The Unseen War

by Lambeth, Benjamin S.

  207.Although the three-day sandstorm did not materially hinder the air component’s contribution to the campaign effort, between March 25 and March 27, 817 scheduled ATO sorties were either canceled or declared noneffective due to the weather. See Anderson, “An Analysis of a Dust Storm Impacting Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 88, 50.

  208.Dave Moniz and John Diamond, “Attack on Guard May Be Days Away,” USA Today, March 31, 2003.

  209.Stout, Hammer from Above, 260.

  210.Kim Murphy and Alan C. Miller, “The Team That Picks the Targets,” Los Angeles Times, March 25, 2003.

  211.Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Baker, “As Marines Resume Advance, Army Fights Baghdad Defenders,” Washington Post, April 2, 2003.

  212.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 227.

  213.Handy, Operation Iraqi Freedom—Air Mobility by the Numbers, 11.

  214.Anthony Shadid, “In Shift, War Targets Communications Facilities,” Washington Post, April 1, 2003.

  215.Quoted in Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 322. “Comical Ali” was a play on the epithet “Chemical Ali,” which referred to Ali Hassan Abd Al Majid Al Tikriti, the former Iraqi minister of defense, interior minister, and chief of the intelligence service who gained notoriety during the 1980s and 1990s for the role he played in Saddam Hussein’s campaigns against domestic opposition forces. Dubbed “Chemical Ali” by Iraqi Kurds for his use of chemical weapons against them (in one instance killing more than five thousand civilians), Al Majid was captured by allied forces after the three-week campaign in 2003 and was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in 2007 for crimes committed during the Al Anfal campaign against Kurdish resistance forces in the 1980s.

  216.Conversation with Major General Darnell, August 6, 2006. General Moseley’s chief of strategy later amplified: “While the primary target was indeed the ministry of information, intelligence reporting told us that many Western journalists were being held there as ‘guests.’ In the end, we decided to go against the antennas on the roof as the best way to achieve the desired effect” (comments by Lieutenant Colonel Hathaway, February 19, 2007).

  217.Hinote, “More Than Bombing Saddam,” 152. See also Kim Burger, Nick Cook, Andrew Koch, and Michael Sirak, “What Went Right?” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 30, 2003, 21.

  218.Davies, F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 65.

  219.Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Baker, “Baghdad Hit Hard from Air as Ground Forces Regroup,” Washington Post, March 28, 2003.

  220.Evan Thomas and John Barry, “A Plan Under Attack,” Time, April 7, 2003.

  221.Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 165.

  222.Eric Schmitt, “Rumsfeld Says Important Targets Have Been Avoided,” New York Times, March 24, 2003.

  223.Michael R. Gordon, “Allied Plan Would Encourage Iraqis Not to Fight,” New York Times, March 11, 2003.

  224.Although triple-redundant, the communications nodes were in principle easy to target. The difficulty stemmed from the fact that destroying the main switches in Baghdad entailed high collateral damage potential. In addition, there were the uncertainties that attended damaging something that the coalition intended to rebuild later and destroying an enemy equity that could provide intelligence value if left intact. Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008.

  225.Bradley Graham, “U.S. Air Attacks Turn More Aggressive,” Washington Post, April 2, 2003.

  226.David J. Lynch, “Marines Prevail in ‘Toughest Day’ of Combat,” USA Today, March 24, 2003. See also Vernon Loeb, “Patriot Downs RAF Fighter,” Washington Post, March 24, 2003.

  227.“Patriot Under Fire for Second Error,” Flight International, April 8–14, 2003, 10.

  228.Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, 133.

  229.Col. Darrel D. Whitcomb, USAFR (Ret.), “Rescue Operations in the Second Gulf War,” Air and Space Power Journal, spring 2005, 97.

  230.Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 354.

  231.Ibid.

  232.Jonathan Weisman, “Patriot Missiles Seemingly Falter for Second Time,” Washington Post, March 26, 2003. It was not correct, as Rick Atkinson reported regarding this incident, that a HARM had been “mistakenly” fired by a “confused F/A-18 pilot” (In the Company of Soldiers, 154).

  233.Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 52.

  234.Comments on an earlier draft by Lt. Col. John Hunerwadel, USAF (Ret.), Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., May 23, 2007. In Israeli military practice, anything that flies (short of artillery and surface-to-surface rockets), from fixed-wing and rotary-wing combat and combat support aircraft to such surface-to-air weapons as Patriots, Hawks, and even AAA, is owned and operated by the Israeli Air Force, in part precisely to prevent such possibilities for fratricide.

  235.Patrick E. Tyler, “Attack from Two Sides Shatters the Iraqi Republican Guard,” New York Times, April 3, 2003; and Bradley Graham, “Patriot System Likely Downed U.S. Jet,” Washington Post, April 4, 2003.

  236.Or, he might have added, Australian, as the RAAF contributed fourteen F/A-18s to the overall campaign effort. Charles Piller, “Vaunted Patriot Missile Has a ‘Friendly Fire’ Failing,” Los Angeles Times, April 21, 2003.

  237.Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Hathaway, February 19, 2007.

  238.Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 354–355.

  239.Thom Shanker, “Risk of Being Killed by Own Side Increases,” New York Times, April 8, 2003. There also were a number of fratricidal air-to-ground engagements, including one involving an Air Force A-10 that was providing CAS to Marines approaching An Nasiriyah. The A-10 strafed the wrong side of a bridge on which friendly and enemy vehicles were commingled and shot up a Marine amphibious assault vehicle, killing six Marines (see Chapter 5). Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 122.

  240.Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 50.

  241.Ibid., 51.

  242.Ibid.

  243.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 11.

  244.ATO M followed the previous day’s ATO L, which was the last ATO executed in the context of Operation Southern Watch before the start of OPLAN 1003V and major combat operations.

  245.David A. Fulghum, “New Bag of Tricks: As Stealth Aircraft and Northern Watch Units Head Home, Details of the Coalition’s Use of Air Power Are Revealed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 21, 2003, 22.

  246.Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 29.

  247.“Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing.”

  248.David A. Fulghum, “Fast Forward,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 28, 2003, 34–35.

  249.Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 30.

  250.Ibid., 31.

  251.Conversation with General Moseley, August 2, 2006.

  252.Ibid.

  253.Ibid.

  254.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 11.

  255.Woods, Lacey, and Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions,” 5.

  256.On the failure of the Iraqi air force to fly, Air Marshal Torpy later noted: “They had obviously been watching the way we had been operating in the no-fly zones for 12 years, so they had good knowledge of our capability and they inevitably also knew what we had brought into the theater as well” (Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 96).

  257.Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Baker, “U.S. Takes Battle to Baghdad Airport,” Washington Post, April 4, 2003.

  258.Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 60.

  259.Major Roberson later remarked that although delivering leaflets was not initially accepted in the squadrons as a legitimate “combat mission,” the pilots eventually came to understand that “it was one of those necessary evils, in that the psyops part of Operation Iraqi Freedom was as important as the . . . kinetic effects of the war. You don’t get any feedback when you [dispense the leaflets], but I think eve
rybody in the squadron accepted the fact that it was something that needed to be done” (ibid., 59).

  260.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 23.

  261.Hampton Stephens, “Compass Call Was Key to Special Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan,” Inside the Air Force, April 2, 2004, 1, 4.

  262.I am grateful to Col. Gregory Fontenot, USA (Ret.), for bringing this important consideration to my attention.

  263.Paul Richter, “Risky Fight for Baghdad Nears,” Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2003.

  264.“Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing.”

  265.Kopp, “Iraqi Freedom—the Hammer and Anvil,” 29.

  266.Butler, “As A-10 Shines in Iraq War, Officials Look to JSF for Future CAS Role,” 1.

  267.Ripley, “Planning for Iraqi Freedom,” 11.

  268.Cordesman, “The ‘Instant Lessons’ of the Iraq War: Main Report,” 40.

  269.This composite portrait of events was assembled from the citations accompanying the award of the Silver Star to Kenneth E. Ray, Bruce R. Taylor, and James Winsmann, provided to the author by AFCENT/A9, Shaw AFB, S.C., April 17, 2009. In addition to the eleven Silver Stars awarded to Air Force airmen, the majority of them JTACs, fifty-eight Distinguished Flying Crosses with special citations for heroism were also awarded to Air Force airmen for similar acts during the same period. Information provided to the author by AFCENT/A9, Shaw AFB, S.C., April 17, 2009.

  270.Lt. Col. Michael W. Kometer, USAF, Command in Air War: Centralized versus Decentralized Control of Combat Air Power (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, June 2007), 142. An earlier version of this study was submitted as the author’s doctoral dissertation in security studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

  271.Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond, 24.

  272.Ibid., 23. The above-noted after-action assessment added: “Amos’s personal style was, by Marine Corps standards, laid back; he was unusually approachable and looked for the common-sense solution as opposed to asserting his status or rank. That said, he was nothing if not results-oriented” (ibid., 49).

  273.Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 534. The core issue has to do with the extent of situational awareness on the part of the CAS controller in differing circumstances. In Type I CAS (the most exacting variant), the JTAC or FAC-A must have visual contact with both the target and the attacking aircraft. Type II requires visual contact with either the aircraft or the target. Type III does not require visual contact with either, but the JTAC or FAC-A must be in communication with the attacking pilot and approve the release of weapons. All of the attendees at the warfighter conference convened by General Moseley at Nellis AFB in August 2002 during CENTCOM’s initial planning workups agreed that draft Joint Publication 3-09.3 for joint CAS offered a serviceable basis on which to ground the emerging KI/CAS concept. They specifically pulled from the draft publication the new types of specified joint CAS control (Types I, II, and III), as well as its definition of a JTAC. The challenge proved to be getting all component players to implement the three types consistently. Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.

  274.Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 11.

  275.Jonathan Finer, “For Marines, a Fight with a Foe That Never Arrived,” Washington Post, April 4, 2003.

  276.Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Baker, “Baghdad-Bound Forces Pass Outer Defenses,” Washington Post, April 3, 2003.

  277.Evan Thomas and Martha Brandt, “The Secret War,” Time, April 21, 2003.

  278.Michael R. Gordon, “Tightening a Noose,” New York Times, April 4, 2003.

  279.Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Alan Sipress, “Army Has First Close Fighting with Republican Guard Units,” Washington Post, April 1, 2003.

  280.Patrick E. Tyler, “Two U.S. Columns Are Advancing on Baghdad,” New York Times, April 1, 2003.

  281.Kopp, “Iraqi Freedom—the Hammer and Anvil,” 30.

  282.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 14.

  283.Michael R. Gordon, “Battle for Baghdad Begins in Area Surrounding Iraqi Capital,” New York Times, April 2, 2003.

  284.Ibid., 120.

  285.Michael Sirak, “Interview with James Roche: Secretary of the U.S. Air Force,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 14, 2003.

  286.Maj. Gen. Franklin Blaisdell, the Air Force’s director of space operations, similarly said that “any enemy that would depend on GPS jammers for their livelihood is in grave trouble” (quoted in “Iraq Is Expected to Try Jamming U.S. Signals,” Baltimore Sun, March 13, 2003).

  287.“DoD Says Russian Sale of GPS Jammers to Iraq Not Affecting Air Campaign,” Inside the Pentagon, March 27, 2003, 19.

  288.“CENTCOM, Pentagon Confirm Destruction of GPS Jamming Equipment,” Defense Daily, March 26, 2003, 1. The Air Force announced plans in early 2003 to allocate $40 million toward countering the effects of potential jamming of GPS-aided air-delivered munitions. Elaine M. Grossman, “Air Force Aims to Redirect $40 Million in FY03 to Counter GPS Jamming,” Inside the Pentagon, January 30, 2003, 1, 14.

  289.Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 115.

  290.Carpenter, “Rapid, Deliberate, Disciplined, Proportional, and Precise,” 14.

  291.Kopp, “Iraqi Freedom—the Hammer and Anvil,” 32.

  292.Sean Boyne, “Iraqi Tactics Attempted to Employ Guerilla Forces,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2003, 16–17.

  293.Mark Mazetti and Richard J. Newman, “The Seeds of Victory,” U.S. News and World Report, April 21, 2003.

  294.Purdum, A Time of Our Choosing, 3.

  295.Merrill A. McPeak, “Shock and Pause,” New York Times, April 2, 2003.

  296.Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 360.

  297.Ibid., 373.

  298.Ibid., 412, 426.

  299.This technique was first employed on a trial basis during the late 1990s by the commander of Operation Northern Watch, then Brig. Gen. David Deptula. It offered an effective measure for mitigating collateral damage, although the technique required a steep weapon impact angle in order to prevent the munition from ricocheting off hard surfaces, with unpredictable consequences.

  300.For a more detailed discussion of the carrier air contribution to the three weeks of major combat in Iraqi Freedom, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, American Carrier Air Power at the Dawn of a New Century (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-404-NAVY, 2005), 39–58.

  301.Nichols, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE.”

  302.A “bolter” is an unplanned touch-and-go landing on the carrier deck that occurs when the aircraft’s tailhook fails to engage an arresting cable.

  303.This discussion has been informed by the description of carrier cyclic operations contained in Peter Hunt, Angles of Attack: An A-6 Intruder Pilot’s War (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002), 53–55.

  304.Robert Wall, “E-War Ramps Up: EA-6B Prowler to Resume Traditional Radar-Jamming Role if Iraqi Conflict Escalates,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 17, 2003, 49.

  305.Holmes, U.S. Navy Hornet Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, pt. 2, 17.

  306.Lyndsey Layton, “Building Bombs aboard the Abraham Lincoln,” Washington Post, March 14, 2003.

  307.“Bring-back” capability refers to the total weight of ordnance that a Navy or Marine Corps combat aircraft can recover with. It depends on the carrier’s landing weight limitations and other operating factors. Munitions in excess of the bring-back weight must be jettisoned before the aircraft can land.

  308.Whitcomb, “Rescue Operations in the Second Gulf War,” 97.

  309.Patrick E. Tyler, “Iraq Is Planning Protracted War,” New York Times, April 2, 2003.

  310.Carol J. Williams, “Navy Does Battle with Sandstorms on the Sea,” Los Angeles Times, March 27, 2003.

  311.“Defense Watch,” Defense Daily, November 12, 2002, 1. GBU-35 was the initial Navy designation for its 1,000-pound JDAM based on its Mk 83 general-purpose bomb. The Navy has since adopt
ed the same GBU-32 designation used by the Air Force.

  312.Carol J. Williams, “Super Hornet Creates a Buzz in the Gulf,” Los Angeles Times, April 1, 2003.

  313.Robert Wall, “Super Hornets at Sea: U.S. Navy’s New F/A-18Es Are Showing Surprising Reliability and Added Endurance,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 17, 2003, 46–47.

  314.Lt. Cdr. Richard K. Harrison, USN, “TacAir Trumps UAVs in Iraq,” Proceedings, November 2003, 58–59.

  315.Michael J. Gething, Mark Hewish, and Joris Janssen Lok, “New Pods Aid Air Reconnaissance,” Jane’s International Defence Review, October 2003, 59.

  316.Robert Wall, “Weather or Not: The F-14D Strike Fighter Can Now Drop Precision Weapons Even on Cloud-Shrouded Targets,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 17, 2003, 48.

  317.Holmes, U.S. Navy Hornet Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, pt. 2, 17.

  318.“Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing.”

  319.Conversation with Major General Darnell, August 2, 2006.

  320.Holmes, U.S. Navy Hornet Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 14.

  321.Sandra I. Irwin, “Naval Aviators Experience Success in Iraq, but Worry about the Future,” The Hook, fall 2003, 69. For a fuller discussion of the development of this close working relationship since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, Combat Pair: The Evolution of Air Force–Navy Integration in Strike Warfare (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-655-AF, 2007); Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Air Force–Navy Integration in Strike Warfare: A Role Model for Seamless Joint-Service Operations,” Naval War College Review, winter 2008; and Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Aerial Partners in Arms,” Joint Force Quarterly, second quarter, 2008.

  322.Vice Adm. Michael Malone, USN, “They Made a Difference,” The Hook, summer 2003, 26.

  323.Moseley, Operation Iraqi Freedom—by the Numbers, 10.

  324.Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 174.

  325.“Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing.”

  326.John M. Broder, “Allies Fan Out in Iraq—Resistance Outside City Is Light,” New York Times, April 9, 2003.

  327.“Citation to Accompany the Award of the Silver Star Medal to Raymond T. Strasburger,” document provided to the author by AFCENT/A9, Shaw AFB, S.C., April 17, 2009. In yet another indication that allied control of the air over Iraq was still not absolute, an Air Force A-10 was shot down two days later near the Baghdad International Airport, evidently by an optically guided Roland SAM. The pilot ejected safely and was recovered. John F. Burns, “Key Section of City Is Taken in a Street-by-Street Fight,” New York Times, April 9, 2003.