A Devil of a Whipping

by Lawrence E Babits

  While the British reformed their ranks, the last militiamen passed through the main line. “As soon as the militia were cleared away from before the second line, the musquetry then had orders to fire.”7 Continental muskets now joined the rifles of Gilmore and Hammond. Their fire covered the movement of the four Virginia companies onto line. Once the militia cleared the front of Lawson’s Virginia State Troops and Tate’s Augusta riflemen, they stepped forward. A half minute later, Buchanan’s and Combs’s riflemen advanced, closing all gaps in Howard’s line. A solid wall of infantry now blocked any further British advance.8

  MAP 14.Main-Line Positions after Militia Withdrawal

  Note: British Legion and light infantry frontage reduced by 25%, 7th Regiment frontage reduced by 20% in allowance for casualties at militia line.

  Morgan reported to Greene that “when the enemy advanced on our lines they received a well directed and incessant fire,” or, as Virginia private Richard Swearingen said, “the Regulars came up and began to Pour it into them nicely.”9 Continental officers reported the British advanced “under a Very heavy fire until the[y] got Within a few yards of us” and Howard’s “regiment commenced firing.” The firing “was kept up with coolness and constancy.”10 Howard’s solid line was arranged into three battalions for firing purposes. Wallace’s Virginia Continentals, Anderson’s Maryland Continentals, and Gilmore’s Virginia militia fired first for their respective battalions. In the center, Kirkwood fired after Anderson, then Mangers, then Dobson. When each Virginia company came on line, they fired. Then the cycle started again. Thomas Young, watching from Morgan Hill, was impressed: “when the regulars fired, it seemed like one sheet of flame from right to left.”11

  Once the volleys began, they quickly developed into a very hot fire. The deeper crash of musket volleys was punctuated by the higher crack of individual rifles and massed rifle volleys. The Americans “received [the British] with unshaken firmness.” “The fire on both sides was well supported, and produced much slaughter.”12 The fight grew more intense as both sides closed the range and kept up the pace of firing. Both British and Continentals “maintained their ground with great bravery; and the conflict between them and the British troops was obstinate and bloody.” “All the officers and men behaved with uncommon and undaunted bravery.”13

  Mounted officers stood out and were observed by soldiers. Maryland private Andrew Rock knew Morgan by sight and “saw him frequently at the battle of the Cowpens.” Virginia’s Private Jeremiah Preston saw Tar-leton across the lines, an indication of how close the fighting was and confirming that gunsmoke was blown away. “The contest became obstinate; and each party, animated by the example of its leader, nobly contended for victory. Our line maintained itself so firmly.”14

  The fighting grew in intensity. Virginia rifleman Jeremiah Preston checked his cartridge pouch later and found he “fired 17 rounds.”15 Seventeen shots provides insight into the battle’s duration. A rifle could be fired no faster than about one shot every fifteen seconds in the hands of an expert. This estimate provides a short-term parameter of about five minutes for the main-line fighting. A longer time is indicated by Johnson, who claimed it lasted “near thirty minutes.”16 It is likely that the infantry fight lasted less than ten minutes from the first shots to the American withdrawal.

  In combat, distances seem foreshortened. When a person is in desperate straits, time seems to slow down; action seems to occur in slow motion. Other thoughts intrude as the musketeer, under the eyes of watchful sergeants, mechanically follows the manual of exercise that will guarantee his survival. During loading and firing, soldiers noticed little increments of their task. The dry taste of black powder and waxed paper cartridges was one step. Then, a rattle of ramrods in the barrels as new charges of buck and ball were forced home against the breech plug with a distinctive ping. Platoon and division volleys crashed with bright yellow flashes from pan and barrel, highlighting the firing sequence. The blast of noise and light was so dramatic a soldier could not tell if his own musket fired. During priming, only a wisp of smoke coming out of the barrel’s touch hole would show that the gun went off. The acrid smell of burnt powder, greasy black smears on hand and face from ramrods grown slick with sweat and powder residue, and cut thumbs from mishandling the musket’s cock added to individual perceptions of the fight. There was a disconcerting whiz of balls going overhead, thwacking against trees, thudding into the ground, or the awful thunk of lead striking flesh and bone. A growing undertone of groans was punctuated by shrill screams of the wounded. Cutting across these distractions came the commands as officers called out, “Prime and load!; Shoulder; Make Ready; Take Aim!; Fire!” and then repeated the cycle.

  During the fighting, senior officers noted the impact of their fire and their own casualties. American casualties provide a key to locating British units and assessing their strength. If an American unit suffered few or no casualties, it is unlikely that a British unit was opposite them. Officer casualties suggest a moderate level of fighting in the road where Combs’s Fauquier Company was located and Preston fired his seventeen shots. “I was in the Road all the time of the actions I covered Captain Combs he was killed.” The shocking indication of mortality was not lost on Private George Rogers, who stood next to Captain Combs; “the Captain . . . was killed and fell by his Side.” Lieutenant Dearing, another officer in Combs’s company, received a mortal wound as he “was wounded through his hand . . . and bled to death.”17 Enlisted casualties in Combs’s company were not heavy, but they did occur and Private William McCoy “received two wounds.”18

  Given constriction of space and American casualties, both the light infantry and the British Legion infantry were much reduced by the time they engaged the Virginians.19 Triplett’s companies suffered about equally, so they had equal opposition, indicating the British right may have been reduced to less than 200 men. Since Triplett had about 160 men and Hammond 115 when the battle began, the Americans brought more guns to this firefight than the British did. The reduced light and legion infantry faced a numerically superior, rifle-armed force at close range. The Virginians were not vulnerable in this fight because they had rifles. They were protected by the cycle of firing which left one company always loaded, and by the bayonets of adjacent Continentals.

  On the right, casualties suggest Wallace and Lawson were under fire only just before their withdrawal. The two right Maryland companies under Anderson and Mangers, and Buchanan’s Augusta riflemen, had no British unit opposite them and could fire virtually unopposed into the 7th Fusiliers. A complete absence of gunshot wounds in the two right Maryland companies suggests they had an easy time, at least until the counterattack. Dobson’s left Maryland company, located between Combs and Kirk-wood, appears to have been in virtual dead space facing a gap between the 7th Fusiliers and the British Legion infantry. Dobson’s low casualties suggest the 7th Fusiliers closed up on their colors opposite Kirkwood as their casualties mounted rather than dressing on the road. If so, they left Dobson’s Marylanders free to fire at targets of opportunity.

  TABLE 3.Wounds in American Main-Line Companies

  The fusiliers advanced slightly later, so they were farther away when the South Carolina militia fired. While they may have escaped the worst volley fire from Thomas and Roebuck, they were shot up by McDowell’s flankers who retreated only as far as British pressure forced them. The British Legion and the light infantry, closer to the guns of Brandon and Farr, suffered more. If the reduced 7th Fusiliers dressed on their cannon and colors instead of the road, they were formed directly opposite the Delaware Company. The compression is a reflection of how badly they had been hurt by the skirmishers, the flanking fire from McDowell, and the militia line.

  Kirkwood’s men suffered because the brunt of the fusilier fire fell on them. If casualties are any indication, Kirkwood’s Delawares saw the most intense fighting of all American units at Cowpens. No other American company suffered anything like the 25 percent casualties at Cowpens that the
Delawares endured. One-third of the Delawares were wounded by bayonet during the counterattack. Ensign Bivins was badly wounded in the hip, probably by a stray musket ball or grapeshot during the militia fighting. Besides Bivins and those wounded in the final stages of the battle, ten Delawares, one-sixth of the company’s strength, were killed or wounded in the main-line firefight.

  Most Delaware casualties were gunshot wounds, and an examination of their wounds is instructive. Of the sixteen Delaware men injured at Cowpens, one was killed outright, four others died before 1 February, and six were so badly wounded they saw no further service. As an added insult, many suffered multiple wounds. Multiple wounding was the result of repeated volley fire as well as the use of buck-and-ball cartridges.20

  Five Delawares were wounded in the arm; three “through the arm,” suggesting musket balls. Sergeant McGuire was listed as having been wounded “in the hand.” Private John Mitchel was wounded “in the arm and leg”; John Todd, wounded “through” the arm, was also wounded “through” the neck. John Harriss and Thomas Walker both suffered multiple wounds in their lower extremities.21

  So many wounds were in the lower extremities and belly that it is likely fusilier officers were particularly effective in getting their muskets “presented” lower than other British units, keeping their fire down where it was more likely to strike home.22 Most Delaware wounds occurred during the firefight, so the high casualty rate reflects a strong British presence opposite them. The 7th Regiment’s cannon fired while engaging Kirkwood, but wounds inflicted by artillery fire are difficult to identify. It is possible that Private Richard Treasure, who “lost” his leg, was struck by grapeshot. Other wounds suggestive of musketry might be from artillery as well.

  Despite the losses, the disciplined regulars fought obstinately. “The contest between the British infantry in the front line and the continentals seemed equally balanced, neither retreating.”23 The British infantry was approaching exhaustion by this time. After their approach march, the earlier fighting against the militia, and now, intense fighting against the Continentals, they were reaching a point at which they could not go forward but were unwilling to retreat. The Continentals and Virginians were just as stubborn.

  Tarleton realized that musketry would not break the formidable Americans, but he had cavalry ready on both flanks. The 71st Regiment and cavalry reserve were already moving forward on his left behind a screen of Ogilvie’s troopers. He “thought the advance of the 71st into line, and a movement of the cavalry in reserve to threaten the enemy’s right flank, would put a victorious period to the action. No time was lost in performing this manoeuvre. The 71st were desired to pass the 7th before they gave their fire. . . . The cavalry were ordered to incline to the left, and to form a line, which would embrace the whole of the enemy’s right flank.”24 Tarleton’s orders caused two separate actions. On the British right, the 17th Light Dragoons broke through Hammond’s skirmishers and attacked the reforming militia in action already described.

  On the British left, the initial impact fell on McDowell’s flanking skirmishers in a now-forgotten encounter that was critical to American success. Main-line veterans only reported that the British “thought to surround our right flank.”25 The men moving against the American right were British Legion dragoons under Ogilvie and MacArthur’s 71st Regiment. The remaining dragoons were a reserve, ready to exploit any breakthrough. They were “ordered to charge the right flank of the Americans.” Already posted on the left flank, the dragoons only had to “form a line.”26

  The main American battle line curved forward on the extreme flanks because the skirmishers were outside the British flanks and moving back only when pressed. Initially, the Highlanders did not see the full extent of the American line behind the ridge. They simply followed the dragoons over the crest, then attacked toward McDowell. It may be that one or two companies were detached on line while the remainder of the 71st came forward in column. Their movement opened a gap between the 7th and 71st Regiments. Only a part of the 71st moved against the skirmishers, but Chesney reported that this “detachment of the 71st Regt under Major McArthur broke the Riflemen without difficulty.”27

  The distance covered by the Highlanders provides another timeframe, confirming that the main-line fighting did not last very long. If the 71st covered 300 yards from their reserve position, the distance is about 450 paces. At the quick step they would take 4.5 minutes, but they ran, so the time was shorter. Even so, McDowell’s flanking skirmishers caused a crucial delay.28

  With the Highlanders running forward, the dragoons advanced at a canter, at least until the North Carolinians directed their fire against them. McDowell’s skirmishers offered some resistance before Ogilvie “cut his way through their line.”29 Sword wounds reported by North Carolinians occurred here because McDowell was not attacked on the skirmish line, nor is there any evidence his men were involved in the militia rout behind the main line.30

  Wounds reported by Surry, Wilkes, and Burke County men were similar. All blade-related injuries suffered by North Carolinians fell on these two companies. Burke County’s Joseph James was “charged on by a British Dragoon and struck on the head with his sword and left on the ground for dead . . . his ribs were broken loose from his back as he supposes by the horse of the Dragoon.”31 A Surry County man “received a blow on the head with a sword from one of the enemy which felld him to the ground.” Others received combinations of wounds indicating both cavalry and infantry fought their way through the North Carolinians.

  Wilkes County private William Meade “received severe wounds . . . a rib broken by the point of a bayonet, had his scull badly fractured by a sword and had a leg badly wounded by the stroke of a cutlass of a British Lieutenant.”32 Meade was originally on the front line as a skirmisher. He withdrew, continuing the fight as the militia line retreated. He was hacked over the head by a saber, which fractured his skull. This wound put him on the ground, where a Highlander made certain he was out of the fight by bayonetting him, breaking a rib. Meade may have been writhing in agony on the ground when cut by the cutlass, a weapon more likely to be a Highland broadsword carried by a Scottish officer. Meade is precise in making a distinction between the head wound by a saber and the lieutenant’s “cutlass.”

  MAP 15.McDowell’s Right-Flank Action

  The fight was a bitter struggle with no opportunity to surrender. Before they went into battle, the 71st were told to give no quarter, and North Carolina riflemen with saber wounds confirm how vicious a fight it was by also reporting bayonet wounds.33 In the short, brutal fight on the right flank, the North Carolinians were driven off but not beaten; they simply moved farther to the right rear, into the boggy ground of Maple Swamp, where they continued to fire at long range in relative safety. They covered the right flank, and bought just enough time for an American victory.

  The American cavalry were protecting the left-flank militia and driving off the 17th Light Dragoons. McDowell gave Washington enough time to return to Morgan Hill, reform, and cover the right flank. Even then, he was just in time because Ogilvie’s troopers were riding, virtually unopposed, toward the American rear. The vicious little flank fight was less than five minutes in duration, the time taken for the main body of the 71st to run about 300 yards and take position opposite Wallace. As the Highlanders swung their line to enfilade Wallace, Ogilvie’s dragoons charged toward the American rear.

  While the North Carolina flankers bought time, the main line fought the British infantry to a standstill. Although neither commander mentioned the right-flank fight, noise and smoke called attention to the threat. Howard “soon observed, as I had but about 350 men and the british about 800, that their line extended much further than mine particularly on my right, where they were pressing forward to gain my flank.” “Their line Was So much longer than ours,” “they gained our flanks, which obliged us to change our position.”34

  The dual threat to the American right was part of a double envelopment; Tarleton sent the 17th L
ight Dragoons against the American left, where they scattered the militia reforming behind the main line. To make matters worse, “the advance of M’Arthur reanimated the British line, which again moved forward; and, outstretching our front, endangered Howard’s right.”35

  Howard was “apprehensive that the reserve could not be brought up in time to defend his exposed flank, or if it were, that it would leave his other flank too much ex-posed.”36 Upon “seeing my right flank was exposed to the enemy, I attempted to change the front of Wallace’s company.” The order required the Virginians “to wheel backward on their left, and face the turning enemy.”37 Something went wrong in the execution of the order. “Whether my orders were not well understood or whether it proceeded from any other cause, in attempting this movement some disorder ensued in this company which rather fell back than faced as I wished them.”

  MAP 16.The Misunderstood Order

  I can account for the retreat. . . . This company on my right were Virginians, commanded by Capt. Wallace who some time previous had formed a connexion with a vile woman of the camp, and the infatuation was so great that on guard or any other duty he had this woman with him and seemed miserable when she was absent. He seemed to have lost all sense of the character of an officer. He was in this state of mind at the time of the action.38

  The proper sequence of commands to refuse the right flank is, “To the right about—Face”; then, “To the right wheel—March”; then “Halt”; and finally, “To the right about—Face.” After completing the ninety-degree wheel and the facing movement, the company would be facing the Highlanders.39

  Some thought “the retreats [sic] was ordered by mistake by one of Morgan’s officers.”40 Initially, the person responsible for the “misunderstood order” seemed to be Captain Andrew Wallace. He commanded the company on the right, was a Virginian, and died later in battle. Howard described the mistake as an affair of honor.41 When Howard ordered Wallace to refuse the right flank, Wallace, an experienced combat veteran, began the maneuver by facing his men to the rear. Wallace then gave the order to wheel right. Instead of a right wheel, they marched to the rear.