A Devil of a Whipping
Page 15
Captain Conway Oldham commanded the second platoon under Wallace. Oldham was probably assigned to Wallace’s company at Charlotte in December 1780. At that time, the light infantry companies were built up to strength, and one soldier who served under Oldham reported joining Wallace’s company then.42 In the noise of battle, Oldham and his platoon, having faced to the rear, may not have heard the entire order and heard only “March!” The men may have been guilty of wishful thinking, and so the platoon marched forward instead of wheeling. At that point, Wallace had no choice but to countermand his own order and march rearward because Oldham’s platoon was stepping into the first platoon, making a bad situation even worse.43
Coincidentally, a volley from the 71st was fired at virtually the same instant Wallace ordered his men to wheel. In Wallace’s company, John Brownlee was “wounded in two places, receiving a ball in his cheek, and One in his thigh,” and William Warren “was shot in the thigh.”44 Leg wounds show the Scots kept their musket barrels down and took good aim as well.45 The enfilade volley from the 71st was shattering and created precisely what eighteenth-century tacticians strove for, disorganization and confusion in the opponent’s ranks.
To compound the crisis, Lawson’s Virginia State Troops on Wallace’s left had a command crisis at the same time. The company commander, “Capt John Lawson was shot at the battle of the Cowpens both the balls in and under the Right arm from which wound he died immediately. My Lieutenant Thomas Taylor held command of my Company.” One of Law-son’s men, Thomas Crowell, was also “wounded by a shot in his leg.”46 In the confusion of replacing commanders, Lieutenant Taylor saw Wallace’s Continentals move off. As the Virginia Continentals withdrew, the right flank of the Virginia State Troops was exposed, and Taylor ordered his company to withdraw, following Wallace to the rear.
The 71st fired only a single volley, which came as the Americans were refusing their flank. The volley lashed the Virginians at precisely the right time to create maximum confusion. A single volley is suggested by American casualties, as well as an immediate charge by Highlanders moving to exploit the confusion their fire created. An all-out rush upon their enemy with swords or bayonets was a Highlander tradition.47
As the Virginians maneuvered, “some confusion ensued, and first a part, and then the whole of the company commenced a retreat. Officers along the line seeing this, and supposing that orders had been given for a retreat, faced their men about, and moved off.” The accidental withdrawal “was very fortunate as we thereby were extricated from the enemy.”48 Seeing the flank companies moving in formation, apparently under orders, other officers followed the Virginians rearward. “The rest of the line expecting that a retreat was ordered, faced about and retreated but in perfect order.”49 The ripple effect reached the Delawares, where “Captain Kirkwood with his company wheeled to the right,” and Virginia private John Thomas noted, “they fired before they retreated.”50 Continentals fired by platoon, company, or division. Firing, and then withdrawing, bought time and indicates the companies withdrew en échelon, not as an entire battle line.51
As the Continentals disengaged and marched off, the movement surprised Morgan and he immediately confronted Howard. Howard recalled that Morgan, who “had mostly been with the militia, quickly rode up to me,” “and in a loud tone of voice” “expressed apprehensions of the event; but I soon removed his fears by pointing to the line, and observing that men were not beaten who retreated in that order.”52 Morgan, seeing the line under control, issued Howard a fragmentary order and, “pointing to the rising ground in the rear of the hollow way, informed him that was the ground which he wished him to occupy, and to face about.”53 The “maneuvre being performed with precision, our flank became relieved, and the new position was assumed with promptitude.”54 While the exact pace of withdrawal is unknown, the men moved “rather in an accelerating step, but still in perfect order.”55
The Americans fell “back Some Distance” “in good order,” for “about 80 yards.”56 The actual distance depends on how far a unit moved from the main line. Morgan had been in the rear but rode forward after the retreat began and met Howard about halfway across the swale. Thomas, in Combs’s Virginia company, said they retreated about 240 feet. Morgan reported they withdrew about 100 feet, indicating some Continentals were halfway across the swale when he and Howard spoke.
As the Americans came off the line, the British saw the retrograde movement and related it to the force of British arms, because, as Tarleton noted, “upon the advance of the 71st, all the infantry again moved on.” Charles Stedman later reported that the “continentals, no longer able to stand the shock, were forced to give way. This was the critical moment of the action, which might have been improved so as to secure to the British troops a complete victory.”57 The British soldiers, seeing the backs of their opponents, started forward to keep the pressure on. Their physical and psychological systems were recharged with energy for the conflict’s final resolution. “The British rushed forwards.”58 The charge was probably spontaneous, perhaps by individuals, then units, as Americans withdrew from their front. The first were the Highlanders on the American right, but then the 7th Regiment opposite the Delawares, “thinking that We Were broke set up a great Shout Charged us With their bayonets but in no Order.”59 Officers may have ordered pursuit, but privates, sensing victory, went after the Americans with a vengeance. They “shouted victory, and advanced rapidly and in disorder, within thirty yards of Howard’s rear.”60 This charge disordered the British infantry, which maintained good discipline up to this point. The British fell into disarray, not only because of the headlong charge, but because the tree cover was somewhat thicker.
TABLE 4.Seventy-first Regiment Firing Distance on American Right Flank
Note: Assumes a 20-second delay in 71st movement.
A withdrawal, especially an unplanned one, in the face of an enemy was a most difficult operation, regarded as the height of an officer’s ability to command troops. A retreat “done in sight of an active enemy, who pursues with a superior force . . . is, with reason, looked upon as the glory of the profession. It is a manoeuvre the most delicate, and the properest to display the prudence, genius, courage, and address, of an officer who commands . . . a good retreat is esteemed, by experienced officers, the master-piece of a general.”61
As Morgan marked the halting point for Howard, he saw the withdrawal took the American line out of a tight spot. He went back to Howard’s men and “rode along the rear of the line reminding the officers to halt and face as soon as they reached their ground.” He also found the British infantry “unable to come up with his corps” because they were “enfeebled by their fatiguing march in the morning . . . and by the subsequent exertions in the action.”62
TABLE 5.Distances Covered at Common and Quick Step
The withdrawal was a race to see if the Americans could reach safety before the British caught them. In less than two minutes, at the rate of eighty paces a minute, Wallace’s Virginians reached Morgan Hill where they formed a rallying point for the main line. If they went faster, “accelerating” as they marched, it would have taken even less time. The withdrawal had been accomplished. Now the inertia of a rearward movement had to be stopped and the ranks dressed, to what Howard later described as “perfectly formed.”63 Then, they could turn and renew the battle.
While the distances depend on where the Highlanders fired and started their charge, an idea of the timeframe and firing distances can be worked out. The timeframe of American retreat and British pursuit was not long. It can be calculated to some extent by computing time, pace, and distance prescribed from manuals. Table 5 provides comparative time and distance information using these figures. American and British infantry had been trained to march and charge at certain speeds. The normal marching pace was 24 inches, but this actually meant “the space between the two feet of a man in walking, usually reckoned at 2V2 feet.”64 Charging men, moving at the “quick step,” were calculated at the same distance.
When the final order to charge was given at very close range, the men were to “quicken their step” even more. The number of paces per minute changed from 80 to 120 at the quick step and was even faster at the final charge. At the common step’s 80 paces per minute, over 66 yards were covered in one minute. With the quick step, soldiers moved 100 yards in one minute.65 The Americans were under control and must be seen as initially withdrawing at the common step, and then slightly faster. The initial slower pace was, in part, because the men were reloading their muskets.
The American withdrawal was a crisis of time versus space. Howard was moving his men to a new position, where they must stabilize, turn, and fire before the Scots ran up their backs. Since the 71st came from the right and pursued Wallace and Lawson, they were not an immediate threat to Continentals farther left who started later. The 7th Regiment seems to have charged only after the Delawares moved off.
The sequence of firing, facing to the rear, and marching off involved a certain amount of time. The Highlander pursuit was almost instantaneous. If five seconds are allotted as the time for firing, facing about, and commencing the rearward march, each unit departed the main-line position five seconds after its right neighbor.66 If the Americans withdrew by division, Triplett started retreating only twenty seconds after Wallace. Anything longer than five seconds per company allowed the 71st to catch Wallace before Triplett left his position.
The Virginia Continentals retreated a hundred yards in a minute and a half at the common step. Wallace probably kept his men at this pace so other American units could catch up with him and keep the line intact. In those same ninety seconds, the 71st covered 151 yards at the quick step of 120 paces per minute. If the Scots started five seconds after Wallace, they covered 141 yards in eighty-five seconds. Since the 71st did not overrun the Americans, the distance initially separating them from Wallace when the 71st fired was approximately 40 yards.67
Triplett’s left-flank Virginians, last to move, retreated only 80 yards to their firing point.68 They covered that distance in less than seventy-two seconds because they sped up during the withdrawal. The time and distance allowed the Virginia riflemen to fire a volley within ten to twelve seconds of Wallace without endangering Washington’s dragoons. Other Continental units reached their turning points between 80 and 100 yards from their original position. The signal to halt and fire may have been Wallace’s Continentals reaching 100 yards. When Wallace halted, the other units halted, faced about, and fired in sequence.
The Americans went off the battle line with empty muskets and reloaded as they moved, giving the appearance of “trail arms,” reported by Johnson. The men were trained to keep their muskets off the ground while reloading, and the timeframe was more than adequate to reload while moving.69 As they marched, American officers steadied the line.
Note: British Legion and light infantry frontage reduced by 25%, 7th Regiment frontage reduced by 20% in allowance for casualties at militia line.
MAP 17.Main-Line Withdrawal
The precise retrograde movement was spelled out in manuals and drilled into the men. “When a battalion is obliged to retire, it must march as long as possible, but if pressed by the enemy, and obliged to make use of its fire, the commanding officer will order, Battalion! Halt! To the Right About, — Face! and fire by battalion, division, or platoon, as before directed.”70 Howard virtually quoted Von Steuben. “As soon as the word was given to halt and face about the line was perfectly formed in a moment. The enemy pressed upon us in rather disorder, expecting the fate of the day was decided. They were by this time within 30 yards of us . . . my men with uncommon coolness gave them an unexpected and deadly fire.” The Continentals “commenced a very destructive fire, which they little expected, and a few rounds” devastated the Scots.71
Howard’s comment about a few rounds suggests firing was company fire, not a single volley. Since the manual calls for the men to fire “as before directed,” the Americans continued their earlier firing pattern, which Stewart confirms by noting “destructive volleys.”72 Multiple smaller volleys are implied by Johnson, who stated “the order flew to right and left.. . promptly obeyed; the enemy were within thirty yards . . . scarcely a man of the Americans raised his gun to his shoulder; when their fire was delivered, they were in an attitude for using the bayonet.”73
When Howard marked the turning point, he was met by “a messenger from Colonel Washington, who . . . had a fair view of the confusion existing in the British ranks. ‘They are coming on like a mob. Give them a fire and I will charge them,’ was the message delivered.”74 The British “coming on like a mob” were the 71st. Washington, having just completed a sweep through Ogilvie’s British dragoons, had seen disorder in the 71st.
With that little coordination, the Americans halted, faced about, and fired. The 71st was shocked when “Howard faced about, and gave it a close and murderous fire.” At a range of “ten or fifteen yards,” “the fire was destructive,” and “nearly one half their number fell.” The damage was magnified by surprise. Some British soldiers simply “threw down their arms and fell upon their faces.” The “unexpected fire . . . stopped the British, and threw them into confusion. Exertions to make them advance were useless [and] an unaccountable panic extended itself along the whole line.” “The ground was instantly covered with the bodies of the killed and wounded, and a total rout ensued.”75
Howard saw the firing “occasioned great disorder in their ranks . . . [and] ordered a charge with the bayonet, which order was obeyed with great alacrity.” The Americans “taking advantage of the present situation, advanced upon the British troops, and augmented their astonishment.”76 “Howard ordered the drums to beat the charge—the inspiring roll was promptly obeyed.” The Americans “charged them home They not expecting any Such thing put them in Such Confusion.”77
The Continentals delivered their bayonet charge on the 71st at the same time Washington’s dragoons attacked the Highlanders’s left flank and rear.78 As the volleys fired, Washington’s cavalry reformed on Howard’s right and rear; an interval between firing and charge was necessary to keep the dragoons out of the line of fire. Once the infantry fired, the cavalry charged without danger from American bullets.
Note: British Legion and light infantry frontage reduced by 25%, 7th Regiment frontage reduced by 20% in allowance for casualties at militia line.
MAP 18.The American Counterattack
After the Americans fired, the Scots “who remained were so scattered . . . they could not be united.” “They were checked.”79 Delaware’s Lieutenant Anderson recalled the Americans “were in amongst them With the Bayonets Which Caused them to give ground and at last to take to the flight But We followed them up so Close that they never Could get in Order again until We Killed and took the Whole of the Infantry Prisoners.”80 The counterattack was relentless, both “officers and men behaved with uncommon and undaunted bravery, but more especially the brave Captain Kirk-wood and his company, who that day did wonders, rushing on the enemy without either dread or fear.”81
The Highlanders “did not fall back immediately, probably expecting that the first line and cavalry would push forward to their support.” The 71st fought back with “irregular firing” and American casualties occurred. Jacob Taylor, a private with Wallace, “was shot through the thigh with several buck shot and was stabed in the leg with a bayonet.”82 Marylander John Bantham “received three severe wounds in my right side by a bayonet.”83
Pickens and his militia chose this moment to reenter the battle. They came forward and a few completed a circuit behind Morgan Hill, but since no Spartanburg veterans mention the 17th Light Dragoon charge as a personal experience, they reformed farther to the right rear and were not disrupted. Now under control, Pickens moved them forward over Morgan Hill, where they “pushed forward to the right flank of the Highlanders.”84 Only after the militia came back on the field did the 71st break. The militia kept the pressure on, firing rifles as the Scots tried to regroup while the
collapse spread to other units. After being blasted by musketry, assaulted by bayonet, and sabered from behind, the 71st was in dire straits. The Scots “saw no prospect of support, while their own numbers were diminishing, and the enemy increasing. They began to retire, and at length to run, the first instance of a Highland regiment running from the enemy,” and their retreat “communicated a panic to others which soon became general.”85
The surprising American volley was bad enough, but the bayonets made it worse. Then the American dragoons struck the Scots in their left flank and rear. A feeling of isolation, being attacked on all sides, struck the Highlanders because they “were farthest advanced, [and] receiving this unexpected charge, fell back in confusion, and communicated a panic.” The British “fled with the utmost precipitation” in “general flight,” and a “total rout ensued.”86
The sudden collapse of the 71st is not unexpected. They had endured a night march and gone without sleep on 15 January. On 16 January, they were awake during the day, moving but more often standing around, while advance troops cleared the route. After four hours’ sleep on the night of 16-17 January, they marched twelve miles over wet, churned-up roads. They stood in the beaten zone during the militia-line fight, then ran almost a quarter mile, fired a volley, and made a headlong hundred-yard downhill charge. The Highland charge was a very simple tactic but difficult to control. Against an enemy who “was properly trained and armed to stand up to the Highlanders, the latter had no alternative,” and the Scots broke when confronted by disciplined volleys fired by bayonet-armed Americans who then charged.87