Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War
Page 15
By this point, the Prussian guns were working day and night to make mush of Prague’s walls. Some twenty batteries of 12-pounder cannon, and ten of the enormous 24-pounders,33 were particularly effective.34 There was enough ammo for the job. Along with the 12-pounder guns, were some 20,000 shells; 10,000 for the 24-pounders; and 6,000 for the big mortars.35 The display of firepower kept those shut-in within the city in an agitated state. Worse still, a new Prussian battery (this one just above Andelka) had been completed; it was set to open on the Austrian lines on June 2. This would exacerbate the gloomy situation, so Charles had no choice but to prepare yet another new, stronger response. The offending battery was protected behind two lines of redoubts, so this would be no cakewalk by any means.
During the night of June 2–3, the new enterprise was set for. The enemy posts were some 290 men strong, with about half that number at the main battery. A preliminary attack overran the first redoubt, forcing the surprised defenders back upon the inner. The Austrians quickly pressed on to the main line, the bluecoats retiring. The battery was snagged, and the intruders wisely spiked/destroyed the guns before they retired to their own lines. This was one of the very few marked successes the garrison had enjoyed against the enemy up to that point. Colonel Laudon and the elder son of Marshal Browne, Colonel Joseph Graf Browne Decamus, led this far more successful foray.36 The meat ration had by that point been curtailed altogether. The only meat available was any that had been secretly hoarded up, and most of that had already been discovered.
The returning men brought some badly needed enemy supplies and guns with them. Their total losses in this endeavor amounted to some 23 killed, but the attackers “killed more than 120” of the Prussians.37 Then came disturbing news: some 3,000 bluecoats had arrived at Troja. Scouts reported this enemy force was trying to put down a pontoon bridge thereabouts, much closer to the main pontoon bridges.
This news caused the garrison to push out reconnaissance patrols, including a detachment of 500 men at Holeschowitz. The Austrians stayed alert throughout the night. The shelling continued apace from the Prussian batteries. Things were getting ever more desperate. The firing was directed from the Wischerad, the Žižkaberg, and the Mansfeldt Garden area. Worse still, by June 3, the sustained shelling was beginning to have its desired intent. Fires broke forth in different sections of the tortured city and threatened to become major. Flames again engulfed the Old Dominican Church in Old Town and looked like a catastrophe in the making. In addition, the incomplete nature of the Belvedere Park fortifications was inviting another Prussian attack.38
With the meat ration problem, prices on the Black Market were soaring in an environment where demand was far outstripping supply. Then word came in that Keith’s men were dismantling the heavy batteries they had on the Žižkaberg. There was a gradual lessening of the pace of the shelling, including fewer of the hot projectiles that had caused so much of the damage already inflicted on the city. The bluecoats had expended enormous quantities of powder and shot, and their effort appeared to be flagging. On the other hand, the big batteries on the Hradschin continued to do their deadly work.
And there was suddenly new disturbing evidence of an impending Prussian stroke seen during the daylight hours. Reinforcements were sent to the Mansfeldt Garden area. The bluecoats were definitely up to something. Austrian posts on the ramparts were advised to stay on the alert, and the patrols were all stepped up. An unconfirmed rumor had Marshal Daun at Czaslau with 80,000 Prussians under their king holding a secure post close-by.
On June 5, a thorough reconnaissance by General Luchessi tried to feel out the position of the Prussians just beyond Prague’s beleaguered walls. The enemy’s guns still continued their roar, although it was ever lessening in intensity, as the powder and ammo for the big guns were being used up. Patrols found little stirring. There was a noticeable effort to step up completion of the crowning works on the Belvedere, this to guard against any possible Prussian effort to seize the posts there.
The discovery of a possible Prussian spy did provide a useful distraction. Thanks largely to Charles’s laxness, Keith’s exposed, vulnerable post continued to remain mostly undisturbed. Isolated cannon fire and some shifting of Prussian forces was reported over near Königssal, which alarmed the whitecoats that more sinister moves might be in the offing. The scouts reported moving Prussian formations, but they were hitching to the rear and, June 10, the firing from the Mansfeldt Garden area abruptly ceased. The bluecoats promptly deserted their nearby post. Just the day before, Prussian patrols had abandoned the works on Andelka, but not before destroying the fortifications. This unwise move immediately made the rest of the Prussian lines more vulnerable, and hastily new enemy patrols appeared in strength in the Mansfeldt Garden area that very same afternoon.
Nevertheless, before the newcomers could make themselves at home, a substantial Croat force was put forth to drive away the bluecoats. This was actually accomplished, in a most desperate fashion, and the works the enemy had been constructing thereabouts ordered destroyed. Prussian artillery responded by concentrating on the area, to prevent the outright destruction of their new gun batteries. The guns, it seemed, were always working. During the daylight of June 9, one of the overworked Prussian cannon suddenly blew apart, and landed forcefully among the entrenchments. Thirteen men were killed outright, and two dozen others were wounded. Meanwhile, though, the rumor mill was spilling out new intelligence hinting the siege might be nearing its end.
For example, evening of June 11, the bluecoats set afire the village of Podoly, close to the Wischerad. Then the bombardment, which had tailed off almost completely, was suddenly resumed with greater ferocity. In addition, General Materni on the opposite side of the Moldau saw Prussian activity. Enemy wounded had been removed to the Monastery of St. Margareth. The Prussian forces crossing the bridges were both infantry and cavalry. General Luchessi was ordered from Prague to investigate what the Prussians might be up to. His scouts discovered a powerful enemy force making for Lieban, and, about 1800 hours, some of Keith’s cavalry forded the Moldau heading for Böhmisch-Brod.
The Austrian response was to try to discern what all this activity portended. Frederick’s men had been shifting around quite a bit recently. Prince Charles sent out General Kheul with a strong force towards the monastery to see about this renewed Prussian effort. Just about then, enemy deserters who came over to the Austrian lines informed them the Prussian besieging force had no more than 40,000 men in the investment lines.39 And, June 13, the alarmed Frederick, taking with him 10,000 men (all he felt he could safely spare from the siege), marched to join Bevern. This created an obvious reduction in the force which had been blockading Prague.
Not everyone in the Prussian camp believed marching to face Marshal Daun’s army was a wise decision after all.40 Marshal Keith, who always seemed to keep a level head about his person in military matters, was adamantly opposed to this march. He advised the king to avoid such a contingency, which could only compel Daun to come after him. There were two reasons put forth: (1) An offensive mounted against the Austrian field army would likely find Daun and his army posted on terrain well suited to defense; (2) There was little to gain, and much to lose, from forcing the marshal’s hand. Conversely, if the Austrian marshal were forced to thus act, he should then find the Prussians posted on ground of their choosing. Moreover, keeping the army at full strength before Prague increased the chances of a successful siege.
Daun was still an unknown entity. That could succeed as well as fail. No one yet knew how the marshal would mount any offensive operation against the besiegers of Prague. He would, after all, have to fight at least one battle to get the siege raised.41 The Austrian leadership was staking everything on Daun, even stripping the garrison of Vienna, three full battalions, to send to reinforce Daun. This left Vienna exposed; “the proud city had as defenders but a few cripples.”42
Time in this narrow context seemed to favor the Prussians. Prague could not hold out indefini
tely. However, Frederick the Great, ever the aggressor, could not resist the thought of tackling the relief army beyond the walls of Prague. In this case, the besieged could do nothing to aid Daun, except to tie down as many Prussians as they could in the siege lines. Besides, there must have been some conceit in a man who had yet to lose a battle after so many desperate encounters. In hindsight, it seems easy to argue that Keith’s analysis was really the best course to follow. It was by no means so certain in early June 1757. The Prussian monarch was rolling the dice on a long shot here; he just did not realize how long the shot was.
The Austrians in Prague were not inactive, either. General Kheul had 28 companies of grenadiers, with four cannon. During the night, Austrian patrols from Andelka clashed with a nearby Prussian force. This provided a backdrop against the Prussian guns which were still hammering the city.
With little happening and no fanfare on the horizon (only a few men, about 40, were at St. Margareth, according to the latest intelligence), Kheul was ordered to stand down. Most of his force was ordered back into Prague forthwith, except for the cavalry. He moved this force of 200 horse on Beraun. There were no movements of consequence taking place thereabouts, and the bluecoats, for their part, were not inclined to bring any on. Suddenly, the Prussian battalions which had been present the night before at the Moldau reappeared. For a moment or two, it looked like trouble for General Kheul’s horsemen, since they were seriously outnumbered. It soon became obvious the Prussians were meant as cover for a convoy of about 140 wagons which forthwith crossed the Moldau and made for Lieban. With numbers of wheeled transport moving in that direction, the Prussians took their cue from this maneuver and drew off in that direction. Since the enemy did not appear anxious to bring on an engagement, Kheul suspected something must be up.
For Marshal Keith, despite his best efforts, most of the attention of the royal army had been shifted away to the king and this confrontation with Daun. Prince Charles then received an intelligence from Daun. The latter had the coming test of arms with the king and his minions on his mind, and he wanted Charles to be kept aware of events to the extent possible. Despite the best efforts of Keith to conceal the reduction in Prussian strength before Prague, the new developments awoke the Austrians to new efforts.
This would be a new sortie, empowered at a fresh council-of-war (June 14), which would have General MacGuire for overall commander. Under his direction would be General Materni with eight battalions and 20 grenadier companies. This force would issue out of the Reich Gate to launch a bold stroke upon the middle of the Prussian camp. Lt.-Gen. Salomon Sprecher von Bernegg, with 16 companies of grenadiers along with another eight battalions, was leading another force. He was to strike between the Mansfeldt Garden area and the bridge over at Podoba. The new ventures were to be made at dawn. The primary objective was to inflict as much injury and distract the Prussians as much as possible.
To provide the capper, Colonel Laudon was to launch an assault with his Croats against the enemy works closest to the New Town side. No success could be looked for here, however. During the day, a torrential downpour erupted, soaking the entire area once again. The weather created such adverse conditions, the jumping off time set for dawn was at first delayed, then canceled. This was a most unfortunate turn of events for the whitecoats. At the precise time when the main Prussian effort was being deflected elsewhere, the weather was turning against the besieged. On the other hand, this made for good news for Marshal Keith and his men. A successful enterprise at that moment could have been a decisive blow, especially in view of events as they worked out between the king and Daun in the coming battle.
Then, June 15, just after lunch, there came the sounds of hostile fire through the distant air. It was at first believed this just might be the signal Marshal Daun had been trying to arrange for. By late afternoon, some one-half of the garrison had been roused and were ready to march, waiting only for orders to do so. The effort would be to move out as fast as they could when Daun’s men were close enough to try to link up with the body of men sallying forth through the gates of Prague. The men were prepped to move out.
About 1800 hours, the scouts discerned, instead of Marshal Daun’s long anticipated men, fresh Prussian formations moving closer in the plain between Michele and Sablielitz. Other enemy bodies could be observed as the day wore on, including some officers galloping back and forth to take their place at the head of their troops.43
There was also a pronounced diminishment in the intensity of the Prussian fire upon Prague. Prince Charles was aware of this. What it portended he did not know. With the dawn none of this appeared to have effected change in the Prussian lines. At the same time, Marshal Daun sent word to Charles the relief of Prague would come before the end of June. In light of this new development, rations were reduced again, but there was at least enough grain for bread to hold on.44 Risking the garrison in “needless” sorties, then, might not be productive and could harm Prince Charles’s position.
Meanwhile, the Prussians were busy strengthening the lines from the Žižkaberg to the Moldau. Then, June 17, word arrived that Daun and the king had clashed. Daun was said to have won the battle. However, there was no immediate change in the make-up of the Prussian camp.45 Nevertheless, the Austrians prepared a strike force to move out when Daun appeared. On June 18, the Prussian shelling seemed to redouble.46 But their efforts to capture Prague were dragging on.
Meanwhile, the anticipated clash of arms took place between the king and Daun on June 18. The result was Frederick’s first defeat, a serious setback. The news of the disaster reached the siege lines around Prague about 0200 hours, on June 19. Major Johann von Grant came riding into the Prussian siege lines, and headed immediately for the Žižkaberg. Here Prince Ferdinand and the Prussian staff (except for Keith) had quarters. Grant handed Ferdinand an order from the king to prepare to raise the siege of the city, and fall back upon Leitmeritz. The bluecoats had suffered a near catastrophe hard about Kolin.
Shock and amazement accompanied the bad news. The king’s eldest brother, Prince Augustus Wilhelm, upon hearing the news, burst out shouting, throwing curses and accusations in all directions. He was finally settled down. The remainder of the commanders received the news with relative calm. After an interlude of some duration, all began preparing for the retreat. Orders were issued to dismantle the siege batteries, to withdraw the heavy guns. The equipment was to be packed up and prepared to go. What about the enemy?
June 19 was destined to be a day which proved nearly fatal to Prussian designs in this war; it seemed to dawn rather innocently from the Austrian view. The Prussian guns continued to work. But there was more noise than damage inflicted. There was a noticeable lessening of the big guns being shot, and some initial movement of surplus equipment was observed on the road towards Brandeis. From the Austrian lines, there were other signs the enemy were up to something, since the energetic movements were the most seen since the start of the siege. Then, late in the afternoon, definite word arrived that Daun had indeed won a great victory. Frederick would have to give up the siege.
There was no question the intelligence could be wrong. During the night of June 19–20, confirmation arrived. About daylight, the bluecoats which had been charged with the siege of New Town showed signs of preparing to lift the siege. Smoke was sighted coming from the camp and the wooden battery posts on the Žižkaberg; the Prussians were destroying their immobile equipment. With the coming of daylight, the garrison could see the enemy making preparations out in the open to leave. The bridges had already been taken up the night before by the Prussian engineers.
With the Prussians obviously making a break for it, the Croats and hussars galloped out of Wischerad and attacked part of the Prussian rearguard. But the enemy still had fight in them; they turned on their pursuers, and a firefight of some intensity ensued. Only after a most desperate struggle did the Croats win the position.47 Another force sallied forth to seize the remnants of the Prussian positions on the Žižkaber
g and the Kleinharska. When the Prussians still ensconced there refused to go, a vigorous effort to outflank them, forced them back in some confusion on Hlaupetin.
The withdrawal was conducted in three columns, by Böhmisch-Brod and Winortz, with the last aiming at Podebrad. As this was clear, Prince Charles pushed out Prince Löwenstein with a body of horse to shadow the withdrawing Prussians and see where they were heading. The entire Prussian force, except for Keith with some 18,000 men, was retreating. Keith kept his posts throughout June 20, doing his best to conceal what was happening.48 By then, Charles was making preparations to attack Keith’s now very exposed position. A quick plan was worked up: Baden-Durlach with 12 companies of grenadiers and 6,000 men was to strike Keith’s left; MacGuire had an equal force with which to attack Keith’s center, hard by Andelka. Arenberg had a similar number of men to assail the Prussian right. The Austrians accordingly issued from Prague on their missions.
As soon as Marshal Keith discerned what his suddenly alert foe was up to, he began withdrawing. The tents were struck. The Austrian attack was actually blunted by a heavy screen of Prussian cavalry, pressed into service by Keith to screen his retreat. The Prussian force on the Weissenberg stood to, and the Austrian guns opened on the Prussian works. This little action was a one-sided affair. MacGuire’s men overlapped the enemy palisades and trenches in front of their lines, and slowly pressed the stubborn enemy back. Baden-Durlach’s men did not encounter serious resistance, and he moved as quickly as possible to link up with MacGuire. Lacy’s men arrived on the scene, followed by Arenberg. The remaining bluecoats retired to join Keith’s left, which had been busy withdrawing behind this screen.
The Prussians reunited their forces as soon as possible, retiring to Schlau, while the vulnerable baggage train was making its tortured way past Hostawitz under a rather light guard. The bluecoats set fire to the village of Rzep and two nearby hamlets. This provided a smoke screen under which the baggage train used the time to close up with the main army. Keith’s men were in a tight spot, and a sustained Austrian effort might have proven decisive. Unfortunately, General Kheul’s forces were exhausted.