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58. See Jean-Claude Willame’s invaluable monograph Zaire: L’épopée d’Inga, chronique d’une prédation industrielle (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1986); see also Young and Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, 296–304, and Crawford Young, “Zaire: The Anatomy of a Failed State,” in History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years, ed. David Birmingham and Phyllis M. Martin (London: Longman, 1998), 119–21.
59. “Bio-fuels: Nigeria, South Africa,” Africa Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 44.5 ( 2007): 17428.
60. I am indebted to my former research assistant Ric Tange for assembling documentation on the Ajaokuta project.
61. http://www.tellng.com/news/articles/060110-13/news/biz, accessed 23 September 2009. Daniel Jordan Smith cites the slightly lower figure of $8 billion in his exegesis of Nigerian corruption; see A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 50.
62. http://234next.com/CSP/sites/Next/Money/565 6518-147/jonathan_promises-to-revive-ajaokuta-steel.esp, accessed 3 March 2011.
63. Proceedings of the colloquium on the Ajaokuta steel project, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1981.
64. Gbolahan Alli-Balogun provides a useful account of the early history of the project; see “Soviet Technical Assistance and Nigeria’s Steel Complex,” Journal of Modern African Studies 26.4 (1988): 623–37.
65. Technical details on the project are provided in Matthew O. Esholomi, “Industrial Technology Transfer and Steel Production in Nigeria,” booklet published by Eshalomi and Associates, Lagos, January 1983.
66. Alli-Balogun, “Soviet Technical Assistance and Nigeria’s Steel Complex,” 632.
67. http://www.nigeriafirst.org/article_1161.shtml, accessed 11 September 2006.
68. New York Times, 3 December 1998.
69. This Day (Lagos), 24 April 2006.
70. “Nigeria Gears to Lead Steel Production in Africa,” 10 June 2009, http://www.afrol.com/articles/29309, accessed 23 August 2009.
71. Sunday Punch (Lagos), 12 April 2010.
72. Peter Lewis, personal communication.
73. Maxim Matusevich, No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in Nigerian-Soviet Relations, 1960–1991 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2003), 189.
74. Ravenhill, “A Second Decade of Adjustment,” 18.
75. Bates, When Things Fell Apart, 15–29.
76. Juan L. Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 1978), 240. See also H. E. Chelabi and Juan L. Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
77. Reno, Corruption and State Politics. The shadow state bears some resemblance to what Achille Mbembe terms “private indirect governance”; see On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 66–101.
78. Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
79. Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 111–31.
80. William G. Thom, “An Assessment of Prospects for Ending Domestic Military Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa,” CSIS Africa Notes 177 (1995), 3, cited in Herbst, States and Power, 19.
81. Bates, When Things Fell Apart.
82. William B. Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 45.
CHAPTER 6. DEMOCRATIZATION AND ITS LIMITS
1. See my “Democratization in Africa,” Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Africa, ed. Jennifer A. Widner (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 230–50, “Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet,” in Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change, ed. Peter Lewis (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 341–58, and “The Third Wave of Democratization in Africa: Ambiguities and Contradictions,” in State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, ed. Richard Joseph (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 15–38.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
3. Ghassan Salamé argues that the Muslim Arab world more broadly initially missed out on the third wave, owing to the entrenched power of its security apparatus, the rentier character of many of its polities, and the challenge of incorporating political Islamist movements into a competitive electoral framework; see “Introduction: Where Are the Democrats?,” in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Middle East, ed. Ghassan Salamé (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), 1–20.
4. Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 3.
5. Aili Mari Tripp offers an extended application of this notion in Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010).
6. Monique Dinan, Vidula Nababsing, and Hansraj Mathur, “Mauritius: Cultural Accommodation in a Diverse Island Polity,” in The Accommodation of Cultural Diversity: Case-Studies, ed. Crawford Young (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1999), 72–102.
7. The striking theme of permanent transition is central to a pair of edited volumes on Nigerian politics in the mid-1990s Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran, eds., Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society under Babangida (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), and Paul A. Beckett and Crawford Young, eds., Dilemmas of Democracy in Nigeria (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1997).
8. Beckett and Young, “Introduction: Beyond the Impasse of ‘Permanent Transition’ in Nigeria,” in Dilemmas of Democracy, 4.
9. Mwesiga Baretsu, “The Rise and Fall of the One-Party State in Tanzania,” in Economic Change and Political Liberalization, 168.
10. Celestin Monga, The Anthropology of Anger: Civil Society and Democracy in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 115.
11. For a brief intellectual history of the concept, see Crawford Young, “In Search of Civil Society,” in Civil Society and the State in Africa, ed. John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 33–50; see also John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (London: Verso, 1988).
12. These perspectives were eloquently expressed by East European intellectuals at a 1991 conference organized in Bellagio, Italy, by Bogumul Jewsiewicki and Prosser Gifford comparing state crisis in African and Eastern Europe.
13. See, for example, Pierre Landell-Mills, “Governance, Cultural Change, and Em powerment,” Journal of Modern African Studies 30.4 (1992): 543–67.
14. Goran Hyden first developed the notion in No Short Cuts to Progress: African Development Management in Comparative Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), which he then more fully elaborated in Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner , 1992), coauthored with Michael Bratton.
15. World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, a Long-Term Perspective Study (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989), 61.
16. Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Staffan I. Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2006); Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
17. As suggested by the epigraph to this chapter from F. Ebussi Boulaga, which comes from Les conférences nationales en Afrique: Une affaire à suivre (Paris: Karthala, 1993), 9.
18. Chris Allen, “Democratic Renewal in Africa: Two Essays on Benin,” Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, Occasional Papers no. 40, 1992, 6.
19. Richard Westebbe, then a World Bank official closely i
nvolved in Benin negotiations, provides an excellent account; see “Structural Adjustment, Rent-Seeking and Liberalization in Benin,” in Economic Change and Political Liberalization, 80–100. See also Samuel Decalo, “Benin: First of the New Democracies,” in Political Reform in Francophone Africa, ed. John F. Clark and David E. Gardinier (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 43–61, Richard Banegas, “Retour sur une ‘transition modéle’: Les dynamiques du dedans et du dehors de la démocratization au Bénin, in Transitions démocratiques africaines, ed. Jean-Pascal Daloz and Patrick Quantin (Paris: Karthala, 1997), 23–94, and Bruce A. Magnusson, “The Politics of Democratic Regime Legitimation in Benin: Institutions, Social Policy, and Security” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1997).
20. I am indebted to my research assistant, Geraldine O’Mahoney, for collecting data on this point.
21. Again I rely on data collected by O’Mahoney. Tripp, using several sources, counted thirty-eight new constitutions.
22. For a detailed account, see Oliver Furley and James Katalikawe, “Constitutional Reform in Uganda: The New Approach,” African Affairs 96.383 (1997): 243–60.
23. For this and other detail on the Zambian transition, see Michael Bratton, “Economic Crisis and Political Realignment in Zambia,” in Economic Change and Political Liberalization, 101–28.
24. This argument is convincingly made by Jens Meierhenrich in The Legacies of Law: Long-run Consequences of Legal Development in South Africa, 1652–2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
25. Special tribute is due to the editors of the immensely valuable documentary record of all elections in African states: Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, eds., Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
26. Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996), 130.
27. Especially valuable for this period in Algeria is Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990–1998, trans. Jonathan Derrick (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). Martinez, a pseudonym for an Algerian scholar, conducted extensive interviews with guerrilla participants in the civil war.
28. Richard Sklar provides a cogent account of the failed transition; see “Crisis and Transition in the Political History of Independent Nigeria,” in Dilemmas of Democracy, 15–44. See also Eghosa E. Osaghae, Nigeria since Independence: Crippled Giant (London: Hurst, 1998).
29. Excellent accounts are provided by René Lemarchand in Burundi: Ethnocide as Theory and Practice (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), in “Burundi at a Crossroads,” in Security Dynamics in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 41–58, and in The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). See also Jean-Pierre Chrétien and M. Mukuri, eds., Burundi: La fracture identitaire (Paris: Karthala, 2002).
30. Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 5.
31. The first published allegation that RPF leader and current president Paul Kagame was responsible came from RPF defector Abdul Ruzibiza in his Rwanda: L’histoire secrete (Paris: Panama, 2005). French investigating magistrate Paul Bruguière in a 2008 indictment accused Kagame and other RPF leaders of shooting down the plane, based on extensive though circumstantial evidence (Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, 105). Ruzibiza subsequently repudiated his allegations, and France did not pursue the Bruguière indictment.
32. Alison des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Tale:” Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Press, 1999). Lemarchand, also a careful scholar, uses the figure of eight hundred thousand (The Dynamics of Violence, 73).
33. In addition to sources already cited, among the abundant works about the Rwanda genocide, the best include Timothy Longman, Commanded by the Devil: Christianity and Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), Filip Reyntjens, La guerre des Grands Lacs: Alliances mouvantes et conflits extra-territoriaux en Afrique Centrale (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1999), and Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
34. Rita Abrahamson elaborates at length on this point in Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa (London: Zed, 2000).
35. From 1900 to 2010, interrupted or aborted transitions occurred in Algeria, Burundi, Central African Repblic, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Rwanda.
36. Patrick McGowan, “African Military Coups d’état, 1956–2001,” Journal of Modern African Studies 41.3 (2003): 339–70.
37. On the early years of Zimbabwe independence, see Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), and Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Pinter, 1989).
38. As one example, Mugabe chose to keep on the intelligence chief of the settler regime, Ken Flower, who later wrote in his memoir that “Mugabe was reconciliation personified, and as we got to know each other he proved to be the most appreciative of all the Prime Ministers I had served” (Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record—Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981 [London: John Murray, 1987], 273).
39. In his widely heralded 1986 BBC series, Ali Mazrui made Zimbabwe the paradigm of the virtuous African polity of the early 1980s.
40. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, 4th ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 201.
41. For an analysis by a Zimbabwean scholar sympathetic to the initial intervention, see Martin R. Rupiya, “A Political and Military Review of Zimbabwe’s Involvement in the Second Congo War,” in The African Stakes of the Congo War, ed. John F. Clark (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 91–105.
42. Scott D. Taylor, “Zimbabwe: State and Society in Crisis,” in Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition, ed. Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 177.
43. Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa, 87.
44. Africa Confidential, 4 July 2008.
45. For detail see Leonardo A. Villalon and Amdourahmane Idrissa, “Repetitive Breakdowns and a Decade of Experimentation: Institutional Choices and Unstable Democracy in Niger,” in Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions, ed. Leonarda A. Villalon and Peter VonDoepp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 27–48.
46. Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa, 147.
47. As a member of a study team visiting Kenya to study the electoral process in 1994, I can attest that available documentation and interviews left no doubt as to the responsibility of leading political figures in fomenting the ethnic clashes.
48. “Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?,” in Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 84.
49. Tom P. Wolf, “‘Poll Poison?’ Politicians and Polling in the 2007 Kenya Election,” typescript, 2009.
50. American ambassador John Campbell, a close observer of the 2003 and 2007 elections, characterized the latter as a complete sham, a mere “election-like event” (Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink [Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011], 97–113).
51. For detail on the Bakassi Boys, see Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 166–90.
52. Human Rights Watch, “Criminal Politics: Violence, ‘Godfathers,’ and Corruption in Nigeria,” Human Rights Watch Reports 19.16(A) (2007): 30.
53. For detail on these elections, I rely on African Research Bulletin and Africa Confidential.
54. Michael Bratton, Robe
rt Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi, eds., Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10.
55. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49.2 (1997): 155–83.
56. Valuable recent contributions on this theme include Daniel N. Posner’s Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Joshua B. Forrest’s Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances, and Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), and Donald Rothchild’s Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).
57. See the thoughtful contributions in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will Kymlicka, eds., Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa (Oxford, UK: James Currey, 2004).
58. See K. M. de Silva, “Electoral Systems,” in Ethnic Diversity and Public Policy: A Comparative Inquiry, ed. Crawford Young (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1998), 72–107, and Andrew Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
59. Salamé, “Introduction: Where Are the Democrats?,” 6.
60. For exhaustive detail see Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, Les voies du politique au Congo: Essai de sociologie historique (Paris: Karthala, 1997).
61. For a succinct account stressing the African diplomatic role, see Thomas J. Bassett and Scott Straus, “Defending Democracy in Côte d’Ivoire,” Foreign Affairs 90.4 (2011): 130–40.
62. Kwame Boafo-Arthur, “A Decade of Liberalism in Perspective,” in Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State, ed. Kwame Boafo-Arthur (Dakar: CODESRIA Books, 2007), 18.
63. Minion K. C. Morrison, “Political Parties in Ghana through Four Republics: A Path to Democratic Consolidation,” Comparative Politics 36.4 (2004): 421–42.
64. Linda J. Beck, Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). For similar findings by a lifelong scholar of Senegalese politics, see Sheldon Gellar, Democracy in Senegal: Toquevillian Analytics in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).