Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  As a result, about dusk, Kheul called off the pursuit, under direct orders from Charles. The latter had left specific instructions to sustain only a limited pursuit. The general himself had his horse killed under him during that last sortie. The Croats did their best to make things miserable for the Prussian escort of the baggage train. They managed to ransack some of the baggage, and carted away the pontoon bridges. For a loss of 84 men, killed and wounded, the Austrians inflicted much heavier damage to the Prussians. The latter lost 1,400 killed, wounded, prisoners, or deserted, along with 13 guns.

  Nevertheless, Keith did a commendable job under the troubling circumstances conducting this withdrawal. His men were busy “carrying everything of any use along.”49 It seems clear from a latter-day perspective, that Charles had it within his grasp to inflict severe damage on his great enemy. This does not detract from the Prussian effort in any way. Keith’s men had to perform a number of very difficult maneuvers to shake off any long-range enemy pursuit. His men could not reach Leitmeritz via Budin until June 28.

  General Nádasti got into Prague about 0400 hours (June 21) and reported to Prince Charles in person about the great victory at Kolin. This appeared to energize the Austrian commander. The whitecoats just then were dealing with hundreds of wounded, both Austrian and Prussian, which had been abandoned by the enemy during their retreat. The people who had been shut up in Prague all that time required resupply and a little rest. The soldiers would need some recovery time before they set off in pursuit of the retreating enemy. As for Daun, he left his army in its old camp just one day he issued orders to set out to chase the enemy. As Horace St. Paul wrote, “the supplies were starting to fail.”50 It was clear that, had Daun not won at Kolin, Prague must soon have succumbed. In the event, the enemy had been clearly knocked about. Prussian deserters started to arrive in droves from the moment of the retreat.

  But the Austrians themselves clearly were in no condition to take immediate advantage of the enemy’s discomfiture. Even General Kheul himself was not unaffected by events, as his lost horse attests. So the pursuit was delayed. This gave the Prussian king a breathing space which he took full advantage of. In their shoes, Frederick’s actions would have been clear. He would not have allowed any breathing space, particularly to an enemy in such bad shape at the moment.

  There was a pursuit. Colonel Laudon took his troopers and nipped at the rear of Keith’s men, capturing dozens of prisoners in this manner. A total of 139 prisoners, to be exact. So, despite Keith’s best effort, Laudon was still able to work his magic with the Croats. To slow down this pursuit, the Prussians set fire to nearby villages. This infuriated Laudon to the point he sent a dispatch rider to Keith telling him, unless he gave orders to stop the practice, then Laudon would give no quarter to any Prussians he captured. It also appears that nearly 1,200 men had deserted from or been captured from Keith’s forces.51 June 23, Laudon attacked and severely mauled a Prussian force at Welwarn. Following a short fight, the enemy fled, leaving approximately 242 more prisoners in Laudon’s hands. Kolin had really taken much of the bite from the Prussian bark.

  Once the general pursuit was underway, the Austrians left a garrison of five battalions under Lt.-Gen. Wetzel to hold Prague. The armies of Daun and Charles had already had council. The citizens of the city had been busy trying to recover from the effects of the siege. There had been extensive damage within Prague. The city walls had suffered, although the extensive posts the Prussians left behind were a plus. Now to the human saga. Prince Charles had been forced into desperate straits. On June 5, he had attempted to expel some 12,000 civilians from the city,52 but had just ended up by readmitting the whole lot. Many citizens had perished during the siege/blockade.53

  Chapter Eight

  Headed for Battle at Kolin

  While these events had been transpiring in and about Prague, Frederick had been busy with Daun. The king, on his way to join Bevern (June 13), moved with his force past Kosteletz and into Zdanitz. Beyond the latter, the monarch (accompanied only by a small vanguard), suddenly encountered masses of Austrian infantry near Zasmück. Frederick with his little band fell back on Zdantitz. The enemy had no clue how close they had come to capturing the Prussian king. The potential results were incalculable under the circumstances. As it was, reinforcements quickly arrived to restore order.

  But the Austrians did announce their presence. Major Constantine von Billerbeck took off from Nimburg, accompanied by some 800 cavalry, toting a train of wagons headed for the main army (June 15). This was a critical supply train for the Prussians, being so deep in enemy territory. Billerbeck kept his cool when he was set upon by 4,000 enemy horse: “despite unequal numbers, [Billerbeck] put up a successful defense of three hours and delivered the wagons.”1

  As of June 12, Daun’s main body was concentrated at Janowitz after moving from Göltsch-Jenikau (marching about 1400 hours). Nádasti, with a substantial body of light troops, rose from Czaslau before daylight on June 12 to screen the movements of the main body from Prussian posts about Kuttenberg, but there was really no attempt to ascertain Austrian plans.

  Early the next morning, Daun’s men started off in four columns, aiming this time for Bickau. Light bodies of troops, accompanied by the hussars of Gersdorf, pushed off in front of the main body. Bevern responded by drawing his men on high ground beyond Bickau.2 Bevern was really stalling for time, while his vulnerable baggage train made off. He employed some ten guns and all of his available cavalry, backed up with infantry support, in this endeavor. The Prussians launched an attack against the advancing hussars, commanded by General Nádasti.

  Denied the full effects of the Austrian infantry, Nádasti was still enabled to drive back the enemy on Kuttenberg, setting fire to some of the structures beyond the Prussian right in proximity to the enemy, then pressed hard against the posts there. The Prussian artillery laid down a heavy shelling, and this enabled Bevern to withdraw his men without substantial enemy interference.

  After Bevern had left, Nádasti pressed his men through the streets of Kuttenberg and secured the place, but some nearby Prussian posts were maintained long enough to get their columns on the road towards Kolin. As Daun had occupied Bickau, General Beck’s riders tried to mount a pursuit of the Prussians, but their artillery found the means to fend off the general by effectively pounding him and his men. Daun set up his headquarters at Kautzer, and the Austrian army encamped in long lines beyond Bickau.

  Frederick could thus dispose of only about 30,000 men against the 50,000 or more of Marshal Daun. The forward Austrian elements were only three miles from Bevern’s lines on June 13, between Planian and Krzeczhorz, without discovery. Bevern then detached Ziethen (about 1100 hours) on June 13 to make a reconnaissance of the new Austrian position. This was a rather formidable force. The Grenadier Battalions of General Friedrich Wilhelm von Wangenheim and Nymschöfsky (33/42), 1,000 Cuirassiers and Dragoons, plus 20 squadrons of hussars.3 Ziethen meant to occupy the rises overlooking Maleschau. His mounted riders struggled to clear away a stubborn enemy light cavalry screen. The indomitable little hussar led the infantry accompaniment against the enemy on the hill. The Austrians reinforced the rise. Still, this initial stroke succeeded, but Ziethen discovered more than he bargained for. Marshal Daun had been able, behind the rise of Maleschau, to shift his army around to confront Bevern.

  The astonished Ziethen sent mounted riders who apprized Bevern of the nearness of the main enemy army. Daun’s chief method of movement was to maintain his entire army, save the left wing, in a static position which did not appear at first glance to threaten Bevern’s posts. But the left flank, camouflaged by thick woods, succinctly moved into a position to threaten the Bevern force. Only from Maleschau, could the elevated view afford the bluecoats the timely warning. Bevern reacted.

  Bevern’s camp was uncomfortably close. With his force now in danger, Bevern withdrew through the nearby defile. Ziethen was compelled to beat back the cavalry of Nádasti, which naturally sought to bar
this retreat, through that defile of Pikan. The Prussian defense was energetic, and the bluecoats whirled round to confront the pursuers as soon as Bevern’s men arrived at a level field where he could at last rank his men for action. Daun broke off the pursuit forthwith, while Bevern remained in his new camp, about Kolin. The next day, the duke withdrew back on the king’s main army, which was at Kaurzim by then. Bevern split his men into three columns to make this withdrawal easier and to preclude the Austrian pursuit. The duke himself drew back by the Kaiser-Straβe directly on Kaurzim, while Ziethen withdrew through Krichenau, also aiming for Kaurzim. Finally, the formations of General Tresckow, which appeared to be the most vulnerable, pulled back through Suchdol with a view towards Malotitz.4 Beck, with a force of some 6,000 men, promptly went to seize Kuttenberg.

  The king, from all appearances, seriously underestimated the capability of his new foe. From the outset, Frederick believed both Bevern and Ziethen were mistaken on two key points: The size of Daun’s army and Daun’s intentions. To elaborate, the Prussian monarch believed the wily hussar leader had been distracted by Nádasti’s covering force into way overestimating the size of the force at Daun’s beck and call. Since the king’s reputation for receiving opinions contrary to his own was well-known, this contributed to the dearth of support for the views postulated by Bevern and Ziethen.

  The Prussian monarch signaled out Major-General Friedrich Augustus von Finck, from whom he assumed that the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern had received faulty advice (Finck, after all, was his chief-of-staff) as well as the fiery General Manstein. The latter’s only “crime” was to belong to the “camp” of Ziethen. While it might appear odd to unfairly place blame on mere subordinates, the king’s conceit was apparently reaching new heights just prior to the debacle at Kolin.

  Frederick assumed that Marshal Daun had retreated upon the first rumor of his coming with a larger force. After all, this was the only field army immediately available to Maria Theresa. It followed a full-blown pursuit would have to be launched to prevent the enemy from getting away. There were some preliminaries which had to be accomplished before any forward movements could be attempted. So the king’s erroneous reasoning before the debâcle at Kolin really helped contribute to the coming melée. Powerful scouting parties were pushed out to check on what Daun was up to. These parties were impeded in their appointed duties by thick bodies of Pandours. Nevertheless, the seasoned Prussian reconnaissance parties accomplished their purpose.

  Daun’s army was discovered in a position of great strength. To size up the enemy, Captain Friedrich Wilhelm von Gaudi (along with Belling) penetrated the rise overlooking Oberkrut. From here, Daun’s army was discovered to be in the location (Gintintz) previously noted by Ziethen and Bevern. The large Austrian army was deployed in three lines. Prussian headquarters staff (Frederick) apparently persuaded himself this latest recon had just discovered Nádasti’s camp and nothing more. Not satisfied, however, other forces were out probing during the day, and by the hours of the evening there was more direct confirmation of a substantial body of enemy cavalry near Stropschütz. The king had thought Daun was still camped about Goltz-Jenikau. Prussian patrols were strengthened and told off to look for further Austrian movements.

  Unfortunately for the Prussian cause, that enemy force disappeared during the night. This appeared to lend credence to the king’s unsteady reasoning. With the arrival of Prince Moritz, Frederick found a kindred spirit for his views which helped boost Frederick’s pride. The king was resolved to go “get” Daun. His Majesty informed Moritz that he intended to make for Janowitz, in order to turn Daun’s left flank and force a decision. The marshal himself was wasting no time. He rose from Gintintz and moved forward. Daun in person, leading 1,000 horsemen, galloped towards Krichenkow, while the main army followed in three columns.5 When the Austrians reached camp at about 1600 hours, they wasted no time in setting up camp. As for that missing enemy body, the king failed to realize that “Nádasti” was on the move. When the army marched through the defile at Stropschütz on June 17, Frederick was finally made aware of the danger. Surprised scouts informed his Majesty that Daun’s whole army was close-by at Krichenkow.

  The marshal had ranged his army into the set country near Kolin. A small tributary crossed the front of his position opposite to the Prussians nearby. There were pools of murky little lakelets, while his flanks and rear were protected by a series of small, stubby hills and knolls, surrounding marshy ground, with a few higher rises. One was the Kamayak Ridge. This rose up at right angles to Daun’s long front, from its closest western end continuing eastwards until it descended near Kolin. This would be most important in the upcoming struggle.

  The king arranged his army out parallel with the marshal, stretching from north to south. Frederick’s left leaned hard by Nimburg, where the Prussian battery was about to be set up. The Prussian left anchored round Kaurzim, while the right was positioned on an oblique position fronting the village of Malotitz. The bluecoat force, like its adversary, lay curled round through the irregularities of the ground, taking advantage of whatever cover it could offer.

  As for Daun, on June 16, his center was anchored just behind Swoyschitz, at the edge of the Kamayak, while his flanks tapered off towards the swampy ground, which was abundant in that region. The right was anchored close by the village of Pohortz, while the left extended almost to a rise near Hostich. Things were mostly quiet until Prince Moritz arrived as per royal orders on June 17. He had managed to gather some 4,000 additional reinforcements, as well as desperately needed provisions of all kinds. Frederick could now dispose of some 34,000 men to face Daun, but the latter still enjoyed the advantage of superior numbers.

  The king and Bevern had been discussing what should be done about the situation confronting them. The duke categorically advised against launching another attack, deferring action in this case to the still untested Marshal Daun. Much like Keith had advised. The concern of superior enemy numbers was an obvious problem, but was allayed somewhat by the startling statement of Moritz, who abruptly blurted out than an immediate attack was needed. The presence of the king, enjoined the rambling prince, was “worth 50,000 men.” His bold statements seem ironic in view of his later, less than stellar, conduct in the battle.

  Frederick himself required little justification for the next move. His confidence in his vaunted infantry was unshaken, in spite of its overall poor performance at Prague. He believed that they could turn a more numerous foe off their own entrenchments. This would help prove the king’s undoing at Kolin. Even the normally cooperative Ziethen complained of Frederick’s refusal to believe Daun could be in earnest with so many men.6As for Daun, summaries of his military skills varied, but so well-respected an historian as Tuttle likened him to a Turenne and pronounced him to be the Prussian king’s “most skillful antagonist.”7

  As soon as Daun received word through his scouts that the enemy were being reinforced from the siege lines around Prague, he decided to retire to a stronger position. His lack of self-confidence was reflected by the quality of his opponent.8 In three wars, and seven battles, the king was yet to be beaten. In addition, Frederick was leading probably the finest soldiers the age had to offer.

  With his resolve stiffened by the rash statement of Prince Moritz, the king shook his army into motion about 1600 hours on June 17. The bluecoats moved off to the left in two columns. Austrian scouts reported a deep ravine intervened between the two armies. The Prussians were observed to swing in behind Planian, a move which suddenly seemed to threaten the right side of Daun’s army.

  The Prussians did draw near Planian. General Beck was in position there. The latter returned fire on the Prussian advanced guard and offered a brief resistance. Then, with the growing Prussian presence before him, Beck’s force of some 2,000 men beat a retreat, back to the nearby village of Radenin. He did not hesitate to inform the marshal that the enemy were directly threatening his position. Prussian hussars immediately occupied Planian. This very bold move
put the bluecoats too close to the Austrian lines for Daun’s comfort, and he gave orders to rearrange the army.

  The Austrian right and center were summarily withdrawn. The heavy baggage was sent to the rear, about 1930 hours, while the main body took up post where the Reserve had been. This repositioned the army back upon the edge of the Kamayak Ridge, so that it faced the high road between Prague and Kolin, on a parallel course. In effect, the main body of the army and the reserve switched positions. The whole force was drawn in this new shape between Chotzemitz and Kolin. It was well into the night when the whitecoats completed this shift. The Austrian left now wrapped around the Kamayak, with the peak at Swoyschitz, the high end at Hradenin. The large Croat screen had been pushed forward to confront the curved part of the Prussian right. Here our old friend General Schöinach was leading the 6th, the 7th, and the 13th Cuirassiers. The Croats, for their part, were present beside the 25th Infantry (Lt.-Gen. Franz Ludwig Graf von Thürheim), the 47th (Lt.-Col. Alois Graf von Harrach), and the 59th Infantry of Marshal Daun himself. Lt.-Gen. Anton Graf Puebla von Portugall was commanding the lot, and he was striving to keep the enemy in the dark.

  Both of the Austrian flanks were on high ground, with the Austrian center holding a fairly level plain in between. The Austrian left, composed of four full strength infantry regiments under General Franz Joseph Baron Andlau, was close, while Lt.-Gen. Johann Winulphus Ludwig Friedrich Graf von Stahremberg, originally positioned in the line behind the former, had been shifted to a meaningful post directly behind Wied and Lt.-Gen. Claudius Freiherr von Sincère on the Krzeczhorz as a reserve for the Austrian center. Behind this, the cavalry reserves were posted below the road from Kaurzim to Krzeczhorz village. Sincère and Wied held the critical part of the Austrian right; here the soon-to-be-famous oakwood was the important consideration.