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Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces sic-3

Page 65

by Tom Clancy


  GENERAL COLIN POWELL: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

  Over the last decade, the services have greatly improved their education systems by taking advantage of the talents and experience of the likes of those above — making them "senior mentors in intermediate and senior-level service schools. Their talents are also used in the CAPSTONE Course and in senior-level joint warfighting exercises.

  As I said at the beginning, I do not know of any institution that puts more into the training of its leaders, or any institution that produces better leaders. This is only fitting, considering that the responsibility for preserving our freedom rests squarely on the shoulders of our armed forces. It is indeed a most worthy and essential national investment.

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  Thanks to all the people of the SOF, who have performed such magnificent feats over the years, and whose work, in this age of new warfare, is far from done. Thanks especially to Carl Stiner, a quiet hero if there ever was one, and a man you definitely want on your side.

  — Tom Clancy

  This book would not have been possible without the help of many great people, and to them I owe so much. Above all, to Tom Clancy, a great American and longtime friend, for making the opportunity possible to tell this story. To Neil Nvren, editor extraordinaire, for keeping us on track and focused on the end-state objective throughout the process. To Tony Koltz, for whom I have the greatest respect as a friend and professional; he showed patience and perseverance in producing the information needed by knowing what questions to ask. Without his writing and editorial skills, this book would not have been possible. To Marty Greenberg, for his advice, counsel, and assistance. To our original agent at William Morris, Robert Gottlieb, for all his help in bringing the book to fruition.

  Writing this book has been a demanding challenge, lasting almost two years… and not just for me — trying to remember all the details and put them in context — but for my wife, Sue, who has typed and retypcd so much material many times over. Without her help day and night, we would never have made it. I also thank my daughters, Carla and Laurie, for their encouragement and help. In the midst of all the demands of this period, there was a miraculous happening, the birth of our first grandchild — Jackson Wade Reel, a gift from the divine power that gives life and sustains us every day.

  These people were also helpful in the development of the book:

  MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS

  Bigadier General FrankAkers, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant General Clay Bailey, USAF

  CW4 Richard "Bulldog" Balwanz, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant General Mark Cisneros, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant Colonel Daniel D. Devlin, USA (Ret.)

  Jim DeFelice

  Colonel (P) John DeFritas, USA

  General Wayne Downing, USA (Ret.)

  Colonel Stan Florer, USA

  Rudi Gresham

  Major General James A. Guest, USA (Ret.)

  Colonel Michael R. Kershner, USA

  Colonel Chris Krueger, USA

  Colonel Tony Normand, USA (Ret.)

  Dr. John Partin, USSOCOM Command Historian

  Colonel David B. Plummer II, USA (Ret.)

  Major General Richard Potter, USA (Ret.)

  Major General Richard A. Scholtes, USA (Ret.)

  General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant Colonel Bill Shaw, USA

  Colonel Joseph R. Simino, USA (Ret.)

  Major General John K. Singlaub, USA (Ret.)

  Captain W. R. Spearman, USN (Ret.)

  Lieutenant General William Yarborough, USA (Ret.)

  BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS

  Brigadier General Heinie Aderholt, USAF (Ret.)

  Master Sergeant Sandy Atkinson, USAF

  Brigadier General Michael W. Reasley, USA

  Major General Ken Bowra, USA

  Major General Jerry Boykin, USA

  Master Sergeant Chris Crane, USA (Ret.)

  Master Sergeant Jimmy Dean, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant Colonel Francis Gabreski, USAF

  Lieutenant Colonel Tony Gies, USA (Ret.)

  Randy Gingrich

  George Grimes, USSOCOM Public Affairs

  Command Sergeant Major Jim Hargraves, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant Colonel Charles Judge, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant Colonel David W. Kinder, USA (Ret.)

  Jerome Klingaman

  Staff Sergeant Andy Kublik, USAF

  Command Sergeant Major Joe Lupyah, USA (Ret.)

  Herbert A. Mason, AFSOC Command Historian

  Clay T. McCutchan, AFSOC Assistant Command Historian

  Colonel Lee Mize, USA (Ret.)

  Major Paul A. Ott, USA

  Command Sergeant Major Paul Payne, USA (Ret.)

  Colonel Kenneth Poole, USAF

  Major Jon Peck, USAF

  Major General Richard V. Secord, USAF (Ret.)

  Major General Sidney Shacknow, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Smith, USA

  Major Dave Snider, USA

  Lieutenant General Michael Spigelmirc, USA (Ret.)

  Brigadier General Joe Stringham, USA (Ret.)

  Lieutenant General William Tangney, USA

  Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Trask, USAF

  Senior Master Sergeant William Waiter, USAF

  — General Carl Stiner (Ret.)

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Atkinson, Rick, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf. New Yorh: Houghton Mifflin, 1993.

  Bado, Captain Christopher M., Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces in Conventional Warfare. Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,] 996.

  Bank, Colonel Aaron, USA (Ret.), From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of SPecial Forces. Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986.

  Beckwith, Colonel Charlie A. (Ret.), Delta Force: The Army's Elite Counterterrorist Unit. New York: Avon, 2000 (first printed in 1983).

  Brown, Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J., Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq 1991 with Marines in Operation Provide Comfort. History and Museums Division, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps. 1995.

  Bucci. Lieutenant Colonel Steven, Interview with General Carl Stiner (Ret.) for the U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1999.

  Carrol], Major Douglas E., Special Forces Doctrine and Army Operations Doctrine. Master's Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.

  Chinnery, Philip D., Air Commando. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

  Churchill, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W., Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Bowra. U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1989.

  Dunnigan, James F. and Bay, Austin, From Shield to Storm. New York: William Morrow & Company, 1992.

  Flanagan, Edward M., Lieutenant General USA (Ret.), Battle for Panama, Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1993.

  Cordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard L., The General's War. New York: Little, Brown & Company. 1995.

  Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NY: Doubieday, 1967.

  Hilton, Lieutenant Colonel Carson L., United States Army Special Forces: From a Decade of Development to a Sustained Future. Military Studies Program Paper, U.S. Army War College, 1991.

  Hiro, Dilip, Desert Shield to Desert Storm — the Second Gulf War. London: HarperCollins (U.S. edition by Routledge), 1992.

  Hutchinson, Kevin, Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield Chronology & Fact Book. Westporl, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995.

  Jones, Major Gregg D., A Historical Perspective of Special Operations Forces As an Instrument of Strategy. Masters Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1991.

  Keaney, Thomas A. and Cohen, Eliot A., Revolution in Warfare? Annapolis, Maryland: Naval institute Press, 1995.

  Kelly, Orr, From a Dark Sky. New York: Pocket Books, 1997.

  Marquis, Susan L., Unconventional Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1997.

  Martin, David C. and Walcott, John, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America's W
ar Against Terrorism. New York: Harper & How, 1988.

  Morse, Stan (editor), Gulf Air War Debrief. London: Aerospace Publishing, Ltd.

  Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, Operation Just Cause, The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama, February 1988—January 1990. Washington, D.C., 1995.

  Parker, James E., Jr., Covert Ops: The CIA's Secret War in Laos. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1995.

  Plaster, John L., SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam. New York: Onyx, 1998.

  Scales, Brig. Cen. Robert H., Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington. D.C.: Brassey's, 1994.

  Shultz, Richard H., Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Corert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1999.

  Singlaub, Major General John K., USA (Ret.), with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

  Smallwood, William L., Warthog. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1993.

  Stanton, Shelby L., Green Berets at War. New York: Ballantine Books, 1985.

  Trest, Warren A., Air Commando One: Heinie Aderholt and America's Secret Air Wars. Washington: Smithsonian, 2000.

  U.S. Department of Defense Plan, Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction. January 1998.

  United States Special Operations Command. History, 1999. Headquarters, U.S. Special Operations Command. MacDill AFB, Florida.

  U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directory of History, Archives. Library, and Museums, "Cease Resistance: It's Good For You": A History of U.S. Army Psychological Operations. Fort Bragg, NC, 1996.

  U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directory of History, Archives, Library, and Museums, Sine Parl: The Story of Army Special Operations, Fort Bragg, NC, 1997.

  U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Directory of History, Archives, Library, and Museums, To Free from Oppression: A Concise History of U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and the John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Fort Bragg, NC, 1996.

  Walker, Creg, At the Hurricane's Eye: U.S. Special Operations forces from Vietnam to Desert Storm. New York: Ballantine Books, 1994.

  Waller, Doulas, The Commandos. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

  Woodward, Bob, The Commanders. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

  Yarborough, Lieutenant General William P. (Ret.), Selections from his published papers, speeches, and interviews.

  XVIII Airborne Corps Public Affairs Office, A Compendium of Articles Appearing in Various Publications, 20 December 1989-13 January 1990 Detailing Fort Bragg's Participation in Operation Just Cause.

  XVIII Airborne Corps, Organizational History Files, 1989—90. Operation Just Cause. Corps Historian's Notes. Notebook #1.

  Примечания

  1

  At one time, CA was thought of as an adjunct to military police — useful once the battle was over and order was being restored. After a war, more than police protection was needed. Later it was realized that CA could be useful during a conflict (Carl Stiner used his CA resources to great effect during the Panama invasion) or even before a conflict begins, to prevent it.

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  2

  Another well-known Philippine guerrilla, Colonel Wendell Fertig, who had gallantly fought the Japanese on Mindanao, later joined Bank and Volckmann's staff. A pretty good movie was made in the 1950s about Fertig, and you can read about him in our friend W. E. B. Griffin's novel Behind the Lines.

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  3

  On December 10, 1955, Brigadier General McClure's Psychological Warfare Center had become the Special Warfare Center and School.

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  4

  An unexpected but gratifying endorsement came from the Soviet censors, who banned "The Ballad of the Green Beret" in the USSR.

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  5

  Because of his background, some of his Army friends later came to call him "Country Carl": a friendly nickname, not a derisive one. Stiner has always loved his origins, and anyone mistaking Stiner for a rube is likely to discover his own mistake with rich embarrassment.

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  6

  My brother Tom served in the army for twenty-nine years, retiring as a colonel. He was elected County Executive six years ago, and still serves in that position. A second brother, Glen, died at age forty-one. My third brother, Emory, is an executive with Burlington Industries. My sister, JoAnn, the youngest, is a registered nurse.

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  7

  Over the years, Ranger School has changed to meet the needs and challenges of the times. Long before the Gulf War, a desert phase, conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas, was added to the program of instruction. It greatly benefited the young leaders who fought in Operation DESERT STORM.

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  8

  The French Army continued to advise the Laotian Army even after Laotian independence — though unenthusiastically. The absence of serious French interest in the enterprise led to U.S. Special Forces involvement.

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  9

  One of his most legendary missions occurred in November 1970, when Simons led a secret commando attack on a North Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp called Son Tay Prison, deep within North Vietnam a few miles west of Hanoi, with the aim of rescuing better than a hundred American POWs. Fifty-six volunteer SF operators had been gathered from the 6th and 7th Special Forces Groups and from the Special Warfare Center to take part in the raid. They prepared and trained intensively for six months (on, for example, actual-scale mock-ups of the prison), flew into Udorn Air Base in Thailand, and then helicoptered into North Vietnam on the night of November 20th and 21st. The raid went off beautifully, but for one thing: The POWs had been moved some time before. In spite of the failure to achieve its overall aim, however, the Son Tay Raid has joined the very select list of Special Forces defining moments. It's there because it shows what they can do. It also shows the cost of bad intelligence. SF troops would pay that cost many other times.

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  10

  A statue to Dick Meadows, another legendary Special Forces soldier, was also recently placed at Fort Bragg, not far from Simons's.

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  11

  The CIA and Special Forces worked very closely in Laos, and later in the early days of the war in South Vietnam. The association is natural. From time to time, Special Forces have been an action arm of the Agency. On the other hand, the association has raised suspicions. As has been noted here, some in the "big" Army, for instance, fear that Special Forces are not "real" Army but some kind of rogue or private Army. The association with the CIA does not ease those fears.

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  12

  In his book To Move a Nation, Roger Hilsman reports that Bill Yarborough was considered for this job but was too junior and too connected with unconventional operations to gain Army backing.

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  13

  When Carl Stiner arrived in Vietnam a few years later, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was the main threat — not the VC.

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  14

  Tear gas. When the drums hit the ground, they would burst and spread the powdery gas. It would remain inert until disturbed.

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  15

  MIKE Forces were handpicked, specially trained, quick-reaction forces modeled along the lines of U.S. Army Ranger units. Each unit had about fifteen hundred men and an advisory detachment of twelve to fifteen U.S. and Australian Special Forces members. Each field force/corps area had its own MIKE Force. The first one to be trained was comprosed of Chinese Nungs, recruited for their fighting ability, but due to the shortage of Nung recruits, practically all other MIKE Forces were manned by volunteers from Vietnamese Army Ranger units.
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  16

  For a fuller description of MACVSOG activities, see the recent and excellent The Secret War Against Hanoi, by Richard H. Schultz, Jr., HarperCollins, 1999.

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  17

  The Secret War Against Hanoi, p. 240.

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  18

  Operational tempo — A measure of the total demands placed on a military unit, typically the number of days per year the unit is deployed away from its home base or station.

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  19

  In 1975, the Cambodians captured the freighter Mayaguez and held its crew hostage. In response, the United States mounted a major rescue operation, made up of a Navy carrier task force, Marines, and Navy and Air Force special operations forces. Two hundred Marines, plus helicopters, made an assault on Koh Tang Island, off the Cambodian coast, where the hostages were being held. The assault failed — as a result of intelligence, communications, and command failures — and the Marines had to be withdrawn, after losing fifteen KIA, three MIA, and most of their helicopters.

 

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