Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Königsegg was left no choice but to avail himself of a night march to bypass his erstwhile rallying point. He crossed the Elbe, stopping at Brandeis. (There the commander did all he could to protect a major bridge thereabouts from the enemy.) Königsegg’s command was tired, discouraged, and somewhat disoriented by the rapid pace of events.

  Browne discovered Königsegg, bruised but not battered, nearby with his detachment still 25,000 strong; in short, he hoped the latter could still hold up the Schwerin-Bevern advance. Then, instead of staying put at Prague, Browne bundled on to Budin. Too late convinced of the earnestness of the enemy’s efforts, early on April 26, the marshal belatedly ordered Arenberg to come join up with the main body of Browne’s army, while Browne himself paced a while in his headquarters at Martinowe, nervously eyeing the enemy mass close to Lobositz and chomping at the bit the whole time. Arenberg’s arrival would give the marshal sufficient strength in his force to try something on Frederick, should the latter break the barrier of the Eger.

  All along, Browne had been doing his best to keep Prince Charles informed of the enemy’s continuing forward progress, and, the very day before the Prussians barged across the Eger, Browne sent word the Prussian king was in front of him with some 50,000 men and there would be a battle soon after all.50 Meanwhile, though, Arenberg did not actually draw near to Browne until the bluecoats suddenly crossed the Eger between 0400 and 0800 hours on April 27, this rather abruptly on three bridges between Schelkowitz and Piatek. Arenberg, confronted by this overwhelming enemy presence, migrated as fast as he could to get out of harm’s way. His men at once moved through Saaz and Laun, aiming for Martinowe. In response, the bluecoats sought to cut him off from joining with the other Austrian forces. Browne sent a communication to Arenberg he was to shift his force through Schlan and join him thereabouts immediately.

  The marshal himself did not even stir from Budin to try to hinder the Prussian march. This was yet more of that uncharacteristic behavior ultimately explainable only by Browne’s progressing illness. Whatever the cause, the bluecoats took advantage of the situation and occupied the heavy overgrown confines of the Budin Ridge. The king had really been concerned that the Austrians would occupy the latter to help thwart the Prussian advance. He was relieved when this undesirable scenario did not pan out. Hurriedly, the Charwatetz beyond (which offered a fantastic view to the south and southeast in the direction of Welwarn and Prague) was grabbed by the bluecoats between 0930–1030 hours. An hour or so afterwards, Frederick’s alert patrols finally discovered enlightening enemy movements.

  All morning, very visible, thick, dust rising into the early spring air below the Charwatetz told of Browne’s activities. Did the dust portend an Austrian counteroffensive movement of some kind? There were some tense moments. However, the answer was nothing more than an Austrian withdrawal towards Welwarn/Prague, to be related shortly. The whitecoats were reeling back in confusion from the very energetic Prussian efforts. In this situation, nothing remained for the Austrians to do, but to retire as soon as was possible.51 Probably even the Prussian monarch did not suspect how badly off his foe was at that moment.

  At the Eger, Frederick’s men attempted an assault against Arenberg to try to cut him off from his bridges.52 If this had succeeded, Arenberg would have been effectively trapped. Ziethen was unbuckled to strike at the withdrawing enemy rearguard. This follow-up was not terminated before the Weissenberg, where the crossing Austrian rearguard finally took refuge. Although the indomitable little hussar Ziethen took 300 prisoners and Arenberg’s supply depots, the latter Austrian commander acquitted himself well. And, this had really tipped off the Austrians about the aim of the offensive. The whitecoats endeavored to seal off the damage, and did a commendable job under the difficult conditions. For instance, Hadik, with some 600 hussars, wrestled the magazine at Martinowe (April 27) from Ziethen, inflicting 25 casualties on the bluecoats. Hadik made certain the contents were rendered unusable to the Prussians before he pulled his men back from this exposed forward position.

  Meantime, Browne continued to wrestle mightily with the enemy’s encroachments. The Austrian leader reluctantly vacated Welwarn, while the general consensus of Austrian officers was a precipitate retreat. April 28, Browne hitched backwards upon Tursko. Early the following morning, the marshal called a council-of-war. The forces nearby now amounted to 30,000 men, as Arenberg was at hand. Browne’s new position on rises overlooking Tursko53 was still about 12 miles short of Prague, towards which he suspected the enemy were hastening at their best pace. Again, the marshal wanted to stand pat, but his generals—in this case, no doubt correctly—insisted a post closer on Prague was more favorable under the circumstances. Orders were issued and the by now shaken men removed as quickly as possible to Tuchomirschitz, where they were less liable to encroachment. The whitecoats were still outnumbered and could have been outflanked had they stayed put at Tursko. Browne’s courage was commendable, but could have been very costly. About 0500 hours, April 30, the Austrians reached their new camp. The army paused at Stredolas while the baggage train hovered about Horskowitz.

  Even here, the main body could not long tarry. The whitecoats did not have far to fall back. The army hitched backwards the short distance on Prague. The Prussian advanced guard, composed of the grenadiers and boasting 40 full squadrons of cavalry, immediately pressed forward towards Tuchomirschitz. But the enemy refused to leave the place peacefully. Here Browne had his headquarters when Prince Charles finally, belatedly, arrived on the scene.54 Browne’s terminal condition had drained away much of his vital force while a demoralizing retreat in the face of the surging bluecoats certainly did nothing to help matters.

  When the new supreme army commander stood before the unfortunate person of Marshal Browne, the latter broke down. April 30, Prince Charles officially took command of the Austrian forces, declaring under Browne’s direction “nobody [in the army] had any orders or knew what he was supposed to do.”55 That may or may not have been true, but at least Browne was prepared to wage a preventative battle to stop the enemy rendezvous. Charles was not similarly inclined. Moreover, Browne had the necessary foresight to release the local citizenry to loot the nearby supply depots along with the soldiers before the Prussians could arrive.

  As for Frederick, his efforts to destroy the Arenberg-Browne force had been wholly unsuccessful, in spite of early promise and early effort. The enemy had reached the vicinity of Prague in fair fighting condition. Except for that brief skirmish on the Eger, there had been no major Austrian effort launched against the king’s own column until they nearly reached Prague.

  Meanwhile, on the left—to the east—the second column of Bevern was making steady forward progress. It moved out on April 20, coming in from Zittau and Hirschfeld. Bevern’s vanguard quickly encountered Königsegg, who had the unenviable task thrust upon him of curtailing Bevern’s progress for as long as possible. An enemy body of 400 infantry and Pandours was taken completely by surprise at Böhmisch-Friedland (April 20).56 The shock of encountering the masses of the bluecoats meant that the Austrians’ only recourse was surrender. MacGuire, in a post at Gabel with seven infantry and three cavalry regiments, moved to cut off the line of communication that Bevern was so dependent upon.

  Bevern was immediately compelled to detach a strong force, some 7,000 men, to look closely after MacGuire’s designs. The latter made a weak advance, but Bevern’s hussars, taking up post in the Lausitzer-Neisse, caused him to fall back upon Gabel again. Lacy was moving up all the while to help Königsegg. The latter was grimly determined to try to contain the bluecoat momentum, and fell back upon Reichenberg, where he took up a position that barred Bevern’s farther penetration into Bohemia. Reichenberg lies among the low hills of the Neisse Valley.

  Across from the place on the opposite bank of the Neisse River, west of the town, a clear hollow flanked by two unusually high forested mountains abutted. Here Königsegg chose to make his stand.

  April 20, same day that Bevern mo
ved out on his mission from Kratzau, the Austrian commander took up there, building and putting in batteries, doing his best to erect a strong barrier to the enemy’s momentum. This was all backed up with a secure supply line as well as a good stock of ammunition. The surrounding forests were so thick “it make[s] it difficult for any kind of troops to pass.”57 Bevern’s Prussians reached the immediate vicinity in strength on the same day. He still “retained fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons.”58 The duke found the enemy already well posted in a position that barred his continued advance, and encamped with the avowed intention of dislodging the Austrians ensconced at Reichenberg the following day.59 His bluecoat force took post with just a small brook separating its left flank from the Austrian lines.60

  The whitecoats had a covering force at Gröttau. This was led by Colonel Karl Prince von Liechtenstein, consisting of 800 cavalry and 300 infantry who would not depart their present locale without some “persuasion.” A frontal attack on Königsegg’s army was judged as too hazardous under the circumstances. But “the interval between the centre and the left was occupied by a plain.”61 With Königsegg’s superiority, Bevern would have to be most diligent in how to deploy his forces in order to obtain the best advantage.62

  Before the main attack, there were necessary preliminaries.63 Puttkammer went right to work, scattering Liechtenstein’s force with a determined, powerful blow. He took some prisoners and about 60 horses, which found useful employment in the Prussian service. But the highlight of April 20’s activities was a forced evacuation of whitecoats from the nearby Graffenstein Castle. The force there was quite stubborn, at the beginning. So the 100 or so Austrians present were “treated” to a nice dose of 12-pounder Prussian cannon shot for their trouble. Meanwhile, Liechtenstein’s disgruntled rearguard took refuge in a nearby graveyard at Kratzau. It took a more sustained effort to evict the enemy from the latter post this time around. Major-General Emmanuel von Schöning’s64 advanced guard left off a dozen or so cannon shot in their direction, which really “helped” the Austrians on their way.

  Königsegg’s force was about 16,700–13,200 infantry in 14 battalions and 15 grenadier companies, and approximately 3,400 riders in 22 squadrons, with a full gun complement of 78 pieces, including 26 heavy guns.65 His flanks were covered by the two rises we have already surveyed. His right was at the Iser-Gebirge, and the left leaned upon the Jeschken-Gebirge. Bevern, by contrast, brought a slightly smaller force to the scene. About 14,500 men, of which some 11,300 were infantry, along with over 3,100 cavalry. In terms of ordnance, the Prussians had a distinct disadvantage; Bevern only had some 40 guns with him on the day of the battle,66 including 12 heavy pieces.

  At dawn on April 21, Bevern deployed his army and, crossing the swampy ground directly in front, proceeded to attack the Austrian left.67 Some deception by the Prussians was involved. The right wing of the Austrians was commanded by Lacy; he was not timid. Bevern sent General Lestwitz with a small force to try to divert Lacy’s attention from the proceedings further down the Austrian line. To begin the day’s action, the duke unleashed his cavalry (15 full squadrons under Lt.-Gen. Friedrich Eugene von Württemberg)68 against the Austrian horse, posted hard about Franzenthal. The latter were under the leadership of Pálffry and Liechtenstein. The Austrian formations were still a bit shaky from the previous day. Bevern’s artillery, all the while, played with great effect upon the participants.69 Many of the Prussian losses were inflicted on this day by their own guns. And there were other factors.

  Bevern feared for his left wing, especially as he suspected a large body of the Austrian infantry present were concealed behind a front line abatis, interspersed among the woods on the Jeschken-Gebirge. An initial attack by Bevern’s infantry was made, in which the Prinz von Preussen (18th Infantry), joined by other units, drove the Austrian foot soldiers on the rise back upon a second line of abatis in short order. This withdrawal immediately exposed the charging Prussian cavalry to a flanking fire.70

  In trying to ride down the Austrian horse, the bluecoat cavalry came under heavy fire from the redoubts on the right and infantry small arms fire on their left. Three several attacks were mounted, but lengthening casualties finally put an end to those efforts. Bevern, nothing daunted, then sent a large infantry squad—composed of the battalions of Möllendorf and the Standing Grenadier Battalion # 1 of General Henning Alexander von Kahlden,71 along with the 1st battalion from the 23rd Infantry of Major-General Friedrich Wilhelm von Forcade de Biaix—to outflank the cavalry support by a circuitous route up the mountain. Puttkammer’s hussars then emerged from concealment in a hollow to attack the Austrian flank. This respite allowed Eugene of Württemberg’s dragoons (which included the exceptional 1st Dragoons of Normann), to renew their attack upon the unsteady Austrian horse and put them to flight.

  The covert operation up the mountain outflanked Königsegg, and the infantry on the Jeschken-Gebirge abandoned their posts and fled. This finally gave the Prussians the advantage of the ground.72 Königsegg did not use his advantage of the terrain to the full, especially failing to utilize the mountains for vantage. For once the Prussians gained the high ground, the issue was hardly in doubt.

  The advancing forces advanced head-on against the main body of the Austrians. The Darmstadt Regiment, led by Colonel Johann Kaspar von Hertzberg,73 pointed the way in this endeavor. The Prussian pursuit was “with great slaughter from hill to hill as far as Rochlitz and Dorfell.”74 Now Königsegg’s center, compromised beyond repair, promptly disintegrated. Königsegg tried to rally, but the Prussian cavalry operating against his exposed left wing and rear “thought proper to abandon their camp, which was entrenched by all the rules of art.”75 All was not bad. “The retreat was made in good order, covered by Count Lascy [sic], who commanded the right.”76

  This ended the Battle of Reichenberg.77 The Austrians lost 1,000 dead and wounded, 500 more as prisoners, and three battle flags. Prussian losses were more than 700 men, including 193 killed and above 469 wounded.78 Major-General Carl Ludwig von Normann’s 1st Dragoons suffered heavy losses; “35 dead and 114 wounded.”79 In almost romantic novel fashion, Normann himself took sword in hand and killed the Austrian Lt.-Gen. August Count Porporatti after a short scuffle. Count Hohenfelds was also killed, and Prince Liechtenstein was badly wounded.

  Königsegg fell back quickly, with Bevern heckling him all along. He reached Liebenau, some 20 miles south of Reichenberg. Here the Austrian commander halted in a narrow defile, forming up again in front of Bevern’s line-of-march. This much stronger camp could potentially hold up Bevern’s farther progress into Bohemia. The Prussian vanguard pressed towards Zascal. A body of Croats deployed there, backed up by some regulars; it spent most of April 23 and 24 hiding from view, and peppering the bluecoats with small-arms fire. This resistance was so stout that Bevern momentarily pulled back his forward elements to give them some rest after their trials.

  However, the efforts of the Prussians had also inexorably managed to drive a wedge between Königsegg and Daun. The latter was busy concentrating his forces between Kolin and Königgrätz. In retrospect, he did precious little to help the other Austrian forces.80 And there were other Austrian forces. At Zittau some 400 infantry and 30 hussars were under the charge of a Major von Göhr.

  Schwerin had his army concentrated at Landshut by mid–April.81 His column had the greatest marching distance to cover of the three, and for that reason had been deployed far ahead of the others.82 On April 18, he got underway, Winterfeldt leading the van.83 Following Winterfeldt, were the two formations of Lt.-Gen. Heinrich Augustus de la Motte Fouquet, Major-General Heinrich von Hautcharmoy84 and Manteuffel.

  Through the Reisengebirge Mountains ran a small pass which Schwerin utilized to cross into Bohemia. In front of him, Serbelloni at Königgrätz was in a good post, but little resistance was encountered. Serbelloni withdrew towards Alt-Bunzlau and Brandeis, towards Prague. With a characteristic slothful approach, Serbelloni (who actually was among the most hated general
s in the army) would contribute little to the Austrian cause in the early, crucial days of the invasion. He did leave a garrison at Königgrätz, and then moved so slowly that Prince Charles was shortly able to countermand his marching orders. Serbelloni covered a bare 65 miles during 17 days of “marching.”

  Winterfeldt encountered an enemy body of 300 Pandours strategically placed in a narrow, but steep, mountain pass by Guldene Els. Wasting no time on preliminaries, he ordered off some troops to ascend the steep mountains to take the enemy’s light troops in the rear. This was no sooner said than accomplished, and the offending body of men was forced to either surrender as P.O.W.s or be otherwise “neutralized.”

  April 23, Schwerin’s men put the castle at Tetschen again under “siege.” The Austrians there, under Major-General Ludwig Freiherr von Butler, were loath to leave. The bluecoats, just as in the previous campaign, required the place so they could utilize the Elbe. The Prussians managed to force Butler out. This was chiefly the result of the activities of Major-General Karl Friedrich von Mayr,85 who led some irregulars that pinched off Butler’s efforts to defend the castle, effectively cutting off supplies and succor.

  Schwerin was thus able to sweep through Gitschin, Sobotka, and to approach Liebenau.86 From there, he was very close to Königsegg’s post. His advance directly threatened the enemy’s flank and rear at Liebenau.87 Königsegg, after sending an alarming communication to the Austrian high command that Schwerin with 50,000 Prussians was before him, abandoned the place. His shaky force fell back to the south-southwest on Münchengrätz in an attempt to prevent the juncture of Bevern and Schwerin, as well as cover the main Austrian magazine at Jung-Bunzlau.