Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces sic-3

by Tom Clancy

  The disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and the potential unemployment and proliferation of thousands of skilled scientists, increased concerns about the protection, control, and accountability of WMD-related materials and technologies. Transnational threats by terrorist organizations have increased the potential for attacks against nonmilitary targets within our borders.

  Non-nuclear WMDs are relatively easy to manufacture and deliver. Facilities to produce biological and chemical weapons are small and hard to detect.

  As far back as 1991, USSOCOM took high-priority actions to deal with this threat. There are two primary requirements for success:

  • Timely and accurate intelligence information for predicting the threat, the likely target, the type of weapon, and its general location is a responsibility of our national intelligence agencies (for threats abroad), and the FBI (for threats within the United States).

  • The capability to recover the weapon (in either a permissive or nonpermissive environment), to render it safe, and to evacuate it to a safe area for turnover or destruction was the focus of USSOCOM's efforts.

  These efforts continued as an assumed mission requirement, and much progress was made with the cooperation and help of national agencies — though at our initiative. When Wayne Downing replaced me, he invited Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to observe firsthand the capability that had been developed. The Secretary was impressed. "Who should have this mission?" he asked.

  "We'll take it," Downing answered.

  "You've already got all these other high-priority missions," Perry replied, doubtfully.

  "True," Downing said. "But as you can see, we have very capable and smart forces, and we can do this thing."

  "What should the mission for counterproliferation say?" Perry asked.

  "We'll send you a draft."

  When Perry received the proposed mission statement, he signed it, and counterproliferation became an official USSOCOM mission. Along with that came funding and formalized cooperation and support from other agencies of government.

  Since then, enormous progress has been made not only in developing and fielding essential technologies but in training special operators in all the skills needed to accomplish this mission. USSOCOM special mission forces have made vast strides in that direction, but that is not enough. The critical key is accurate intelligence for timely warning.

  FORCES OF CHOICE

  Since 1987, SOF has become the force of choice for theater CINCs and ambassadors; and SOF forces have been involved in virtually every contingency operation, as well as thousands of joint training exchanges, peacetime engagement activities, and humanitarian relief operations. I've already mentioned several contingencies and training activities. Some other significant operations, involving all elements of SOF, include: Somalia (1992–1995), Haiti (1994–1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-present), Kosovo (1999-present), and Macedonia (1999-present). Many others cannot be mentioned for security reasons.

  During the same period, SOF forces have performed a wide variety of missions under the category of "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW). OOTWs include a wide range of missions, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian demining, peacekeeping, crisis response, combating terrorism, enforcement of sanctions or exclusion zones, and show of force.

  During the 1990s, these increased significantly.

  For the UN's first forty years, only thirteen OOTWs were conducted, but from 1988 to 1994 their numbers more than doubled — with far greater scope and complexity. U.S. Special Operations forces have served in most nations of the globe, performing as instruments of U.S. national policy, executing missions, and providing assistance possible only through their unique skills, language capabilities, and cultural orientation — missions that conventional units could not perform, and in many cases where a U.S. military signature was unacceptable to the host.

  SOF takes up less than 1.4 percent of the total force structure and only 3.5 percent of the DOD budget; yet the increase in optempo is ample evidence of their usefulness. During 1993, USSOCOM averaged 2,036 personnel deployed away from home station each week, serving in 101 countries. By 1996, the number had climbed to 4,613; and by 1999, it had climbed to 5,141, deployed to 149 countries and foreign territories.

  This is an incredibly small investment compared to the payback.

  1 here are significant intangible benefits as well. Enduring personal relationships with the militaries and government officials of host nations will serve our national interests for years to come.

  These deployments also benefit SOF — providing training in foreign cultures and languages and knowledge of potential operational areas.

  APPENDIX II:

  LEADERSHIP

  C arl Stiner:

  The Army does a better job producing leaders than every other institution of which I am aware. This achievement derives primarily from the Army's institutionalized education system, which is designed to provide each officer and noncommissioned officer the technical and tactical proficiency necessary for every level of command: from second lieutenant all the way through general officer, and from sergeant E-5 through sergeant major.

  Leadership is the fundamental "core" subject throughout all the curriculums of the schools in the "system."

  Leadership and professional training for officers begins with the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or service academy. The basic-level course for newly commissioned lieutenants is the Basic Officers Course, which is designed to develop the technical and tactical proficiency essential for leading at the platoon level. The Advance Course prepares captains for command at the company level. The Command and General Staff College prepares majors for duties and responsibilities as principal staff officers at the brigade level, as well as the essential prerequisites for commanding at the battalion level. The War College is designed to prepare officers at the colonel level for commanding at the brigade level, as well as for serving as a principal staff officer at division and higher levels of responsibility.

  Other subjects increase the officer's breadth of knowledge: politico-military affairs, the Arm's programming, planning, and budgeting system, and so on. For those fortunate enough to be selected for flag rank, each scrvice runs its own two-week-long general officer orientation course, followed by the seven-week-long CAPSTONE Course, which is mandatory within the first year of promotion for all flag-rank officers of all services. This course broadens the officers' knowledge and understanding of responsibilities and joint warfighting at the unified command levels.

  Other courses, such as at the Armed Forces Staff College, primarily for majors and lieutenant colonels of all services, are required for those who have been selected for joint assignments, and focus on developing proficiency in joint operational techniques and procedures.

  The "Army's Educational System" is not limited to the "schoolhouses"; there is other specialized training as well — advanced degrees at civilian education institutions in appropriate technical fields; master's courses in advanced executive-level management; and branch specialized courses, like the Special Forces Qualification Course.

  Credit for bringing the Army back from its post-Vietnam downturn is due to the vision and efforts of General Shy Meyer, who institutionalized the Army's education system; to Ceneral Carl Vuono, who established our national "Maneuver Training Centers"; and to General Cordon Sullivan, who gave priority to the training process by providing necessary resources and updating doctrine. These great leaders made training and combat readiness their number-one priority and spent vast amounts of time personally supervising training. The results were manifested in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

  WHAT MAKES A LEADER?

  Some people claim that leaders are born. That may be so in some cases, and leaders certainly share basic characteristics; but not everyone with those characteristics becomes a leader — or becomes a good one. Leadership is primarily acquired. It has to be learned. 1 have a number of thoug
hts about how this should be done, based on my own experience learning leadership.

  No one all of a sudden realizes, "Hey, I'm a leader." It doesn't come out of the blue. A person becomes a leader because he has a sincere desire to lead, he is willing to give it whatever it takes, and he has within him the fundamental attributes and professional qualities that all leaders must possess:

  When an officer is commissioned, he takes an oath, inherent in which is the sacred responsibility for the lives and well-being of those entrusted to his leadership. This responsibility transcends normal duty hours — it is twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week — and includes the "whole person." We must not only make the soldiers we lead the best soldiers possible, but also take care of their families, and develop each soldier to be a productive citizen.

  Other fundamental qualities arc also required:

  A leader should be physically fit (soldiers will not respect a physically sloppy commander). He must be confident in his own abilities. He must be mentally tough, particularly on himself. He must be courageous. He should be willing to take risks. He should train his subordinates by providing them with an environment in which to grow — expecting mistakes and acting as a "heat shield." He should not serve for his own personal ego, but for those entrusted to him and for his unit. A leader should never need to be told what to do; he must be a man of vision, always looking ahead and planning ways to take his unit to higher levels. A leader should never take credit for his own successes or the successes of his unit. He should give all the credit to his men — for this is all the credit that most may ever receive. We should always remember that it is squads, platoons, and crews that win battles and ultimately wars.

  A leader must create within his unit "a healthy environment, and I don't mean by that mere physical health. He must make an environment that promotes the total health and growth of the whole person. In such an environment, each person will believe that what he or she is doing at this particular time — serving their country — is the most important thing they could possibly be doing. Great honor and self-respect come with this; these can never be taken away.

  A leader must develop for his unit a "spiritual soundness program" that meets the spiritual needs of both soldiers and their families (you will find that many soldiers come from an unhealthy environment).

  A leader must cause his troops in whatever type of unit to believe that their mission is vital, and that they must prepare for it to their utmost. Soldiers must also understand that those serving beside them have the same motivation and dedication, and they should therefore respect and take care of each other. If your objectives in developing this environment are appropriately understood, every soldier should look forward to each day and expect it to be a rewarding and fulfilling experience. He will, as a corollary, believe his unit is the best unit in the Army, and will want to be nowhere else. He wants to be here serving with his buddies.

  A leader must talk to his troops. They must clearly understand the unit's mission and training objectives. They must understand the leader's goals and objectives, as well as his expectations in terms of professional standards, conduct, and duty performance.

  A leader must get his troops started off right. He should have a formal program to personally welcome and orient all new replacements. They get to know him, they come to understand the importance of their mission, and they learn what is expected of them and what they can expect of the leader. If this is done right, they should leave the orientation with the conviction that they are in the best place they can be — serving their country as members of the right unit, where they are going to be taken care of.

  Another important part of the command welcome program is "sponsorship" — especially for married personnel. Each couple should be assigned a sponsoring couple, who should arrange for quarters, have the refrigerator stocked with food, and meet and welcome them. Company commanders, first sergeants, and the unit chaplain should oversee this program. The company commander and chaplain should visit the new couple within the first week of their arrival.

  A leader should never leave his troops "on their own" on weekends — especially unmarried troops. He should require subordinate commanders to establish positive programs to keep the troops constructively occupied and involved over the weekends.

  A leader is responsible for morale, good order, and discipline. He must know what is going on in the barracks and have a system of inspections executed by the chain of command, for which they arc held accountable.

  Every soldier is important. I have always given my subordinates this charge: "You should put into every soldier the same love, devotion, and caring you would want someone someday to put into your own son or daughter." But after you've done this, if they still fail to perform to standards — if you can't depend on this soldier in combat-then get rid of him soonest.

  A leader is responsible for the training of his unit, and mission training should be his first priority. All training activity should be oriented toward maximizing combat readiness for the mission. Training programs should be as realistic as possible, including live fire. The only exceptions are for the safety of the troops. This builds not only proficiency but confidence in both individuals and units. The proficiency required at the small-unit level cannot possibly be obtained through simulations.

  A cadre training program, unique to the unit, is necessary to ensure the proficiency of subordinate leaders and staffs. Certain units have unique mission requirements for which subjects are not adequately taught in institutionalised service schools (for example, "anti-armor defense of the airhead"[34] for airborne units). It is the commander's responsibility to know what these are and to structure training programs to ensure unit proficiency by all subordinate leaders.

  A leader must have the respect of his troops. This respect is earned — cre — ated not only by the programs I've already mentioned, but also by sharing the troops' hardships. As a division commander, I made it a practice to participate in every battalion-size operation. I would often slip into the rear ranks of a company and walk with them all night to assess their readiness and discipline, and to listen to what they were talking about. You must assess for yourself what the troops are capable of doing and where additional training is needed. That way the troops will come to trust you and talk to you — and "tell it like it is." They will also have faith in you and know you will take care of them. They have no one else to look to for their security and well-being.

  Training must be your first priority. Training for combat. No soldier ever complained to me about tough, realistic training. Soldiers know this is life insurance. You can't fool a soldier.

  A commander should maintain a constant state of readiness in his unit. It must be able to accomplish its combat mission whenever called upon. If it is not ready, the commander should correct the problem immediately. If the problem is beyond his control, then the cause should have been ferreted out a long time back and brought to the attention of the next-higher-level commander, who should take action to fix the problem.

  Competition both within and among units is healthy — so long as it is not at the expense of another individual or unit. Competition for the Expert Infantryman's Badge or Expert Medical Badge is a good example. These should benefit each individual as well as their units, and should include formalized training programs to ensure that each person and each unit emerges as a winner. There is no glory or pride in second place — and no alternative to defeat in battle.

  LEARNING FROM OTHERS

  When I entered the Army in 1958, I do not remember hearing the words "role model" or "mentor." But, as I gained experience, several people distinguished themselves above others. I learned from these men things that were not taught, and which I did not read about in a field manual.

  The first officer I came to respect as a "role model" was Colonel Jim Bartholomees, the rock-solid Commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group. I joined the 3rd SFG as a captain in July 1964, when it was forming as part of President Kennedy's Sp
ecial Forces buildup. Colonel Bartholomees knew how to get the most out of people, while "taking care of them" in the process. He created a command environment that provided the latitude and encouragement for subordinates to use their own initiatives and abilitics. I never heard him raise his voice or belittle anyone.

  In the years ahead I worked for several other outstanding leaders — each with maybe a little different leadership style; yet all were role models, and worthy of emulation and application to my own leadership style and abilities. A leader should never try to be something — or choose a style-that he is not. He should take from the gifts of his teachers / mentors and apply them to his own abilities.

  To the following men, in the positions they held then, I owe more than words can say:

  GENERAL ROSCOE ROBINSON: My brigade commander, 82nd Airborne Division

  GENERAL GEORGE BLANCHARD: Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division

  GENERAL EDWARD C. (SHY) MEYER: ADCO, 82nd Airborne Division; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

  GENERAL FREDERICK KROESEN: Commanding General, 82nd Airhorne Division

  LIEUTENANT GENERAL DICK LAWRENCE: Project Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program

  GENERAL BILL LIVSEY: Commanding General, U.S. Army Infantry Center

  GENERAL P. X. KELLEY: Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

  GENERAL BOB KINGSTON: Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command

  GENERAL Jim LINDSAY: Commanding General, 82nd Airborne Division; Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps; Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command

  GENERAL JOHN Foss: Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps

  GENERAL CARL VUONO: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

  GENERAL JACK VESSEY: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

  AMBASSADOR DONALD RUMSFELD: President's Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs