Five Days in London, May 1940

by John Lukacs

  “The action taken against potential Fifth Columnists is strongly approved.… These precautions should be carried to even greater lengths.” Cardiff: “Feeling is definitely disturbed by our apparent inability to check the German advance, and by the possibility that this may mean that our own troops will be cut off, but never-the-less there is confidence in our ultimate success.”

  On 25 May, Mass-Observation, somewhat unusually, set out a report on people’s morale in statistical terms:

  Males (%)

  Females (%)

  Disquiet

  27

  31

  Optimism

  30

  18

  Doubt (Don’t Know)

  21

  30

  Disquiet was higher among the upper middle class (40 to 25 percent) than among the lower class and artisan samples of the population; optimism was about even (23 to 25 percent) between the two groups; the number responding “don’t know” was higher among the lower and artisan classes and higher among their females. The daily Mass-Observation survey, which was also transmitted to the Ministry of Information, largely accorded with the ministry’s morale survey: “People are becoming distinctly confused today, and the strongest optimists, the working-class males, are today often qualifying their remarks with some slight suspicion or doubt as to the way things are developing.” Some people cannot understand how the Germans can advance as they are doing without being cut off. Plenty believe that all this development is part of our strategy.”

  “Depression is quite definitely up,” the survey concluded, “but on the whole the main trend is for people to be rather fatalistic, as if their minds were prepared for almost anything now in the way of bad news. A large number of people today are finding themselves unable to express any opinion or to know what to think.… On the whole, the quality of optimism has violently declined, and the quality of pessimism deepened. The public mind is in a chaotic condition and ready to be plunged into the depths of an utterly bewildered, shocked, almost unbelieving dismay. The whole structure of national belief would seem to be rocking gently.”26

  Compared with many other reports, some of them cited above, this last summary statement, suggesting as it does a radical change in mood, seems to have been exaggerated. For once, the words of Virginia Woolf in her diary, where this withdrawn and often solipsistic woman otherwise gave very little space to the great political and military events of that time, sum up the situation and the feeling of the day: “The [Germans] seem youthful, fresh, inventive. We plod behind.”27

  CHAPTER FOUR

  Sunday, 26 May

  An agitated day. – Three meetings of the War Cabinet. – Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill. – Disagreements between Halifax and Churchill.– Scarcity of news: “A mandate to delay judgment and not to worry” – “In Westminster Abbey.”

  A gloomy day, in more than one way: for the first time in many a day it rained.

  In early April there had been some talk of a National Day of Prayer. The archbishop of Canterbury had thought it inadvisable because it could be misinterpreted. Now, along with all the churches, he endorsed it. The king had spoken of it in his broadcast of 23 May.1 So had the newspapers. “Let Us Pray” was an article on the front page of the Daily Express on Saturday: “It must mean something tomorrow.” At ten o’clock on Sunday morning the king, the queen, and the highest personages of the empire arrived in Westminster Abbey. The king and queen carried gas masks. Wilhelmina, queen of the Netherlands, came with them. Someone shouted: “Long live the Netherlands!” Wilhelmina dropped a curtsey. There was a long queue outside. Churchill made it clear to his household that he and Mrs. Churchill would be able to attend for no longer than ten to thirty minutes. Indeed they left early, in the middle of the service, for there was plenty for him to do.

  The events of this grave Sunday were so many and complicated that, before their reconstruction and analysis, their sequence ought to be sorted out and summed up briefly. We have seen that Churchill requested a meeting of the War Cabinet at the unusual hour of 9 A.M. on this Sunday. One hour later came the high service in Westminster Abbey. Meanwhile, Reynaud and a French delegation arrived in London. At noon Halifax saw the Italian ambassador again. Then he lunched with Chamberlain. Churchill had a long lunch with Reynaud in Admiralty House. He returned to 10 Downing Street for another cabinet at 2 P.M. After about forty minutes Churchill asked Halifax to go over to Admiralty House to meet with Reynaud. Churchill, Chamberlain, and Greenwood followed him twenty or so minutes later. A few minutes after four o’clock Reynaud left for France. The War Cabinet members stayed. There was another cabinet meeting in Admiralty House at five o’clock, ending at half past six. At eight Churchill dined with Ismay and Eden.

  The War Cabinet session at 9 A.M. began with Churchill’s account of the situation with the French and with the Belgians. He had a letter from his personal representative in Paris, General Edward Spears — all bad news about France and the French. The king of Belgium was making ready to capitulate. Churchill’s envoy to the king, Sir Roger Keyes, had sent a telegram whose essence was that “King Leopold had written to King George VI to explain his motive in remaining with his army and people if the Belgian Army became encircled and the capitulation of the Belgian Army became inevitable.”

  The gist of all this was summed up by Churchill: “It seems from all the evidence available that we might have to face a situation in which the French were going to collapse, and that we must do our best to extricate the British Expeditionary Force from northern France.”

  Then Churchill played an important card. A few days before he had asked the chiefs of staff “to consider the situation which would arise if the French would drop out of the war.”

  In the event of France being unable to continue in the war and becoming neutral, with the Germans holding their present position and the Belgian army being forced to capitulate after assisting the British Expeditionary Force to reach the coast; in the event of terms offered to Britain which would place her entirely at the mercy of Germany through disarmament, cession of naval bases in the Orkneys etc.; what are the prospects of our continuing the war alone against Germany and probably Italy. Can the Navy and the Air Force hold out reasonable hopes of preventing serious invasion, and could the forces gathered in this Island cope with raids from the air involving detachments not greater than 10,000 men; it being observed that a prolongation of British resistance might be very dangerous for Germany engaged in holding down the greater part of Europe.

  The answer of the chiefs of staff has since become a historic document of first importance, well known to students of the period. Entitled “British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality,” it was a long paper.2 It presumed the worst possible conditions — and, by 25 May, an increasingly plausible situation: the French making peace with Germany, Italy entering the war, Europe and French North Africa under German control, and the loss of most of the British Expeditionary Force still struggling in northern France and Belgium. Still—even in these conditions Britain could hold out, if the United States would support Britain increasingly, eventually entering the war, and if the Royal Air Force, together with the navy, would remain in control over Britain and thus “prevent Germany from carrying out a serious sea-borne invasion of this country.” In this they were to be proved right. The rest of the document dealt with the question of whether Germany could be ultimately defeated. On 25 May this could not be even remotely envisaged. The chiefs of staff assumed that Germany’s economic situation was to be plagued by shortages of raw materials. Together with air attacks and revolts in the occupied countries, Germany could be defeated—at some time in the future, and with American help. In this assessment the chiefs of staff were wrong rather than right. They—much like Attlee and Greenwood in the War Cabinet, and to a considerable extent Chamberlain, too — not only overestimated but were altogether mistaken about the economic “factors” handicapping Germany.3 But that is not our concern here. The crux was “the immediate
problem [of] … how to get through the next few months, with the Germans across the Channel and no effective allies. On this the Chiefs of Staff offered a reasoned case for hope.”4

  We must, however, consider that on this Sunday, one so closely packed with dramatic events, the War Cabinet members did not have the time to peruse this long document in detail. And before copies of this secret paper were circulated, there occurred the first open clash of opinion between Halifax and Churchill.

  Halifax said that “in the dark picture which had been presented there was one brighter spot in that the dispute on the rights and wrongs of Lord Gorf’s action in drawing back had now been satisfactorily cleared up and there would be no recriminations on that point.” Then he came to “the broader issue. We had to face the fact that it was not so much now a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany but of safeguarding the independence of our own Empire and if possible that of France.”

  “In this connection,” he told the cabinet about his interview with the Italian ambassador the night before, “Signor Bastianini had clearly made soundings as to the prospect of our agreeing to a conference. The Ambassador had said that Signor Mussolini’s principal wish was to secure peace in Europe” He (Halifax) “had replied that peace and security in Europe were equally our main object, and we should naturally be prepared to consider any proposals which might lead to this, provided our liberty and independence were assured. The French had been informed of this approach by the Italian Ambassador. Signor Bastianini had asked for a further interview this morning, and he might have fresh proposals to put forward.”

  Churchill said that peace and security would not be achieved under a German domination of Europe: “That we could never accept. We must ensure our complete liberty and independence. He was opposed to any negotiations which might lead to a derogation of our rights and power.”

  Chamberlain now said that he “thought it very probable that Italy might send an ultimatum to France very shortly, saying that unless she would agree to a conference, Italy would come in on Germany’s side. This would bring very heavy pressure to bear on the French.” There followed some confusing talk about Italy. Attlee “thought that Mussolini would be very nervous of Germany emerging as the predominant power in Europe.” (This was not so.) Attlee added that he had not yet read the papers of the chiefs of staff “as to our prospects of holding out if the French collapsed.” Halifax made a somewhat obscure statement. He pointed out that if the French intended to come to terms, “they had a very strong card to play if they made it clear to Hitler that they were bound not to make a separate peace.” (Why?) “They might use this as a powerful lever to obtain favourable terms which might be of great value to us, if it was Hitler’s object to break the alliance.”

  At that moment copies of another paper by the chiefs of staff were handed to the members of the cabinet about the prospects of Britain going on with the war single-handed. “It had been drawn up simply for the purpose of providing arguments to deter the French from capitulating and to strengthen their will to continue to fight.”5 Chamberlain thought that Italy was important. “Was it possible to ask the French whether Italy could be bought off? This might at least keep matters going.” Churchill “agreed that this point was worth bearing in mind.” Halifax then said that, from reading the chiefs of staffs’ paper, he gathered that the entire issue “of our ability to carry on the war single-handed against Germany would depend on the main on our being able to establish and maintain air superiority over the Germans.”

  The chief of the air staff, who was present throughout the meeting, said that the issue was “not our obtaining air superiority over the Germans, but on our preventing the Germans from achieving such air superiority as would enable them to invade this country.” There was some discussion of this, with Halifax suggesting that once France collapsed the Germans would “no longer need large land forces. They would be free to switch the bulk of their effort to air production.” He also “suggested that in the last resort we should ask the French to put their factories out of gear.” Chamberlain must have felt that this was nugatory: “Whatever undertakings of this character we might extract from the French would be worthless, since the terms of peace which the Germans would propose would inevitably prevent their fulfilment.” Churchill “agreed. It was to be expected, however, that the Germans would make the terms of any peace offer as attractive as possible to the French, but lay emphasis on the fact that their quarrel was not with France but with England.”6

  Then he asked the War Cabinet to convene again at 2 P.M., after his lunch with Reynaud. They adjourned, Churchill and Chamberlain hurrying to Westminster Abbey. Halifax went back to the Foreign Office, where Bastianini came to see him. Cadogan, who was present, wrote in his diary: “Nothing to be got out of [Bastianini]. He’s an ass — and a timid one at that.”7 Then Halifax had a quick lunch with Chamberlain.

  Churchill had a long lunch with Reynaud at Admiralty House. Reynaud was constrained to present Churchill with a general view of the near hopelessness of the French military situation, largely in accord with what Weygand and Pétain had insisted upon in their high council the night before. Churchill said that Britain would go on alone. “We would rather go down fighting than be enslaved to Germany.” Yet underlying their discussion, which was not unfriendly — Reynaud, who was an Anglophile, respected and admired Churchill—was an understanding that their governments were divided. This, of course, was less so with the British than with the French. Reynaud “had hinted that he himself would not sign peace terms imposed upon France, but that he might be forced to resign, or might feel he ought to resign” — which eventually came about, three weeks to the day. Churchill knew about Weygand and Pétain, though he was not yet fully aware of the defeatism of the former. Nor was he quite aware of what another member of the French delegation had sensed, or had pretended to sense. Colonel Villelume was Reynaud’s principal military aide. That evening he wrote in his diary, “Halifax … shows his understanding; Churchill, prisoner of his habit of blustering, was absolutely negative.”8

  At 2 P.M. the War Cabinet convened again. Churchill gave a lengthy and rather precise account of what Reynaud had said and what he had told Reynaud. He then suggested that Halifax go over and see Reynaud, who was still at Admiralty House; Churchill, Chamberlain, and Attlee would follow a few minutes later. Halifax would talk with Reynaud about the chances of buying off Mussolini. Did Churchill wish to avoid Halifax, since the latter might state his case before the others in the War Cabinet? We cannot tell. And Halifax did not leave yet. “A short further discussion ensued whether we should make any approach to Italy.” Halifax “favoured this course, and thought that the last thing that Signor Mussolini wanted was to see Herr Hitler dominating Europe. He would be anxious, if he could, to persuade Herr Hitler to take a more reasonable attitude.” Churchill “doubted whether anything would come of an approach to Italy, but said that the matter was one which the War Cabinet would have to consider.”

  The open disagreement between Halifax and Churchill had now become evident. Halifax no longer wished merely to state his views; now he wanted to extract a commitment from Churchill: “We had to face the fact that it was not so much now a question of imposing a complete defeat upon Germany but of safeguarding the independence of our Empire.… We should naturally be prepared to consider any proposals which might lead to this, provided our liberty and independence were assured. … If he [Churchill] was satisfied that matters vital to the independence of this country were unaffected,” would he be “prepared to discuss such terms?”

  At this juncture Churchill knew that he could not answer with a categorical no. He said that he “would be thankful to get out of our present difficulties on such terms, provided we retained the essentials and the elements of our vital strength, even at the cost of some territory” — an extraordinary admission (my italics).9 He then added that he did not believe in the prospect of such a deal. Chamberlain did not say much. Then with Churchill and Green
wood he departed to Admiralty House to join Halifax and Reynaud, who were discussing the approach to Mussolini. Reynaud left after four o’clock.

  Churchill now asked the War Cabinet to stay on in Admiralty House. The record of this day’s third, fairly dramatic meeting of the War Cabinet is preceded by two significantly cryptic notes: “After M. Reynaud’s departure, an informal Meeting of War Cabinet Ministers was held in Admiralty House.” (Why “informal”?) Also, perhaps more significantly: “This record does not cover the first quarter of an hour of the discussion, during which the Secretary [Sir Edward Bridges] was not present.”10 Such conditions of secrecy had no precedent in the modern history of Britain. Then the Secretary came in and Churchill began.

  “We were in a different position from France. In the first place, we still had powers of resistance and attack [?] which they had not. In the second place, they would be likely to be offered decent terms by Germany, which we would not. If France could not defend herself, it was better that she should get out of the war rather than that she should drag us into a settlement which involved intolerable terms. There was no limit to the terms which Germany would impose upon us if she had her way. From one point of view, he would rather France was out of the war before she was broken up, and retained the position of a strong neutral whose factories could not be used against us.”

  Attlee said that Hitler “was working to a time-limit, and he had to win by the end of the year.” Chamberlain agreed. (Both were wrong — again, due to their overestimation of the economic factors.)