Five Days in London, May 1940
Page 11
Churchill said that “he hoped that France would hang on. At the same time we must take care not to be forced into a weak position in which we went to Signor Mussolini and invited him, to go to Herr Hitler and ask him to treat us nicely. We must not get entangled in a position of that kind before we had been involved in serious fighting.”
Now Halifax spoke. He “did not disagree with this view,” but “he attached perhaps rather more importance than the Prime Minister to the desirability of allowing France to try out the possibilities of European equilibrium.11 He was not quite convinced that the Prime Minister’s diagnosis was correct and that it was Herr Hitler’s interest to insist on outrageous terms. On this lay-out it might be possible to save France from the wreck.” Churchill disagreed. Halifax “said that he was not so sure.” He “thought that we might say to Signor Mussolini that if there was any suggestion of terms which affected our independence, we should not look at them for a moment. If, however, Signor Mussolini was alarmed as we felt he must be in regard to Herr Hitler’s power, and was prepared to look at matters from the point of view of the balance of power, then we might consider Italian claims. At any rate, he could see no harm in trying this line of approach.”
Chamberlain now sat on the fence. He “thought that Mussolini could only take an independent line if Herr Hitler were disposed to conform to the line which Signor Mussolini indicated. The problem was a very difficult one, and it was right to talk it out from every point of view.” Chamberlain did not think that Reynaud had a case for buying Mussolini off: “For one thing, the only advantage we should get was that France would be able to move away ten divisions now on the Italian front. Signor Mussolini would get something for nothing, and what was offered would be only the starting-point for new demands.” This was correct. Yet: “Another method of approach would be if the French told Signor Mussolini that he must consider the future of Europe, including his own future. Italy was in no safer position than any other country. If Signor Mussolini was prepared to collaborate with us in getting tolerable terms, then we would be prepared to discuss Italian demands with him.” Hadn’t Churchill said “that it was undesirable that France should be in a position to say that we had stood between her and a tolerable settlement?” Still, Chamberlain agreed with Churchill that we might be better off without France, “provided we could obtain safeguards on particular points. This was certainly a point of view which deserved serious consideration.”
Churchill “thought that it was best to decide nothing until we saw how much of the Army we could re-embark from France. The operation might be a great failure. On the other hand, our troops might well fight magnificently, and we might save a considerable portion of the Force. A good deal of the re-embarkation would be carried out by day. This would afford a real test of air superiority, since the Germans would attempt to bomb the ships and boats.” (Attlee “thought that the Germans might well attempt some diversion against this country while we were engaged in re-embarking the Force”) This was the first indication that what was to happen at Dunkirk was predominant in Churchill’s mind.
This was not so with Halifax. He came back to the Italian matter. He read out the account of his talk with Bastianini. Churchill answered that “his general comment on the suggested approach to Signor Mussolini was that it implied that if we were prepared to give Germany back her colonies and to make certain concessions in the Mediterranean, it was possible for us to get out of our present difficulties. He thought that no such option was open to us. For example, the terms offered would certainly prevent us from completing our re-armament.” Halifax did not quite agree. Churchill said that “Herr Hitler thought that he had the whip hand. The only thing to do was to show him that he could not conquer this country. If, on M. Reynaud’s showing, France could not continue, we must part company. At the same time, he did not raise objection to some approach being made to Signor Mussolini.”
What this meant was that Churchill, at least momentarily, thought that he had to make some kind of concession to Halifax. There followed a discussion of what might be offered to Mussolini. Greenwood “thought that Signor Mussolini would be out to get Malta, Gibraltar and Suez. He felt sure that the negotiations would break down; but Herr Hitler would get to know of them, and it might have a bad effect on our prestige.” Chamberlain generally agreed. Halifax “thought that this was a good argument against mentioning particular matters in the approach.” Chamberlain “thought that Signor Mussolini would say that he knew what he wanted, but was only prepared to deal as part of a general settlement.” This was so; but now Halifax came to the essence of his argument. He “thought that if we got to the point of discussing the terms of a general settlement and found that we could obtain terms which did not postulate the destruction of our independence, we would be foolish if we did not accept them.”12 And now Churchill felt that he could not oppose Halifax unconditionally. The War Cabinet agreed to ask Halifax to prepare a draft of his “Suggested Approach to Italy.” At the same time Churchill gained a point: the cabinet agreed that the next day Archibald Sinclair, the secretary of state for air, “as head of the Liberal Party, would be invited to be present when this matter was discussed.” Sinclair was a supporter of Churchill.
The rest of the meeting involved discussions about Belgium and Ireland. Chamberlain asked what information should be given out to the Dominions. Churchill said that nothing should be divulged as yet, except that the French had agreed to the move of the BEF to the coast.13
The meeting lasted for about an hour and a half. It was a “very jumpy” meeting (Halifax wrote in his diary), especially near the end, with secretaries coming in and out, bringing dispatches about Belgium, Ireland, and so on. Toward the end of the meeting, Halifax produced his “Suggested Approach to Signor Mussolini,” prepared after his meeting with Reynaud.14 Its essence was: “If Signor Mussolini will co-operate with us in securing a settlement of all European questions which safeguard[s] the independence and the security of the Allies, and could be the basis of a just and durable peace for Europe, we will undertake at once to discuss, with the desire to find solutions, the matters in which Signor Mussolini is primarily interested.” (Somewhat disingenuously, Halifax suggested that this kind of phrasing was Reynaud’s, whereas it was really Halifax’s.) This was now coupled with the text of a joint British-French appeal in Washington to President Roosevelt, asking that he inform Mussolini of the French and British willingness to consider certain Italian claims, “to be dependent of course on Italy not entering the war against the Allies.”15 The memorandum had a postscript reporting the opinion of the British ambassador to Rome, Sir Percy Loraine, to the effect that neither this approach nor any attempt by Roosevelt would do any good. Yet “the situation could hardly be made worse by the approach suggested by M. Reynaud, and that the first consideration there set out must be very present to Signor Mussolini’s mind.” (That “first consideration” in the memorandum was “a frank explanation of the position in which Signor Mussolini will be placed if the Germans establish domination in Europe”) Yet there was a difference in the emphasis of the approaches. Reynaud’s main purpose was to try buying Mussolini off; Halifax’s, to try inducing Mussolini to mediate with Hitler.16
Let us now leave Halifax and Churchill for a moment and consider Chamberlain. Cadogan was summoned to Admiralty House for the 5 P.M. meeting. In his diary he wrote: Churchill “seemed to think we might almost be better off if France did pull out and we could concentrate on defence here. Not sure he’s right. He [is] against final appeal, which Reynaud wanted, to Muss. He may be right there. Settled nothing much. W.S.C. too rambling and romantic and sentimental and temperamental. Old Neville still best of the lot.”17 Best of the lot or not, Chamberlain, in his handwritten diary, tells us much about the atmosphere and about some of the details of that crucial day: “May 26. Blackest day of all.… This was the National Day of Prayer. I could hardly attend to the service with this load on my mind.” About the 5 P.M. cabinet: “Halifax said why not sugges
t that [Mussolini’s] own independence would be threatened if France and G.B. [!] collapsed but if he would use his influence to discuss terms which did not menace our independence and offered a prospect of a just and durable settlement of Europe we would try to meet his own claims.… The P.M. disliked any move toward Musso.18 It was incredible that Hitler would consent to any terms that we could accept — though if we could get out of this jam by giving up Malta & Gibraltar & some African colonies he would jump at it. But the only safe way was to convince Hitler that he couldn’t beat us. … I supported this view, Attlee said hardly anything but seemed to be with Winston.… We hear Hitler had told Mussolini that he does not want him in as he can manage France by himself.19 If so, he evidently cannot be bought off.… But it is a terrible position for France and ourselves. The most horrible in our history.”20
At this moment in his long life Neville Chamberlain was already a very sick man. He may not have known that; the diagnosis of his cancer occurred a month later. But — notwithstanding all the justifiable gloom and doom of his diary, which he wrote with a strong and untrembling nervous hand at the end of that very long, very tiring day—he was not weak. His situation in the War Cabinet was central. He sat — literally as well as figuratively —between Halifax and Churchill. Had he sided with Halifax, Churchill’s position would have been not only very difficult but perhaps untenable. But it was not only because of Chamberlain’s literally crucial position that we must eschew the imputation of weakness. When I wrote above that on one occasion he “sat on the fence,” balancing between Halifax and Churchill, his statements show a considerable strength of his views. There were two elements in these. One was his, perhaps belated, but essentially substantial, realization of what Hitler was: of what could, and of what could not, be expected from him. In this respect Chamberlain had become more realistic and less willing to compromise than Halifax. There was now a nearly complete reversal of their respective views of Hitler nineteen months (before Munich) or even eight months before, when it was he, Chamberlain, who had been inclined to give Hitler some benefit of doubt and Halifax much less so, if any at all; Chamberlain had learned much since that time. But there was another element, too — perhaps an even more important one. This was Chamberlain’s new relationship with Churchill. Yes, Churchill was dependent on him, even after becoming prime minister, because of Chamberlain’s support by the majority of the Conservative Party. Yes, Churchill had asked him to be in charge of important matters of government. (When, on 16 May, Churchill had had to fly to Paris, he said, “Neville, please mind the shop!”) But there was even more to it than that. After the May crisis, Churchill wrote to Lloyd George (who hated Chamberlain): “I have received a very great deal of help from Chamberlain. His kindness and courtesy to me in our new relations have touched me. I have joined hands with him and must act with perfect loyalty.”21 Note the phrase “new relations.” This change was indeed new—and more than an improvement. Its main architect (if that is the word) was Churchill, inspired less by calculation than by magnanimity. Their enmities and suspicions had begun to dissolve from the very moment when Churchill had become a member of Chamberlain’s government—from the very first day of the war. Soon Chamberlain would confide to his wife and sister that Churchill’s loyalty was unexceptionable. And after 10 May it was not only that Chamberlain knew he was now subordinate to the new prime minister. There was, too, Churchill’s instant and generous offer to the Chamberlains to continue living at 10 Downing Street. Churchill’s magnanimity was something to which, perhaps because of his temperament and background, Chamberlain had been unaccustomed. Indeed to some extent it may have surprised him. He not only welcomed but appreciated it and responded to it, which is to his credit; and this was more than a weary gratitude for courtesies that had been offered to an old man.
It was thus that, during what was probably the greatest crisis for Britain in long centuries, Churchill did not have to face opposition from Chamberlain. Few people outside the War Cabinet were aware of that.22 This does not mean that Churchill and Chamberlain now saw everything in the same way. They were, after all, different in their temperaments and also in their vision. Next to Britain, Churchill mainly envisaged Europe; Chamberlain, perhaps, the Empire. Churchill was convinced that a British acceptance of the German dominion of Europe was intolerable, and not only because of the security of Great Britain. Chamberlain knew less about Europe than Churchill did and, save for Europe’s effects on Britain’s security, was less inspired by what happened there. What they had come to agree on was that Hitler could not be trusted; indeed, that he must be rejected; and in these crucial days, that was enough.
This was not the case with Halifax. But before returning to an analysis of Halifax’s views, perhaps we should permit ourselves one more word about his character, especially in view of his relationship with the king, which did contain a possible political consideration. King George VI liked Halifax and offered him many private and personal favors. “Diffident, moral, family men, the King and Halifax both had speech impediments, which caused them to dislike microphones and distrust Churchill’s ebullient grandiloquence. They had many good qualities in common, and their view on appeasement and politics in general largely coincided, but they were the wrong type of men to lead Britain in a world war. Fortunately, Halifax appreciated this fact about himself” (Andrew Roberts). “Halifax had a reputation for sound judgment, and never did he exercise it better than when he refused the Premiership on 9 May 1940. Halifax’s new role was to work with Chamberlain in the War Cabinet to restrain Churchill, and it must have been a relief for him to know that, if the new Prime Minister did turn out to justify their worst fears, the ultimate prerogative to dismiss him lay with a monarch whom the ‘Respectable Tendency’ could trust to act in their best interests.”23 And Churchill knew that.
The question that we must raise at this moment is this: Now, a fortnight after Churchill’s assumption of the premiership, was Halifax’s judgment sound? He had come to believe that, for the sake of England’s survival, the attempt to inquire about peace terms should not be avoided, and that here Churchill, carried away perhaps by his flamboyance and other qualities alien to Halifax, was wrong; indeed, that perhaps Churchill ought to be stopped in his tracks. But the purpose behind this was not political ambition: there is not the slightest indication that, were Churchill thwarted or eventually removed, Halifax wished to take his place. He was motivated by patriotism, not ambition. Halifax was not a defeatist, nor was he an intriguer. He was a seasoned watcher of the tides of events and of the tides of British opinion. He was a very British type, in the sense that he know how to adjust his mind to circumstances rather than to attempt to adjust the circumstances to his ideas. This does not mean that he was a hypocrite or an opportunist—except in the habitual Anglo-Saxon way, which is not really Machiavellian since the innate practice of that kind of English hypocrisy often serves purposes that are higher than individual prestige or profit.24
And now: was Halifax a typical British conservative? By this I mean not his situation within the Conservative Party but whether he could be considered a “conservative,” with a lowercase c: was he an exemplar of British conservatism? Yes and no. Yes: because of his background and habits and his personal and social inclinations. No: because his views about Britain’s position in the world were more Whiggish than Tory, more pragmatically rather than historically minded, and certainly not Burkean. An important clue to this may be found in one of his, generally unremarked, speeches. The title of his address, “British Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” is telling, and so is the date, 24 February 1939, that is, well after his conversion from appeasement to resistance to the Third Reich.25 In the central argument of his speech Halifax refuted Burke. Burke had said in 1792, about the French Revolution, “It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war.” Halifax said, “But that, however, is precisely what we were not.” Note that “precisely.” He cited Pitt, and he cited Castlereagh in 1820: “When the territorial
balance in Europe is disturbed [England] can interfere with effect, but she is the last government in Europe which can be expected or can venture to commit itself on any question of abstract character.”26 Leaving aside the consideration that Edmund Burke, ideologically opposed as he was to the French Revolution, was very far from being an abstractionist, Halifax’s statement of the principles of British foreign policy make it clear that he was thinking in the usual terms of the balance of power.27 And, in a way, it was still in terms of a balance of power that Halifax saw the war in May 1940. It is interesting that it was Halifax who suggested on 16 May that Churchill write a personal letter to Mussolini.28 At the same time he—unlike Chamberlain—was very willing to improve relations with Stalin’s Russia. On that same day of 16 May he consulted Sir Stafford Cripps about Russia (and China). “I like Cripps very much.”
Whether Halifax knew the history of the Napoleonic era as well as did Churchill we cannot tell. Yet the position advocated by Halifax in May 1940 resembled that of the Foxite and Hollandite Whigs in 1802, who were in favor of the armistice with Bonaparte, the 1802 Peace of Amiens. (There was, however, a difference: the Foxite and Hollandite Whigs in 1802 had a definite respect, even a touch of admiration, for Bonaparte, whereas Halifax had no such ideological sentiments for Hitler.) What Halifax did not understand was that, unlike Bonaparte in 1802, Hitler would have been contemptuous of the kind of Britain that would inquire for terms. And that Churchill understood very well.
And in 1802 Britain still had, if not actual, then potential Allied Powers in Europe. Unlike in 1802, in 1940 Britain, after France, would have none. Unlike Churchill, Halifax never thought much of the French or of the French army; as early as December 1939 he said in the cabinet that if ever the French dropped out, “we should not be able to carry on the war by ourselves.” The night before 26 May he wrote in his diary about how awful the collapse of the French army was, “the one firm rock on which everybody has been willing to build for the last two years.” (For “everybody,” read Churchill.) In this respect the British historian Sheila Lawlor, in Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940-1941, is wrong. She writes of the “superficial differences (which were really the best way to deal with the French)” between Halifax and Churchill in May 1940, concluding that “Halifax rejected the peace moves and negotiations, on ground both of policy and tactics — his support for the approach to Mussolini in May having been a matter of not giving the French the opportunity to recriminate. His position was not so different from Churchill’s.”29 But the differences between Halifax and Churchill were not superficial.