Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  Weather reporting had also taken up an increasing level of importance within FAGr 5's missions as dependence on air attacks against convoys had grown following the slump in U-boat activity. Regierungsrat Dr. Konstantin Blanck, a meteorologist attached to the Gruppenstab of FAGr 5, flew 11 missions between 17 May and 5 August 1944, although several of these were frustrated by aircraft or equipment failures. Blanck also conducted tests to investigate measuring cloud height from low-flying aircraft.30

  While on daily weather flights, the Ju 290s often observed enemy shipping, such as at 0852 hrs on the 2nd when a Junkers spotted a ‘convoy of 10 merchant ships up to 1,000 tons in 25° West 2061, course 210°.’31

  On the 5th, Ju 290 9V+FK of 2./FAGr 5 took off at 0530 hrs for a weather reconnaissance and returned at 0007 hrs on the 6th. ‘When we landed at Mont de Marsan,’ the radio-operator Feldwebel Herbert Littek recalled, ‘all four engines came to a stop because the fuel had run dry. But our senior command had already written us off.’32 The same day, Oberleutnant Otto-Karl Kremser, with Regierungsrat Dr. Blanck on board, flew another weather reconnaissance mission in Ju 290A-7 Wk-Nr 0191 9V+AB as far as 54° 00´ North 25° 00´ West. On the way back to France, the Junkers suffered an engine failure as a result of an encounter with two Liberators. The Junkers landed at Mont de Marsan at 0012 hrs on the 6th, after a flight of 18 hr 43 min.33

  On the 7th, a Ju 290 undertaking weather reconnaissance sighted what was part of SL.165/MKS.56, which had left Freetown on 20 July and Gibraltar on the 29th and comprised 37 merchant vessels. The Junkers was to the west of Ireland when it made contact with the convoy at 1030 hrs, making about five knots on a course 170° to 190° in 25° West 6348 and reported seeing 20 motor vessels, of which four or five were estimated at 10,000 tons. There were also some escort vessels and what was believed to be an escort carrier.34 This may well have been one of the last, if not the last convoy contact for FAGr 5. Weather flights continued daily until at least the 11th.

  For the record, at around this time, Major Fischer prepared a summary of the operations of Fernaufklärgungsgruppe 5 from the first days of its operations on 15 November 1943 to 12 August 1944:

  OPERATIONS OF FAGr 5 OVER THE ATLANTIC

  Operational base: Mont de Marsan

  Period: 15.11.43–12.08.44

  Results: 20 enemy convoys detected (of which 14 through visual observation and with photographic confirmation, six with radar [Hohentwiel])

  Operations (sorties) flown: 191 (approximately 640,750 km)

  Flying hours: 2,438 hrs = (av.) 12.7 hrs per operation

  Identified merchant ships: 650 units of c 4.6 million GRT (visual reconnaissance)]

  Warships: one battleship – six aircraft carriers – seven heavy and eight light cruisers – 65 destroyers – 60 escorts – 15 corvettes

  Successes through U-boats: which led to eight destroyers and one escort

  Success achieved through KG 40: three merchant ships of 18,000 GRT and two corvettes

  FAGr 5 own losses: nine crews (with 20 officers and one official; with Unteroffizier and men = 91). Of this figure, seven crews through enemy action, two crews through technical deficiencies

  four operations on instructions of BdU with 54 sorties. Involved coordination with KG 40 and U-boats.

  one task for Marinegruppe West. Gathering of blockade-runners = 17 sorties.

  38 sorties for security reconnaissance.

  17 sorties for weather reconnaissance for Wekusta 2/OKL.

  Evident here is the Gruppe’s erroneous belief in, or overestimation of, its level of success in operations against enemy naval vessels while operating in cooperation with U-boats. In fact, no destroyers were sunk as a result of such cooperation.

  As operational activity gradually declined, Major Fischer was keen that his men kept physically active and alert. The aircrews of 2./FAGr 5 kept themselves busy practising emergency and survival drill with rubber dinghies in the newly completed ‘swimming pool’ which had been created from the old airport reservoir, although dinghy drill ended when cracks began to appear in the cement! These were repaired and at the end of July, the Gruppe indulged in a series of inter-unit swimming and athletic events, as well as tennis, table tennis and rifle and pistol shooting. Hauptmann Sachtleben, the pilot who had rescued the Bassgeiger weather team from Greenland in June, proved particularly successful in the pool, while Oberfeldwebel Jaenicke of the Stabskompanie excelled at diving, and Oberleutnant Hans Münsterer, a pilot of 2.Staffel, won the table tennis tournament.35

  Not surprisingly, however, against a backdrop of the Third Reich’s worsening military predicament, by early August 1944, the situation at Mont de Marsan had become nothing short of surreal. The prevailing sense of uncertainty had grown even stronger since the attempt on the life of the Führer the previous month in which Generaloberst Günther Korten, the Chief of Luftwaffe General Staff, had been mortally wounded. FAGr 5’s Ju 290s and their crews had no U-boats to support, travelling in the surrounding area had become dangerous because of the ever-present Resistance, men were being posted away from the unit to bolster other units at the various battle fronts, but there was, strangely, plenty of time for sports and games. On 10 August, FAGr 5 was suddenly removed from the tactical jurisdiction of X.Fliegerkorps, which had relocated from Angers, north to Reims, to be placed under the command of II.Fliegerkorps based at Chartres, though it received no communication or orders from this Korps at all. Next day, the female Luftwaffe signals auxiliaries at Mont de Marsan were evacuated. In addition, most of the local Heer and military security units had vacated the Mont de Marsan area, to be replaced by the Free India Legion formed by the Indian independence leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, and which based itself at Lacanau, to the west of Bordeaux.

  By mid-August, with the Allied armies pushing against trapped German forces in the Falaise pocket, there was serious talk of vacating Mont de Marsan.

  Major Fischer decided to visit the headquarters of II.Fliegerkorps to obtain some guidance on future operations. But as Oskar Schmidt comments: ‘We, the Fernaufklärgungsgruppe 5, clung on at Mont de Marsan without any military purpose. It was as if we had been forgotten.’36 On 11 August, Major Fischer returned from his visit to the Korps, but none the wiser: ‘They don’t know what is to be done with us,’ he told his staff, ‘We’re supposed to continue as before.’ Schmidt recalled:

  So we were still up in the air, and no one felt responsibility for the Gruppe, at least at that time … Also in the area were some smaller airfields, intended for fighters, each with a staff of only 50 men. They seemed to be forgotten too. No one seemed responsible for them either. For years there had been no [air] units at these locations.

  Because our assignment to the II.Fliegerkorps was only a formality (as the Kommandeur’s visit had proved), did this mean that our only responsible command was the General der Aufklärungsflieger in Berlin? In the coming days, the Kommandeur wanted to fly to the Reich to get some answers, to explain our precarious position to the General, and to demand some clear orders. It was high time, because the enemy would soon advance down the Rhône valley from the north [a reference to the expected and imminent Allied landings in southern France]. The detailed plans for a retreat by road were now put in force.

  The ‘heroes’ in the Gruppe, however, were of the opinion that we still had had ‘time’. But we all knew what would happen, in a unit like ours, if there was a sudden command to pull out. The flying crews, the staff and the [technical] ‘experts’ would leave quickly with the aircraft, and the Stabskompanie would have to organize all the Unteroffiziere and men, along with equipment, for a retreat overland by truck.

  A withdrawal with vehicles had been ordered by the Kommandeur, as Allied forces were advancing ever further in a large pincer movement, and we were in danger of being cut off from being able to return to Germany. But was it still possible to make a safe movement through French territory occupied by the Resistance? 37

  Despite his attempt to fly to Germany, Fischer wa
s prevented from doing so by the Staff of Luftflotte 3. Thus, by 13 August, in the absence of any firm directives from high command, Fischer ordered FAGr 5 to prepare to vacate Mont de Marsan by air and by road within days and to relocate to Mühldorf am Inn in Bavaria. Yet despite all the preparations, as far as the road withdrawal was concerned, there were still challenges and difficulties to deal with as Schmidt recalled:

  The question of fuel for the land column was completely unclear. But thank God, there was some good fortune: it happened that the airfield construction company and its staff also had orders to leave, so the manager, Bauleiter Bölt, gave us all his fuel. The procurement of barrels for the petrol and diesel also to be sorted out, but we did it. For the wood-gas-powered vehicles, sufficient quantities of wood were obtained to cover at least a great part of the journey. Once underway, more could be found.

  Everything was very tense and understandably so, for everyone wanted an ordered departure in such a situation. The load requirements of the individual technical specialist sections were enormous and they had to be greatly reduced, not without great annoyance. The luggage of each man was, of course, very much increased from his time in Mont de Marsan – wine, cognac (not really acceptable), but we took what was possible. By feverishly feeding fuel from the construction company, we ensured the maximum number of vehicles were available.

  In the midst of this, reports came through of increased Maquis activity across all of France. ‘It was high time we moved!’ Schmidt remembered.

  But on the 14th, instead of ordering FAGr 5’s aircraft to take off for Germany, Fischer instructed that once again the town of Aire sur Adour, now fully occupied by the Resistance, was to be bombed from the air by the unit’s Ju 290s. However, as a result of persuasion to the contrary from Hauptmann Augustin and Oberleutnant Schmidt, this was never carried out.

  The following day, Oberst im Generalstabsdienst Artur Eschenauer, the Chef der 6. Abteilung of the OKL Generalquartiermeister, issued a report which would have ramifications for personnel of FAGr 5. It was addressed to the technical officer on Göring’s personal staff, the OKL Führungsstab and Generalmajor von Barsewisch. According to Eschenauer:

  The removal of the Ju 290 and Ju 390 from the long-range reconnaissance programme has left a hole which needs to be closed. It is possible that the large amount of assembled parts [for the Me 264] still available would be enough to build 20–30 Me 264s and make them operational. In order to actually realize this, personnel from the General der Auflkärungsflieger and General der Fliegerausbildung should be placed with Sonderkommando Nebel which will have the task of coordinating the testing and deployment of the Me 264.38

  Meanwhile, ‘normal’ air operations continued: on the 11th, what is believed to have been the last weather reconnaissance was flown by Leutnant Hellmut Hetz of 1./FAGr 5 in Ju 290A-7 Wk-Nr 0192 9V+HH when he left Mont de Marsan with Leutnant Luc and Fähnrich Brubach on board, returning at 2315 hrs.39 On the 15th, the day Allied forces landed on the coast of southern France, Leutnant Nagel took off from Mont de Marsan at 1845 hrs in Ju 290 9V+BH to conduct a 40-minute security flight along the Atlantic coast.40 The aircraft returned safely to Mont de Marsan, which, because of the threat of a direct attack by the Resistance, now resembled a ‘fortress’. Also that evening, disregarding the orders of Luftflotte 3, Major Fischer instructed the Gruppenadjutant, Oberleutnant Herbert Abel, to fly to Dessau and then, via whatever means he could find at his disposal, to get to Berlin. Once there, he was to make contact with Generalmajor von Barsewisch in another attempt to make him aware of the danger facing the personnel and aircraft of the Gruppe and to ask for further orders. Abel departed in Ju 290 Wk-Nr 0158 9V+AH, with Oberleutnant Herlein and Oberleutnant Pfeiffer sharing the flying.

  ‘Surely, something had to happen to us?’ wrote Oskar Schmidt.

  In the town of Mont de Marsan, in the interests of security and safety, the Stab and other elements of FAGr 5 evacuated their quarters in the former girls’ school and relocated to the quarters of 2.Staffel, where conditions became uncomfortably crowded.

  Meanwhile, Abel, Herlein and Pfeiffer had made it safely to Berlin, having commandeered a motorcycle and sidecar.41 They returned on the 17th, bringing with them the redeeming news that the Luftwaffenführungsstab had ordered Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5 to transfer in its entirety with immediate effect to Mühldorf am Inn. Quite why it had been necessary for three officers to travel to Berlin to ascertain this was a mystery to the Staff of FAGr 5. The first ‘official’ instruction would not be forthcoming until 21 August when 2.Fliegerdivision at Giebelstadt ordered the Gruppe to transfer to Mühldorf.42 Nevertheless, the Gruppe immediately began to make preparations for a mass withdrawal from the Atlantic Coast. Many of its crews would soon be embarking on very different tasks and missions – from the testing of new aircraft, to covert operations, to flying the most advanced jet aircraft in the last days of the war.

  It is perhaps poignant to note at this point that the German military historian Sönke Neitzel has commented: ‘From the very beginning, the few units which operated over the sea were overtaxed to an even greater degree than the rest of the Luftwaffe.’43

  * * *

  *Schmidt’s reference to ‘three units’ probably includes the 4./FAGr 5, for which see Chapter Twelve.

  CHAPTER TWELVE

  4./FAGr 5

  by Nick Beale

  Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

  Sun Tzu, The Art of War

  The 4./FAGr 5 was formed in the spring of 1944 from Horch- und Störstaffel (HuSSt) 2 (Eavesdropping and Jamming Flight 2), the role of which had been to monitor and disrupt RAF Coastal Command’s use of radar against U-boats in the Bay of Biscay. HuSSt 2 likewise had a predecessor: Kommando Rastedter, which had pioneered this specialism from July or August 1944 through to February 1944. From what little is known of these formations’ activity, the emphasis seems to have been on detection since, as discussed at a Kriegsmarine conference in March 1944, the Germans’ one airborne jamming set, Kettenhund (Watchdog), covered the frequency band of the older Allied ASV radar (Mk II) but not the nine-centimetre wavelength used by the latest ASV Mk III. Any active jamming attempted is likely to have been experimental, since there was clearly a limit to the operations that one (or occasionally two) aircraft per night could achieve.

  The new Staffel was commanded by a Hauptmann Kunz and its existence first became known to the Allies from a deciphered administrative instruction dated 21 May. Subsequently, those of its flights that became known were largely via routine warnings to the Kriegsmarine and Flak authorities about where and when aircraft could be expected to cross the coast. Four days later, an He 111 of the new Staffel was due to take off from Nantes at 2030 hrs and return eight hours later. The British Admiralty saw a probable connection between this flight and a badly damaged U-boat heading for port; attacked by a Liberator and unable to dive, U-736 had nevertheless shot down a Wellington of No. 612 Squadron. It was escorted into Lorient by five minesweepers, making port on the 26th after 57 days at sea.

  On the night of the 28/29th, the Staffel was to operate between 1950 and 0400 hrs but nothing was heard by the British Y-Service (Wireless Intercept). On 1 June, an He 111 was to make a daylight training flight over the coast west of Bordeaux from 0616 to 0845 hrs; on the 2nd, the night’s operation, by a single He 111, was to take place from 2000 to 0230 hrs. Two days after that, 4./FAGr 5 was told to coordinate its operations with the Ju 88-equipped 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.123, which had long flown security reconnaissances over the Bay of Biscay. The intention that particular night was for an He 111 to fly out over Pointe du Raz on the Finisterre Peninsula at 2105 hrs and back at 0230 hrs. No wireless traffic was picked up to confirm that this intention was carried out, however.

  Having begun May with no aircraft, during the month the unit would take on a repaired He 111H-6 along with a Do 217E-4 and a Ju 188F-1 from other units. During June, a Ju 88A-4 was added, also from repair, giving a final compl
ement as follows:

  Do 217E-4 Wk-Nr 4330 9V+AM Undergoing repairs to a damaged engine and radio gear on 17 July, with completion of the work expected within the week.

  He 111H-16 Wk-Nr 8308 9V+DM Under its factory code (DT+YI) this aircraft had served with HuSSt 2 at least as far back as 15 February. Destroyed before it could be physically transferred to 6.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.123.

  Ju 88A-4 Wk-Nr 301573 DW+OE Armed with 1 x MG 81, 1 x MG 81Z, 2 x MG 131 and 1 x MG FF. Ferried to 6.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.123 on 12 July but absent from that formation’s surviving strength returns for later dates.

  Ju 188F-1 Wk-Nr 260251 9V+EM Refitting in Werneuchen at the time of its transfer to 6.(F)/Aufkl. Gr.123 and expected to be ready for ferrying on 19 or 20 July.

  Intercepted signals indicated that 4./FAGr 5 was non-operational by 20 June. Nevertheless, strength in personnel on 10 July was 103, among them 48 aircrew, as follows:

  Pilots 8 (inc. 1 officer)

  Observers 8 (inc. 3 officers)

  Radio Operators 14

  Radio Operator/Mechanics 13

  Schnarrfunker 5

  This last specialism offers a clue to one part of the Staffel’s role: the verb schnarren translates as ‘to buzz’ or ‘to clatter’, suggesting the transmission of noise. Another ten radio operators were to be found among the ground echelon, suggesting rather more radio gear to service than four conventionally equipped aircraft might require. An earlier strength return had listed four on-board radio operators, three flight mechanics and an air gunner as ‘not belonging to crews’, so the overall numbers suggest that the Staffel mustered eight full crews of five, each consisting of a pilot, observer, gunner and two radio operators (as carried by a Ju 188 of Kommando Rastedter which had gone missing in December 1943).