The Unseen War
Page 52
73.Squadron Leader Hugh Davis, “VC-10 Tanker: Operation Telic,” RAF 2004, Ministry of Defence, Directorate of Corporate Communication (RAF), London, 2004, 44, 49.
74.Conversation with then Wing Commander Stuart Atha, RAF, Ministry of Defence, Whitehall, London, October 26, 2004.
75.Operation Telic—United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq, 8.
76.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 47.
77.Gardner, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Operations,” 98.
78.Ibid., 47. This niche expertise in tactical reconnaissance was valuable because the U.S. Air Force had withdrawn its dedicated RF-4C tactical reconnaissance aircraft from service after the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The use of a reconnaissance pod on the Harrier GR7 and the RAPTOR system on the Tornado GR4A represented the culmination of a process for upgrading the RAF’s tactical reconnaissance capability that began in 1991 with the acquisition of six early-generation improved low-level reconnaissance pods to supplement the original pods carried by the RAF’s single dedicated Jaguar reconnaissance unit, 41Squadron, based at RAF Coltishall. Gething, Hewish, and Lok, “New Pods Aid Air Reconnaissance,” 52.
79.Gardner, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Operations,” 92.
80.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 62.
81.Conversation with Air Marshal Torpy, October 26, 2004.
82.Holmes, “RAAF Hornets at War,” 39. Nevertheless, as the commanding officer of 75 Squadron later recounted, the RAAF’s deployed Hornet pilots did get some useful in-theater acclimation short of participating in Southern Focus operations before the campaign formally kicked off: “We did some missions where we flew up the North Arabian Gulf along the administrative route that would take us into the Iraqi theater. We flew up over Kuwait as well and did some training over there. While they were massing the army forces in Kuwait, we used that for our own training benefit to look at what a tank would look like on the ground, how we could see it on the radar or our other sensors, and so we experienced the communications process, the operation and coordination with our command and control agencies. We did all that and practiced that prior to actually deploying across the line, so we became quite familiar with what was there. We just hadn’t experienced going across the border into a combat area” (official interview with Wing Commander Hupfeld, September 16, 2003).
83.Comments on an earlier draft by Air Vice-Marshal Geoff Brown, RAAF, deputy chief of air force, RAAF, July 2, 2009.
84.Holmes, “RAAF Hornets at War,” 40.
85.Official interview with Wing Commander Hupfeld, September 16, 2003.
86.In his later recollection of this precedent-setting event for the Australian defense establishment, the RAAF’s chief targeting adviser to CENTCOM characterized the final decision-making process: “The target was an Iraqi leadership target. . . . It just so happened that at the particular time that the target was detected and went through the approval chain, our aircraft were the closest ones to it. So after a quick national validation, I remember standing next to Geoff Brown with the lawyer in the CAOC, and I can’t remember the exact words, but it was really: ‘Are you happy, are you happy, are you happy’ sort of thing, and we sort of said: ‘Yep, it all appears good to us, your decision now, Boss.’ So he said, ‘Do it’” (official interview with Wing Commander Keir, February 19, 2007, provided to the author by the RAAF Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, Australia).
87.Air Marshal A. G. Houston, RAAF, “Message from Chief of Air Force: Operation Falconer,” Canberra, Australia, March 24, 2003.
88.Air Commodore Geoff Brown, RAAF, “Iraq: Operations Bastille and Falconer—2003,” in Air Expeditionary Operations from World War II until Today, ed. Commander Keith Brent, RAAF (Canberra: Proceedings of the 2008 RAAF History Conference, April 1, 2008).
89.Ibid.
90.The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, 26–28.
91.Brown, “Iraq: Operations Bastille and Falconer—2003.”
92.The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, 29.
93.“Op Bastille/Falconer Timeline.”
94.Air Marshal A. G. Houston, RAAF, “Message from Chief of Air Force: Operation Falconer,” Canberra, Australia, April 4, 2003.
95.“Operation Falconer Honors List,” Canberra, Department of Defence, November 28, 2003.
96.Brown, “Iraq: Operations Bastille and Falconer—2003.”
97.The RAAF also is acquiring the AGM-158 JASSM and twenty-four F/A-18F Super Hornets to replace its aging F-111Cs and has taken on four C-17s and will acquire five KC-30B tankers and six Wedgetail AWACS aircraft. The RAAF’s capability in the second decade of the twenty-first century will be significantly greater than that of the 2003 force. Comments by Group Captain Keir, July 2, 2009.
98.Ibid.
99.Holmes, “RAAF Hornets at War,” 39.
100.Ibid., 42.
101.First Reflections, 19.
102.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 43.
103.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 1, 32.
104.Group Captain Chris Finn, RAF, “Air Aspects of Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Royal Air Force Air Power Review, winter 2003, 19.
105.On this point, Air Chief Marshal Burridge stressed the criticality of joint air-ground training being conducted “end to end” in such a manner that it “exercises the entire kill chain” (conversation with Air Chief Marshal Burridge, October 27, 2004).
106.Conversation with General Moseley, August 2, 2006.
107.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.
108.Conversation with Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, RAF, chief of the air staff, London, UK, May 19, 2009.
Chapter 4. Key Accomplishments
1.During the third week of the major combat phase, General Moseley asked rhetorically on this point: “Did we get 30 days of [prior air] preparation like in the first desert war? No. But I don’t think we needed 30 days of preparation. . . . While we didn’t have 30 days of preparation, we’ve certainly had more preparation pre-hostilities than perhaps some people realize” (“Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing”).
2.These statistics were drawn from Moseley, Operation Iraqi Freedom—by the Numbers; Maj. Gen. Daniel J. Darnell, USAF, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” undated briefing charts; and Nichols, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: CFACC/CAOC/NALE,” undated briefing charts.
3.An experienced A-10 pilot and combat commander offered the insightful observation that “in most cases, the A-10 gun is considered a precision munition. Given that an average burst in combat is around 50 rounds and that our A-10s shot 311,597 rounds in all, I would suggest that the Air Force actually did in the neighborhood of another 6,230 precision attacks (311,597 total rounds divided by 50 per burst), or, perhaps more correctly, at least 5,000-plus, a number that is not insignificant, since only two other precision munitions, the GBU-12 LGB and GBU-31 JDAM, exceeded that number” (comments by Colonel Neuenswander, March 6, 2007).
4.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 327. A Los Angeles Times survey of records from 27 hospitals in Baghdad and outlying areas indicated that at least 1,700 Iraqi civilians were killed and more than 8,000 were injured in the Baghdad area alone during the campaign and in the initial weeks thereafter. The greatest obstacle impeding the establishment of a more accurate count was the problem of distinguishing between Iraqi soldiers and civilians. Many soldiers continued to man their positions as the campaign unfolded, but dressed in civilian clothing and without ID tags. Laura King, “Baghdad’s Death Toll Assessed,” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2003.
5.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 14–15.
6.Willis, “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 19.
7.Ibid., 11.
8.Ibid., 40.
9.Another F-16 pilot added: “When you’re dropping JDAM, we call it ‘O-6 bombing,’ because even the colonels can hit the target” (Davies and Dildy, F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 44, 88).
10.Hampton Stephens,
“Wind-Corrected Anti-armor Weapon Used for First Time in Iraq,” Inside the Air Force, April 4, 2003, 9.
11.Stephen Trimble, “Air Force’s AMC Tallies Massive Airlift Effort for OIF,” Aerospace Daily, May 29, 2003.
12.See Martin Streetly, “Airborne Surveillance Assets Hit the Spot in Iraq,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2003, 34–37.
13.Trimble, “Air Force’s AMC Tallies Massive Airlift Effort for OIF.”
14.Cynthia Di Pasquale, “Russian Planes Expand U.S. Airlift Capability Strained during OIF, OEF,” Inside the Air Force, April 2, 2004, 9.
15.Trimble, “Air Force’s AMC Tallies Massive Airlift Effort for OIF.”
16.Lessons of Iraq, vol. 2, Ev 50.
17.Ibid., Ev 59. An RAF logistics officer at Strike Command headquarters similarly proposed that slack in logistical support is essential not merely as insurance but also as a potential force multiplier by virtue of the overinsurance that it provides. He added, in a thoughtful cautionary note, that “just in time” logistics can all too often end up meaning “just too late.”
18.Rowan Scarborough, “Myers Says ‘Annihilation’ of Iraqi Army Wasn’t Goal,” Washington Times, June 30, 2003.
19.Thom Shanker, “Assessment of Iraq War Will Emphasize Joint Operations,” Washington Post, May 1, 2003.
20.Ibid. JFCOM’s commander, Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, added in this regard that General Franks “doesn’t care where he gets capability to go kill a target, to accomplish a mission, or take an objective. So whether we do it with air power, artillery, naval gunfire, naval aircraft—it doesn’t make a difference. He just cares about taking care of a target.”
21.Capt. David A. Rogers, USN, “From the President: The Health of Your Tailhook Association,” The Hook, fall 2003, 4. In January and February 2003, with CENTCOM’s complete cooperation and support, JFCOM established a joint “lessons-learned” team of subject matter experts to observe, assess, and document joint combat operations while they were still under way. JFCOM subsequently deployed more than thirty of its team members to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility just before the campaign’s start. Admiral Giambastiani later remarked, “We were there before operations started and followed the entire campaign in real time. We had complete access to all commanders and their staffs for all operations at all levels. General Franks set the tone and welcomed this team with open arms.” In a synopsis of the team’s initial findings seven months later, Giambastiani offered as the effort’s ultimate key judgment that “our traditional military planning and perhaps our entire approach to warfare have shifted . . . away from employing service-centric forces that must be deconflicted on the battlefield to achieve victories of attrition to a well trained, integrated joint force that can enter the battlespace quickly and conduct decisive operations with both operational and strategic effects” (statement by Adm. Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, before the House Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., October 2, 2003).
22.Moseley, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Initial CFACC Roll-up.”
23.Feiler, “Iraqi Campaign Lessons Show Shift to ‘Overmatching Power’ Doctrine,” 1, 12–13.
24.For a thorough account of that experience, see Lambeth, Air Power against Terror, 163–231.
25.Elaine M. Grossman, “General: War-Tested Air-Land Coordination Cell Has Staying Power,” Inside the Air Force, March 12, 2004, 13–14.
26.Elizabeth Rees, “Standup of 484th AEW Proved Vital to Army, Air Force Ops Integration,” Inside the Air Force, September 5, 2003, 3.
27.The primary ASOC supporting V Corps remained collocated at the latter’s principal command post in Kuwait. A tactical ASOC advanced with the V Corps tactical command post and allowed for a long-range communications relay from the main ASOC. The E-2, E-3, and E-8 aerial and ground surveillance aircraft also fulfilled as-needed communications relay functions, but there was no command and control aircraft that was dedicated exclusively to support ASOC employment.
28.Maj. Alexander L. Koven, USAF, “Improvements in Joint Forces: How Missteps during Operation Anaconda Readied USCENTCOM for Operation Iraqi Freedom,” research report, Air University, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., April 2005, 20–21, emphasis added. The author was a command and control duty officer in the CAOC’s time-sensitive targeting cell during the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom.
29.Earlier in January 2003, during CENTCOM’s final precampaign workups, V Corps planners had met with their CENTAF counterparts at Shaw AFB to discuss the ASOC’s concept of operations for urban CAS. Out of that exchange emerged the foundation for the ultimate arrangements for conducting that mission that were finalized in March 2003. Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.
30.In this important distinction, “operational control” entails “organizing and employing forces, sustaining them, and assigning [them] general tasks,” whereas “tactical control” is “the specific direction and control of forces, especially in combat” (Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond, 10).
31.The first priority of Marine Corps aviation is to support Marines on the ground. Accordingly, the Marines look at their combat air assets first and foremost as integral components of their combined arms team, or MAGTF.
32.Stout, Hammer from Above, 16–17.
33.Conversations with Colonel Erlenbusch, Major Roberson, and other CENTAF staff, January 29, 2007.
34.Ibid.
35.Although the V Corps shaping effort was called “Corps CAS” and was conducted inside the FSCL using Type III CAS procedures, that effort really represented air interdiction, which does not require the terminal attack control that the V Corps commander nonetheless demanded for the battlespace that he controlled (see Chapter 5).
36.Stout, Hammer from Above, xiv–xv.
37.Ibid., 14.
38.“Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) Employment,” briefing presented at the Air Force Doctrine Summit IV sponsored by the Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., November 17, 2003.
39.Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 428.
40.Ibid.
41.Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report: Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Stewart, Ga.: U.S. Army 3rd Infantry Division, 2003), 29. The concurrent after-action assessment of 3rd ID’s Division Artillery called the conduct of CAS both a “winner” in Iraqi Freedom and a welcome testament that the Air Force had finally become “rededicated to CAS.” See Fires in the Close Fight: OIF Lessons Learned (Fort Stewart, Ga.: 3rd Infantry Division DIVARTY [Division Artillery], November 2003).
42.Ibid., 137.
43.Ibid., 138.
44.Holmes, U.S. Navy Hornet Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, pt. 2, 68–69.
45.Expanding on this, the commanding officer of VFA-15, Cdr. Andy Lewis, recalled that “communication with the FAC was usually via our KY-58 secure radio, which is akin to talking with your head in a trash can” (ibid., 70).
46.“Coalition Forces Air Component Command Briefing.”
47.Ibid.
48.Koven, “Improvements in Joint Fires,” 25.
49.Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment, 20–21.
50.Charles E. Kirkpatrick, Joint Fires as They Were Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations Group during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Land Warfare Papers no. 48 (Arlington, Va.: Association of the U.S. Army, Institute of Land Warfare, October 2004), 1.
51.Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, 86, 137.
52.John Liang, “JFCOM Commander Outlines ‘Good’ and ‘Ugly’ in Iraq Lessons Learned,” Inside the Pentagon, March 25, 2004, 15.
53.Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 285. By one report, PowerPoint briefings consumed as much as 80 percent of the bandwidth used during the major combat phase of Iraqi Freedom.
54.The assessment added that the resultant common operating picture “worked only within the CFLCC zone. Other forces o
perating on the ground in other components’ areas of operations were not included in the CFLCC picture and had to devise their own workarounds” (Joint Lessons Learned, 55).
55.Ripley, “Closing the Gap,” 26.
56.Tony Capaccio, “U.S. Commanders Wore General Dynamics Transmitters,” Bloomberg.com, April 30, 2003. After the campaign ended, the Air Force considered ways to improve the Blue Force Tracker system to ensure that pilots could talk ground forces onto targets and to enable life-or-death decisions involving, for example, the presence of friendly forces. “That could be deadly if we are being spoofed or if the display is not proper,” General Leaf noted. “Or it could be a reverse decision . . . to employ weapons based on the absence of Blue Force Tracking” (Elaine M. Grossman, “Air Force May Expand Significantly on Army Battlefield Tracking System,” Inside the Pentagon, November 6, 2003, 3).
57.Franks with McConnell, American Soldier, 447.
58.For a concise synopsis of the main technical and performance features of these aircraft, see Carlo Kopp, “Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Defence Today magazine, June 2004, 1–6.
59.“Global Hawk Feats in Iraq Could Lead to ISR Fleet Lessons,” Inside the Pentagon, May 29, 2003, 8.
60.Loren B. Thompson, “ISR Lessons of Iraq,” briefing prepared for the Defense News ISR Integration Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18, 2003.
61.Ibid.
62.The only reason why the Air Force’s F-22 Raptor fifth-generation air dominance fighter, the most data-linked combat aircraft in the world by far, was not used in the offensive and defensive counterair roles and for precision ground attack missions in which stealth would have been required for survival in Iraq’s most challenging threat envelopes was that the aircraft was not yet ready for combat employment when the campaign began. It only achieved initial operational capability two years later with the 1st Fighter Wing at Langley AFB, Virginia.
63.Davies, F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 21.