The Politics of Aristotle
Page 328
But generally no pleasure is a becoming. For even the pleasures of eating and drinking are not becomings, but there is a mistake on the part of those who say that these pleasures are becomings. For they think that pleasure is a becoming because it [25] ensues on the application of the remedy; but it is not. For there being a part of the soul with which we feel pleasure, this part of the soul acts and moves simultaneously with the application of the things which we need, and its movement and action are pleasure. Owing, then, to that part of the soul acting simultaneously with the [30] application, or owing to its activity, they think that pleasure is a becoming, from the application being visible, but the part of the soul invisible. It is like thinking that man is body, because this is perceptible by sense, while the soul is not; but the soul also exists. So it is also in this case; for there is a part of the soul with which we feel [35] pleasure, which acts along with the application. Therefore no pleasure is a becoming.
And it is, they say, a conscious restoration to a normal state. But there is pleasure without such restoration to a normal state. For restoration means the [1205a1] filling up of what by nature is deficient but it is possible, as we maintain, to feel pleasure without any deficiency. For deficiency is pain, and we say that there is pleasure without pain and prior to pain. So that pleasure will not be a restoration of a deficiency. For in such pleasures there is no deficiency. So that if the reason for thinking that pleasure is not a good was because it is a becoming, and it is found that [5] no pleasure is a becoming, pleasure may be a good.
But next it is maintained that some pleasures are not good. One can get a comprehensive view of this point as follows. Since we maintain that good is mentioned in all the categories (in that of substance and relation and quantity and [10] time and generally in all), this much is plain at once. Every activity of good is attended with a certain pleasure, so that, since good is in all the categories, pleasure also will be in all;21 so that since the goods and pleasure are in these, and the pleasure that comes from the goods is pleasure, every pleasure will be good. [15]
At the same time it is manifest from this that pleasures differ in kind. For the categories are different in which pleasure is. For it is not as in the sciences, for instance grammar or any other science whatever. For if Lampros possesses the science of grammar, he as a grammarian will be disposed by this knowledge of [20] grammar in the same way as any one else who possesses the science; there will not be two different sciences of grammar, that in Lampros and that in Ileus. But in the case of pleasure it is not so. For the pleasure which comes from drunkenness and that which comes from the commerce of the sexes do not dispose in the same way. Therefore pleasures would seem to differ in kind. [25]
But another reason why pleasure was held by them not to be good was because some pleasures are bad. But this sort of objection and this kind of judgement is not peculiar to pleasure, but applies also to nature and knowledge. For there is such a thing as a bad nature, for example that of worms and beetles and of ignoble [30] creatures generally, but it does not follow that nature is a bad thing. In the same way there are bad branches of knowledge, for instance the mechanical; nevertheless it does not follow that knowledge is a bad thing, but both knowledge and nature are good in kind. For just as one must not form one’s views of the quality of a sculptor from his failures and bad workmanship, but from his successes, so one must not [35] judge of the quality of knowledge or nature or of anything else from the bad, but from the good.
In the same way pleasure is good in kind, though there are bad pleasures—of [1205b1] that we ourselves are as well aware as any one. For since the natures of creatures differ in the way of bad and good, for instance that of man is good, but that of a wolf or some other beast bad, and in like manner there is one nature of a horse, another [5] of a man, an ass, or a dog, and since pleasure is a restoration of each to its own nature from that which runs counter to it, it follows that this will be appropriate, that the bad nature should have the bad pleasure. For the thing is not the same for a horse and a man, any more than for any of the rest. But since their natures are different, their pleasures also are different. For pleasure, as we saw, is a restoration, [10] and the restoration, they maintain, restores to nature, so that the restoration of the bad nature is bad, and that of the good, good.
But those who assert that pleasure is not a good thing are in much the same [15] case as those who, not knowing nectar, think that the gods drink wine, and that there is nothing more delightful than this. But this is owing to their ignorance. In much the same case are all those who assert that all pleasures are becoming, and therefore not a good. For owing to their not knowing other than bodily pleasures, and seeing these to be becomings and not good, for this reason they think in general [20] that pleasure is not a good.
Since, then, there are pleasures both of a nature undergoing restoration and also of one in its normal state, for instance of the former the satisfactions which follow upon deficiency, but of a nature in its normal state the pleasures of sight, hearing, and so on, the activities of the nature in its normal state will be better—for [25] the pleasures of both kinds are activities. It is evident, then, that the pleasures of sight, hearing, and thought will be best, since the bodily pleasures result from a satisfaction.
Again, this was also said by way of showing that it is not a good, that what [30] exists in all and is common to all is not good. Such an objection might seem to be appropriate in the case of a man who covets honour and is actuated by that feeling. For the man who is covetous of honour is one who wishes to be sole possessor of something and by some such means to surpass all others; so he thinks that, if pleasure is to be a good, it too must be something of this sort. Surely this is not so, but, on the contrary, it would seem to be a good for this reason, that all things aim at [35] it. For it is the nature of all things to aim at the good, so that, if all things aim at pleasure, pleasure must be good in kind.
[1206a1] Again, it was denied that pleasure is a good on the ground that it is an impediment. But their asserting it to be an impediment seems to arise from a wrong view of the matter. For the pleasure that comes from the performance of the action is not an impediment; if, however, it be a different pleasure, it is an impediment; for [5] instance, the pleasure of intoxication is an impediment to action; but on this principle one kind of knowledge will be a hindrance to another, for one cannot exercise both at once. But why is knowledge not good, if it produces the pleasure that comes from knowledge? And will that pleasure be an impediment? Surely not; but it will intensify the action. For the pleasure is an incentive to increased action, if [10] it comes from the action itself. For suppose the good man to be doing his acts of excellence, and to be doing them pleasantly; will he not much more exert himself in the action? And if he acts with pleasure, he will be good, but if he does the right with pain, he is not good. For pain attends upon what is due to compulsion, so that if [15] one is pained at doing right, he is acting under compulsion; and he who acts under compulsion is not good.
But indeed it is not possible to perform excellent acts without pain or pleasure. The middle state does not exist. Why so? Because excellence implies feeling, and [20] feeling pain or pleasure, and there is nothing intermediate. It is evident, then, that excellence is either attended with pain or with pleasure. Now if one does the right with pain he is not good. So that excellence will not be attended with pain. Therefore with pleasure. Not only, then, is pleasure not an impediment, but it is actually an incentive to action, and generally excellence cannot exist without the [25] pleasure that comes from it.
There was another argument, to the effect that there is no science which produces pleasure. But this is not true either. For cooks and garland-makers and perfumers are engaged in the production of pleasure. But indeed the other sciences do not have pleasure as their end, but the end is with pleasure and not without it; there is, therefore, a science productive of pleasure. [30]
Again, there was another argument, that it is not the best
thing. But in that way and by the like reasoning you will reject the particular excellences too. For courage is not the best thing. Is it, therefore, not a good? Surely this is absurd! And the same with the rest. Neither, then, is pleasure not a good simply because it is not [35] the best thing.
To pass on, a difficulty of the following kind might be raised in the case of the excellences. I mean, since the reason sometimes masters the passions (for we say so in the case of the man of self-control), and the passions again conversely master the reason (as happens in the case of the incontinent), since, then, the irrational part of the soul, being vicious, masters the reason, which is well-disposed (for the [1206b1] incontinent man is of this kind), the reason in like manner, being in a bad condition, will master the passions, which are well-disposed and have their proper excellence, and if this should be the case, the result will be a bad use of excellence (for the [5] reason being in a bad condition and using excellence will use it badly); now such a result would appear paradoxical.
This difficulty it is easy to answer and resolve from what has been said by us before about excellence. For we assert that there is excellence when reason being in a good condition is commensurate with the passions, these possessing their proper [10] excellence, and the passions with the reason; for in such a condition they will accord with one another, so that reason should always ordain what is best, and the passions being well disposed find it easy to carry out what reason ordains. If, then, the reason is in a bad condition, and the passions not, there will not be excellence owing to the [15] failure of reason (for excellence consists in both). So that it is not possible to make a bad use of excellence.
Speaking generally, it is not the case, as others think, that reason is the principle and guide to excellence, but rather the feelings. For there must first be produced in us (as indeed is the case) an irrational impulse to the right, and then [20] later on reason must put the question to the vote and decide it. One may see this from the case of children and those who live without reason. For in these, apart from reason, there spring up, first, impulses of the feelings towards right, and reason supervening later and giving its vote the same way is the cause of right action. But if [25] they have received from reason the principle that leads to right, the feelings do not necessarily follow and consent thereto, but often oppose it. Hence a right disposition of the feelings seems to be the principle that leads to excellence rather than the reason.
8 · Since our discussion is about happiness, it will be connected with the [30] preceding to speak about good fortune. For the majority think that the happy must be the fortunate life, or not apart from good fortune, and perhaps they are right in thinking so. For it is not possible to be happy without external goods, over which [35] fortune is supreme. Therefore we must speak about good fortune, saying generally who the fortunate man is, and what is his province and his sphere.
First, then, one may raise difficulties by having recourse to the following considerations. One would not say of fortune that it is nature. For what nature is the cause of, that she produces for the most part or without exception,22 but this is never [1207a1] the case with fortune—her effects are disorderly and as it may chance; this is why we speak of chance in the case of such things.
Neither would one identify it with any mind or right reason. For here more than ever is there order and uniformity, but not chance. Hence, where there is most [5] of mind and reason, there is least chance, and where there is most chance, there is there least mind.
Can it be, then, that good fortune is a sort of care of the gods? Surely it will not be thought to be this! For we suppose that, if god is the disposer of such things, he assigns both good and evil in accordance with desert, whereas chance and the things [10] of chance do really occur as it may chance. But if we assign such a dispensation to god, we shall be making him a bad judge or else unjust. And this is not befitting to god.
And yet outside of these there is no other position which one can assign to fortune, so that it is plain that it must be one of these. Now mind and reason and knowledge seem to be a thing utterly foreign to it. And yet neither would the care [15] and providence of god seem to be good fortune, owing to its being found also in the bad, though it is not likely that god would have a care of the bad.
Nature, then, is left as being most connected with good fortune. And good fortune and fortune generally displays itself in things that are not in our own power, [20] and of which we are not masters nor able to bring them about. For which reason no one calls the just man, in so far as he is just, fortunate, nor yet the brave man, nor any other excellent character. For these things are in our power to have or not to have. But it is just in such things as follow that we shall speak more appropriately of good fortune. For we do call the well-born fortunate, and generally the man who [25] possesses such kinds of goods of which he is not himself the controller.
But all the same even there good fortune would not seem to be used in its strict sense. But there are more meanings than one of the term ‘fortunate’. For we call a man fortunate to whom it has befallen to achieve some good beyond his own calculation, and him who has made a gain when he ought reasonably to have [30] incurred a loss. Good fortune, then, consists in some good accruing beyond expectation, and in escaping some evil that might reasonably have been expected. But good fortune would seem to consist to a greater extent and more properly in the obtaining of good. For the obtaining of good would seem to be in itself a piece of [35] good fortune, while the escaping evil is a piece of good fortune accidentally.
Good fortune, then, is nature without reason. For the fortunate man is he who apart from reason has an impulse to good things and obtains these, and this comes from nature. For there is in the soul by nature something of this sort whereby we are impelled, not under the guidance of reason, towards things for which we are well fitted. And if one were to ask a man in this state, ‘Why does it please you to do [1207b1] so’?—he would say, ‘I don’t know, except that it does please me’, being in the same condition as those who are inspired by religious frenzy; for they also have an impulse to do something apart from reason.
We cannot call good fortune by a proper name of its own, but we often say that [5] it is a cause, though cause is not a suitable name for it. For a cause and its effect are different, and what is called a cause contains no reference to an impulse which attains good, in the way either of avoiding evil or on the other hand of obtaining [10] good, when not thinking to obtain it. Good fortune, then, in this sense is different from the former, and this seems to result from the way in which things fall out, and to be good fortune accidentally. So that, if this also is to be called good fortune, at all events the other sort has a more intimate connexion with happiness, namely, that wherein the principle of impulse towards the attainment of goods is in the man [15] himself.
Since, then, happiness cannot exist apart from external goods, and these result from good fortune, as we said just now, it follows that it will work along with happiness. So much then about good fortune.
9 · But since we have spoken about each of the excellences in detail, it [20] remains to sum up the particulars under one general statement. There is a phrase, then, which is not badly used of the completely good man, namely, ‘nobility and goodness’. For he is noble and good, they say, when he is completely good. For it is in the case of excellence that they use the expression ‘noble and good’; for instance, [25] they say that the just man is noble and good, the brave man, the temperate, and generally in the case of the excellences. Since, then, we make a dual division, and say that some things are noble and others good, and that some goods are absolutely good and others not so, calling noble such things as the excellences and the actions which spring from them, and good, office, wealth, glory, honour, and the like, the [30] noble and good man is he to whom the things that are absolutely good are good, and the things that are absolutely noble are noble. For such a man is noble and good. But he to whom things absolutely good are not good is not noble and
good, any more than he would be thought to be in health to whom the things that are absolutely [35] healthy are not healthy. For if the accession of wealth and office were to hurt anybody, they would not be desirable, but he will wish to have for himself such things as will not hurt him. But he who is of such a nature as to shrink from having [1208a1] anything good would not seem to be noble and good. But he for whom the possession of all good things is good and who is not spoilt by them, as, for instance, by wealth and power, such a man is noble and good.
10 · But about acting rightly in accordance with the excellences something [5] indeed has been said, but not enough. For we said that it was acting in accordance with right reason. But possibly one might be ignorant as to this very point, and might ask, ‘What is acting in accordance with right reason? And where is right reason’? To act, then, in accordance with right reason is when the irrational part of [10] the soul does not prevent the rational from displaying its own activity. For then the action will be in accordance with right reason. For seeing that in the soul we have a worse and a better part and the worse is always for the sake of the better, as in the case of body and soul the body is for the sake of the soul, and we shall say that we [15] have our body in a good state, when its state is such as not to hinder, but actually to help and take part in inciting towards the soul accomplishing its own work (for the worse is for the sake of the better, to aid the better in its work); when, then, the passions do not hinder the mind from performing its own work, then you will have [20] what is done in accordance with right reason.