The American Military

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  To the south, the Royal governor of Virginia faced challenges of his own. John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore, received word that a renewed cycle of Indian raids threatened backcountry settlements. Unrest spread throughout the countryside during 1774, particularly in the insular communities distant from the capital at Williamsburg. The Mingo and the Shawnee, who lived west of the Royal Proclamation line, began attacking provincials entering their hunting grounds. At Dunmore's request, Virginia's House of Burgesses authorized funding for a volunteer militia expedition against the gathering threats. At the junction of the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers, Dunmore's forces defeated Shawnee and Mingo warriors in the Battle of Point Pleasant on October 10, 1774. The governor returned to the capital to declare victory in his war.

  Irrespective of his military leadership, Dunmore confronted political opposition in the House of Burgesses. Patrick Henry, a combative member of the House, called for the permanent organization of a volunteer company of cavalry or infantry within every county. In an expression of solidarity with Massachusetts, he encouraged the House to pass a resolution in 1774 declaring a day of fasting and prayer. In response, Dunmore dissolved the House.

  The next year, local officials across Virginia readied the militia for an emergency. At the behest of the Virginia Convention meeting in Richmond, they stockpiled weapons, ammunition, and gunpowder. After the clashes at Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts, Dunmore sought to deprive a potential insurrection of logistical capabilities. He ordered the Royal marines to empty the arsenal and to disable the muskets stored in Williamsburg. On the night of April 20, 1775, Lieutenant Henry Collins arrived in the capital with a squad from H.M.S. Magdalen, which anchored on the James River. Afterwards, they fled in the dark with 15 half-barrels of powder for delivery to H.M.S. Fowey on the York River.

  Rumors about additional operations by the Royal marines brought out the Virginia militia. Led by Henry, the Hanover County militia voted on May 2 to march on Williamsburg. They stopped outside the capital, because Henry received a bill of exchange as payment for the powder. Nevertheless, Dunmore felt so imperiled that he briefly armed a group of black slaves and Shawnee Indians to guard the Governor's Palace. On June 8, he fled from the capital to H.M.S. Fowey. On November 17, he issued a shocking proclamation, which promised freedom to chattel in the Old Dominion if they joined an “Ethiopian Regiment.” He also dispatched an emissary to recruit Indian warriors to “march forth to conquer the Virginia rebels.” After a decisive defeat in the Battle of the Great Bridge that December, he resorted to sporadic raiding the next year. The Virginia gentry decided that British rule had lost legitimacy.

  By the end of 1775, British hopes for colonial reconciliation had all but disappeared. The Crown began recruiting new regiments of provincial loyalists and soliciting armed auxiliaries from Indian tribes. In addition, the home government hired 30,000 Hessian mercenaries for deployment to North America. “Well, the die is now cast,” King George III responded when told of rebel forces. The king concluded forthrightly: “Now, blows must decide whether they're to be our subjects or independent.”

  Conclusion

  The American military originated in the violent interactions of diverse people, who armed themselves for survival in the woodlands. Beginning in 1607, the English colonies organized militia units to conduct operations from their coastal bases. Their acts of war included frequent skirmishes with the Indians as well as occasional patrolling in the interior. Taking advantage of their assets, they pushed Indian tribes from the perimeters of provincial towns. At the same time, they relied upon the Royal Army and Navy to battle against rival empires. Eventually, the population of North America became involved in a series of global wars between Great Britain and France. The fighting culminated with the French and Indian War, which exposed thousands of locals to arduous campaigning. Governmental disputes with London produced an imperial crisis, when the British placed the colony of Massachusetts under martial law. Soon, the militia and the regulars came to blows. By 1775, revolting Americans defied the military power of Great Britain.

  Long before Americans revolted, trans-Atlantic colonization gave credence to the myth that the frontiersmen stood ready to provide an effective defense against all enemies. That is because the conquerors of North America resorted to the inherited traditions of classical republicanism for their notions of security. In the life-and-death struggle for control of the continent, the militia system reflected a kind of reversed self-image of what English colonists associated with imperial might. Armed citizens led the way for the American military, first against the spirited resistance of Indian tribes and later against the standing armies and navies of European monarchs. Generally, they did not perform well on expeditions outside the vicinity of their homes and communities. Many deserted their posts, especially if the logistics for conducting operations in faraway places faltered. Clinging to their colonial insti­tutions, Americans assumed that amateurs could stand toe-to-toe with professionals in war.

  In the wars of the colonial era, Americans experienced an evolution of military affairs. Though slow to change in many respects, European approaches to combat were not completely abandoned by the armed forces. Nevertheless, imperial warfare waged by regulars gave way to military actions that entailed a great deal of innovation. On the one hand, troops possessing organization, discipline, and firepower remained necessary to clear and to hold objectives for decisive results. On the other hand, they needed to travel faster and lighter to take advantage of cover, concealment, and surprise in the marshy woods. In other words, combatants on both sides of the Atlantic learned from each other while reinventing their systems of defense. Because American warriors adapted their strategies, tactics, and logistics to the threat environment, their fighting styles revealed a number of lessons learned from Indian people.

  Fighting in the colonial era broadly reinforced the warrior attributes not always evident in the rank and file of the standing military. Regardless of the force structure, soldiers and sailors in North America tended to act in highly competitive ways. They preferred to serve and to sacrifice for their friends and their families rather than for the objectives of distant authorities. Drawn from a dynamic population, they grew united in their desire to overcome adversaries with strenuous work and dauntless courage. They seemed to resent the discipline and the punishments associated with His Majesty's service, even though they battled against long odds with prodigious bursts of energy. Eager to return from the theater of operations as soon as possible, they often fought with their passion for liberty uppermost in mind. Time and again, the strengths and weaknesses of the American military manifested under the stress of a long war.

  Essential Questions

  1 How did the technology and tactics of the Native Americans differ from those employed by European forces?

  2 What were the chief features of the colonial militia system?

  3 Why did the colonists revolt against a standing military after the French and Indian War?

  Suggested Readings

  Allison, William T., Jeffrey Grey, and Janet G. Valentine. American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007.

  Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766. New York: Knopf, 2000.

  Archer, Richard. As If an Enemy's Country: The British Occupation of Boston and the Origins of Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

  Cave, Alfred A. The Pequot War. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996.

  Doubler, Michael D. Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636– 2000. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

  Ferling, John E. Struggle for a Continent: The Wars of Early America. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1993.

  Grenier, John. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

  Keegan, John. Fie
lds of Battle: The Wars for North America. New York: Knopf, 1996.

  Leach, Douglas Edward. Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607–1763. New York: Macmillan, 1973.

  Lepore, Jill. The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity. New York: Random House, 1998.

  Malone, Patrick M. The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among New England Indians. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 2000.

  Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. Revised edition. New York: Free Press, 1994.

  Peckham, Howard H. The Colonial Wars, 1689–1762. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

  Ross, John F. War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America's First Frontier. New York: Bantam Books, 2009.

  Shea, William L. The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983.

  Silver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New York: W. W. Norton, 2008.

  Starkey, Armstrong. European and Native American Warfare, 1675–1815. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998.

  Steele, Ian K. Warpaths: Invasions of North America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

  2

  War for Independence (1775–1787)

  Introduction

  In the last days of a long war, an anonymous letter circulated among the American soldiers encamped at Newburgh, New York. Composed without attribution by Major John Armstrong, an officer loyal to General Horatio Gates, it expressed outrage over the failure of Congress to fund the salaries, bounties, and pensions of the officer corps. It complained bitterly about the ingratitude of civilian leaders toward members of the armed forces. Anticipating a special meeting in the days ahead, the military camp buzzed with speculation about the Newburgh conspiracy.

  General George Washington issued an order for a regular officers' meeting on the Ides of March, 1783. The commander-in-chief reported in advance that he would not attend, thus leaving the chair in the meeting to Gates. Another anonymous letter circulated, which suggested widespread agreement among the malcontents about a course of action. In all likelihood, a mutiny was in the offing.

  The meeting came to pass in a building known as the Temple. Washington unexpectedly entered the hall, as Gates sat perplexed. The commander-in-chief asked the audience to remain patient, to remember posterity, and to save the republic. Speaking of the anonymous letters, he denounced the author for sowing seeds of discord among Americans. “My God!” he declared in exasperation before raising the rhetorical question: “What can this writer have in view?”

  Washington paused, reached into his coat pocket, and took out a letter from a congressional delegate. With his eyes squinting, he stared intently at the lines on the paper. Suddenly, he stopped reading. Then he reached into his coat pocket again and took out a pair of reading glasses. “Gentlemen,” he stated, “you must pardon me.” He gestured to the audience: “I have grown gray in your service, and now find myself going blind.”

  The sight of an aging, bespectacled warrior caught many off guard. The feelings of anger dissipated, while a sense of shame swept through the hall. The officers began to weep. After Washington exited the Temple, the Newburgh conspiracy came to an end.

  Figure 2.1 Alexander H. Ritchie, Washington and His Generals, 1870. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

  Refusing to become an American Caesar, the commander-in-chief resigned his commission on December 23, 1783. His leadership forged a “patriotic band of brothers” during the War for Independence, but the military almost turned against Congress in the end. With the new government bankrupt, the unfunded liabilities to veterans amounted to as much as $6 million. Auction houses soon sold off naval warships to the wealthiest merchants. Service members pondered what happened yet clung to their concepts of republican virtue, which imparted meaning to their longsuffering. While an embattled populace decided who should rule at home, the American Revolution reaffirmed the principle of civilian authority over the armed forces.

  The American Revolution commenced over eight years earlier, when the British Empire attempted to smash the colonial rebellion. As the Second Continental Congress gathered during 1775, military escorts accompanied the delegates to the Pennsylvania State House in Philadelphia. Following the bloodshed at Lexington and Concord, Congress assumed the functions of an inter-colonial legislative body. Though refusing to declare independence that spring, a committee sought to procure military supplies. The delegates voted to borrow money for the purchase of gunpowder and passed resolutions that urged citizens to arm themselves. They opened a public debate on war and peace, while Massachusetts officials beseeched them to create a “powerful army.”

  “Oh, that I was a soldier,” sighed the Massachusetts delegate John Adams, who encouraged Congress to take action. While several delegates already held military commissions from their assemblies, the 13 colonies possessed the potential to amass as many as 500,000 combatants through the enrolled militia system. However, at least one-third of the colonists remained loyal to the Crown. Many of the rest stayed uncommitted. Only individuals known as patriots volunteered to confront the armed might of His Majesty. If acts of violence gave birth to the United States, then the sacrifices of ordinary men and women nurtured a republican form of government. Their quest for home rule profoundly affected a Virginia delegate named Washington, who wore his buff and blue militia uniform to Congress in 1775.

  American Crisis

  Congress authorized the formation of America's first national institution, the Continental Army, on June 14, 1775. The delegates voted to raise 10 companies of riflemen from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia and ordered them to protect New England. The next day, Congress appointed Washington as the commander-in-chief of “all the continental forces raised, or to be raised, for the defence of American liberty.” After offering addi­tional commissions to four major and eight brigadier generals, Congress adopted articles of war to govern their military conduct. The colonial assemblies still controlled their respective militia units, but henceforth Americans served under the coexistent authority of Congress.

  Refusing to accept pay from Congress, Washington took command of the armed forces on July 2, 1775. As he inspected the encampments in Cambridge, Massachusetts, he found not an army but a rabble of 14,000. Immediately, he imposed a training regimen to discipline and to regulate the rank and file. He favored the application of harsh punishment for insubordination and approved the use of flogging for major infractions. Finding few good sergeants or competent lieutenants in the camps, he took personal responsibility for providing food and quarters. He ordered the distribution of firearms to the troops, because some carried nothing but pitchforks, pikes, and spears. Concerned about honor and reputation, he often reminded the Continentals of their shared devotion to “the glorious cause” of America.

  While the Continentals formed a defensive line around Boston, Congress passed measures to expand the American military. On October 13, 1775, the delegates authorized the outfitting of vessels for the Continental Navy. Initially, they commissioned the Alfred, Andrew Doria, Cabot, and Columbus. David Bushnell, a student at Yale College, tested a submarine named the Turtle, which failed to torpedo any British ships. Less than half the 13 frigates ordered for the war sailed into action. Though mired in controversy, Commodore Esek Hopkins of Rhode Island briefly became the Navy's first and only commander-in-chief.

  On November 10, 1775, Congress established a corps of marines to support the Navy on land and at sea. Tasked with a variety of missions, they primarily formed a shipboard security force to protect the captain and the officers. Moreover, sharpshooters stationed themselves on ship masts and picked off enemy officers, gunners, and helmsmen. Corps legends highlighted the prominence of the Tun Tavern in Philadelphia as the first recruit­ing post, while Captain Samuel Nicholas, whos
e family owned another tavern in the city, became the first commandant. During the Navy's inaugural cruise in the Caribbean, marines landed twice at Nassau to seize military stores from the British Empire.

  Meanwhile, Washington endorsed a two-pronged invasion of Quebec. Colonel Benedict Arnold moved a Continental detachment through the Maine and Canadian wilderness. Until falling ill, General Philip Schuyler of New York commanded units in the Northern Department near Lake Champlain. General Richard Montgomery, formerly a Royal officer, assumed command of the operation and took St. Johns, Chambly, and Montreal. To face the British forces under Governor General Sir Guy Carleton, Arnold and Montgomery arrived at the outskirts of Quebec on November 13, 1775. The American assault that began the following month proved disastrous. Montgomery died from a bullet to his head, while Arnold received a wound in his leg. The next year, General David Wooster of Connecticut arrived with reinforcements for another failed assault. Unable to turn Quebec into a fourteenth colony, the Continentals retreated southward to Crown Point.

  Washington sent Colonel Henry Knox, a corpulent Boston bookseller, to secure military stores at Fort Ticonderoga. He planned to transport captured weapons to the Continentals in Cambridge. Despite icebound roads and winter weather, his oxcarts and sleds moved 44 guns, 14 mortars, and a howitzer over 300 miles. They also dragged along 7,000 rounds of cannon shot, 2,000 muskets, and 31 tons of musket shot. Americans emplaced the artillery behind makeshift works on Dorchester Heights, which overlooked Boston. Facing a trap, General William Howe, the British commander, decided to evacuate the city. On March 17, 1776, British forces boarded ships at the wharves and departed for Halifax, Nova Scotia.

  The reluctance of the Royal Army and Navy to crush the Continentals emboldened the radical voices in North America. Thomas Paine, a freelance writer in Philadelphia, authored a pamphlet in early 1776 titled Common Sense, which denounced the rule of King George III. “The blood of the slain,” Paine declared, and “the weeping voice of nature cries 'tis time to part.”