Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces sic-3

by Tom Clancy

  • Consolidate and submit program and budget proposals for Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11)

  • Develop and acquire special-operations-peculiar equipment, materials, supplies, and services

  These last two tasks, managing MFP-11 and developing and acquiring special-operations-peculiar items, made USSOCOM unique among the unified commands. These responsibilities — dubbed "servicelike" — had heretofore been performed exclusively by the services. Congress had given the command extraordinary authority over SOF force structure, equipping, and rcsourcing.

  The Command's mission evolved with the changing geopolitical environment. The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of regional instability put SOF's capabilities in ever-greater demand, and this increased operational tempo (optempo) and called for a large SOF involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. USSOCOM later added counterprolileration and information operations command-and-control warfare to its list of principal missions, and expanded the counterterrorism mission to include defensive measures (antiterrorism).

  Since 1987, there have been six CINCSOCs: General James J. Lindsay served from April 16, 1987, to June 27, 1990; Carl W. Stiner from June 27, 1990, to May 20, 1993; Wayne A. Downing from May 20, 1993, to February 29, 1996; Henry H. Shelton from February 29, 1996, to September 25, 1997; Peter J. Schoomaker from November 5, 1997, to October 27, 2000; and Charlie R. Holland from October 2000 to the present. Each CINCSOC left his mark on the SOF community as he responded to significant changes on the military landscape. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the downsizing of the U.S. military, the appearance of new aggressor states, heightened regional instabilities, highly organized international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — all led to an increased use of SOF by conventional U.S. military commanders, ambassadors, and other governmental agencies.

  General Lindsay's greatest challenge was to make the command the driving force behind the congressionally mandated revitalization of SOF without alienating conventional military leaders. This was no casy task, given the opposition in many military circles to the command's mere existence. As the first CINCSOC, he developed priorities to get the command functioning. They were to: organize, staff, train, and equip the headquarters; establish the necessary operating systems, including intelligence, as well as information and logistical support; develop the relationships necessary to discharge his roles and missions; create Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) to ensure SOF controlled its financial destiny; build command-and-control relationships with the components, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and the special operations commands assigned to the theater CINCs; define worldwide SOF requirements; and plot the future of the command. General Lindsay also faced two major operational tests — for which he provided trained and ready forces — Operation EARNEST WILL/PRIME CHANCE ONE in the Persian Gulf, and Operation JUST CAUST/PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama. The use of SOF by the theater CINCs increased significantly during General Lindsay's tenure.

  The creation of MFP-11 was a special and unique priority for both General Lindsay and Congress. Like the services, USSOCOM was to have its own budget and would be responsible for determining its own funding needs, including research and development, and equipping and training all the Special Operations forces of all the services.

  Although the Nunn-Cohen Amendment had created MFP-11 to reform SOF funding, the wording of the law permitted varying interpretations, and some Defense Department officials argued that the new command should not submit its own Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which defines and justifies all programs and initiatives necessary for readiness, including the spread of funding over time (the POM thus serves as the basis for building the budget). The services wanted to keep control of the budgeting process for SOF forces so they could use the money on things other than SOF, as they had always been accustomed to doing.

  This debate lingered until September 1988, when Senators Nunn and Cohen clarified congressional intent, saying that the sponsors of the law "fully intended that the commander of the Special Operations Command would have sole responsibility for the preparation of the POM." Congress enacted Public Law 100–456 that same month, which directed USCINCSOC to submit a POM directly to the Secretary of Defense.

  Four months later, on January 24, 1989, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft IV, signed a memorandum giving USCINCSOC budgetary authority over MFP-11. Soon afterward, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) gave USSOCOM control of selected MFP-1 1 programs on October 1, 1990, and total responsibility in October 1991.

  By law, the services are responsible for training, equipping, and modernizing their respective forces. The CINCs are not. They take the forces they are given and employ them. The services had long been "robbing" SOF by transferring previously approved money to other requirements. Giving financial control to SOF was the fundamental basis for the Nunn-Cohen Amendment.

  For the first time ever, a CINC had been granted authority for a budget and POM.

  The complex, politically sensitive process of establishing a new unified command extended into Carl Stiner's tenure as CINCSOC. He pushed the command to fulfill the provisions of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment; oversaw the implementation of developing and acquiring "special-operations-peculiar" equipment, materiel, supplies, and services; and watched over the command's submission of fully supported budgets based on SOF mission requirements.

  After DESERT STORM, he devoted much of his time to raising awareness about SOF capabilities and successes in and out of the military. Supporting the theater CINCs and maintaining SOF combat readiness were also top priorities. Finally, he convinced the Secretary of Defense to designate Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and Civil Affairs as part of SOF. This enabled USSOCOM to command and control these units in peacetime as well as war, which greatly improved the command's ability to fund, train, equip, and organize these forces.

  During his time in command, SOF optempo rose 35 percent. USSOCOM supported a number of operations worldwide, most notably DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT (support to Kurdish refugees), PROVIDE RELIEF, and RESTORE HOPE (Somalia relief operations).

  The main challenges of General Downing's tenure were to continue the revitalization of SOF and to prepare the SOF community for the twenty-first century. to these ends, General Downing streamlined the acquisition of SOF-specific equipment, increased the command's focus on new emerging threats, and realigned SOF budget requirements with the reduced Defense Department's budget. His changes in the allocation of resources resulted in a far more efficient strategic planning process.

  During his watch, SOF optempo again increased, with SOF participation in UNISOM II (Somalia), SUPPORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), as well as many smaller contingencies and deployments.

  General Henry H. Shelton guided the command through a time of greatly constrained resources and extraordinary worldwide demand for SOF support. SOF operations increased by more than 51 percent, and personnel deployments increased by 127 percent. In 1996 alone, SOF deployed to a total of 142 countries and engaged in 120 counterdrug missions, 12 demining training missions, and 204 joint combined exchange training exercises with other nations. General Shelton's largest SOF operations commitment was to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD, the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, and special operators assisted in noncombatant evacuations from such crisis areas as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Albania.

  General Peter J. Schoomaker's top priority was to organize SOF in ways that kept it relevant to national security requirements. To that end, he initiated or accelerated numerous projects — headquarters reorganization; planning, programming, and acquisition enhancements; and the integration of SOF's components into one resourcing and acquisition team.

  On his watch, SOF took part in the transition from JOINT GUARD to JOINT FORCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina, DESERT THUNDER in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (to thwart Saddam Husscin's restri
ctions on UN inspectors' freedom of movement), and numerous contingencies and peacetime engagements. SOF played crucial roles in ALLIED FORGE, the operation that forced Serbian forces out of Kosovo, and joint GUARDIAN, which enforced the Kosovo Peace Agreement.

  GENERAL CARL STINER, CINC USSOCOM

  Carl Stiner describes his time in command:

  In my thirty-five years of service, I have never known anyone who faced a challenge of greater complexity than General Jim Lindsay's in the standing up of the United States Special Operations Command, nor do 1 know an officer who could have done the job better. If you had the choice of whom to succeed in command, it would certainly be Jim Lindsay. Not only did he turn over a well-trained and functioning staff, but all operating systems were in place as well.

  Because he had kept me constantly in the loop on his challenges and decisions, very little transition was needed when I assumed command. My challenge became to take what he had given me and move it forward.

  Two major objectives remained in achieving Congress's intent: developing a new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process to structure a SOCOM POM and budget, and bringing under the command the major weapons development programs that were still being managed by the services.

  Even with a congressional mandate, the Command found itself in a very difficult position to establish MFP-11. The command was still "standing up," and some 100 key personnel short of reaching its manning objective, when the Chairman directed USSOCOM to take personnel cuts proportionally equal to other commands, as part of the downsizing of the military resulting from the fall of the Soviet Empire. The Command had to take a measured approach to assuming its budget tasks.

  DEVELOPING THE POM

  The POM was the first step. The initial one was completed and submitted in 1988 during Jim Lindsay's tenure — but through the Department of the Air Force (which was USSOCOM's executive agent for budgeting issues at the time). The Command only assumed budget execution authority by October 1990.

  Meanwhile, many critics at OSD level who resented the decision to give USSOCOM its own budget argued that the Command would never be able to submit a POM. They believed USSOCOM didn't have the intelligence and expertise to develop it. Nevertheless, in 1991, the Command submitted its first fully supported POM, totaling $3.2 billion-and it was the first one in, ahead of all the services. This was the first time USSOCOM had researched SOF mission requirements and developed the analysis for the POM justification instead of "cross-walking" requiremcnts to other services.[33]

  The establishment of MFP-11 set up a more focused resource process and insured a balanced review of special operations requirements and programs.

  CONTROL OF PROGRAMS

  USSOCOM also worked to take control of its major weapons programs.

  On December 10, 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense authorised the Special Operations Development and Acquisition Center (SORDAC). Owing partly to manpower cuts, in 1992 Stiner consolidated the Command's acquisition and contracting management functions into a new directorate under a deputy for acquisition, who was named the Command's acquisition executive and senior procurement executive.

  The Command's procurement strategy emphasized a streamlined acquisition process — by modifying existing weapons or buying "nondevelopmental" (off-the-shelf technology) systems. This approach permitted quick, economical improvements to operational capabilities.

  Since 1987, USSOCOM has fielded a number of modified or new systems, affecting nearly every aspect of special operations. Some of the more notable arc the MC-130H Combat Talon II long-range insertion aircraft and a state-of-the-art intelligence system (the most advanced in any command), both of which were used in DESERT STORM; and the Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships, used in Operations SUPPORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Other significant acquisitions included the MH-47E Chinook, a medium-range heavy-lift helicopter designed to conduct insertion operations under all weather conditions; the AC-130U Spector gunship, used for close air support and reconnaissance; the Mark V special operations craft, a high-performancecombatant boat capable of being transported over land or aboard C-5 aircraft; and the rigid inflatable boat (RIB) for the Naval Special Warfare Command, which provides a long-sought capability for a high-speed SEAL insertion-and-extraction craft. The RIB program, completed under cost and months ahead of schedule, exceeded every performance objective and won the 1998 Defense Department's Packer Award for excellence in acquisition.

  Another major program now coming to fruition is the Advanced SEAL Delivery System. The CV-22 Osprey aircraft program will also give the Command's forces much greater capability for long-range insertions and extractions under all weather conditions.

  By completing the POM and establishing control of major programs, USSOCOM had complied with all the provisions of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. Six years after President Reagan approved the Command, USSOCOM now controlled all SOF forces, its own budget, and its modernization programs.

  USSOCOM has used its acquisition capability a number of times during contingencies to provide SOF with the latest technology or to accelerate modifications. During DESERT STORM, for example, the Command modified Chinooks with aircraft survivability equipment before they deployed to the Iraqi area of operations.

  EDUCATING CINCs AND AMBASSADORS

  Following the Gulf War, I spent a great deal of my time educating commanders, particularly regional CTNCs and serving ambassadors, in the capabilities of SOF — showing the CINCs how to integrate SOF into their theater engagement plans, and showing the ambassadors how to integrate SOF into their country-security plans.

  A theater engagement plan is based on the national security strategy for each of the world's regions, and it is the responsibility of the regional CINC. The plan, which is country-specific, is developed with each ambassador, and details the security-assistance needs for that country.

  We also educated newly appointed ambassadors on SOF capabilities before they took their posts. Every couple of months, in coordination with the State Department, we brought a new crop of ambassadors to Fort Bragg for a detailed orientation. Afterward, the ambassadors were far better prepared to use SOF forces to their fullest.

  UPGRADING THEATER SOCs

  I also devoted a lot of effort to upgrading the Special Operations Commands (SOCs) assigned to the regional CINCs. A special-operations-qualified flag officer was placed in charge of each SOC, and it was staffed with qualified SOF personnel. The SOCs exercised both operational control (for the CINCs) of SOF forces involved in peacetime engagements and command of SOF forces in times of crisis.

  COMBAT READINESS TRAINING

  Training is the most important thing we do — we must always train as we will fight. It was therefore my highest continuing priority.

  Training should always be based on potential mission scenarios (including peacetime engagement missions) and serve as a rehearsal for what may ultimately become a no-notice contingency requirement. As such, it needs to cover all the bases: individual, collective, multi-echelon, and joint. Proper training — tough, realistic, demanding, and designed to develop and sustain individual and special skills — builds highly motivated individuals and units that function as an efficient, effective, and professional team. The primary focus of any training program must be the development of:

  • Technically / tactically proficient leaders, sound in judgment, who will exercise initiative within the commander's intent

  • Disciplined, mature troops, physically and emotionally prepared to withstand the hardships and dangers of combat

  • Troops highly skilled in individual tasks, and mature beyond their years

  • Small units / crews well grounded in basic technical tactical tasks and drills

  There are three fundamentals to successful mission accomplishment:

  1. Disciplined, competent leaders with high ethical and professional standards are the key element of any training program — and any effective combat unit. The central focus of all SOF-related training mu
st be to develop leaders.

  2. Language skills and culture training make SOF uniquely suited to our assigned mission and is fundamental to success.

  3. We must focus our training on joint requirements, and we must train as we expect to fight. We will fight jointly in the future.

  MEDICAL TRAINING

  In the past, each service trained its own medics — to varying levels of technical proficiency.

  With the assistance of the surgeons general of all the services, we established a medical university at Fort Bragg to train all the medics of all Special Operations units — an innovation that greatly improved medical proficiency and readiness, and at considerable savings.

  FOREIGN AVIATION TRAINING

  ln 1992, we established a Special Operations Aviation Foreign Internal Defense training capability. Many nations that we help had outdated, practically useless air forces. By developing a SOF training cadre proficient in both vintage aircraft and native languages, we have been able to help them greatly upgrade their air capability for meeting their own security needs.

  COUNTERPROLIFERATION

  One of USSOCOM's primary responsibilities is to anticipate the unanticipated, and then to develop the capability to deal with the potential threat. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the increased sophistication of state-sponsored terrorism, the threat of an asymmetrical attack with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) has increased significantly.

  Advanced information technology allows extremists to communicate widely and efficiently; publicly available databases serve as repositories for technical information relating to weapons production; and materials and technology used to make WMDs are increasingly available. Many of these materials are widely used for legitimate commercial purposes.