With Us or Against Us
Page 13
the Iraq crisis has brought Britain closer to the United States. In 2002,
when the British were asked what country was the most important to
Britain—Europe, the Commonwealth, or the United States—50 percent
replied Europe, 19 percent the Commonwealth, and 29 percent the
United States. In 2003, when the Iraq war was winding down, the pro-
portions were 42, 16, and 34 percent, respectively. And when asked
which country was the most reliable ally and which country the least
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French and European Public Opinion
71
reliable, the answer was America as the most reliable for 73 percent and
France the least reliable for 55 percent. It is clear that even if the
British were at first opposed to the war, they remain faithful to their
special relationship with the United States. As for Spain, the regional
and local elections of May 25, 2003 did not turn into a defeat for
Aznar’s party, contrary to what opinion polls had predicted. But
Aznar lost the legislative election after the March 11, 2004 Madrid
terrorist attack.
In a wider perspective, the new survey of the Pew Global Project
Attitudes released in June 2003 revealed that one month after the end
of the war in Iraq, the level of anti-Americanism had dropped in
Europe (table 3.6). But the size of the decline varied from country to
country. It was least pronounced in the case of Russia and of France.
Anti-Americanism appeared relatively weak in Great Britain and Italy,
fairly strong in other countries.
Public opinion in all European countries favored, to varying degrees,
the evolution of diplomatic and security ties between Europe and the
United States, and the development of a greater sense of independ-
ence (table 3.7). The British and the Germans were more concerned
Table 3.6
Favorable view of the United States (in %)
March 2003
May 2003
Difference
Great Britain
48
70
⫹22
Italy
34
60
⫹26
Germany
25
45
⫹20
France 31
43
⫹12
Spain
14
38
⫹24
Russia
26
38
⫹8
Source: Pew Global Project Attitudes.
Table 3.7
United States–European diplomatic and security ties (in %)
March 2003
Should remain close
Should be more
Don’t know
independent
U.S.
62
29
9
Britain
40
48
12
France
30
67
4
Germany
46
52
3
Italy
30
63
7
Spain
24
60
16
Source: Pew Research Center, March 2003.
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72
G érard Grunberg
with maintaining close relations than were the Spanish, the French,
and the Italians. There emerges a distinction between northern
Europe and southern Europe—a distinction that does not correlate
with the positions taken by the governments concerned. In addition
to the differences between countries, there are differences within each
country according to the political orientations of the respondents
(table 3.8). This is particularly true of France where, anti-Americanism
becomes more pronounced as political orientation moves further to
the left. In addition, whereas the French electorate close to the left
“sided” with the Iraqis as frequently as with the Americans, the elec-
torate close to the right clearly “sided” with the United States (44
percent as against 18 percent). Only 47 percent of the left electorate
favored a coalition victory; on the other hand, the percentage rose to
69 for those on the right. These differences are reflected in the level
of support for the alliance with the United States as revealed by the
Table 3.8
The image of the United States according to political
orientation
Political orientation on
Negative image of
a left/right scale
the US (%)
Left
65
Center-left
51
Center
48
Center-right
42
Right
38
Table 3.9
The French American alliance
How strongly do you yourself support the alliance between France and the United States?
Support the
Total
Political orientation
alliance
(%)
Left
Right
(%)
(%)
Very strongly
17
15
23
Fairly strongly
40
38
45
Subtotal (support)
57
53
68
Not really strongly
28
34
22
Not at all
11
11
7
Subtotal (nonsupport)
39
45
29
No answer
4
2
3
Total
100
100
100
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French and European Public Opinion
73
BVA survey of February 2003: those on the right were more
supportive of the alliance than those on the left. In France, the left is
deeply split on the issue of the alliance with the United States. For
some people on the left, the United States is not an ally but an adver-
sary (table 3.9). It is here that radical anti-Americanism emerges most
clearly.
The data that have been presented indicate that even if the Iraq
crisis constituted a unique event that of itself precipitated a steep rise
in anti-Americanism—the crisis served essentially to bring to the sur-
face and reinforce an underlying level of anti-American sentiment. The
foundations of the transatlantic alliance would appear, except in the
case of Great Britain, to be fragile as far as European public opinion is
concerned. The American superpower is a source of anxiety and U.S.
policies are suspect. Europeans sense the gap to be widening between
their societies and the United States. And the new foreign and military
policies adopted by America run into strong objections because of its
excessive reliance on military force and unilateralism. The Europeans
are no longer certain that they defend the same causes and strive for
the same objectives as the Americans. They fear that the American
model of society will be forced upon them. In short, they feel that
they are different.
* * *
4
I s There a New
A nti-Americanism?
R eflections on Germany in
T imes of Global Simultaneity
Detlev Claussen
With the Iraqi campaign of 2003, America has once again become
the focus of world debate. Since 9/11, there has been a heated debate
in Germany over its relationship with the leading power in the West—
the United States. Though much has already been said against U.S.
policies, the question now is whether there is a new anti-Americanism,
one that has intensified since 1989 in the aftermath of the collapse of
the Cold War’s bipolar world order. Is this even anti-Americanism at
all? This question cannot be answered if the situation in Germany is
viewed in isolation. Like the devil and holy water, most participants
in this discussion shy away from a more precise definition of anti-
Americanism, the reason being that a closer examination would force
the public parlor game of mutual accusation to give way to a serious
analysis of the current global situation. Even those who argue in favor of
the anti-American side do not want to be considered anti-American,
at least not in the West anyway. While the manifest anti-Americanism
preached by the group that surrounds bin Laden cannot be denied, it
must be remembered that it is only since the 1980s—when Afghanistan’s
war with the Soviet Union ended—that this group’s ideology turned
against America. During the Cold War, bin Laden, like a magician’s
apprentice to the field of politics, fought with American support
against the unbelievers of the Soviet Union. To him and his cohorts,
the Soviet Union appeared to be the main secular enemy of the Arab
world—the world from which they came and which shaped their
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D etlev Cl aussen
motives. It was only after the Gulf War, in which one of the last
representatives of Arab political nationalism, Saddam Hussein, styled
himself in vain as the political leader of the Arab world, that the
anti-American aspect of their worldview emerged. Manifest anti-
Americanism in the Arab world has been well suited for its ongoing
role of identifying guilty parties for the disaster of decolonization. As
a cipher and symbol for the Arab world’s failed liberation from colonial
dependence, the state of Israel also continues to fulfill this function.
Rather than recognizing that Israel’s powerful position in the middle
of the Arab world is related to the Arab world’s own inability to create
a peaceful, future-oriented social order, Israel’s status has been attrib-
uted solely to the allegedly one-sided support by the United States.
Since the 1920s, Arab nationalism in the form of Nasserism and
Baathism has competed with the “corrupt regimes” that were held
responsible for the failed modernization of the Arab world. Increasing
in strength after the defeat of Nasser in the Six-Day War of 1967,
political Islam, by contrast, declared both paths into the modern world
equally corrupt. From nationalism, these Islamists inherited manifest
anti-Americanism as a weapon in the Arab power struggle. After the
victory of the Ayatollah Khomeini, with whom they had been com-
peting, and after the fatwah against Salman Rushdie in 1989, the
Islamists then integrated this weapon into their own worldview. The
attacks of 9/11 constitute the previously unimaginable pinnacle of
these activities. Though the attacks were meant to embarrass Arab
regimes of all colors—modern and traditional alike—this struggle is
no longer justified politically. Instead, it is justified in religious and
cultural terms. It is in this respect that bin Laden’s terrorism can
be understood as a new anti-Americanism, even when it is put in the
service of many old resentments.
Not the acts themselves, but aspects of their justification could
count on a surprisingly worldwide sympathy. In the initial aftermath
of 9/11, this sympathy was heard only in conversations at parties,
then in public spaces, at universities, and on television and radio out-
lets. Then increasingly, these sympathies started to appear in print,
first in feuilletons, and until finally they reached the editorial pages.
The public was beginning to interpret the attacks of 9/11 and the
central argument that emerged was that the world order was unjust.
The current icon of this slant in the media is Arundhati Roy, who has
taken on the role of spokesperson for a Third World that no longer
exists. This post-colonial performance, which is intended for academic
and mass media markets, has already been presented by the firebrand
Edward Said. As both a spokesman for the Palestinian diaspora and a
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Is There a New Anti-Americanism?
77
successful scholar within the American university system, Said was able
to articulate himself in universal terms. In this way, he succeeded in
establishing himself as a symbolic representative for people who iden-
tify with the Third World as well as for urban oriented intellectuals.
The 1989 collapse of the bipolar world reflected a global simultaneity,
which is bewildering. The social contradictions between the modern
and the traditional coexist in every corner of the world; realities through-
out the entire globe are characterized by bizarre mixtures of progress
and backwardness. In the midst of this chaos, America serves as a
point of orientation. It seems to have remained the same while the
world has changed almost beyond recognition. Even the expression,
“the only remaining superpower,” strikes many people as a provoca-
tion, at the same time when it has become a social fact. The phrase,
“new world order,” already existed in 1990, even before the Gulf War,
which came to symbolize this new world order. The half hearted way
in which this particular notion was staged can be criticized. The coali-
tion may have succeeded in the war but the situation in the Middle
East was left unresolved. Criticism of U.S. foreign policy in the
Middle East is completely justifiable. However, this criticism veers
toward anti-Americanism when it represents the U.S. government as
the only responsible power that should still be concerned about the
region’s dissarray. Anti-American emotions were running high when
the embarrassingly excessive, “No Blood For Oil,” was coined. In the
early 1990s, Western societies did not settle this conflict either in the
public arena or in terms of domestic policy. Saddam Hussein’s disar-
mament hardly elicited any argument in 1991. Yet, the United States
has dominated the last decade and in the eyes of most of its accusers,
this makes it responsible for everything that has happened since then.
The strongest power is always regarded as all-powerful. As a result, an
anti-American worldview has become firmly established, a position
that is always at hand and ready to be put to use.
Shock over 9/11 shaped the new reality of world politics. This
shock only lasted a few days, however, bef
ore old reflexes, unresolved
intellectual and political issues from the recent past, returned. The
new anti-Americanism filled the void left by the lack of a theoretical
conception of global society that would adequately reflect the way
the world has changed since 1989. By employing such empty concepts
as “globalization” social scientists have preferred to label, rather than
to understand, the post-1989 period. What is underestimated is the
extent to which the imperative to modernize as quickly as possible
is more than ever colliding against lingering traditions. The long,
post–World War II boom was accompanied by an international
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D etlev Cl aussen
revolution in education, which created a new, globally competitive
world middle class. Those who do not identify with America as the
most advanced society in the world, or who cannot study it without
emotion or bias, feel neglected or cheated—a well-known phenome-
non in twentieth-century German social psychology. Since the last
third of the twentieth century, the return to the past as a resource has
been an integral part of this process. In the most advanced society in
the world, this process has led to the public acceptance, far beyond
the academic arena, of such categories as “ethnicity” and “identity.”
The recently formed middle classes, which had replaced the tradition-
ally educated middle class in their cultural strongholds of schools and
universities, founded a new, ethnic, religious, and, later, gender-based
model of historical interpretation. This was appropriate for the United
States, as it is a society characterized by immigration. Outside the
United States, these very modernization processes, which had already
found expression in the globally concurrent events of 1968, led to
renationalized self-perceptions among the new middle classes. The
“children of Karl Marx and Coca-Cola,” as Jean-Luc Godard called
them, became adults who invented their own ethno-cultural identity.
In distancing themselves from America, their past could once again be
national.
In other European countries, this renationalization of the past can
happen with less restraint than in West Germany, which in contrast to
France or Italy cannot define itself in unambiguously national terms,
without playing down the National Socialist past. For this reason,
heated debates over the German past constantly reoccur. Moreover,