With Us or Against Us
Page 12
Seventy-one percent of the French consider that the U.S. role in the
Iraq crisis was not justified; 56 percent of them expressed their lack of
comprehension of America’s role, 49 percent a sense of exasperation,
44 percent expressed hostility, with only 14 percent indicating a
degree of understanding, 9 percent respect, and 9 percent solidarity.
The United States was resented above all as a power seeking to dom-
inate the world. Given the choice between liberating a country’s
people by overthrowing their tyrant and protecting “puny” little Iraq
against the powerful and rich Americans, it would seem that the
majority of the French opted for the latter alternative. When asked to
which nation, the United States or Iraq, they felt closest to, 34 percent
replied the United States, 25 percent Iraq, and 31 percent neither. And
if 53 percent came in the end to prefer an American/British victory,
there were still 33 percent in favor of Iraq winning.
The battles waged by France in the UN was massively approved by
the French who fully supported the line adopted by President Chirac
and his minister for foreign affairs. Thus, 64 percent of the French
(IPSOS, March 2003) were against any form of involvement in the
conflict if the United States were to intervene without a second reso-
lution of the UN Security Council. The issue of the veto became the
primary means to counter the United States: if the United States were
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French and European Public Opinion
65
to succeed in having a majority of the Security Council vote in favor
of intervention, 69 percent of the French were in favor of France
using its right to veto, which confirms the fact that stopping American
intervention by all possible means was indeed a first imperative. This
accounts for the French population’s unqualified support for their
president. Three-quarters of the French considered that Chirac had
not gone overboard in his opposition to the United States (IPSOS,
March 2003), and, according to all the opinion polls, Chirac’s popular
support rose dramatically during this period.
Even though the major reason given by French political leaders, and
by the president of the Republic himself, for opposing the American
position was the question of whether or not the UN was to authorize
intervention, a significant minority of the French appear to have
adopted a decidedly pacifist stance; that is to say, opposition to the war
whatever the UN chose to do. Thus, 52 percent of those opposed to
military intervention (78 percent of the total) declared that they would
not change their minds even if weapons of mass destruction were to be
discovered in Iraq. In January, 60 percent of the French, according to
Gallup, were against intervention even if supported by the UN.
According to IPSOS (March 2003), even were the UN to approve,
only 13 percent wanted France to take part in the conflict, whereas
44 percent thought France should indicate support but not take part,
and 41 percent thought France should stay completely out of it. This
tendency can also be found in other European countries. Two thirds of
the Spanish, three-quarters of the Swiss, and more than half of the
Danish were against intervention even with the approval of the UN
Security Council. Close to three-quarters of the Italians opposed inter-
vention even if weapons of mass destruction were to be found.
The issue of the use of force and the aggressive nature of American
foreign policy can be seen as elements that crystallized European
opinion except in the case of the British. These are the factors that
pushed the Europeans into the “peace camp.” These are the issues
that, for a major segment of public opinion, turned Jacques Chirac
into the leader of the camp. Thus, in February 2003, two thirds of
the Spanish wanted their government to adopt the Franco-German
position and three-quarters of the Germans were in favor of closer
cooperation between Chirac and Schröder.
The Europeans and the American Model
Returning once again to the conclusion of the July/October Pew
Center report, opposition to the the American intervention “reflects a
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G érard Grunberg
broader discomfort with the imposing U.S. presence around the
world. Even those who are attracted to many aspects of American
society, including its democratic ideas and free-market traditions,
object to the export of American ideas and customs. People in every
European country except Bulgaria are resentful of American cultural
intrusion in their country.”
Anti-Americanism, without doubt, spreads as well—and perhaps
even primarily—as a reaction to a global model of society. In February
2003 (13–15 February), BVA asked respondents to say whether the
French should take America as an example in terms of its economic
system, its culture, foreign policy, and social structure. The reply was
an emphatic “no” in all areas: 64 percent “no” for the economic system,
77 percent for cultural matters, 84 percent for the way of life, 80 percent
for foreign policy, and 84 percent for the social structure. It is more
than evident that the French see the Americans as very different from
themselves and have no desire to see their society resemble the United
States. Furthermore, a majority of the French think that France and
the United States are increasingly taking opposite sides in the funda-
mental economic and social debates of the day. The overriding impres-
sion is that the two countries are growing steadily apart.
Anti-Americanism and “Anti-Bushism”
Present-day anti-Americanism is tinged, particularly in France, with a
pronounced hostility directed at George W. Bush. From the IPSOS
survey of March 2003, 82 percent have a negative image of the presi-
dent of the United States (of which 46 percent are very negative). For
BVA (February), 54 percent of those interviewed had a favorable opinion
of the American people as against 35 percent unfavorable, whereas
only 15 percent had a favorable opinion of George Bush as against
76 percent unfavorable. George Bush is held personally responsible for
the war. Thus, for IPSOS in March, 76 percent considered that the
American position was closely tied to the personality of George Bush;
only 17 percent thought the United States would have acted similarly
under another president. And the French blame the United States for
the deterioration of relations between the two countries.
A survey conducted in France on the occasion of the spring elec-
tions of 2002 (CEVIPOF/CIDSP conducted by the SOFRES)
revealed the particular characteristics of the anti-Bush factor in the
negative opinions of American policy. Anti-Bushism does not stem from
the same sources as traditional anti-Americanism. Traditional anti-
Americanism is primarily anticapitalism (table 3.3). The United States
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French and European Public Opinion
67
Table 3.3
Ant
i-Americanism and anticapitalism
Attitudes
Negative image
of the U.S. (%)
The word “profit” evokes:
Something very positive
32
Something fairly positive
38
Something fairly negative
56
Something very negative
66
The term “globalization” evokes:
Something very positive
23
Something fairly positive
34
Something fairly negative
56
Something very negative
70
Making money is:
Not very important
62
Fairly important
51
Very important
41
Extremely important
35
Source: CEVIPOF/CIDSP/SOFRES.
stands at the heart of the capitalist system, as the prime agent of
globalization and its foremost beneficiary. It appears as a society that
values money above all else.
On these issues, there is no significant difference between anti-
Americanism and anti-Bushism. This decidedly does not hold true
when it comes to universal values (such as cultural liberalism, antiracism).
The differences here emerge when the replies to a question concerning
the United States are compared to those concerning Bush. The ques-
tion on the United States was framed in these terms: “Does the word
United States bring to mind something positive or something negative?”
The question on Bush consisted of score of likableness (on a scale
of 0 to 10). Half of the people interviewed had a negative opinion of
the United States and likewise little liking (under a score of 5) for
George Bush.
Close analysis of the survey results shows that the image of the
United States and that of George Bush do not entirely correspond.
In fact, in comparison with traditional anti-Americanism, anti-
Bushism retains its distinct characteristics. Table 3.4 lists the issues for
which the differences between anti-Americanism and anti-Bushism
were the most marked. Table 3.4 reveals, according to certain atti-
tude and social class variables, the specific attributes of Bush’s image
as opposed to that of the United States. These attributes concern
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Table 3.4
Anti-Americanism and anti-Bushism
Negative image
Dislike
of the U.S.
of Bush
(%)
(%)
France has too many immigrants
Yes, absolutely
42
28
No, not at all
65
76
The death penalty should be reinstated
Yes, absolutely
44
32
No, not at all
60
67
Islam evokes something
Entirely negative
51
38
Entirely positive
46
74
Liberty is
Extremely important
54
57
Not very important
54
30
National defence is
Extremely important
45
37
Not very important
65
78
Ariel Sharon
Extremely favorable opinion
37
17
Extremely unfavorable opinion
66
71
Voted Le Pen in the first ballot of the
presidential elections of 2002
40
27
Class self-identification
Middle class
38
53
Working class
53
45
Educational level
Elementary school
47
41
College
41
61
problems of immigration, Islam, national defense, individual liberty,
and the image of Ariel Sharon. Dislike of Bush is strongest for those
who are most opposed to the use of military force, who have a positive
view of Islam and of immigrants, and who favor cultural liberalism
and the defence of individual liberty. Bush stands clearly, for better
or worse, for an aggressive interventionist America, authoritarian,
repressive and racist, and supportive of Sharon’s government.
Conversely, pro-Bushism is stronger than pro-Americanism in the case
of those who are the most xenophobic, those who attach greater
importance to the military capacity of their country, who are in favor
of the death penalty, and who support Israeli policy. Jean-Marie Le
Pen’s electorate is far less anti-Bush than anti-American.
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French and European Public Opinion
69
Table 3.5
Anti-Americanism in relation to economic liberalism
and xenophobia
Negative image of
Dislike of
the U.S. (%)
Bush (%)
High economic liberalism
Very xenophobic
37
34
Not very xenophobic
44
56
Low economic liberalism
Very xenophobic
54
38
Not very xenophobic
65
76
It is thus evident that Bush’s personality and policies constitute
a factor apart within the larger context of anti-Americanism in
general. It is a form of anti-Americanism based less on opposition to
economic liberalism and more on hostility to cultural liberalism.
Moreover, a number of studies have shown that a strong correlation
exists between educational level and belief in cultural liberalism.
Table 3.4 indicates, in effect, that French people on the lower end of
the social scale were more anti-American than those of the higher
classes, whereas their dislike of the president of the United States
was not as great as that of the latter. Table 3.5 indicates that for
non-xenophobic economic liberals, anti-Bush sentiment runs higher
than anti-Americanism, whereas for those who are not economic
liberals but are xenophobes, anti-Americanism is higher than anti-
Bushism. However, the distinction between anti-Bushism and
anti-Americanism should not be overdrawn. Those who are against
both cultural and economic liberalism are both anti-American and
anti-Bush.
Relations between Europe and the United States
Has the Iraq crisis brought about a change in relations between
Europe and the United States? Are Europeans seeking to distance
themselves from the United States? According to the report of the
Pew Research Center survey of March 2003: “While critics of
America’s foreign policies mostly blame the president, rather than
America more generally, the poll finds strong support for the idea that
Western Europe should take a more independent approach to security
and diplomatic affairs. Majorities in four of five Western European
>
countries surveyed hold this opinion and a 48% plurality in Great
Britain agrees. In the U.S., by contrast, 62% believe diplomatic and
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G érard Grunberg
security ties with Western Europe should remain as close as they have
been.”
Data gathered on the French side suggests the existence of a
genuine crisis in Franco-American relations as seen by the French,
but above and beyond the crisis, there exists a sizeable built-in
minority who no longer sides with the United States. France and the
United States appear to be drawing apart and this has serious impli-
cations for the traditional alliance between the two countries:
whereas 57 percent of the French, according to a BVA poll in
February 2003, considered the alliance with the United States to be
a positive factor, 39 percent did not. To be sure, 57 percent is a rela-
tively high figure and it should warn us against concluding that
today’s anti-Americanism reflects a refusal of the alliance. But the size
of the minority opinion should be borne in mind. In the eyes of the
French, what America has gained in power, it has lost in terms of
legitimacy; as a result, the idea of what the ties between the two
countries should be has of necessity undergone a change. The serious
differences of opinion between the various European governments,
that the handling of the Iraq crisis revealed, have led the French to
reformulate their images of the heads of other European govern-
ments. They disapprove of leaders or governments that have taken a
stand in favor of the war. According to the IFOP survey of March,
the percentage of favorable opinions of government leaders was
Aznar 24 percent, Blair 22 percent, Berlusconi 20 percent, and Bush
14 percent. On the other hand, percentages for those opposed to
the war were: Chirac 85 percent, Schröder 71 percent, and Poutine
47 percent. The issue is not simply one of transatlantic relations but
of political divisions within Europe as well. One of the questions
raised indirectly by the Iraq crisis is whether or not the governments
of countries that supported the American intervention will suffer
from it in the next general elections.
As of now, the British exception goes to show that there is no
common European public opinion. The British, after having disap-
proved of their government, ended up by adopting the official line.
Tony Blair remains the favorite for the next British elections. Above all,