Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  Then, on the eve of Overlord, a coded message from London, broadcast openly on the BBC, called upon the Maquis across France to cut railway lines throughout the country. Of 1,050 pre-planned railway sabotage operations, 950 were executed.14 Nowhere was safe.

  On the 12th, Major Fischer, back at Mont de Marsan from Berlin, once more called his senior officers for a meeting. He told them that information emanating from reliable agents warned of an attack being planned by the Maquis against the airfield. Furthermore, in the town of Riscle, 45 km south-east of Mont de Marsan on the River Adour, a strong group of maquisards had cut off and surrounded a company of Wehrmacht construction troops. It had been decided by senior command that a ‘battle group’ made up of elements of FAGr 5 and commanded by Fischer, together with all the unit commanders of the Gruppe, would ‘capture’ the town, engage the Resistance fighters there, and free the beleaguered construction company.

  After this had sunk in, Fischer and his officers discussed the creation of a motorized column, its size and the weaponry required. The tactical method of attack was not decided upon, and although they had grave concerns about their lack of weapons training and capability, the airmen believed that a mobile attack was the only way to go. It was also decided that their route to Riscle would be via Grenade and Aire sur Adour.

  That afternoon, an advance patrol of 15 NCOs and men led by Hauptmann Walter Schoof – a pilot of 1./FAGr 5, a former member of 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.10, and a recipient of the Ehrenpokal and the Deutsche Kreuz in Gold – departed to investigate the situation in Riscle.

  At 0345 hrs on the morning of the 13th, a fully motorized main column under the command of Major Fischer together with his Staffelkapitäne, Hauptmann Augustin and Hauptmann Eckl, and Oberleutnant Schmidt of the Stabskompanie, moved off, supported by a platoon of light Flak from the airfield Flak unit. A short while later, on the country roads between Grenade and Aire sur Adour, the head of the column came upon some men of the advance troop sent out under Hauptmann Schoof. They were badly wounded. It transpired that the advance group had never reached Riscle, for, as it crossed the bridge in Aire sur Adour, it came under heavy fire from the basement windows of nearby houses. Hauptmann Schoof and eight of his men had jumped for safety into the river and escaped only by clambering along the riverbank. However, six of his men remained badly wounded in the town. Schoof and those men with him had made their way back towards Mont de Marsan along a different route of country roads, creeping carefully through roadside ditches. Unfortunately, in the process, they ran into another Resistance group and they took more heavy fire. Schoof was hit and wounded in the stomach but managed to continue, while Feldwebel Samosch of 2./FAGr 5 was so badly wounded that he simply lay in the road where he had been hit.

  A short while later, the main column under Fischer found Schoof and he was immediately sent back to hospital in Mont de Marsan where his wounds were treated by both the FAGr 5 doctor as well as French medics.

  The fact was that if the main column had arrived just ten minutes earlier, the Maquis attack could have been prevented. However, because the situation facing the main column could not be accurately assessed and in order to avoid further losses, Fischer ordered a return to Mont de Marsan. But as the column turned around, so it was fired upon from a farm close to the road. After a short period of time, the farmhouse was surrounded, entered and searched, where the only people to be found remaining were the apparently innocent owners, and a single wounded civilian who had been hit in the fight with the men of Schoof’s advance group.

  As the column made its way back to Mont de Marsan, so it was fired upon again from a house in Grenade, but on this occasion two armed civilians were captured. Then, eight kilometres from the airfield, while it progressed through wooded countryside, it happened again. This time, the Germans combed the woods and saw civilians making off on bicycles who managed to escape. After that, the column reached Mont de Marsan without further incident.

  Oskar Schmidt recalled: ‘This badly prepared “operation” had no success and resulted only in senseless sacrifice. The attacks on the column at various places showed that this was an organized and well-coordinated operation on the part of the Maquis … Aside, we were worried about the fate of our remaining soldiers.’15

  At midday, the Gruppe received orders to mount further assaults on Aire sur Adour and Riscle with the aim of freeing both towns of the Resistance. This time, the FAGr 5 battle group would be joined by an infantry unit based to the south. At around 1400 hrs, 100 heavily armed troops led by Major Fischer moved off towards the south, but as soon as it reached Grenade, the column came under heavy fire and became engaged in a fierce battle. Deploying the Flak guns and heavy infantry weapons it had brought with it, the FAGr 5 group gradually flushed out the Resistance ‘nests’, including those strongly barricaded in the local police station. However, the fighting claimed casualties on the German side, both dead and wounded, with a number of vehicles damaged as well. At 1555 hrs, with Grenade free of the Maquis, the battle group claimed victory and was able to return to Mont de Marsan, since news came through that the infantry had taken Aire sur Adour as well with little resistance.

  Also stumbling into Mont de Marsan that day was one of FAGr 5’s drivers, Obergefreiter Lewan, who had been the driver for Hauptmann Schoof’s reconnaissance group the day before. When Schoof’s group had come under attack, their lorry was shot up, but Lewan had jumped out and taken cover in a ditch. After the battle, he remained there for several hours in the darkness, close to the maquisard positions and listened to their conversations as they tended to their own wounded. Lewan was astonished to hear some of them apparently conversing in German! Eventually, he managed to escape and wandered around the countryside, without a map, until he finally returned to Mont de Marsan, completely exhausted.16

  During the action against the Resistance, FAGr 5 suffered several personnel killed or badly wounded; from 1.Staffel, Hauptmann Schoof died of his wounds on the 16th and was buried with full military honours in the local military cemetery the next evening, while Unteroffizier Adam Wolk, a pilot, and Untertoffizier Herbert Losch, an air gunner, were killed during the operation. Flight engineer Feldwebel Hermann Starge, observer Gefreiter Heinz-Emil Pütz and gunner Gefreiter Manfred Gierschner were badly wounded. From 2./FAGr 5, Feldwebel Horst Hille (pilot), Feldwebel Emil Broszio (radio-operator) and Unteroffizier Hans Roth (gunner) were all wounded.17 There were other casualties among the ground personnel of the Gruppe, including Obergefreiter Lewan.

  Over the next few days, a high state of alert and anxiety pervaded Mont de Marsan. In consequence of the Allied landings and the subsequent marked increase in Resistance activity, all leave was cancelled for German military personnel. Security at all of FAGr 5’s accommodation was strengthened resulting in considerable disruption; each evening the personnel of 1.Staffel left their billets on the Rue de Manon to join those of 2.Staffel in the former girls’ school building. The Stabskompanie was farthest from the airfield, in quarters in the centre of the town, where the guard was particularly enforced. It was later joined by the signals section of the Gruppe.

  During the evening of the 14th, word came through that the Maquis were about to launch an attack on a local fuel depot, and a detachment of men from the Stab of FAGr 5 was sent to deal with it. By the time they arrived, the depot had already been secured by the Resistance fighters. This had been achieved by maquisards wearing German uniforms, driving captured German vehicles and shooting the guards on the gate. As Oskar Schmidt mentions: ‘Because our men were neither equipped nor prepared for a night battle, the operation was postponed until the morning.’ Schmidt also recalled:

  Work continued to reinforce the defences of the individual units’ accommodation and security measures generally were increased. The Stabskompanie accommodation was strongly secured all-round. No maquisards could get anywhere near. There was a lot of heightened awareness and teams of men were trained up as assault troops. There was nothing else we could do and had to just
watch out as the fighting in Normandy went on. However, bearing in mind the blows that our units there were taking, privately we were quite glad that we were not being sent there immediately. Of course, these were not openly expressed views!18

  On the 15th, FAGr 5 apparently instigated something of a controversial operation. Information from French informants to the local German security forces had revealed that a large group of Resistance fighters was assembling in a town to the north-east of Mont de Marsan. Subsequently, Major Fischer ordered that a Ju 290 should be despatched to bomb the town. Oberleutnant Schmidt expressed grave concerns that innocent lives would be lost in such an operation, but according to Schmidt, that night a Ju 290 was sent to bomb the unidentified town with unknown results.

  On the 17th, having distributed motor vehicles, weapons and equipment, Major Fischer once again headed to Grenade and this time secured it without trouble. It seems the Resistance had pulled out. From this point, an uneasy calm settled over the Mont de Marsan area, as well as a growing sense of isolation among the men of FAGr 5 as Oskar Schmidt explains:

  We were both glad and surprised that the road and railway line from Mont de Marsan to Morcenx were still open and that our supply routes had not been cut off. Otherwise the places around Mont de Marsan seem to be in the hands of the resistance. There were too few [German] troops in our area. The few that had been there had long since been withdrawn, and sent elsewhere. We received no orders. In any case, there was probably little interest in our few remaining four-engined aircraft. Some of our crews were commandeered for special operations.19

  Air operations did continue on a sporadic basis, mainly in the form of security reconnaissance patrols. In the evening of the 22nd, for example, Leutnant Nagel of 1./FAGr 5 was airborne from Mont de Marsan in Ju 290 9V+FH at 2003 hrs on a patrol over the Bay of Biscay, covering 1700 km in a flight lasting over six hours.20

  The next day, a small formation of Mosquitos attacked Mont de Marsan airfield, but the airfield Flak defences gave a good account of themselves and drove the enemy fighter-bombers off without their having caused much damage. During the raid, the Gruppe had also deployed some of its 20 mm MG 151 cannon which the crews had rigged up onto the backs of vehicles in an attempt to make what was mockingly referred to as a mobile ‘anti-invasion weapon’.

  In the meantime, Major Fischer led another heavily armed foray to Aire sur Adour, but when the column arrived, the town was quiet and apparently vacated by the Resistance. The FAGr 5 column located one of its missing vehicles in the town and set about towing it back to Mont de Marsan. Unfortunately, however, on the way, it caught fire and had to be abandoned.

  The news from Normandy was grave; on 29 June, although Caen remained in German hands, the port of Cherbourg had been lost to the Allies. That day, Feldmarschälle Rommel and von Rundstedt flew to see Hitler at Berchtesgaden to demand significant reinforcements for the battle in Normandy, particularly in aircraft and Flak guns.

  The Luftwaffe fighter force was also slowly being bled dry with the demands of the Eastern Front, the protection of the Reich from Allied bombing and in dealing with overwhelming enemy air operations in France. From late June, FAGr 5 began to lose some of its flying personnel for training ahead of posting to the Jagdverbände operating on the Western Front or over the Reich.

  Certainly, the convoy war in the eastern Atlantic was over. By the end of June 1944, the statistics for the U-boat arm did not look good. The number of ships destroyed in the first quarter of the year was 41 (235,580 GRT) for the loss of 61 U-boats, while by the end of the second quarter, the sinking total was down to 25 vessels (143,978 GRT) for 72 U-boats lost.21 Until Dönitz could take delivery of the promised new boats, there would be no meaningful operations.

  July began with a sudden emergency. According to Schmidt: ‘It was a case of “anything that had legs had to go up in the air”.’ Enemy shipping had been picked up and there was a suspicion that it was another Allied invasion fleet heading for western France.22 Indeed, in an unprecedented action, no fewer than six Ju 290s were ‘scrambled’ from Mont de Marsan at 1920 hrs on a reconnaissance mission. This high number of aircraft was probably intended both to ensure a wide and effective search as well as to offer, with the prospect of so much enemy opposition, mutual protection in the air.

  Six aircraft took off again from 1720 hrs on the 2nd. In fact, what these Junkers first picked up with their FuG 200 at 0007 hrs on the morning of the 3rd in 23° West 7715 was another combined Liverpool-bound convoy, SL.162/MKS.53, of around 20 vessels plus escort on a course of 330°. Another aircraft confirmed the contact ten minutes later in 23° West 7718, but the convoy’s composition could not be made out. Contact was maintained until 0420 hrs, by which time the convoy had reached 23° West 8889. The Ju 290s eventually broke off and all returned safely.23

  Also on the 3rd, Oberleutnant Paul Birnkraut of 1./FAGr 5 took off from Mont de Marsan in a Ju 290 on a supply flight to Achmer, which demonstrated remarkably modern air–ground logistics. The Junkers was heavily overloaded: in addition to its crew, it carried 18 other personnel as well as a Kübelwagen and a motorcycle. While in the air, the aircraft picked up constant radio warnings of anticipated enemy air attacks on airfields, but it reached Achmer safely and was able to put down. Oberleutnant Schmidt, together with some NCOs from the Stabskompanie, drove off to the main vehicle park at Osnabrück to pick up some engine parts. The Ju 290 then flew on to the Junkers plant at Dessau, where it was loaded with aircraft spares. It then returned to Achmer, collected Schmidt, the Kübelwagen and the engine parts and landed back at Mont de Marsan at 2200 hrs.

  According to British wireless intelligence, another attempt was made on the night of 3/4 July to scour the Atlantic for the convoy so that it could be attacked: ‘During the night 3–4/5 it had been intended to repeat moonlight attack on convoy (SL.162/MKS.53) with all available Fw 200s (III./KG 40). Three Ju 290s (FAGr 5) were to be subordinated for battle recce. Operation was cancelled during the morning.’24

  Far to the east, in Berlin, on 9 July, at the evening situation conference, the Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff Generalleutnant Karl Koller advised that, following a visit from a naval liaison officer, he recognized there was a need for maritime reconnaissance, and while technical problems existed, the Ju 290 and He 177 would be the only aircraft available to fulfil the role in the foreseeable future with the exception of the Me 264, which would be ‘built [only] in small quantities.’25

  This may have been the case, but it did not stop the fact that in addition to transfers to ground units and day fighter units, FAGr 5 was now being required to give up crews to the special operations Geschwader of the Luftwaffe, KG 200. On 10 July, the crews of Oberleutnant Günther Korn (who also served as Staffel Technical Officer) and Leutnant Siegfried Wache of 1./FAGr 5, along with Hauptmann Hanns Kohmann of 2./FAGr 5, were ordered to report to KG 200 at Fürstenwalde with three Ju 290s for Sonderaufgaben (special duties). Simultaneously, in the light of no further guidance or orders being received from any higher Luftwaffe commands, Major Fischer flew again to Berlin in order to ascertain from the office of the Generalluftzeugmeister and Generalmajor von Barsewisch what the longer-term intentions were for FAGr 5.

  ‘What now?’ recorded Schmidt.26 ‘No aircraft. No Kommandeur. No U-boats. No KG 40 [that Geschwader was in the process of leaving France] – and the three units more or less at full strength [in terms of personnel]! And the Gruppe languishing at Mont de Marsan in south-western France!’*

  Fischer returned from Berlin on 16 July – ‘Surprisingly quickly,’ noted Schmidt. He informed his senior officers that the intention was to ‘further develop’ Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5, replacing the Ju 290 with the He 177 until such time as the prototypes of a new aircraft could be delivered, probably in December 1944 or January 1945. It had been hinted that this aircraft would have sufficient range to cross the Atlantic and reach the East Coast of the United States, which serves as a strong indication that the intention was to equip the
Gruppe with the Messerschmitt Me 264, a new, ultra-long-range, four-engined reconnaissance/anti-shipping aircraft, the first prototype of which was then undergoing testing with Messerschmitt in Bavaria. In the meantime, as long as there was no requirement from the U-boats, the crews of FAGr 5 would be released for ‘special duties’ – probably another reference to KG 200. Production of the Ju 290 would be discontinued.27

  Security reconnaissance patrols and weather flights were maintained by one or two Ju 290s at a time, operating at least every two days into late July. The latter type of mission came to a gradual end when Wekusta 2 returned from Germany with its new, but problematic He 177s, moving in to join FAGr 5 at Mont de Marsan.28 Just after 0530 hrs on the morning of 24 July, for example, one Ju 290 took off and flew out across the coast at 14° West 2568. It made regular weather reports between 0615 and 0950 hrs along a course 14° West 25, 35, 46, 75, 77, 87, and 88, 24° West 19 and 29, and 25° West 20, at which point the aircraft broke off its task. It also reported ‘2 destroyers or light cruisers’ at 1140 hrs in 14° West 0462. On the 29th, Oberleutnant Hans Müller of the Stab FAGr 5 commanded Ju 290A-7 Wk-Nr 0191 9V+FK on a weather flight lasting 16 hr 50 min, turning back only once a point west-south-west of Ireland had been reached.29