Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940

by Henrik O. Lunde

  Unknown to the Norwegians, who continued their advance towards Steinkjer, the Allies began thinning out their frontline forces. By April 28, they had withdrawn most of their troops to a location near Namsos from where they could reach the harbor within a few hours. This left the Norwegian right flank exposed. The Norwegians noticed the withdrawal but were told that only some forces were withdrawn to take part in a direct operation against Trondheim.22

  The Allied evacuation was successful, embarking about 4,200 troops in four hours. The Luftwaffe did not attack until the ships were at sea. The air attacks caused the loss of two destroyers carrying the Allied rear guard, the French Bison and the British Alfridi, with the loss of more than 250 men. This was in addition to the loss of the British antiaircraft sloop Bittern on April 30.

  The Norwegians were still involved in operations against Steinkjer in the evening of May 2 when Colonel Getz received a curt letter from General Carton de Wiart regretfully announcing the withdrawal. He received a more personal letter from General Audet apologizing for the necessity imposed on him. A part of this letter read, “Be assured that the situation in which I find myself is very painful because I am afraid you will conclude that I have not been loyal to you. I am a victim of war’s necessity, and can do nothing but follow orders.”23

  Getz found himself in a difficult situation. His right flank was wide open and the Germans were pouring through that opening and moving into his rear. Despite a severe shortage of ammunition, he managed to extricate his forces and withdraw towards Namsos. Knowing that a capitulation was probable, he sent the battalion belonging to General Fleischer northward so that it would not be included in the surrender. Whether Getz should have attempted a northward withdrawal will be discussed later.

  In his letter announcing the withdrawal, Carton de Wiart had written, “We are leaving a quantity of material here, which I hope you can come and take, and know it will be of value to you and your gallant forces.”24 Instead, the Allies destroyed most of what they left behind. Upon entering the destroyed town of Namsos, the Norwegians found the promised supplies: a dozen burned out trucks, some antiaircraft guns damaged beyond repair, 300 rifles without ammunition, and a few crates of food.25 Getz surrendered his forces on May 3.

  Hegra Fort held against repeated German attacks but lack of food after Getz’ surrender made defense of the fort meaningless. Major Holtermann assembled his troops on May 4 and announced, “Today, each man will receive 10 kroner and one pack of tourist rations. And what this means, everyone understands.”26 He and his 200 troops surrendered on May 5.

  NORWEGIAN-FRENCH OFFENSIVE, APRIL 29–MAY 12

  “Group Narvik’s mission can only be accomplished if reinforcements are received…. Nothing else possible.”

  GENERAL DIETL’S JOURNAL ENTRY FOR MAY 4, 1940.

  The Norwegian Reorganization and Allied Buildup

  The Germans withdrew to positions on the high ground in the defile between Gratangen and Bjerkvik within a few days after the engagement in Gratang Valley. The valley was in Norwegian hands and the capture of Elvenes and Gratangen made it possible to resupply forces by sea since it proved very difficult to open the roads after the heavy snowfall. However, there was still a German force at Foldevik. Norwegian patrol boats bombarded the German positions two nights, starting on April 28 and this caused the Germans to withdraw. A reinforced Norwegian company was brought from Sjøvegan to Gratangen to secure the area after the second bombardment.

  Norwegian forces were reorganized into two light brigades after the fiasco at Gratangen, with a combat strength of about 4,800 troops. The reorganization became effective on April 30. Colonel Løken retained command of the 6th Brigade, which consisted of three infantry battalions (1/16th, 2/16th, and 1/12th), the 8th Mountain Artillery Battery, and a medical company. Colonel Faye was designated commander of the newly created 7th Brigade but Lieutenant Colonel Dahl commanded it pending his arrival. The Brigade consisted of two infantry battalions (Alta and 2/15th), the Mountain Artillery Battalion minus one battery, the 9th Motorized Artillery Battery, an engineer platoon, part of a medical company, and a reinforced company from the Reserve Battalion of the 16th Infantry Regiment. The remainder of that battalion was under division control.

  There was no significant increase in Allied ground force strength in the two weeks following the landing of the 24th Guards Brigade on April 15 and 16. The three battalions of that brigade had not participated in any combat operations since their arrival. The flow of Allied combat troops into the Narvik area started again in late April and early May.

  The 27th Half-Brigade of Chasseurs Alpins (CA) arrived on April 28. This unit consisted of the 6th, 12th and 14th Battalions. This Half-Brigade was held initially in Scapa Flow as a reserve for the operations in southern and central Norway. It was relieved of its reserve mission and sent to North Norway on April 24. Brigadier General Marie Emilie Béthouart, who had commanded the French ground forces under General Audet in Namsos, received a telegram from General Gamelin on April 26 ordering him to Harstad to take command of French forces in North Norway. He arrived there on the destroyer Acasta at about the same time the 27th Half-Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Valentini was disembarking. British authorities ordered the 6th and 14th Battalions to land behind the Norwegian front at Sjøvegan and Salangen, respectively. The 12th Battalion landed at Bogen, on the north side of Ofotfjord, and came under the operational control of Brig. General Fraser, the commander of the 24th Brigade. The first shots fired by Allied ground forces at Germans took place in the morning of April 29, when a German ski patrol approached Bogen from the east.

  The disposition of the three battalions of the 24th Guards Brigade at this time was as follows: The two companies of 1st Scots Guards were moved from the Fossbakken area to Harstad. The 1st Irish Guards along with headquarter elements of the 24th Brigade were moved to Bogen on April 19. General Fraser later moved his forward headquarters to Ballangen, on the south side of Ofotfjord. The 2nd South Wales Borderers were moved to Skånland initially and to Ballangen between 26 and 28 April.

  The 203rd British Field Artillery Regiment finally received its guns on April 29. The French also brought 12 75mm guns. Some amphibious assault craft from the limited British resources were made available to support the planned operations. These consisted of four Assault Landing Craft (ALC) able to carry 40 infantry troops each and four 20-ton Mechanized Landing Craft (MLC) capable of carrying vehicles, equipment, and supplies.

  A convoy carrying the 13th Half-Brigade, consisting of two battalions of the Foreign Legion, and support elements of the 1st Light Division arrived in Harstad on May 6. Two companies were kept near Harstad to protect that town against threats from the west. The rest of the 13th Half-Brigade landed at Kjeldebotn, on the south side of Ofotfjord, across from Ramnes. The divisional support and supply organizations were moved to Ballangen.

  A convoy carrying 4,778 troops of the Polish brigade, organized into two half-brigades of two battalions each, arrived off Tromsø on May 5.1 The Allies planned to land the brigade in Tromsø and move it to East Finnmark. Norwegian authorities opposed its planned use in East Finnmark because the deployment of Polish troops on the border could be viewed as a provocative move by the Soviets. The convoy remained at sea for two days pending the selection of a new landing site. In the end, the Polish troops were landed in Harstad in the evening of May 7.

  The facilities in Harstad were limited and the buildup had reached a saturation point. The lack of an effective liaison with Norwegian authorities and a very rudimentary civil affairs program led to friction between the civilian population and the Allied troops. The brigade staff, the 1st Half-Brigade, and support troops were camped outside Harstad. The staff and 4th Battalion of the 2nd Half-Brigade were moved to Salangen as reinforcement for the 27th Half-Brigade. The 3rd Battalion was moved to Ballangen where it was to be used as a security force towards the south and southeast.

  With the landing of the two Polish half-brigades on May 7, the
Allies had achieved a decisive superiority in combat troops in the Narvik area. There were three battalions of British regulars, three battalions of French Chasseurs Alpins, two battalions of the French Foreign Legion, and four Polish battalions. In addition, there were six Norwegian battalions. The German forces consisted of three battalions of mountain troops and the destroyer crews organized into seven small battalions.

  The Allied naval presence continued to be impressive. The battleship Resolution replaced Warspite and aircraft from the carrier Furious provided air support throughout the second half of April and early May. The aircraft carrier Ark Royal replaced her in early May after her engines were damaged from a near miss by a German bomb. Requirements for the evacuations in central Norway reduced the number of cruisers but, on average, 15 destroyers were available to Admiral Cork. While German air attacks caused damage to Allied ships, only the Polish destroyer Grom was sunk during this period.

  Continued Allied Caution

  General Mackesy still viewed a direct landing in Narvik as too risky. He planned to begin an advance on Narvik on both sides of Ofotfjord with French and British troops. The southern advance would start from Ballangen towards Ankenes and the northern advance from Bogen towards Bjerkvik. The problem with this scenario was that half the Allied ground forces, four battalions, were located over 50 kilometers to the north, behind the Norwegian front with roads that were almost impassable. This was pointed out to Cork and Mackesy when General Béthouart had his first meeting with them a few hours after arriving in Harstad on April 28.2

  Admiral Cork recommended that Béthouart make a reconnaissance in the fjord aboard a destroyer. Béthouart concluded that the Germans occupied only part of the coastline near Narvik in force and he felt it was possible to land both at Øyjord and to the east of Narvik. Capturing Øyjord would threaten the rear of the Germans in the Bjerkvik area and provide a starting point for an amphibious operation against Narvik.

  Admiral Cork appeared to agree with the recommendation but General Mackesy did not approve when General Béthouart briefed him after returning to Harstad. Instead, he ordered General Béthouart to take command of the two French battalions in the Salangen area and advance on Bjerkvik in coordination with the Norwegians.

  Béthouart proceeded to Salangen on April 29 and made contact with Lieutenant Colonel Valentini and with General Fleischer. This was the first meeting between the two generals. They established a good working relationship. From Fleischer, Béthouart learned that the Norwegians had recaptured the Gratangen area and that it was possible to move his battalions from Sjøvegan to Gratangen by sea. The 6th Battalion CA and the brigade CP were moved to Gratangen on April 30 in Norwegian fishing vessels. Valentini co-located his headquarters with that of the 7th Brigade. Béthouart established his headquarters at Straumsnes, on the south side of the fjord.

  Mackesy’s planned advance along both sides of Ofotfjord began on April 29 when the South Wales Borderers, reinforced by the ski reconnaissance platoon (Section d’Éclaireurs Skieurs, SES) from the 12th Bn CA, made an unopposed landing at Skjomnes, on the northwest side of Ankenes Peninsula. The main British force advanced towards Ankenes along the coastal road while one company and the French reconnaissance platoon were sent into Håvikdal as a screen for the British right flank.

  At this time, there were only weak German outposts on the Ankenes side of Narvik harbor. However, German artillery and heavy machineguns from Narvik could fire on the coastal road west of Ankenes and this fire stopped the South Wales Borderers and forced them to fall back to positions near Båtberget. General Fraser was lightly wounded while carrying out a reconnaissance and Lieutenant Colonel T. B. Trappes-Lomax, the commander of the Scots Guards, assumed command of the brigade.

  The Germans increased their forces on Ankenes Peninsula after the British landing at Skjomnes. A detachment of skiers, reinforced by naval personnel, was sent across the bay with orders to occupy Hill 606 between Håviksdal and Beisfjord. This force, commanded by Lieutenant Mungai, conducted an active defense and moved into Håviksdal where it encountered the British and French flank security force and drove it back to Mattisjord.

  Company 6 of the 139th Regiment, commanded by First Lieutenant Obersteiner, was moved across Beisfjord to Ankenes Peninsula on the night of May 1–2. In a surprise attack, the German company threw the advance elements of the South Wales Borderers back from Båtberget to a rear position at Emmenes. The German company was preparing to attack the new position when it came under fire from British warships and suffered considerable casualties, including the company commander. It withdrew to Ankenes and by May 6, its strength was down to about 50 men. The South Wales Borderers suffered three killed and several wounded. Another three soldiers were killed and an equal number wounded on May 2, when German aircraft bombed the battalion CP.

  This was the first and last employment of British ground forces in the Narvik area. The South Wales Borderers could make little progress off roads in the deep snow and it was decided to withdraw them and turn the operations on the south side of Ofotfjord over to the 12th Bn CA.

  The Allies failed to inform General Fleischer about their operation on the south side of Ofotfjord before it began. The Norwegians viewed the activities on Ankenes Peninsula as inconsequential for the operation against Narvik. Fleischer sent Major Lindbäck-Larsen to Harstad to confer with the Allied commanders and to convince them that decisive results could be achieved on the north side of the fjord. Two alternatives were suggested: landings in Rombaken east of Øyjord followed by an advance through the valleys leading to Jernvannene (Iron Lakes) or landings on the west side of Herjangsfjord, followed by an advance on Bjerkvik. Lindbäck-Larsen was unable to reach accord with the British.

  The Norwegians provided the British liaison officer with an operational draft the following day, May 7. This draft stated that the division’s primary effort would be directed against Bjørnefjell. The plan assumed that an Allied operation against the Bjerkvik area could be undertaken with relative ease while the Norwegians attacked from the north.

  There was a second reason for sending Lindbäck-Larsen to the British headquarters. The Allied withdrawal from Namsos gave the Germans an opportunity to come to Dietl’s assistance through Nordland Province where there were only weak Norwegian forces. Reports had reached Fleischer that a small British force had landed in Mosjøen but the situation was unclear. Lindbäck-Larsen failed to obtain an agreement for joint operations in Nordland Province since the forces there were not under General Mackesy’s command.

  Lindbäck-Larsen points out that coordination with the Allies was exceedingly bad and it was difficult to understand their operational goals. Fleischer’s headquarters requested that the Norwegian Army High Command (HOK) assist in bringing about regular cooperation with the Allies. Norway’s interests would be best served, in Fleischer’s view, if the Allies devoted their main effort at stopping the German advance from Namsos.

  Norwegian-French Offensive Plans

  General Fleischer issued orders for the continuation of the offensive on April 29. While the 7th Brigade, supported by one battalion of French CA, attacked towards Bjerkvik and Elvegårdsmoen through Gratangseidet and Labergsdal, the 6th Brigade would advance through Gressdal and Vassdal and thereby threaten Elvegårdsmoen and Bjerkvik from the east. The plan called for the main force of the 6th Bn, 27th CA to advance south through Labergsdal while one company of that battalion advanced along Route 50 from Elvenes to Bjerkvik. The operation was assisted by the Norwegian capture of Hill 509 on April 27. This height dominated the road and the area around Storfossen and its capture forced the Germans to fall back and establish their defenses with the western flank along the chain of lakes on the east side of the Route 50. The German withdrawal allowed the Norwegians to move forward and occupy the area around Fjelldal, Holtås, and Kvernemoen.

  The Germans needed to protect themselves against a possible drive against their right flank over the mountains from Lortvann. The area did not lend itself
to a continuous front and the Germans did not believe the Norwegians would be able to conduct large-scale operations in this roadless wilderness. Furthermore, it would be extremely difficult to keep large German forces supplied in this area. The Germans elected to base their defense on patrols and a few observation points. These had radios that enabled them to report any threatening activities. The plan called for the Norwegian 7th Brigade to advance towards Bjerkvik on the east side of Route 50 with the Alta Battalion on the right and the 2/15th on the left. The forces on the two flanks would make the main effort: the French advance through Labergsdal on the right and the units of the 6th Brigade operating in the east. The 7th Brigade expected to move forward as the pressure on the German flanks forced them to withdraw.

  According to French sources, Fleischer gave Béthouart command on April 30 of the forces operating along both sides of Route 50 between Gratangen and Bjerkvik, including one Norwegian battalion. They allegedly agreed to an operational boundary between the French and Norwegian commands along a line from Durmåsfjell over Hills 1150, 1118, and 1009. The same sources claim that Béthouart delegated command of French and Norwegian forces in this area to Lieutenant Colonel Valentini, commander of the 27th Chasseurs Alpins.3

  There are no indications in Norwegian records that such a command agreement was ever put into operation. The actual arrangements were apparently based on close coordination between Lieutenant Colonels Dahl and Valentini. The Norwegians placed one company from 2/15th Inf at the disposal of the French for security missions in Labergsdal, since the French had only a limited number of ski troops. Only one SES and ten men in each company had skis. The rest used snowshoes.