The Unseen War

by Lambeth, Benjamin S.

  328.Carla Anne Robbins, Greg Jaffe, and Dan Morse, “U.S. Aims at Psychological Front, Hoping Show of Force Ends War,” Wall Street Journal, April 7, 2003.

  329.Michael Knights, “USA Learns Lessons in Time-Critical Targeting,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2003, 33. The GBU-31 penetrates ten to twenty feet below the surface of its target before being detonated, with the depth depending on the type of material the weapon must go through.

  330.“Baghdad Raid Takes 12 Minutes from Targeting to Attack,” Flight International, April 15–21, 2003, 8. See also “Speed Kills,” Inside the Pentagon, April 10, 2003, 13.

  331.Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 176.

  332.Giles Ebbutt, “UK Command and Control during Iraqi Freedom,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2003, 42.

  333.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 118, 130.

  334.Stout, Hammer from Above, 200.

  335.Ibid., 269.

  336.David E. Johnson, Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post–Cold War Era (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-405-AF, 2006), 115.

  337.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 214.

  338.Anthony Shadid, “Hussein’s Baghdad Falls,” Washington Post, April 10, 2003.

  339.On July 22, 2003, Hussein’s two sons Uday and Qusay were killed when a detachment of troops from the 101st Airborne Division and a joint SOF and CIA team raided a house where their presence had been detected; see Kevin Sullivan and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Hussein’s Two Sons Killed in Firefight with U.S. Troops,” Washington Post, July 22, 2003. Saddam Hussein himself was finally captured by U.S. forces on December 13, 2003, in a farmhouse near Tikrit. He was subsequently tried and executed by the elected Iraqi government that replaced him.

  340.Nichols, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE.”

  341.Rowan Scarborough, “White House: ‘We’ve Won,’” Washington Times, April 15, 2003.

  342.David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Bush Says Regime in Iraq Is No More: Victory ‘Certain,’” New York Times, April 16, 2003.

  343.Michael R. Gordon, “American Forces Adapted to Friend and Foe,” New York Times, April 10, 2003.

  344.Greg Jaffe, “Rumsfeld’s Vindication Promises a Change in Tactics, Deployment,” Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2003.

  345.Stephen J. Hedges, “Air War Credited in Baghdad’s Fall,” Chicago Tribune, April 22, 2003.

  346.Neil Tweedie, “U.S. Fighter ‘Shot Down with Missile Left by SBS,’” London Daily Telegraph, June 6, 2003.

  347.Once the major fighting was over, the commander of the wing to which the F-15E had been assigned took a recovery team to the crash site. He reported: “After I briefed General Moseley on what I found there, he declared the jet and crew combat losses—end of story” (comments on an earlier draft by Maj. Gen. Eric Rosborg, USAF, March 19, 2007).

  348.Moseley, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Initial CFACC Roll-up.”

  349.Nichols, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE.”

  350.General Myers, the JCS chairman, dismissed that criticism as “bogus,” adding that it came from people who “either weren’t there, don’t know, or they’re working another agenda” (Jonathan Weisman, “Rumsfeld and Myers Defend War Plan,” Washington Post, April 2, 2003). A far more compelling criticism would have faulted the Bush administration and its subordinate Rumsfeld Pentagon for having entered into a regime-change campaign with a ground force grossly insufficient to consolidate the military victory with postcampaign stabilization and restoration of public order. See Chapter 6.

  351.Gen. Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret.), “Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Transformation of War,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 5, 2003, 66.

  352.Former Air Force chief of staff Gen. Ronald Fogleman, in criticizing a common American war-gaming practice that persists to this day, complained in a memorandum to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1996 that “these legacy models are most relevant when considering . . . an employment strategy of attrition and annihilation. Models assessing force-on-force engagements, based on force ratios and territory gained or lost, lack the capability to fully and accurately portray the significant effects of operations . . . directly attacking the enemy’s strategic and tactical centers of gravity.” A standard campaign model still widely used by the Department of Defense and Joint Staff, called TACWAR (for “tactical warfare”), for example, does not model anything approaching the application of air power to achieve decisive functional effects as was demonstrated in both Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. For further discussion of this important point, see Lt. Col. Steve McNamara, USAF, “Assessing Air Power’s Importance: Will the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] Debate Falter for Lack of Proper Analytic Tools?” Armed Forces Journal International, March 1997, 37.

  353.Dennis Cauchon, “Why U.S. Casualties Were Low,” USA Today, April 21, 2003.

  354.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 37.

  355.Terry McCarthy, “What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?” Time, May 12, 2003, 38.

  356.Ibid.

  357.Quoted in Lt. Col. Mark Simpson, USAF, “Air Power Lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Headquarters Air Combat Command, ACC/XPSX, Langley AFB, Va., November 25, 2003.

  358.McCarthy, “What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?”

  359.DeLong, Inside CentCom, 114.

  360.Lessons from Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 50.

  361.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 374.

  362.Ibid.

  363.Rear Adm. David C. Nichols Jr., USN, “Reflections on Iraqi Freedom,” The Hook, fall 2003, 3.

  364.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 273, 329.

  365.Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 56.

  Chapter 3. The Allies’ Contribution

  1.For official commentary on the United Kingdom’s contribution to Operation Desert Storm, which the British code-named Operation Granby, see Michael Mates, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby: House of Commons Papers 1990–91 (London: Stationery Office Books, 1991); and Nicholas Bonsor, Implementation of Lessons Learned from Operation Granby: House of Commons Papers 1993–94 (London: Stationery Office Books, 1994).

  2.For more on that contribution by the United Kingdom, see Lambeth, Air Power against Terror, 116–119. See also Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalition: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1746-AF, 2003), 55–63.

  3.As but one indicator that British involvement in the prospective war against Iraq was anything but assured at that point, RAF aircraft were proscribed from taking part in some elements of Operation Southern Focus. Conversation with senior staff officers at RAF Strike Command, RAF High Wycombe, UK, October 28, 2004.

  4.Keegan, The Iraq War, 125.

  5.As the United Kingdom’s forward deployment for the campaign began, that effort enjoyed only 32 percent public support—about the same level that prevailed in 1956 when British forces deployed for the Suez campaign. That support rose to 85 percent by the time combat operations commenced, then dropped to 50 percent before the campaign had ended and to a considerably lower level thereafter. Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, RAF, “Iraq 2003—Air Power Pointers for the Future,” Royal Air Force Air Power Review, autumn 2004, 7–8.

  6.Operations in Iraq: First Reflections (London: Ministry of Defence, July 2003), 3, hereinafter cited as First Reflections.

  7.Operation Telic: United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq (London: Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 60 Session 2003–2004, December 11, 2003), 1.

  8.Ibid., 1.

  9.Ministry of Defence: Operation Telic—United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq (London: House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, 39th Report of Session 2003–04, July 21, 2004), 3–4.

  10.David Willis, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” International Air Power Review, summer 2003, 16–18.

  11.Information provided by Group Captain Richard Keir, RAAF, director, RAAF Air Power De
velopment Centre, Canberra, Australia, July 2, 2009.

  12.In connection with Operation Slipper, the Australian government dispatched an Australian national commander to Kuwait in October 2001. It also concurrently deployed a SOF task group to Afghanistan, four F/A-18 Hornet fighters for the local air defense of Diego Garcia, two Boeing 707 tankers to support allied air operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan operating out of Manas, Kyrgyzstan, and in early 2003 sent two P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft to the Persian Gulf region.

  13.Press interview with Senator the Honorable Robert Hill, Minister for Defence, RAAF Base Richmond, New South Wales, Australia, February 7, 2003.

  14.The first RAAF officer, Wing Commander Otto Halupka, joined CENTAF’s initial planning deliberations at Shaw AFB, S.C., as early as August 2002 after having deployed shortly before for initial in-briefs at CENTCOM’s headquarters at MacDill AFB with the designated Australian national commander, Army Brigadier Maurie McNarn, and the designated Australian air contingent commander, Group Captain Geoff Brown. Official interview with Group Captain Geoff Brown, RAAF, Operation Falconer air component commander, April 9, 2008, provided to the author by the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, Australia.

  15.Tony Holmes, “RAAF Hornets at War,” Australian Aviation, January–February 2006, 38.

  16.Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003 (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence, 2003), 15.

  17.The Honorable John Howard, address to the House of Representatives, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, March 18, 2003.

  18.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 33.

  19.The MoD assigned a three-star RAF representative, then Air Marshal Jock Stirrup, to CENTCOM headquarters in Florida at the start of Operation Enduring Freedom. Stirrup was later replaced by a two-star successor as the Afghan air war ramped down, but the position was again upgraded to a three-star billet for Operation Iraqi Freedom with the assignment of Air Marshal Burridge as national contingent commander.

  20.Conversation with Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, RAF, commander-in-chief, RAF Strike Command, on board a 32 Squadron HS 125 en route from RAF Northolt to RAF Lossiemouth, UK, October 27, 2004.

  21.At the time, Air Vice-Marshal Torpy was serving as the air officer commanding of No. 1 Group within RAF Strike Command, who oversaw all RAF strike fighter operations.

  22.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 42.

  23.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 52.

  24.Ibid., 53.

  25.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 42.

  26.Ibid., Ev 44.

  27.Ibid., Ev 43.

  28.Claire Bannon, Media Liaison Officer, “Op Bastille/Falconer Timeline,” Canberra, Australia, Government of Australia, no date.

  29.The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003 (Canberra, Australia: Department of Defence, 2004), 13.

  30.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 32.

  31.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 198.

  32.Operations In Iraq: Lessons for the Future (London: Ministry of Defence, December 2003), 6–7, hereinafter cited as Lessons for the Future.

  33.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 3, Ev 416.

  34.First Reflections, 4.

  35.Conversation with senior staff officers at Headquarters Strike Command, October 28, 2004.

  36.“RAF Contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom,” briefing given to the author by 23 Squadron, RAF Waddington, UK, October 29, 2004.

  37.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 44.

  38.The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, 8.

  39.The Honorable John Howard, Address to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia, Canberra, Australia, November 20, 2002.

  40.Darwin and ANZAC, along with the RAAF’s AP-3s, were already deployed in CENTCOM’s AOR in support of Operation Slipper, the ADF’s contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

  41.Once regional air defense was no longer a serious concern, the F3s were pulled out to free up more ramp space for other aircraft. Although ramp space was at a premium throughout the campaign, sufficient strike aircraft were always present to satisfy the commitments levied on the British contingent by the daily ATO. Conversation with Air Vice-Marshal Andy White, RAF, air officer commanding, No. 3 Group, Headquarters RAF Strike Command, RAF High Wycombe, UK, October 28, 2004.

  42.First Reflections, 43–48.

  43.Ark Royal carried Royal Navy Sea King and RAF Chinook helicopters.

  44.First Reflections, 43–48.

  45.Conversation with Air Vice-Marshal White, October 28, 2004.

  46.Holmes, “RAAF Hornets at War,” 38.

  47.A fourth F/A-18 squadron, and the first to have been stood up at Williamtown in 1986 after the RAAF acquired the Hornet to replace its aging Mirage fighters, is 2 Operational Conversion Unit, the RAAF’s transition squadron that consists mainly of dual-control F/A-18B trainer versions of the aircraft.

  48.Official interview with Group Captain Bill Henman, RAAF, Operation Falconer commander of the air combat wing, April 9, 2007, provided to the author by the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, Australia.

  49.Ibid.

  50.Conversation with Air Marshal Glenn Torpy, RAF, commander, Permanent Joint Headquarters, Northwood, London, UK, October 26, 2004.

  51.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 52.

  52.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 59.

  53.Ibid.

  54.Torpy further volunteered that experience from previous operations had demonstrated the need for delegated targeting responsibility in order to maintain a sufficiently high tempo during Operation Telic. He also noted that the British defence minister, Geoffrey Hoon, fully understood those needs and was pivotal in securing the needed streamlining of the approval process. Conversation with Air Marshal Torpy, October 26, 2004.

  55.Gardner, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Operations,” 94.

  56.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 59.

  57.Lessons for the Future, 27.

  58.“Op Bastille/Falconer Timeline.”

  59.On this point, ADF legal officers vetted targets “in concert with RAAF intelligence personnel to produce what was called a ‘legal target appreciation’ for each target to be hit by RAAF aircraft. Also, each target was briefed to Group Captain Brown for his approval. This was done in parallel with the U.S. process, not sequentially, so as to not hold up the CAOC process. Anything outside Group Captain Brown’s approval level was either not accepted as a target or, if there was time, referred back to Australia for a decision. If there was an issue with a target, we were always able to pull it from the U.S. allocation to us and have it replaced with something more suitable. For this level of involvement, we relied heavily on RAAF planners within the GAT [guidance, apportionment, and targeting] and MAAP cells” (comments on an earlier draft by Group Captain Richard Keir, RAAF, chief of intelligence and targeting for the RAAF under Group Captain Brown, director, RAAF Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, Australia, July 2, 2009).

  60.Official interview with Group Captain Brown, April 9, 2008. Later, Group Captain Brown recalled that one of his most memorable moments in the CAOC occurred when General Moseley invited him to join him, alongside General Franks and RAF Air Vice-Marshal Torpy, in a video teleconference with President Bush, a former Texas Air National Guard F-102 pilot, who said to Franks: “Well, lucky you’re surrounded by three fighter pilots to keep you under control there, Tommy!” (Ibid.).

  61.Official interview with Wing Commander Melvin Hupfeld, RAAF, Operation Falconer commanding officer, No. 75 Squadron, September 16, 2003, provided to the author by the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, Australia.

  62.A parachute recovered by Iraqis that they claimed was that of a downed coalition airman was actually an ALARM parachute under which the missile descends slowly as it searches for its target. Conversations with senior staff officers at Headquarters Strike Command, October 28, 2004.

  63.Operation Telic: United Kingdom Military Operations in Ira
q, 7.

  64.First Reflections, 14.

  65.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 200.

  66.“Storm Shadow Appears ahead of Official Entry into Service Date,” Flight International, April 1–7, 2003, 6.

  67.First Reflections, 23. The munition includes an initial penetrator charge followed by the main explosive charge in order to breach reinforced structures. Neil Baumgardner, “RAF Spokesman: Enhanced Paveway ‘Outstanding’ in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Defense Daily, April 2, 2003, 7–8.

  68.The loss of the use of Turkish bases for conducting combat operations into Iraq created a major ripple effect as the RAF’s Tornado GR4 Storm Shadow shooters were forced to strike critical hard targets in northern Iraq that had originally been scheduled to be attacked by F-15Es configured with GBU-28 5,000-pound bunker busters. The GR4 was able to range farther north into Iraq than was the F-15E from the latter’s southern base at Al Jaber, Kuwait. Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.

  69.Flight Lieutenant Andy Wright, RAF, “GR4 Reconnaissance: Operation Telic,” RAF 2004, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Corporate Communication (RAF), Ministry of Defence, London, 2004, 24–25. Just before the start of combat operations the RAF modified some of its Tornado F3 counterair fighters to carry ALARM missiles for use in defense suppression but determined that the modification was not sufficiently robust to warrant introducing it into combat. Air Chief Marshal Sir John Day, RAF, “Air Power and Combat Operations—the Recent War in Iraq,” RUSI Journal, June 2003, 35.

  70.Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Cline, January 11, 2008.

  71.“RAF Contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

  72.Flight Lieutenant Roz Rushmere, RAF, “E-3D Sentry: Operation Telic,” RAF 2004, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Corporate Communication (RAF), London, 2004, 20–22.