing Saxon contingents. These units deserted wholesale whenever the opportunity arose.

  Frederick got off to a strong start the following year. In the spring of 1757 the Prussian army streamed into Bohemia in four columns, converging against the Austrian army just to the east of Prague. Although in a strong position, the Austrians left a gap in their center as they attempted to reinforce against the Prussian cavalry pressing their right flank. Frederick took advantage of the opportunity and won a solid victory. Duffy summarizes the state of affairs afterward: “Thus Frederick had taken on an Austrian force of approximately equal size and had driven it from its prepared position in the face of almost every conceivable obstacle and accident. … At the same time the Prussians had plenty of food for thought. They had lost over 14,000 men (actually more than the Austrians) and among that number were included Field-Marshal v. Schwerin and what Frederick called ‘the pillars of the Prussian infantry.’”72 The victory was not long celebrated. The remains of the Austrian army withdrew into Prague, forcing Frederick to lay siege; only a month later, a relief army under Leopold von Daun arrived and dealt Frederick a serious defeat at Kolin in mid-June, forcing the Prussian army back into Silesia. Six weeks later a French army overcame a force of Germans protecting Hanover, and by early September they controlled the province. This gave France an open road into Saxony. To make matters worse, at the end of August a Russian invasion through Poland into East Prussia gained a quick victory over Frederick’s holding force there. Luckily for Frederick the Russians pulled back into Poland for the winter, but he still had serious French and Austrian threats to deal with.

  The Battle of Rossbach

  FREDERICK WAS LUCKY that Austrian marshal von Daun was overly cautious and did not seize the momentum after the battle at Kolin to press the Prussians completely out of Bohemia. Temporarily saved in the east by the Russian withdrawal and aided in the south by Daun’s lack of vigor, Frederick decided to strike westward against the encroaching French, who, having taking Hanover, now threatened Saxony. The French army was initially under the command of General Charles de Rohan, Prince of Soubise. It was reinforced by a coalition army of German imperial states loyal to Maria Theresa under the nominal command of Field Marshal Prince Joseph Friedrich von Sachsen-Hildburghausen. The command was nominal because it was a coalition: 231 states contributed troops, and Hildburghausen soon learned that the term “chain of command” meant little when so many generals and princes were in the army with their own ideas of how things should be done.73 The command structure was further weakened by the soldiers they commanded. The quality of the French soldier had deteriorated badly in the decade since the War of the Austrian Succession, and French officers were often dandies who had no concept of discipline. A French officer captured after Rossbach described his army as “a traveling whorehouse.” Hildburghausen’s so-called Reichsarmee thus lacked any coordination. Showalter points out that though in previous wars “Imperial troops had performed well as part of larger entities once they learned their trade, [i]n 1757, … they were being sent against the best fighting army in Europe with less than six months’ experience in working together, with supply and administrative services even weaker and more disorganized than those of France.”74

  Thus, attacking through Saxony certainly seemed the wisest choice. Leaving General A. W. Bevern with 36,000 men to protect Silesia from an Austrian offensive out of Bohemia, Frederick led 10,000 men to Dresden. There he combined his force with 12,000 men under Maurice (Moritz) of Dessau. Together they marched westward past Leipzig to Erfurt in far western Saxony, arriving on 13 September. Soubise, not yet joined by Hildburghausen, abandoned the town and relocated southwestward to Gotha. For the next four weeks the two armies crossed and recrossed the same ground, reacting to each others’ moves. Not until mid-October was there a major move, when 3,400 Austrian Pandours launched a surprise attack on Berlin. Not knowing how large the force was, Frederick took 14,000 men to relieve the city as the rest of his force pulled back east of the Saale. That convinced the Franco-German commanders to advance. They were bluffed out of their offensive by Frederick’s new commander of cavalry, thirty-six-year-old Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz. Seydlitz used his cavalry so aggressively at Gotha that Soubise was convinced the entire Prussian army was at hand. Fredrick was quickly back in Saxony with his main force by the 28th after he learned that the attack on Berlin had been no more than a raid. Hildburghausen, however, had advanced again east across the Saale River, and Frederick hoped to catch the imperial forces on the move. He broke his force into three prongs to cross the river at Merseburg, Halle, and Weissenfels. Unfortunately, when he reached the town of Wiessenfels the imperial troops retreated and burned the bridge behind them. Hildburghausen withdrew toward Erfurt. Soubise had considered opposing Prussian crossings at the two other towns after burning the bridges there as well, but pulled back to Müchelin, where he was joined by Hildburghausen. Together they numbered some 42,000 troops (though Friedrich estimated them at 60,000).75 The initial French deployment was on the Schatau Heights in an east-west line, but Hildburghausen convinced Soubise to swing ninety degrees and face east with a north-south line.

  Frederick’s three prongs converged on the town of Braunsdorf early in the evening of 3 November. He had roughly 22,000 men, whom he deployed along a line anchored on the north by the village of Bedra and on the south by Rossbach. Forces probing the French position early had withdrawn in the face of intense artillery fire, so Frederick decided to await developments rather than charge uphill against superior numbers. Fortunately for Frederick, Soubise thought that the re
pulse had cowed the Prussian king. Finally, Soubise got up the courage to launch an attack, which his staff and Hildburghausen had been pressing. The two allied commanders decided to abandon their high ground and swing east by the Prussian left flank. Soubise wanted to hit the flank but Hildburghausen preferred a sweep behind the Prussians to threaten their lines of communication. This would force them to retreat back across the Saale or meet on open ground.

  Why would the allies not stay in their virtually impregnable position? Primarily it was a matter of supply. Recent French reinforcements had arrived with no food of their own, straining the resources of an army that had been living off the land. Had the Prussians not arrived, Hildburghausen had been planning on withdrawing farther west to a supply base at Unstrut. The allied force had to move or starve. It was November and by that time of year most armies were already in winter quarters.

  Further disagreements between the two commanders used up most of the morning of 5 November, and it was approaching noon by the time camp broke and the allies deployed for the march in three columns of infantry. Frederick assumed that their desperate supply situation was forcing them to move toward their base, and ordered his men to stand firm and wait. He posted a lookout to keep an eye on them while he sat down to eat. Seydlitz, however, thought the allies were maneuvering for an attack, so he ordered his cavalry to prepare for action. He was proven correct when the lookout informed Frederick that the French had turned east with the cavalry moving ahead as the infantry in three lines dragged along, losing their marching order as they made the eastward turn. The king was quick to act when he realized his position. At 2:15 p.m. the Prussian camp disappeared, in a matter of a few minutes, as the army faced about. Frederick ordered Seydlitz to lead the 4,000 cavalry eastward behind the cover of Janus Hill and position himself at its far end. The artillery, which had begun to prepare when the cavalry did, were quick to move as well. They were sent to the top of Janus Hill where they commanded an unobstructed field of fire as the enemy marched by. The infantry deployed between Ross-bach and the hill, hidden behind some woods.