Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Allied Decisions The Supreme War Council met in Paris on April 22 and all major actors, political and military, attended. Reynaud found himself in a dilemma similar to that faced by his predecessor concerning Finland. If operations in Norway proved unsuccessful, he might share the same fate. He saw a way out of the dilemma by insisting on increased efforts in Norway. If things turned out well, he would get much of the credit. On the other hand, if things did not go well, he could blame the outcome on the British for not prosecuting the war vigorously. This was probably the main French motive for arguing that nothing should stand in the way of a successful conclusion in Norway. However, there was still a strong feeling that the commitment of more Germans in far-off Norway would reduce the threat to the French homeland. He argued for strong efforts against Trondheim and talked about sufficient troops in the Narvik area to occupy the Swedish iron ore fields after eliminating Dietl.

  Chamberlain expressed complete agreement with Reynaud and explained that the recapture of Narvik was postponed only because forces were redirected to Trondheim. His explanation caused the French to believe that Operation Hammer was still alive and well. The French were not told that it had been cancelled several days before this meeting. While Chamberlain may not have known that the northern pincer against Trondheim was in full retreat through the burning town of Steinkjer, and that the 148th Brigade had been decimated in Gudbrandsdal, he was not honest with his ally. That the fog of war was even thicker at the highest counsels than on the battlefield is illustrated by Reynaud congratulating the British Army on “not hesitating to march on Oslo immediately after landing in Norway.” Reynaud concluded the meeting by summarizing that they had agreed on winning the battle for Trondheim and establishing a strong base there for future offensive operations. The British did not object despite having already cancelled operations against Trondheim.14

  The British political and military apparatus was again in a state of confusion. Reports of defeats around Steinkjer and in Gudbrandsdal were arriving in London. Other problems were also obvious. After the landing of the 15th Brigade, Åndalsnes and Namsos had become primary targets for the Luftwaffe. The antiaircraft fire from both land-based guns and the guns on the antiaircraft cruisers proved ineffective. It was not long before the harbor facilities and the town were reduced to ashes. The Luftwaffe also rained destruction on the subsidiary base at Molde, Ålesund, and the city of Kristiansund.

  Brigadier General Hogg, who was in charge of the garrison and port facilities in Åndalsnes, concluded in the evening of April 26 that unless the air situation was brought under control, the base would become unusable. General Paget agreed, pointing to his own precarious position. Paget may have intended this as a form of pressure on London to send additional forces, particularly air and antiaircraft assets. If this was his intention, it had the opposite effect after Hogg sent an urgent message next morning to General Massy calling for immediate evacuation. On the previous day, the MCC had already recommended that plans be readied for an evacuation from Åndalsnes and Namsos. Chamberlain and other cabinet members hoped the evacuation could be delayed long enough to announce Narvik’s recapture. The effect of an evacuation on the Norwegians was not discussed, but the British were rightly fearful of reactions in France.

  The news of a planned evacuation from southern and central Norway caused tempers to explode in Paris. An enraged Reynaud sent a personal letter to Chamberlain, which caused consternation because of its unusually frank language. One sentence, “One must think big or stop making war, one must act fast or lose the war” was typical of the letter’s flavor.15 General Gamelin came to London and insisted that the Allies hold a sizable bridgehead in central Norway and occupy as many points as possible on the coast between Namsos and Narvik.

  On April 27, the two messages from General Hogg supplemented by a memorandum from General Massy, decided the issue. General Massy reminded the government that General Ironside had given him a free hand regarding the timing of any evacuation and he rejected the MCC’s conclusion that an evacuation should be delayed as incompatible with his prerogatives. In a second memorandum on the same day, General Massy requested authority to evacuate both Åndalsnes and Namsos. The request was considered at the meeting of the War Cabinet the following morning and Ironside stated that there were enormous difficulties in carrying out General Gamelin’s proposal and that a disaster was a real possibility unless an immediate evacuation was ordered.

  Only Churchill spoke against the evacuation and recommended that forces be left in Norway to do the best they could. He even suggested reconsideration of a Hammer type operation. His colleagues were not willing to face the political fallout of a military disaster, and although the minutes of the meeting are vague it is likely that the participants were fully aware that a decision for immediate evacuation had been made. A message to General Carton de Wiart, the commander in Namsos, sent immediately after the meeting, as well as Ironside’s diary confirm this conclusion.16

  The British were less than candid with their allies at the meeting of the Supreme War Council and did not reveal the fact that the decision to evacuate had been made. Chamberlain stated that Gamelin’s suggestions from the previous day were under study. In fact, they had been rejected. While he noted that the situation in Norway had deteriorated and it was no longer possible to take Trondheim, he assured the French “this was not tantamount to a decision to evacuate,” only a recognition that “it could not long be delayed.17

  Reynaud stressed that a complete withdrawal from central Norway would be a moral and political disaster. He argued that some sort of foothold be kept north and south of Trondheim along the lines proposed by Gamelin. Chamberlain concurred and the French came away believing the British had agreed to Gamelin’s proposals. Two hours after the meeting, the British ordered the immediate evacuation of south and central Norway. This was nothing short of an open defiance of the Supreme War Council and an insult to their allies.

  The French did not learn about the evacuation until the afternoon of April 29. They also learned that the order to evacuate had been issued two hours after the Supreme War Council meeting that led them to believe that the British had agreed to General Gamelin’s proposal. The French made every effort to reverse the evacuation order. Reynaud wrote a letter to Chamberlain asking that it be cancelled “in the name of friendship between our two peoples.”18

  There were also pressures within Great Britain to make a more aggressive effort in Norway. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, the hero of Zeebrugge, even addressed the House of Commons on the matter, after repeated letters to Churchill evoked neither action nor response.

  The Norwegians were even less well informed than the French. They still believed that the Allies would launch their long promised attack on Trondheim. General Ruge was regrouping and reorganizing his forces, about 4,000 men, near Dombås for the anticipated attack against Trondheim.

  The British Evacuation

  General Paget received orders to evacuate in the early morning hours of April 28. The order stated that he should not inform the Norwegians. Paget found this part of the order completely impractical since he had to rely on Norwegians for road and rail transport as well as flank protection as he withdrew his forces 180 kilometers through Romsdal to Åndalsnes. He decided to ignore that part of the order and proceeded to General Ruge’s headquarters at about 0500 hours.

  It was a painful meeting. The news was devastating to General Ruge who remarked, “So Norway is to share the fate of Czechoslovakia and Poland.”19 As his anger grew, he left the room. A few minutes later, he returned and stated that these things were not for soldiers to debate. He asked how he could help the British in their task. An agreement was reached whereby a British battalion would stay in positions at Dombås to cover the withdrawal of the Norwegians. The Norwegians, for their part, would provide transport for the withdrawing British, means to evacuate the wounded, and ski detachments for security. Ruge hoped that his troops would be evacuated and brought to N
orth Norway, but this was not to be.

  The Norwegian King and his government were in Molde. The British sent the cruiser Glasgow and destroyer escorts to bring them to safety. They were concerned that the Norwegians might throw in the towel and the captain of the Glasgow had orders to bring them along by force, if needed. This proved unnecessary as the Norwegians decided on Tromsø as their destination. Ruge followed on May 1 after first refusing to board British ships bound for Scapa Flow before proceeding to North Norway. As the Norwegian Army commander, he refused to go to Great Britain, even temporarily, since it would appear he was fleeing the country. In the end, Ruge and his staff were transported to Tromsø in a British destroyer.

  Since the British did not attempt to evacuate the Norwegian troops, reportedly because they lacked adequate shipping, Ruge ordered the 11th Infantry Regiment demobilized and turned over the command of all forces in the Åndalsnes area to General Hvinden-Haug, along with an authorization to surrender. The surrender took place on May 3. Conditions were lenient. The troops were allowed to proceed to their homes if they gave assurance that they would not participate in any further hostilities against the Germans.

  The Operations in Trøndelag and the Evacuation of Namsos

  The 2/13th Inf battalion was in Nord-Trøndelag on April 9. The 1/13th Inf was in Narvik. An improvised third battalion was mobilized and organized within a couple of days after the attack, while the reserve battalion was organized into a territorial command. The 3rd Cavalry Regiment was in the process of mobilizing on April 9. Three squadrons were ready on April 11 and the remaining four a few days later. The 12th Infantry Regiment in Sør-Trøndelag also had a battalion on duty in North Norway, which later took heavy casualties at Gratangen. The mobilization depots for the 12th Regiment and the 3rd Artillery Regiment were located in Trondheim and captured by the Germans on April 9. It was therefore only possible to raise improvised units of a small battalion and one independent company.

  There were about 180 Norwegians, mostly 5th Division’s school personnel, at Værnes Airfield on April 9. They prepared to defend the airfield and prevented German attempts to land on April 9. The executive officer of the 3rd Artillery Regiment, Major R. Holtermann, was at Værnes to receive troops reporting for duty with the regiment on April 9. He moved about 250 of these troops to the old fortress at Hegra. The 2/13th Inf moved south towards Trondheim after the German attack and was located at Åsen, only about 20 kilometers from Værnes. Instead of moving forward to the airfield, the unit was ordered back to Verdal in the evening of April 9 because German warships were reported in the fjord. The 5th Division school personnel were also ordered to Verdal. The front line was established north of Steinkjer with one motorized machinegun company at Verdalsøra to secure the bridge.

  The Germans sent about 500 troops towards the airfield on April 10. Before their arrival, a German officer showed up in a taxi and demanded surrender. The Norwegian officer in charge contacted General Laurantzon who ordered him to comply with the German demand. Failure to defend Værnes was a major blunder that made Norwegian and Allied operations extremely difficult. The capture of the airfield ended the isolation of Colonel Weiss’ forces in the Trondheim area. Værnes was also the only airfield in relative proximity to Narvik and played a decisive role in the transport of supplies and reinforcements in May and June. Aircraft from Værnes provided essential close ground support and resupply during the 2nd Mountain Division’s drive through Nordland Province to relieve Dietl’s forces. Finally, German aircraft based at Værnes influenced the British decision to abandon Operation Hammer. The airfield had a limited capacity but was quickly expanded using Norwegian labor.

  Operation Maurice, the northern pincer against Trondheim, involved both British and French forces. The British contingent consisted of the 146th Infantry Brigade with three territorial battalions. The French 5th Half-Brigade of alpine troops also had three battalions. Major General Carton de Wiart commanded the Allied forces with Brigadier General C. G. Phillips commanding the 146th and General Audet the French contingent.

  Carton de Wiart was promised forces that he never received. In addition to the 146th Brigade he was pledged the 148th Brigade, to arrive on April 17, French forces on April 18, and the 147th Brigade with artillery on April 20 or 21. The 147th and the artillery never arrived and the 148th was diverted to Åndalsnes.

  The landing of British forces in Namsos, as in the other areas of the country, took place amid considerable confusion. The 146th Brigade was destined for the Narvik area when diverted to Namsos at the last moment. The brigade commander landed in Harstad and it took some time for him to rejoin his command. There were no maps of the area, only of Narvik. This brigade, like the 148th, was separated from some of its critical equipment in the confusing period after April 7 and the transports were not loaded tactically. To make matters worse, much equipment ended up in Narvik and had to be reshipped to Namsos. There was no artillery, no air support, and the skis had no bindings.20 In the hurry to get the transports out of the Luftwaffe’s reach, at least 130 tons of valuable supplies and equipment sailed away in the returning transports.

  Colonel Ole Berg Getz, commanding the 5th Field Brigade, was in charge of all Norwegian troops in this part of the country as of April 16. His forces did not come under General Carton de Wiart’s authority, but as soon as the Allies landed, Getz reported to Carton de Wiart and offered whatever help and cooperation was needed. He placed all his forces at the disposal of the British and he undertook a major reorganization of his command in order to create as many ski detachments as possible. The 2/13th Inf provided one ski company and two were formed by the 3rd Cavalry.

  General Fleischer, as mentioned earlier, transferred the 1/14th Inf from his control to that of Getz on April 14. This force arrived in the Namsos area on April 18–19 and was organized as a ski battalion. Getz explained to Carton de Wiart that Norwegian forces were pulled back to Steinkjer because of the amphibious threat posed by the Germans who controlled the fjord and because his troops had only a one-day supply of ammunition.21

  Carton de Wiart decided to establish himself in the Steinkjer area initially, with forward security at Verdal, near the Norwegian security force. The French forces remained in the Namsos area while waiting for the arrival of equipment and supplies. The Norwegian forces assumed the mission of protecting the British eastern flank. Carton de Wiart placed strict limitations on the operational information shared with Getz because he feared leaks. Consequently, the Norwegians were unsuccessful in their attempts to coordinate their activities with the British forces. The British troops were assembled at Steinkjer on April 19 with one battalion south of that town and a one-company security force at Stiklestad. The Allied troops now numbered about 4,700.

  Colonel Getz urged them to move forward and secure a defile south of Åsen and about 50 kilometers from Trondheim, before the Germans seized it. The number of Norwegian troops at Trøndelag was about equal to that of the Allies and together they had a clear numerical superiority over the Germans. The defile south of Åsen was an excellent defensive position, could be supported by the Norwegian forces at Hegra, and served as a good starting point for an offensive against Trondheim. However, it appears that the Allies felt there was no urgency.

  Major General Woytasch, commander of the 181st Infantry Division, arrived in Trondheim on April 20 and he immediately initiated operations to secure his northern front. His first goal was to secure the area between Steinkjer and Snåsa, to protect Trondheim from the threat of a Norwegian–Allied offensive. He sent an infantry battalion, two companies of mountain troops, and some artillery into that area. Some of these troops advanced along the road from Trondheim while others carried out amphibious landings at Innerøya and Trones, in the right rear of the Norwegian and British forces at Verdal and Stiklestad. The landings were made from armed trawlers and seized Norwegian fishing vessels.

  The Norwegian motorized machinegun troop at Verdalsøra repelled frontal attacks in the morning of April
20. After about one hour of fighting, the German unit that landed at Trones attacked the Norwegians from behind. The Norwegians lost one platoon and the rest of the troop withdrew to Stiklestad where it linked up with the British company. The British were trying to regroup their forces to defend against the German landing at Inderøy by pulling the company at Stiklestad back to the northern end of Lake Leksdal. The Norwegian troops also withdrew and, at the request of the British, most were sent to the Ogndal area to provide the British with flank protection.

  The Germans infiltrated the British lines, forcing a withdrawal to Ogndal in the afternoon of April 20. That night, the Germans also made an amphibious landing near Steinkjer. General Phillips decided to withdraw his brigade to the Beistad area on the road from Steinkjer to Namsos. Getz also withdrew his forces and positioned his forward units at Stod and at another line along Lake Snåsa, in the Valøy-Øksnes area. In the short span of 24 hours, the Germans had captured the area between Åsen and Steinkjer and forced the Allies to abandon Steinkjer.

  The Luftwaffe conducted continuous attacks against Steinkjer and Namsos and the Allies lost much of their supplies in these attacks. Carton de Wiart, who witnessed the destruction of Namsos, sent a message to the War Office on April 21 in which he pointed out that it would not be possible to carry out his mission as long as the enemy had air dominance. He followed this up two days later with a message recommending withdrawal. Carton de Wiart was directed to assemble his forces and remain on the defensive. On April 28, he received the order to evacuate but was told to keep this information from the Norwegians.

  Colonel Getz reached agreement with the Allies on April 27 for an offensive against Steinkjer. The Norwegians were to advance on the left with Allied forces in the center and on the right. The Germans had remained inactive in the Steinkjer area for several days, waiting for reinforcements before continuing their advance. The Norwegian advance began on April 28 and there were only sporadic contacts with the enemy.