The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  Next, for destructive purposes, see if the account fails to apply to that to which the name applies, and if the name fails to apply to that to which the account applies; for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch [10] as being a living being that partakes of knowledge is true of God, while man is not predicated of God, to be a living being that partakes of knowledge will not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the name as well is predicated of that of which the account is predicated, and if the account as well is predicated of that of which the name is predicated. For then what is stated [15] not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) living creature is true of that of which having a soul is true, and having a soul is true of that of which living creature is true; and so having a soul will be a property of living creature.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has rendered a subject as a property of that which is said to be in the subject; for then what has been stated to be a property [20] will not be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as he who has rendered fire as the property of the body with the most rarefied particles, has rendered the subject as the property of its predicate, fire will not be a property of the body with the most rarefied particles. The reason why the subject will not be the property of that which is found in the subject is this, that then the same thing will be the property of a [25] number of things that are specifically different. For the same thing has quite a number of specifically different predicates that belong to it alone, and the subject will be a property of all of these, if anyone states the property in this way. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has rendered what is found in the subject as a property of the subject; for then what has been stated not to be a [30] property will be a property, if it is predicated only of the things of which it has been stated to be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that it is a property of earth to be specifically the heaviest body has rendered of the subject as its property something that is said of the object alone, and is said of it as a property, and so the property of earth will have been rightly stated.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property has been given by way of [35] participation; for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. For an attribute which belongs by way of participation is a constituent part of the essence; [133a1] and an attribute of that kind will be a differentia applying to some one species. E.g., inasmuch as he who has said that being terrestrial and two-footed is a property of man has rendered the property by way of participation, being terrestrial and [5] two-footed will not be a property of man. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering the property by way of participation, or as showing the essence, though the subject is predicated convertibly with it; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) he who has stated that to be naturally percipient is a property of animal has rendered the property neither by way of participation nor as showing the essence, though the subject is [10] predicated convertibly with it; and so to be naturally percipient will be a property of animal.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property may belong not simultaneously, but either as posterior or as prior to the name; for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property—either never, or not always. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch [15] as it is possible for walking through the market-place to belong to an object as prior and as posterior to ‘man,’23 walking through the market-place will not be a property of man—either never, or not always. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if it always and of necessity belongs simultaneously, without being either a definition or a differentia; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a [20] property. Thus (e.g.) being an animal capable of receiving knowledge always and of necessity belongs simultaneously with ‘man’, and is neither differentia nor definition, and so being an animal capable of receiving knowledge will be a property of man.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see if the same thing fails to be a property of [25] things that are the same so far as they are the same; for then what is stated to be a property will not be a property. Thus, for example, inasmuch as it is no property of an object of pursuit to appear good to certain persons, it will not be a property of the desirable either to appear good to certain persons; for an object of pursuit and the desirable are the same. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the same thing is a property of something that is the same in so far as it is the same. For then [30] what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as it is said to be a property of a man, in so far as he is a man, to have a tripartite soul, it will also be a property of a mortal, in so far as he is a mortal, to have a tripartite soul. This commonplace rule is useful also in dealing with accident; for the same attributes ought either to belong or not belong to the same things, in so far as they are the same.

  [35] Next, for destructive purposes, see if the property of things that are the same in kind fails to be always the same in kind; for then neither will what is stated to be a [133b1] property be a property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as a man and a horse are the same in kind, and it is not always a property of a horse to stand still by his own initiative, it will not be a property of a man to move by his own initiative; [5] for to stand still and to move by one’s own initiative are the same in kind, because they belong to each of them in so far as each is an animal. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if of things that are the same in kind the property is always the same in kind; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) since it is a property of man to be two-footed and terrestrial, it will also be a property of a bird to be two-footed and winged; for each of these is the same in kind, in so far as the one pair are species that fall under the same genus, being under the [10] genus animal, while the other pair are differentiae of the genus, viz. of animal. This commonplace rule is false whenever one of the properties mentioned belongs to some one species only while the other belongs to many, as does terrestrial quadruped.

  Inasmuch as ‘same’ and ‘different’ are used in several ways, it is a job to render [15] to a sophistical questioner a property that belongs to one thing and that only. For an attribute that belongs to something qualified by an accident will also belong to the accident taken along with the subject which it qualifies; e.g. an attribute that belongs to man will belong also to white man, if there is a white man, and one that [20] belongs to white man will belong also to man. One might, then, discredit the majority of properties, by representing the subject as being one thing in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident, saying, for example, that man is one thing, and white man another. Again, one might do so by representing as different a [25] certain state and what is called after that state; for an attribute that belongs to the state will belong also to what is called after that state, and one that belongs to what is called after a state will belong also to the state: e.g. inasmuch as the condition of the scientist is called after his science, it will not be a property of science that it is incontrovertible by argument; for then the scientist also will be incontrovertible by [30] argument. For constructive purposes, however, you should say that the subject of an accident is not different without qualification from the accident taken along with its subject; though it is called another thing because what it is to be them is different; for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and for a white man to be a white [35] man. Moreover, you should take a look along the inflections, and say that the man of science is not that which is incontrovertible by argument, but he who is incontrovertible by argument, and that science is not that which is incontrovertible [134a1] by argument, but she who is incontrovertible by argument.24 For against an objector who sticks at nothing the defence should stick at nothing.

  5 · Next, for destructive purposes, see if, while intending to render an [5] attribute that naturally belongs, he states it in h
is language in such a way as to indicate one that invariably belongs; for then it would seem that what has been stated to be a property is upset. Thus (e.g.) the man who has said that being two-footed is a property of man intends to render the attribute that naturally belongs, but his expression indicates one that invariably belongs; accordingly, being [10] two-footed will not be a property of man; for not every man is possessed of two feet. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he intends to render the property that naturally belongs, and indicates it in that way in his language; for then the property will not be upset in this respect. Thus (e.g.) he who renders as a property of man, being an animal capable of receiving knowledge, both intends, and by his [15] language indicates, the property that belongs by nature, and so being an animal capable of receiving knowledge will not be upset or shown in that respect not to be a property of man.

  Moreover, as regards all the things that are called as they are primarily after something else, or primarily in themselves, it is a job to render the property of such [20] things. For if you render a property of what is so called after something else, then it will be true of its primary subject as well; and if you state it of its primary subject, then it will be predicated also of the thing that is so called after this other. Thus (e.g.) if any one renders being coloured as a property of surface, being coloured will be true of body as well; whereas if he ascribes it to body, it will be predicated also of [25] surface. Hence the name as well will not be true of that of which the account is true.

  In the case of some properties it happens for the most part that some error is incurred because of a failure to define how and to what things the property is stated to belong. For every one tries to render as the property of a thing something that [30] belongs to it either naturally, as being two-footed belongs to man, or actually, as having four fingers belongs to a particular man, or specifically, as consisting of most rarefied particles belongs to fire, or without qualification, as living to living being, or in virtue of something else, as being prudent to the soul, or as the primary subject, as being prudent to the rational faculty, or because the thing is in a certain state, as [35] being incontrovertible by argument belongs to a scientist (for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain state will he be incontrovertible by argument), or because it is the state possessed by something, as being incontrovertible by [134b1] argument belongs to science, or because it is partaken of, as perceiving belongs to animal (for other things as well perceive, e.g. man, but they perceive because they partake of animal), or because it partakes of something else, as living belongs to a particular kind of living being. Accordingly he makes a mistake if he has failed to [5] add the word ‘naturally’ (because what belongs naturally may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs, as (e.g.) it belongs to man to have two feet); or if he does not make a definite proviso that he is rendering what actually belongs (because it will not be such as to belong to it, e.g. the man’s possession of four [10] fingers); or if he has not shown that he states it as the primary subject, or in virtue of something else (because then its name will not also be true of that of which the account is true, as is the case with being coloured, whether rendered as a property of surface or of body); or if he has not said beforehand that he has rendered a property to a thing either because that thing possesses a state, or because it is a state possessed by something (because then it will not be a property—for, supposing he [15] renders the property to something as being a state possessed, it will belong to what possesses that state; while supposing he renders it to what possesses the state, it will belong to the state possessed, as did being incontrovertible by argument when stated as a property of science or of the scientist); or if he has not indicated beforehand that the property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken of by, something (because then the property will belong to certain other things as [20] well—for if he renders it because its subject is partaken of, it will belong to the things which partake of it; whereas if he renders it because its subject partakes of something else, it will belong to the things partaken of, as (e.g.) if he were to state living to be a property of a particular kind of living being, or just of living being); or if he has not expressly distinguished the property that belongs specifically (because then it will belong only to one of the things that fall under the term of which he states the property—for the superlative belongs only to one of them, e.g. being lightest as applied to fire). Sometimes, too, a man may even add the word [25] ‘specifically’, and still make a mistake. For the things in question should all be of one species, whenever the word ‘specifically’ is added; and in some cases this does not occur, as it does not, in fact, in the case of fire. For fire is not all of one species; for live coals and flame and light are each of them fire, but are of different species. The reason why, whenever ‘specifically’ is added, there should not be any species [30] other than the one mentioned, is this, that if there is, then the property in question will belong to some of them in a greater and to others in a less degree, as happens with consisting of most rarefied particles in the case of fire; for light consists of more rarefied particles than live coals and flame. And this should not happen unless the name too is predicated in a greater degree of that of which the account is true to a [35] greater degree; otherwise it will not be the case that where the account is true to a greater degree the name too is true to a greater degree. Moreover, in addition to [135a1] this, the same attribute will be the property both of the term which has it without qualification and of that element therein which has it25 in the highest degree, as is the condition of consisting of most rarefied particles in the case of fire; for this same attribute will be a property of light as well; for it is light that consists of the most [5] rarefied particles. If, then, any one else renders a property in this way one should attack it; for oneself, one should not give occasion for this objection, but should define in what manner one states the property at the actual time of making the statement.

  Next, for destructive purposes, see if he has stated a thing as a property of itself; for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. For a [10] thing itself always shows its own essence, and what shows the essence is not a property but a definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has said that becoming is a property of beautiful has rendered the term as a property of itself (for beautiful and becoming are the same); and so becoming will not be a property of beautiful. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if he has avoided rendering a thing as a property of [15] itself, but has yet stated a convertible predicate; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus he who has stated animate substance as a property of living creature has not stated living creature as a property of itself, but has rendered a convertible predicate, so that animate substance will be a property of living creature.

  Next, in the case of things consisting of like parts, you should look and see, for [20] destructive purposes, if the property of the whole is not true of the part, or if that of the part is not predicated of the whole; for then what has been stated to be a property will not be a property. In some cases it happens that this is so; for sometimes in rendering a property in the case of things that consist of like parts a [25] man may have his eye on the whole, while sometimes he may address himself to what is predicated of the part; and then in neither case will it have been rightly rendered. Take an instance referring to the whole: the man who has said that it is a property of the sea to be the largest volume of salt water, has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but has rendered an attribute of such a kind as [30] is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not the largest volume of salt water); and so the largest volume of salt water will not be a property of the sea. Now take one referring to the part: the man who has stated that it is a property of air to be breathable has stated the property of something that consists of like parts, but he has stated an attribute such as, though true of some air, is still not predicable of the whole (for the
whole of the air is not breathable); and so breathable will not be a [135b1] property of air. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see whether, while it is true of each of the things with similar parts, it is also a property of them taken as a collective whole; for then what has been stated not to be a property will be a property. Thus (e.g.) while it is true of earth everywhere that it naturally falls [5] downwards, it is a property of the various particular pieces of earth taken as the Earth,26 so that it will be a property of earth naturally to fall downwards.

  6 · Next, look from the point of view of the opposites, and first from that of the contraries, and see, for destructive purposes, if the contrary of the term rendered fails to be a property of the contrary subject. For then neither will the contrary of the first be a property of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as [10] injustice is contrary to justice, and the lowest evil to the highest good, but to be the highest good is not a property of justice, therefore to be the lowest evil will not be a property of injustice. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, see if the contrary is the property of the contrary; for then also the contrary of the first will be a property of the contrary of the second. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as evil is contrary to [15] good, and objectionable to desirable, and desirable is a property of good, objectionable will be a property of evil.