With Us or Against Us
Page 14
German relations with America are always connected with the fact
that the United States liberated Germany from National Socialism
through war and reeducation. This is hardly the case in the former
East Germany. There, the discussions over the National Socialist past
serve to validate or invalidate the winners and losers of reunification.
Common German ground is only reached in discussions over the
Allied bombing and the expulsions of Germans from the occupied ter-
ritories after the war. Anyone who was not in Germany in the summer
of 2003 would have trouble believing that, after the intervention in
Iraq, the most-debated public issue in Germany concerned the correct
interpretation of events that took place six decades ago. Only from a
distance does Germany’s cultural debate appear enviable. On closer
inspection, these public disputes turn out to be a way of shifting con-
temporary social problems unto distant countries and the distant past.
Uncertainty is the chiaroscuro that distorts reality. What is feared are
the “American conditions,” in which class predominates. Xenophobic
* * *
Is There a New Anti-Americanism?
79
fears are intertwined with anxiety over the end of the welfare state.
Considered an old-European invention, it was not recognized that,
beyond its specific forms, the welfare state was a common social devel-
opment of the “short century.” Without the welfare state, the concept
of the West as the “abundant society,” as Kenneth Galbraith put it,
would never have looked attractive. Today, as in the past, the absolute
oppositions that are presented between America and Europe are actu-
ally distortions of social differences. This gives the propagandist
ideologues the opportunity to exploit the ambivalence of the public
toward social change. As a result, America’s present offers Europe a
picture of its own future. In the population’s anxieties about the
future, old fears are reproduced in the new anti-Americanism.
The social basis of the new anti-Americanism is to be found in the
middle classes that succeed through education and training. Their
German spokespersons see themselves in agreement with the
American anti-Bush opposition, which has grown since the end of the
direct military confrontation in Iraq. On American campuses, resist-
ance to the war on terrorism has been expressed in terms of the so-
called new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. In Europe, as
well as in Latin America, the same social and political pink–purple–
green categories are intertwined with national ones. During the
protests in Germany against the war in Kosovo, Serb and Greek flags
could be seen alongside new and old pacifist symbols. Now with the
anti-Iraq war protests of 2003, a new transnational symbol has been
found—the word “Pace” written over a rainbow flag—a poorly secu-
larized version of ultra-Catholicism, a geopolitical St. Peter’s Square.
The forces of yesterday criticize those of today and that is fine with
each new sheep that enters the flock, whether the sheep wanders in
from the youth-oriented, antiglobalization movement or from the
reawakened veterans of the 1970s and 1980s who have been incor-
rectly characterized as former “1968ers.” This results in a harsh view of
an America that appears omnipotent. In a world where America
defines the rules to which the rest of the world orients itself, it is,
nonetheless, fitting that it always occupies the number one spot. The
academic left in Germany feels reassured by the reactions of its
American colleagues, who for a long time appeared powerless against
the unilateral course of the Bush administration but who have started
to attack the Bush administration’s foreign policy. As a result, the
German academic left does not see itself as anti-American at all. Some
of the American opposition’s public statements against the policies of
the Bush administration after 9/11 were rather muddled. On the level
of domestic policies, however, George W. Bush’s opponents, who
* * *
80
D etlev Cl aussen
already felt slapped in the face by the presidential election, have
sought a better way to hinder his reelection. The behavior of the
Democrats in the days leading up to the Iraqi invasion was purely tacti-
cal in motivation, leading the academic opposition to orient itself on
the old “Vietnam Setting,” as Charles Kupchan had accurately termed
it in September 2001. It is for this reason that the peace demonstra-
tions of 2003 had a nostalgic touch that spanned generations. In
Europe, however, the demonstrations in London, Rome, Paris, and
Berlin were celebrated as the birth of a new Europe. This would have
been completely unthinkable during the anti-Vietnam demonstrations
in 1968. The new anti-American propaganda has a bit of the illusion
of a European society, an illusion that is necessary for the acceptance
of a pan-national entity—just as Ernest Renan pointed out that his-
torical lies were necessary in order to make the abstraction of the
nation acceptable.
September 11 produced strange new battle lines. While the ruling
coalition in Germany committed itself to “unconditional solidarity”
with the United States, the activists of the once old, now revived,
social movements rose up against this solidarity. In the mass media,
the aversions integral to the convictions of the old left met with the
new confidence of the recently emerged middle classes. The former
consider war vulgar, whereas the latter accept “going along with it.”
The so-called German pacifism of today likes to see itself as the result
of historical learning processes. Yet, at least since the 1970s, German
pacifism has been used more as a means of flattering the self-confi-
dence of the post-Nazi generation. This generation sees itself as,
above all, superior to a nation of sycophants, which is how they define
most of the older generations. Class distinctiveness intertwines with
national distinctiveness. Professional politicians are singled out by the
new middle classes as objects for contempt, despite the fact that pro-
fessional politicians generally come from among their ranks—this is a
phenomenon that Jimmy Carter already encountered in the previous
generation. Such class-specific biases are now united against George W.
Bush, Gerhard Schröder, and Joschka Fischer. The antipolitical
protest stance of the academic American left denies that, in contrast to
Vietnam, it is possible that, even if a different administration came to
power in 2004, it would have to remain in Iraq. In German academic
and mainstream media circles, this protest stance quickly becomes
tinged with anti-American sentiment. From this perspective, politicians
look like cynical opportunists and the majority of the population,
which is not at all spontaneously anti-American, like easily manipu-
lated fools, who are simply uninformed. In the same way that the
* * *
Is There a New Anti-Americanis
m?
81
arrogance of class distinctiveness feeds on ambivalence toward power,
so does the new anti-Americanism. This is reflected in the common
reproach, the “arrogance of power.” Power is always envied and
this jealousy leads to an exaggerated sense of power as omnipotence, thus
making it possible to spread blame to everyone. At the same time, the
powers that be, though hardly populist, look to the middle classes
in educational institutions and in the media as their opinion leaders.
The brand of anti-Americanism to which intellectuals subscribe, spans
generation and stirs up resentment against any exercise of power.
When contempt for politics becomes a social norm, society’s ability to
criticize power weakens.
The attacks of 9/11 underlined the necessity of an international
peacekeeping organization. The U.S. government reacted to the
terrorist attacks, however, with a “war on terrorism.” If one takes the
threat of terrorist attack scenarios seriously, then the logic of this war,
which seeks to apprehend not only terrorists but also terrorist sup-
porters, speaks for itself. Destroying Al Qaeda’s training camps, which
the Taliban concealed, seems only logical. The attention of the inter-
national community has put pressure on the U.S. government to
adhere to rules that promote civilized warfare, but those who do
not acknowledge the threat of terrorism, no longer have the right
to debate the appropriateness of ends versus means. Supported by
American Nobel laureates in an attempt to avoid accusations of anti-
Americanism, German intellectuals damned the campaign in Afghanistan
with a preachy tone that arose from the loss of this relationship
between ends and means. Their demands to simply endure barbaric
terrorist attacks merely mimic pacifism and hinder any recognition of
the terrorist danger in their own country. Not even limited coopera-
tion with America was possible under these conditions. As long as the
attention of the world community is focused on U.S. foreign policy,
this new form of anti-Americanism will have a great future. One of the
main functions of this new anti-Americanism involves interpreting
new developments with familiar tropes. In this way, new aspects of
international terrorism need not be recognized and acknowledged as
new developments. Terrorists, acting without regard to national bor-
ders, are then not seen as independent actors who only reach their
goal by instilling fear and anxiety within the society. The threat of ter-
rorism emerges from modern society itself, however. The openness of
modern societies is precisely what makes them attractive targets for
terrorists. The terrorists behave according to bin Laden’s image as a
son of the desert but, in reality, terrorists, such as the ones who car-
ried out the 9/11 attacks, are children of multicultural societies and
* * *
82
D etlev Cl aussen
like fish in water, they circulate freely in these societies. By no means
should they be seen as guerillas. What distinguishes them from free-
dom fighters is their destructiveness. After all, terrorists and freedom
fighters are not labeled arbitrarily. September 11 left the world com-
pletely speechless because its violence was completely destructive. The
relationship between ends and means burst apart. Even the demand to
withdraw American troops from Saudi Arabia was only a pretext. In
reality, 9/11 was intended to compensate the Islamic world for its
imagined humiliation at being a third-rate world power. It is for this
reason that the attacks of 9/11 are so lacking in perspective. Not faith,
but willingness to deploy violence in a completely destructive manner
is what binds the suicide bombers of America and Israel.
Only when the West recognizes 9/11 as a problem not just for
America but also for the West as a whole will the new anti-Americanism
lose the ground beneath its feet. If the modernization of society con-
tinues to be equated with unwanted Americanization, anti-Americanism
will maintain its social basis. The middle classes that the new education
system produced started to look toward the past in reaction to the dis-
appointments of 1968, when hopes for substantive changes in society
collapsed in the face of reality. In urban areas, very small groups of
people then turned to terrorism, which promised to undermine the
prosaic “reality principle” of parliamentary democracy. The reality of
this armed conflict left little to be romanticized, however. The conflict
in Indochina, which had been used to justify violence, came to an end,
robbing terror of any illusion to legitimacy. Since terrorists could no
longer look to the present to justify their goals, they would have
to find some justifications in the past. Once again, developments
in Europe followed closely on the heels of those that took place in
America. The similarity of these social processes was hardly noted
as this change of society was considered, for the most part, to result
from outside forces. The loss of a socially transforming vision of the
future allowed the past to appear as a source of self-understanding.
Corresponding to the need of the new middle classes for self-assurance
was the discovery of identity as a formula that would explain social
behavior. According to this formulation, the collapse of the bipolar
world order and the subsequent disappearance of the Third World
amounted to a gigantic, global leveling out that has made one’s home-
land less important. Indeed, the way that discourse is conducted has
become globalized. Cultural criticism in New York, as well as in Cairo
or Shanghai, is only a mouse click away. September 11 showed that
educational institutions are threatening to turn from progressive nursery
schools into conservative institutions. The turn to the Vietnam
* * *
Is There a New Anti-Americanism?
83
protests of the past might be a symptom. Outside of the United
States, this symptom is augmented by the revival of anti-American
memories. Memory is deceptive, however, as it is difficult to discern
the difference between fact and fiction. In Vietnam, the intervention
of the United States hindered the emancipation of the people of
Indochina from their dependency on colonialism and large landowners.
Since 9/11, on the other hand, American society has been forced to
defend itself against the threat of terrorism. Only when the interna-
tional community acknowledges that international terrorism is a shared
threat will anti-Americanism recede in strength.
Only with this social background in mind can the shifting tides of
public opinion be correctly interpreted. All German and international
opinion polls indicate that, as of 2003, public sentiment has settled
on the side of antipathy. The Frankfurt book fair of October 2003
brought to light a deluge of anti-American literature. Reading through
this flood would only be worthwhile if it is taken as a model for
cliched images of the world. Not a singl
e book actually considers
what anti-Americanism really is—a prejudice, an ideology, a distorted
view, or an opinion even worthy of discussion? The mixture of anti-
Americanism with anti-Semitism has had a particularly disastrous
effect in German debates, since these debates do not take into account
the special character of anti-Semitism or its particular meaning in
post-1945 Germany. On the other hand, opinion polls treat both anti-
Americanism and anti-Semitism as mere opinions. This downplays
anti-Semitism and stretches anti-Americanism past the point of recog-
nition. Well-founded rejection of a certain government’s policies
should in no way be judged as anti-American per se. Likewise, all crit-
icism of Israel’s government should not be considered anti-Semitic.
However, it is this fact, per se, that must be emphasized. An integral
aspect of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism is the way in which they
are camouflaged as mere opinions in order to garner the appearance of
democratic legitimacy.
In this way, public debate seems more of a discussion of ghosts
rather than of current alliances and conflicts between peoples. The
public arena resembles show business as public figures jockey for posi-
tions on the issues. The blinding effects of public relations strategies
collide with the grassroots voices that lurk beneath the surface of offi-
cially orchestrated opinion. Most political analysis, however, is satisfied
with the merely superficial in terms of public and private opinion.
Poorly designed public opinion polls stand in for empirical evidence.
Public squabbles over the Iraqi campaign reveal more about the
decline of the public sphere and public debate in the West than about
* * *
84
D etlev Cl aussen
the way that society thinks and behaves. To this end, polling science is
too afraid of theory to really uncover anything. One of the rumors
that will not fade away, even among spin doctors, is the ridiculous and
unsophisticated assertion that the red–green coalition in Germany
was reelected against the odds, and that Chancellor Schröder led a
German-nationalist, anti-American election campaign. This explana-