Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Meanwhile, the bulk of the king’s army was awakening from its winter repose.18 March 24, Frederick left Dresden for field headquarters. With the forthcoming invasion of Bohemia decided upon, the monarch finalized preparations for this undertaking.19 On an almost amusing distraction (from a strictly modern perspective, of course), a rather inept attempt to poison the king, by feeding him chocolate,20 by a soldier named Glasow, was discovered. The plot was headed off before any repercussions were felt, and the culprit was subsequently imprisoned at Spandau; he later died in captivity.21

  For their business, the Prussian forces were divided into four22 separate groups for the invasion to make the difficult transit through the border mountains easier, although the different formations would try to stay in close contact. This precaution was taken to ensure that Browne could not concentrate on one Prussian column in time to destroy that particular one. Frederick knew the quality of his opponent. Of no less import was the terrain of the affected area. The region, according to a nearly contemporary account, “has an infinity of roads which proceed from Prague, as from a center, over mountains.”23

  The position of the bluecoat forces before Bohemia as of late March/April were:

  • Prince Moritz (14,100 infantry, 5,200 cavalry) at Zwickau;

  • Frederick (30,500 infantry, 9,100 cavalry) at Pirna;

  • Bevern (16,000 infantry, 4,300 horse) at Zittau;

  • Schwerin (25,000 infantry, 9,300 horse) at Schweidnitz.

  This constituted a formidable force, and every conceivable precaution was taken to ensure Prussian success. Magazines had been carefully prepared, and the proposed invasion routes planned out long in advance of need. Frederick was throwing down the gauntlet before the growing season, so he was aware his ability to supply his troops and horses with fodder especially would be limited. Supply wagons originating from far behind the front lines could hardly be expected to supply the increasingly voracious demands of a large multi-columned army on the move, and any re-supply by water would also clearly be insufficient. To make the crucial invasion a success, the aforementioned hoarded up enemy magazines would be required to feed the bluecoats as they plunged ever farther into Austrian territory. Prussian plans had to figure on this contingency, and a rapid advance should ensure the capture of many of the Austrian supplies.

  Meanwhile, the Austrian forces, which in their turn were being concentrated in northern Bohemia, and which had their own agenda, were a formidable host. General Christian Moritz Königsegg was in front of the projected route of Bevern near Kratzau/Regensburg—at Gabel—with 18,000 infantry and some 4,900 cavalry. Lt.-Gen. Carl Leopold Duke of Arenberg had an additional 20,400 infantry and about 3,800 cavalry holding a line on the Eger River near Budin and Koschlitz, at Plan. Marshal Browne himself was not far from there with 30,400 infantry and 8,700 horse, sandwiched in between Welwarn and the Field Marshal Jean Baptiste Graf Eger. Piccolomini (soon to be superseded by Serbelloni) had 22,000 men near Olmütz, and Prague kept an 8,000-man garrison itself. Finally, Field Marshal Leopold Reichsgraf von Daun was busy gathering troops from Moravia. Culling every available man, he would soon have about 23,000 men. All told, Austrian strength was listed in early 1757 as totaling approximately 133,000 men.24

  Daun was being strengthened to invade Silesia with about 45,000 or so men once the campaign season got underway, at least according to one plan being bandied about in Vienna. In yet another incarnation, Prince Charles was to assemble a force of 70,000 men with which to move into Lusatia while General Franz Leopold Nádasti, with a force of some 10,000 light troops, constituted a strong detachment that Charles would be counting upon. Nádasti’s men would ostensibly hover between Moravia and Silesia. Nádasti’s immediate superior, Daun, was to be kept informed at all times about any detected Prussian movements. Interestingly, in the strange atmosphere prevailing, no one scheme was garnering widespread support from those most directly involved in the planning.25

  The numerous ideas, plans, and schemes prevailing on the Austrian side, contrasts between a one-man command like the Prussian, where the king alone determined final strategy, not to mention having the entire army at his beck and call, and the far too many, varied opinions among the Austrians. As a result, no definite plan in their case was adopted in time to be effective, other than the vague intentions of an offensive movement.26 But this nearly absolute power of Frederick in determining the shape of Prussian plans and direction, with a single-minded purpose, would time and again prove the salvation of the Prussian cause. In a way that was just not possible to her enemies. Not the least of the contributing factors was that the Prussian king alone among the crowned heads of Europe accompanied his armies into the field. He could thus exercise direct control of those forces.

  The Austrians could not even claim ignorance as to Prussian intentions. Frederick confided his bold aim to only a handful of officers, but it did not stop there. No less an authority than Friedrich Christian the Electoral Prince of Saxony warned of an imminent bluecoat irruption into Bohemia with no less than five columns totaling 160,000 men.27 Serbelloni went so far as to issue stern warnings on two separate occasions to the Austrian high command that the Prussians were definitely going to launch a full-scale invasion of Bohemia.28 These soundings were completed in plenty of time to allow for some form of countermeasure.

  Browne himself hovered between taking the outright initiative or not. The scattered Austrian forces were being maneuvered so that an invasion of Saxony might go those divergent routes. It was not by accident that the whitecoat forces would be so deployed. Browne wanted to take those routes into Saxony; the Prussians merely beat him to the draw. Moreover, there was yet another alternative. According to this latter scheme, one of the armies, likely led by Browne, would be built up to more than 90,000 strong and would then invade Saxony directly. A second force, about 10,000 strong, would operate out of Moravia to distract the enemy present in Silesia. But a larger diversionary force might have helped matters here for the Austrians somewhat.

  The advanced forces were busy gathering supplies for the anticipated invasion of Saxony, and it was expected within the Habsburg lands that both Saxony and Silesia would soon be recovered. Ultimately, Austrian magazines were established at Budin, Jung-Bunzlau, Karwatitz, Kosmanos, and Martinowe.29 Enormous investments in equipment and supplies, bought dearly by the cash-strapped government, were made by Maria Theresa. But the specter of financial worries was not permitted to cloud the military objectives. Success was at hand, and in the euphoric atmosphere prevailing, there was no allowance given to possible Austrian defeat.30 Rarely in the annals of military history have the expectations of a nation’s leaders for a quick, easy victory been so delusional.

  About the middle of March, Prince Charles’s entourage31 left Vienna and journeyed towards the front. Charles was to take over field command from Browne.32 Word reached the whitecoats about the same time that their foe was fortifying Dresden, Torgau, and the forward posts thereabouts, strengthening the barriers between Saxony and Bohemia on their side of the border. It appeared Frederick intended only to stand on the defense in Saxony against an Austrian encroachment.

  The Prussians, naturally, were doing everything they could to promote this belief. The success of Frederician security was wonderful; for a change. Although the bluecoat attempts to keep campaign plans secret more often than not would leave something to be desired, in this case, they functioned quite well.33 Allied spies, including the Saxon troops who had “volunteered” to serve on the Prussian side, tried to seek out information on Prussian movements/plans. At Dresden, numerous reports of troop concentrations did indeed leak out, enough to spawn rumors that had been floating around on the Bohemian side of the frontier. Too bad more credence was not paid to this gossip.

  That rumors were all that could get out, in enemy territory, was remarkable. Moreover, when a spy for the queen of Poland revealed every important aspect of the invasion plans to the allies, “they thought them [i.e., the plans
] too crazy to be true.”34 Nevertheless, the sheer volume of the invasion chatter should have been sufficient to tip off the Austrian High Command that something major was afoot. So the success of the Prussian security arose not so much from their own efforts, but rather a distinct lack of Austrian exertion.

  Much the opposite took place. On February 2, an Imperial decree instructed Browne to keep away from his advanced magazines as “long as possible.”35 This was to keep the depots set for the anticipated Austrian offensive. But the underlying theme of not deploying too soon was also clear. That nagging fact had to be in the back of Browne’s thoughts all the time just about then. The whitecoats themselves helped contribute to their unpleasant surprise come the spring invasion by the bluecoats.

  To the point, Browne himself had been in Vienna when the often heated discussions regarding future Austrian campaign plans were being bandied about in earnest in the month of February. The dialogue was involved. Marshal Daun was in favor of putting most of the army into Moravia, and Browne shifted back and forth between and among the various views. Other opinions were voiced as well.

  One of the pressing urgent concerns voiced was, “Who would command the field armies in 1757?” The field of candidates was not wide open, with actually very few suitable choices. Browne was favored by Kaunitz, and also by Maria Theresa. But the co-regent and husband of Maria Theresa, Emperor Francis Stephen, favored the appointment of Prince Charles of Lorraine, his own brother, to this all-important post. Prince Charles had already, rather immodestly, taken full credit for the latter phases of the Silesian Wars; little of which praise he actually deserved.36 Ultimately, Prince Charles would be vested with the command, although Marshal Browne was belatedly offered a dual command post with Charles.

  Meanwhile, the supply situation was slowly improving. January 30, Haugwitz had issued a statement to the effect that all of the units in the army should be supplied until March (later April), when the campaign would likely begin. This was a good thing as the Austrians were calculating on little real help from their allies for much of the campaign season.37 Despite the grand trumpeting of allied campaign plans, most of the effort for 1757 would be borne on the allied side by the whitecoats alone.

  Due to a number of factors, one of the main ones being Marshal Browne was about to return to the front, the high command put the stamp of approval on Browne’s plan to concentrate into four bodies on the Bohemian frontier. But the time was postponed until the middle of April; this advanced date, again, to preserve the magazines in the forward areas as long as possible. And, once more, any talk of countering a possible Prussian offensive was squelched right out of the gate.

  Yes, there would be collating the army into formations on the frontier all right. That was firm. The April date was a firm one. Still, Browne returned from the campaign talks to Bohemia with no firm commitment to an Austrian offensive in early 1757. The rumor mill was churning full blast, spurred on by innuendoes and outright false “intelligence.” When Browne reached Prague on March 21, the rumors about Prussian forces massing behind the Saxon frontier had already reached the city before him. To be fair, the forward most posts were instructed to stay vigilant for any suspicious enemy efforts that appeared to be an invasion. Browne might have been lulled into a false sense of security with continuing reports the snows were still too deep for major offensive operations.

  And the Austrians were growing stronger almost daily.38 New reinforcements, sharply trained and prepared, were busy making their way towards the front. Under such conditions, the Prussian task was becoming more difficult with the passage of time.

  What was needed was a clear, aggressive directive to prep the Austrian army for either an offensive or a defensive stand. But Prince Charles would dally until nearly the end of April before he finally saw good to arrive on the scene. In the meanwhile, Marshal Browne was running the show. April 4, two days before the Prussian invasion deadline set by the Electoral Prince of Saxony, Browne himself appeared in person along the Elbe to look over the army’s posts thereabouts. The actual day of the deadline passed by rather serenely, but new rumblings about unusual concentrations of horse teams, wagons, supplies, along with beefed up Prussian patrols, seemed to drive home the point there just might be something to this whole invasion business after all. The ailing commander promptly repaired to the fortress of Königgrätz to look those facilities over next.

  The events of the imminent invasion were hardly Browne’s fault alone, although his misguided overconfidence did not help matters. Meanwhile, right up to the last minute, the bluecoats were doing everything they could to encourage this false sense of security.

  Prince Moritz of Dessau had been detached with a substantial force (19,300 men) to move from Chemnitz astride the Eger, in the process swinging much further west than the king’s own column. Colonel Seydlitz was with this body of men.39 Prince Moritz marched through Komotau (April 19–20) against the whitecoats. His men broke up a nearby post, held by some 400 of Austria’s finest dragoons, and Moritz promptly ordered off a 4,000-man detachment to swing up on Holtenburg and seize the Schirdinger defile. The Austrians present thereabouts were under the direction of Arenberg, and Croats were dispatched to interfere with the bluecoat advance. Prince Moritz’s approach turned out to be a restricted probing effort.

  It turned out to be more of that deceptive practice of the king—almost a dress rehearsal for the coming main event. Arenberg was fully convinced he was confronting the main invasion effort there and then. The latter gallantly determined to stand his ground and see what came out of this.

  Moritz quickly betrayed the truth. The Prussians with Prince Moritz withdrew about April 22, moving in the direction of Aussig directly through Brüx and an important rendezvous with the king’s column. Major-General Berend Asmus von Zastrow commanded a detachment that drove the enemy out of Aussig on the same day. This movement was yet another diversion to draw away Browne’s attention to the Eger as the real line of invasion. Arenberg at once alerted his superior, Browne, of the unfolding incident. More reports of bluecoats encroaching upon Austrian territory were coming in daily by now.

  The king had erupted from Lockwitz with the major portion of his column on April 20.40 On April 25, at Linay, the monarch was joined by Prince Moritz, the main body of the latter’s command passed through Pirna and Aussig to accomplish this juncture. The Austrian force at Aussig, under Major-General Joseph Graf von Draskovitch, had been forced to beat a hasty retreat when Zastrow’s men put in their rather sudden appearance.

  The king was certain that Browne was about to receive reinforcements, so he had bridges erected near Köschlitz, less than two miles from the marshal’s camp. But Frederick, aware the Austrians had been thoroughly surprised by the actual invasion, was determined to press his advantage while he still could, especially with the increasing size of the Austrian forces actively opposing him. The following morning, the bluecoats were underway again, leaving the fateful field of Lobositz to the eastward (the stench of the men who had lost their lives there was still pervading the air), but there was no intention to stay close-by in any case, desiring to link up Frederick’s men with those of Moritz to prevent either one from being beaten in detail.41

  Back to events.42 The main royal column arrived at Trebnitz on April 25. The king’s original intention had been to unite with Schwerin’s men at Leitmeritz. Frederick planned on the Austrian army reacting to the Prussian maneuvers rather than try to counterattack. So, when circumstances did not permit a rendezvous at Leitmeritz, the monarch put off the meeting until the various field forces were loosely deployed in front of Prague. Overall, Austrian resistance had been sporadic; indicating the enemy had been caught at a disadvantage. Although the breaks were not all one-sided, the king remained confident of ultimate victory in the present endeavor.43

  On the down side, General Zastrow fell victim to enemy fire on April 25 when a wandering Pandour shot him. This loss was a great blow to the king, Zastrow having enjoyed a long career in
the royal army. But there was precious little time to dwell on disturbing developments. The ultimate goal of victory over the Austrian enemy needed to be kept at the forefront.

  Short time was not the only factor confronting the Austrian opposition. Over on the whitecoat side, much was in outright disarray. As soon as the Austrians perceived the Prussian penetration of Bohemia was indeed in deadly earnest, a general panic spread among the troops and population positioned next to the frontier. The troops burned their carefully stored, and expensive, magazines, falling back in the general direction of Prague. The bluecoats would ultimately capture great quantities of supplies over the ensuing next few days, stored up primarily in the six major Austrian supply depots in the area. These provisions would provide for months. Included among the desired targets was the important principal Austrian magazine at Jung-Bunzlau.44

  The whitecoat border patrols were put on alert when Marshal Schwerin’s men swept across the frontier.45 April 19, Marshal Browne discovered it. Instead of trying to move his scattered forces into a united throng to seal off the breach, Marshal Browne unwisely—and almost incredibly—chose to disregard the timely warning. All except for dispatching a reinforcement (a regiment of cuirassiers, two regiments and a battalion of foot soldiers) to link up with Serbelloni.46 Browne was overconfident. He had deluded himself into reasoning his great foe was incapable of swiftly, and effectively, mounting major military operations. The marshal even dared to voice the opinion that Frederick the Great “in no way can be considered a great captain.”47

  On April 21, unwelcome word was received that major Prussian forces were across the border with Saxony, whither Serbelloni was beating a retreat upon Königgrätz. Rumors abounded that General Königsegg’s men had been beaten back from their post at Reichenberg.48 The latter tried to regain Jung-Bunzlau from a direct Prussian threat. This on orders from Browne, issued beforehand, just in case of an emergency. But Schwerin’s forward elements were moving to lay hold of that all-important supply depot before the Austrian relief force could even draw in sight. Schwerin’s bluecoats were just too quick on the move.49