The Politics of Aristotle

by Aristotle

  [10] Here is another difficulty that might be raised. It is held that the temperate man is also self-controlled. Will this involve the temperate man’s having vehement appetites? If then he is to be self-controlled, it will be necessary for him to have vehement appetites (for you would not speak of a man as self-controlled who masters moderate appetites); but if he is to have vehement appetites, in that case he [15] will not be temperate (for the temperate is he who does not display appetite or feeling at all).

  The following considerations again present a difficulty. For it results from the statements that the incontinent man is sometimes praiseworthy and the self-controlled man blameworthy. For let it be supposed, it may be said, that some one has gone wrong in his reasoning, and let it appear to him as the result of his [20] reasoning that which is right is wrong, but let appetite lead him to the right; then reason indeed will forbid his doing it, but being led by appetite he does it (for such we found was the incontinent man); he will therefore do what is right, supposing that appetite leads him thereto (but reason will try to hinder him; for let it be [25] supposed that he is mistaken in his reasoning about right); it follows that he will be incontinent and yet be praiseworthy; for in so far as he does what is right, he is praiseworthy. The result then is a paradox.

  Again, on the other hand, let his reason be mistaken, and let what is right not seem to him to be so, but let appetite lead him to the right. Now he is self-controlled who, though he has an appetite for a thing, yet does not act upon it owing to reason; [30] therefore if his reason is wrong it will hinder him from doing what he has an appetite for;19 therefore it hinders him from doing what is right (for to that we supposed that his appetite led him); but he who fails to do what is right, when it is his duty to do it, is blameworthy; therefore the man of self-control will sometimes be blameworthy. In this way then also the result is a paradox. [35]

  A difficulty might also be raised as to whether incontinence and the incontinent man display themselves in and about everything, for instance, property and honour and anger and glory (for people seem to be incontinent with regard to all these things), or whether they do not, but incontinence has a certain definite sphere.

  The above, then, are the points which present a difficulty; but it is necessary to [1201b1] solve these difficulties. First, then, that which is connected with knowledge. For it appeared to be an absurdity that one who possessed knowledge should cast it from him or fall away from it. But the same reasoning applies also to opinion; for it makes no difference whether it is opinion or knowledge. For if opinion is intensely firm and [5] unalterable by persuasion, it will not differ from knowledge, opinion carrying with it the belief that things are as he opines them to be; for instance, Heraclitus of Ephesus has this sort of opinion about his own opinions.

  But there is no paradox in the incontinent man’s doing something bad, whether he has knowledge or opinion such as we describe. For there are two ways of [10] knowing, one of which is the possessing knowledge (for we say that one knows when he possesses knowledge), the other is putting the knowledge into operation. He then who possesses the knowledge of right, but does not operate with it, is incontinent. When, then, he does not operate with this knowledge, it is nothing surprising that he [15] should do what is bad, though he possesses the knowledge. For the case is the same as that of sleepers. For they, though they possess the knowledge, nevertheless in their sleep both do and suffer many disgusting things. For the knowledge is not operative in them. So it is in the case of the incontinent. For he seems like one asleep [20] and does not operate with his knowledge. Thus, then, is the difficulty solved. For the difficulty was whether the incontinent man expels his knowledge or falls away from it, both of which appear paradoxical.

  But, again, the thing may be made manifest in this way: as we said in the Analytics deduction depends on two propositions, and of these the first is universal, [25] while the second is subsumed under it and is particular. For instance, I know how to cure any one with a fever, this man has a fever: therefore I know how to cure this man.

  Now there are things which I know with the knowledge of the universal, but [30] not with that of the particular. Here then also mistake becomes possible to the man who possesses the knowledge: for instance I know how to cure any one with a fever, but I do not know if this man has a fever. Similarly then in the case of the incontinent man who possesses the knowledge the same mistake will arise. For it is [35] possible for the incontinent man to possess the knowledge of the universal, that such and such things are bad and hurtful, but yet not to know that these particular things are bad, so that while possessing knowledge in this way he will go wrong; for he has the universal knowledge, but not the particular. Neither, then, in this way is it at all [1202a1] a surprising result in the case of the incontinent man, that he who has the knowledge should do something bad.

  For it is so in the case of persons who are drunk. For those who are drunk, when the intoxication has passed off, are themselves again. Reason was not expelled from them, nor was knowledge, but it was overcome by the intoxication; and when they [5] have got rid of the intoxication, they are themselves again. So, then, it is with the incontinent. His passion gains the mastery and brings his reasoning to a standstill. But when the passion, like the intoxication, has been got rid of, he is himself again.

  There was another argument touching incontinence which presented a difficulty as seeming to show that the incontinent man will sometimes be praiseworthy, [10] and the self-controlled man blameworthy. But this is not the case. For the man who is deceived in his reason is neither continent nor incontinent, but only he who possesses right reason and thereby judges of right and wrong, and it is the man who disobeys this kind of reason who is incontinent, while he who obeys it and is not led [15] by his appetites is self-controlled. If a man does not think it disgraceful to strike his father and has a desire to strike him, but abstains from doing so, he is not a man of self-control. So that, since there is neither self-control nor incontinence in such cases, neither will incontinence be praiseworthy or self-control blameworthy in the way that was thought.

  There are forms of incontinence which are morbid and others which are due to [20] nature. For instance, such as these are morbid. There are some people who pluck their hairs and nibble them. If one masters this pleasure, then, he is not praiseworthy, nor blameworthy if he fails to do so, or not very much. As an instance of incontinence due to nature we may take the story of a son who was brought to trial in court for beating his father, and who defended himself by saying, ‘Why, he [25] did so to his own father’—and he was acquitted, for the judges thought that his going wrong was due to nature. If, then, one were to master the impulse to beat his father, he is not praiseworthy. It is not, then, such forms of incontinence or continence as these of which we are now in search, but those for which we are called blameworthy or praiseworthy without qualification.

  [30] Of goods some are external, as wealth, office, honour, friends, glory; others necessary and concerned with the body, for instance, touch and taste, and bodily pleasures.20 He, then, who is incontinent with respect to these, would appear to be incontinent without qualification. And the incontinence of which we are in search would seem to be concerned with just these. And the difficulty was about the sphere [35] of incontinence. As regards honour, then, a man is not incontinent without qualification; for he who is incontinent with regard to honour is praised in a way, as being ambitious. And generally when we call a man incontinent in the case of such things we do it with some addition, incontinent ‘as regards honour or glory or anger’. But when a man is incontinent without qualification, we do not add the [1202b1] sphere, it being assumed in his case, and being manifest without the addition, what the sphere is. For he who is incontinent without qualification has to do with the pleasures and pains of the body.

  It is evident also from the following consideration that incontinence has to do with these things. For since the incontinent man is blameworthy, the subject-matter [5] of hi
s incontinence ought also to be blameworthy. Now honour and glory and office and riches, and the other things with respect to which people are called incontinent, are not blameworthy, whereas bodily pleasures are blameworthy. Therefore, reasonably enough, the man who is concerned with these more than he ought is called incontinent in the complete sense.

  Among the so-called incontinences with respect to other things that which is [10] concerned with anger is the most blameworthy. But which is more blameworthy, this or incontinence with regard to pleasures? Now incontinence with regard to anger resembles servants who are eager to minister to one’s needs. For they, when the master says ‘Give me’, are carried away by their eagerness, and before they hear [15] what they ought to give, give something, and give the wrong thing. For often, when they ought to give a book, they give a pen. Something like this is the case with the man who cannot control his anger. For passion, as soon as it hears the first mention of injury, is impelled to take vengeance, without waiting to hear whether it ought or [20] ought not, or not so vehemently. This sort of impulse, then, to anger, which appears to be incontinence of anger, is not greatly to be blamed, but the impulse to pleasure is blameworthy. For this latter differs from the former owing to the injunction of reason to abstain, which it nevertheless acts against; for which reason it is more [25] blameworthy than incontinence due to anger. For incontinence due to anger is a pain (for no one feels anger without being pained), but that which is due to appetite is attended with pleasure, for which reason it is more blameworthy. For incontinence due to pleasure seems to involve wantonness.

  Are self-control and endurance the same thing? Surely not! For self-control has to do with pleasures and the man of self-control is he who masters pleasures, but [30] endurance has to do with pains. For the man of endurance is he who endures and undergoes pains. Again, lack of self-control and softness are not the same thing. For softness and the soft person is he who does not undergo pains—not all of them, but [35] such as any one else would undergo, if he had to; whereas the incontinent man is he who is not able to endure pleasures, but succumbs to them and lets himself be led by them.

  Again, there is another character who is called intemperate. Is the intemperate, then, the same as the incontinent? Surely not! For the intemperate is the kind of [1203a1] man who thinks that what he does is best and most expedient for himself, and who has no reason opposing the things which appear pleasant to himself, whereas the incontinent does possess reason which opposes his going in pursuit of those things to [5] which his appetite leads.

  But which is the more curable, the intemperate or the incontinent? On first sight, indeed, it might seem that it is not the incontinent. The intemperate, it may be urged, is more easy to cure; for if reason could be engendered in him, to teach him that things are bad, he will leave off doing them; but the incontinent man has [10] reason, and yet acts as he does, so that such a person would seem to be incurable. But on the other hand which is in the worse condition, he who has no good at all, or he who has some good joined with these evils? Plainly the former, the more so inasmuch as it is the more valuable part that is in a bad condition. The incontinent man, then, does possess a good in his reason being right, while the intemperate does [15] not. Again, reason is the principle in each. Now in the incontinent the principle, which is the most valuable thing, is in a good condition, but in the intemperate in a bad; so that the intemperate will be worse than the incontinent. Again, like the vice of brutality of which we spoke, you cannot see it in a beast, but only in a human [20] being (for brutality is a name for excessive vice). Why so? Just because a beast has in it no bad principle. Now the principle is reason. For which would do more evil, a lion, or Dionysius or Phalaris or Clearchus, or some of those wicked men? Plainly the latter. For their having in them a bad principle contributes greatly to their [25] powers of mischief, but in the beast there is no principle at all. In the intemperate, then, there is a bad principle. For inasmuch as he does bad acts and reason assents to these, and it seems to him that he ought to do these things, there is in him a principle which is not a sound one. Hence the incontinent would seem to be better than the intemperate.

  [30] There are two species of incontinence, one in the way of precipitancy and want of forethought, a kind that comes on suddenly (for instance, when we see a beautiful woman, we are at once affected in some way, and from the affection there ensues an impulse to do something which perhaps we ought not), the other a sort of weakness, but attended with reason which warns against action. Now the former would not seem to be very blameworthy. For this kind occurs even in the good, in those who are [1203b1] of warm temperament and of a rich natural endowment; but the other in the cold and atrabilious, and such are blameworthy. Again, one may avoid being affected by fortifying oneself beforehand with the thought, There will come a pretty woman, so one must control oneself. So that, if he has fortified himself beforehand with a thought of this kind, he whose incontinence is due to the suddenness of the [5] impression will not be affected at all, nor do anything wrong. But he who knows indeed from reason that he ought not, but gives in to pleasure and succumbs to it, is more blameworthy. The good man would never become incontinent in that way, and fortification by reason would be no cure for it. For this is the guide within the man, [10] and yet he does not obey it, but gives in to pleasure, and succumbs with a sort of weakness.

  Whether the temperate man is self-controlled was raised as a difficulty above, but now let us speak of it. Yes, the temperate man is also self-controlled. For the man of self-control is not merely he who, when he has appetites in him, represses [15] these owing to reason, but also he who is of such a kind that, though he has not appetites in him, he would repress them, if they did arise. But it is he who has not bad desires and who has his reason right with respect to these things who is temperate, while the man of self-control is he who has bad desires and who has his reason right with regard to these things; so that self-control will go along with temperance, and the temperate will be self-controlled, but not the self-controlled [20] temperate. For the temperate is he who does not feel passion, while the self-controlled man is he who does feel passion, or is capable of feeling it, but subdues it. But neither of these is actually the case with the temperate. Hence the self-controlled is not temperate.

  But is the intemperate incontinent or the incontinent intemperate? Or does neither follow on the other? For the incontinent is he whose reason fights with his [25] passions, but the intemperate is not of this sort, but he who in doing base deeds has the consent of his reason. Neither then is the intemperate like the incontinent nor the incontinent like the intemperate. Further, the intemperate is worse than the incontinent. For what comes by nature is harder to cure than what results from [30] custom (for the reason why custom is held to be so strong is that it turns things into nature). The intemperate, then, is in himself the kind of man who is bad by nature, owing to which, and as a result of which, the reason in him is bad. But not so the incontinent. It is not true of him that his reason is not good because he is himself such (for he would have to be bad, if he were of himself by nature such as the bad). The incontinent, then, seems to be bad by custom, but the intemperate by nature. [1204a1] Therefore the intemperate is the harder to cure. For one custom is dislodged by another, but nothing will dislodge nature.

  But seeing that the incontinent is the kind of man who knows and is not [5] deceived in his reason, while the wise man also is of the same kind, who views everything by right reason, is it possible for the wise man to be incontinent? Surely not! For though one might raise the foregoing difficulties, yet if we keep consistent with our former statements, the wise man will not be incontinent. For we said that the wise man was not merely he in whom right reason exists, but he who also does [10] what appears in accordance with right reason to be best. Now if the wise man does what is best, the wise man will not be incontinent; but an incontinent man may be clever. For we distinguished above between the clever and the wise as being different. For though thei
r spheres are the same, yet the one does what he ought and [15] the other does not. It is possible, then, for the clever man to be incontinent (for he does not succeed in doing what he ought), but it is not possible for the wise man to be incontinent.

  7 · After this we must speak about pleasure, since our discussion is on the subject of happiness, and all think that happiness is either pleasure and living [20] pleasantly, or not without pleasure. Even those who feel disgust at pleasure, and do not think that pleasure ought to be reckoned among goods, at least add the absence of pain; now to live without pain borders on pleasure. Therefore we must speak about pleasure, not merely because other people think that we ought, but because it [25] is actually indispensable for us to do so. For since our discussion is about happiness, and we have defined and declare happiness to be an exercise of excellence in a complete life, and excellence has to do with pleasure and pain, it is indispensable to [30] speak about pleasure, since happiness is not apart from pleasure.

  First, then, let us mention the reasons which some people give for thinking that one ought not to regard pleasure as part of good. First, they say that pleasure is a becoming, and that a becoming is something incomplete, but that the good never [35] occupies the place of the incomplete. Secondly, that there are some bad pleasures, whereas the good is never to be found in badness. Again, that it is found in all, both in the bad man and in the good, and in beasts wild and tame; but the good is unmixed [1204b1] with the bad and not promiscuous. And that pleasure is not the best thing, whereas the good is the best thing. And that it is an impediment to right action, and what tends to impede right cannot be good.

  First, then, we must address ourselves to the first argument, that about [5] becoming, and must endeavour to dispose of this on the ground of its not being true. For, to begin with, not every pleasure is a becoming. For the pleasure which results from thought is not a becoming, nor that which comes from hearing and seeing and smelling. For it is not the effect of deficiency, as in the other cases; for instance, [10] those of eating and drinking. For these are the result of defect and excess, owing to the fulfilment of a deficiency or the relief of an excess; which is why they are held to be a becoming. Now defect and excess are pain. There is therefore pain wherever there is a becoming of pleasure. But in the case of seeing and hearing and smelling [15] there is no previous pain. For no one in taking pleasure in seeing or smelling was affected with pain beforehand. Similarly in the case of thought. One may speculate on something with pleasure without having felt any pain beforehand. So that there may be a pleasure which is not a becoming. If then pleasure, as their argument maintained, is not a good for this reason, namely, that is a becoming, but there is [20] some pleasure which is not a becoming, this pleasure may be good.