An American Life

by Ronald Reagan

  With regard to Afghanistan, one gets the impression that the United States side intentionally fails to notice the open door leading to a political settlement. Now there is even a working formula for such a settlement. It’s important not to hinder the negotiations in progress but to help them along. In that event a fair settlement will definitely be found.

  Mr. President, I would like for you to view my letter as another one of our “fireside chats.” I would sincerely like not only to keep the warmth of our Geneva meetings but also move further in the development of our dialogue. I look at correspondence with you as the most important channel in preparing for our meeting in Washington. There are only a few days before the New Year and I would like to convey to you and your spouse our warmest wishes.

  M. Gorbachev

  December 24, 1985

  A few days into the new year, George Shultz began discussing with Ambassador Dobrynin the details for the next summit and we issued an invitation for Gorbachev to come to Washington in late June.

  We got no reply to the invitation, although Gorbachev responded to my letter regarding human rights in the Soviet Union by saying these issues were of concern to no one except the Soviet Union:

  Dear Mr. President:

  Your letter of December 7, transmitted through Secretary Baldrige, addressed questions on which we had a rather thorough discussion in Geneva. At that time, I outlined in detail our approach to these questions, and, it seemed to me, you took in what was said with certain understanding.

  It is hardly necessary to repeat, that the questions involved pertain to the internal competence of our state and that they are resolved in strict conformity with the laws. I would like only to point out, the Soviet laws do not create impediments when decisions are taken on the questions of departure from the USSR by Soviet citizens who have legal grounds for that. . . the existing laws are obligatory to everybody—both to those who apply to leave and those who consider exit applications. Such is the essence of our law and order and nobody is entitled to violate it—whether under any pressure or without it. I should think that should be understood in the U.S. We, of course, take into account, that due to various circumstances, divided families appear, which live partially in the USSR and partially in the USA. Only in the past five years there have been over 400 marriages between Soviet and American citizens. The overwhelming majority of those marriages—to be precise, more than 95 per cent—encountered no problems in regard to the reunification of the spouses and to living together. Yes, there are exceptions, and we have frankly and repeatedly told you what they are about. But generally, and I want to stress it once again, questions of this kind are resolved by us on the basis of humanism and taking into account the interests of the people concerned.

  I share your desire to channel a relationship between our countries to a more constructive course. And the brakes are being put on this process in no way due to the existence of the cases of such sort—though I do not tend to belittle their importance from the point of view of the lives of individual persons—but because of the attempts to blow them out of proportion in the general balance of Soviet-American relations. The key issues in this area are awaiting their resolution.

  I would like to note in passing: as it can be seen, the continuing attempts by the American side to tie up trade and economic relations with questions of a different nature will bring no benefit. It is high time to take a realistic look at this whole issue from the position of today, rather than yesterday.

  It would seem that much will now depend on how accurately we are going to follow jointly the real priorities in our relations, if we wish to bring about their tangible normalization already in the near future. I think, the chances are not bad here.

  Sincerely,

  M. Gorbachev

  January 11, 1986

  Four days later Gorbachev sent me still another letter. Several hours before I received it, he made it public in Moscow. (Three weeks earlier, he’d written me that he valued the private nature of our confidential correspondence.)

  This latest letter was clearly meant for propaganda.

  He said the Soviet Union wanted to eliminate all INF weapons from Europe, in effect accepting my 1982 zero-zero proposal for intermediate-range missiles in Europe while trying to make it appear that it was a Soviet idea; he proposed a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing; and he called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by both sides by the end of 1999—but only if the United States renounced “the development, testing and deployment of space-strike weapons,” a reference to SDI.

  It was propaganda, yes, but we couldn’t ignore it.

  “Gorbachev surprisingly is calling for an arms reduction plan which will rid the world of nuclear weapons by the year 2000,” I wrote in my diary January 15. “Of course, he has a couple of zingers in there which we’ll have to work around. But at the very least it is a h—1 of a propaganda move. We’d be hard put to explain how we could turn it down.” I made this entry in my diary only a few days later: “. . . over to the Oval Office for staff and N.S.C. meetings and then five Afghan children were brought in. They were mere babies. But all victims of Soviet bombings. One little girl with her face virtually destroyed. Three with one arm each and one without one leg. I’d like to send the photos to Gen. Secretary Gorbachev.”

  Although I agreed with the goals of Gorbachev’s proposal, there were enormous problems to be solved before we could work out an agreement that was equitable and verifiable and airtight in preserving our security. Great problems were posed in reaching an agreement not only by the differences between the Soviets’ huge force of land-based missiles and our three-pronged force of land-, sea-, and air-launched missiles, but by the great size of the Warsaw Pact countries’ conventional forces in Europe, which dwarfed those of NATO; by French and English nuclear missiles that the Soviets regarded as a threat to them but on which we were in no position to negotiate restrictions; and by Soviet intermediate-range missiles that were aimed at Europe from Asia.

  And, while a truly secure and verifiable U.S.-Soviet agreement eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was something I wanted, too, what about the Qaddafis of the world, or a lunatic who got his hands on an A-bomb?

  The Strategic Defense Initiative, if it proved practical, would give us the insurance we needed even after we had banned nuclear weapons—and on this, I decided, Gorbachev was up against an immovable object.

  This is part of the entry in my diary for February 4, 1986:

  NSPG time in the situation room re Gorbachev’s proposal to eliminate nuclear arms. Some wanted to tag it a publicity stunt. I said no. Let’s say we share their overall goals and now want to work out the details. If it is a publicity stunt this will be revealed by them. I also propose that we announce we are going forward with SDI but if research reveals a defense against missiles is possible, we’ll work out how it can be used to protect the whole world not just us.

  Two days later, I sent another handwritten letter to Gorbachev, replying to both his Christmas Eve letter and his mid-January proposal. After chiding him for making public his letter to me, I said I was pleased we were approaching a common ground on the intermediate-range missiles and I hoped remaining problems dealing with verification of an INF agreement could be worked out shortly. I wrote that I agreed with him that we had to make decisions not on the basis of each other’s assurances or intentions but with a cold-eyed regard for the capabilities of both sides.

  Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. If such defenses prove feasible in the future, they could facilitate further reductions of nuclear weapons by creating a feeling of confidence that national security could be preserved without them.

  Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a disarming first strike capability could under some conditions be destabilizing.
That is why we are proposing that both sides concentrate first on reducing those weapons which can deliver a disarming first strike. Certainly, if neither of our countries has forces suitable for a first strike, neither need fear that defenses against ballistic missiles would make a first strike strategy possible.

  I also do not understand your statement that what you call “space-strike weapons” are “all-purpose” weapons. As I understand it, the sort of directed energy and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the context of ballistic missile defenses are potentially most effective against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They would be ill suited for mass destruction on earth. If one were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques; the destructiveness can never approach that of the nuclear weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real problem.

  Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential to effective communication, I want to add another point: you speak often of space-strike weapons and your representatives have defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from earth and its atmosphere and weapons in space that can strike targets in space or on earth.

  What country has such weapons? The answer is only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the atmosphere and has been tested in that mode.

  Your co-orbital anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did and seems well along in research (and incidentally, some testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of directed energy. I do not point this out in reproach or suggest these activities are in violation of agreements, but if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you call space-strike weapons would only be developed by a country planning a first strike, what would we think?

  We see the Soviet Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems, an effort which antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a Soviet Union which has built up its counterforce weapons in numbers far greater than our own. If the only reason to develop defensive weapons is to make a disarming strike possible, then clearly we should have been more concerned than we have been.

  We are concerned, and deeply so, but not because you are developing, and, unlike us, deploying defensive weaponry, we are concerned that the Soviet Union for some reason has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may be reasons for this other than seeking a first strike advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than intentions and we feel certain you have an advantage in this area.

  Frankly, Mr. General Secretary, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to destroy hardened missile silos, a capability your SS-18 definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the capabilities for such a role; they could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic weapons, a potential first strike weapon. Its short flight time is not substantially different than that of the more capable and much more numerous SS-20’s aimed at our European allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no nuclear capability of their own.

  Our forces have very limited capability to strike Soviet silos. We’re improving this capability only because we cannot accept this situation in which the Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage in counter force weaponry.

  Even if we are to complete all planned deployments in the absence of an accord which limits them they will not match the number of Soviet weapons with a first strike capability. I feel that because the specialists disagree in some areas, let’s arrange for them to meet and discuss their concern. A frank discussion of the respective assessments and reasons could perhaps clear up these misunderstandings, which are not based on fact.

  In any event we have both agreed to the principle of a fifty per cent reduction of nuclear arms. Implementing that agreement is surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva.

  Let me stress once again that we are willing to reduce the weapon systems which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the Soviet Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the United States and its allies. . . .

  So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what I wrote to you before: if your concern is that such systems may be used to permit a first strike strategy, or as a cover for basing weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be practical ways to prevent such possibilities.

  Of course, I have in mind not general assurances but concrete verifiable means that both sides can rely on to avoid those contingencies. Neither of which is part of U.S. strategy or planning. I honestly believe that we can find a solution to this problem if we approach it in a practical fashion rather than debating generalities. I would like nothing more by our next meeting than to have found acceptable ways to solve the problem. But I believe it will require two things: accelerating negotiations to reach agreement on the way to reduce offensive weapons by fifty per cent and discussion of concrete ways to insure that any future development of defensive systems cannot be used as a cover for a first strike strategy or for basing weapons of mass destruction in space. Aside from these broader issues, I believe recent proposals bring settlement of intermediate range missiles closer and there are improved measures in several areas.

  Regarding regional conflicts, I see that our respective analyses of the causes are incompatible. I see little point in continuing to debate the matter, on which we are bound to disagree. I suggest we simply look at the current situation in pragmatic terms. I think it would show two very important facts. The Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet Union, so why is it continued? Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we do not have the power to induce thousands of people to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any other country other than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. But who can tell the people of another country they should not fight for their motherland, for their independence and for their national dignity? I hope there is an open door to a just political settlement. Of course, we support you in that process and hope that it will take a practical and realistic turn.

  However, 1985 was marked by an intensification of conflict. I hope this is not what the future holds. If you really want to withdraw from Afghanistan, you’ll have my cooperation in every reasonable way. We’ve no desire to exploit a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan to the detriment of Soviet interests. But the fighting can only be ended by the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of Afghan refugees to their country and the restoration of a genuinely sovereign non-aligned state. Such result would have an immediate positive effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would help clear the way to progress in many other areas. . . .

  The problems of superpower military involvement in local disputes are not limited to Afghanistan. Recent actions by the Soviet Union are most discouraging. What are we to make of your sharply increased military support of a local dictator who has declared a war of terrorism against much of the rest of the world and against the United States in particular? [I was referring to Qaddafi, whose responsibility for airport bombings in Rome and Vienna we had just established.] How can one take Soviet declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when confronted with such action? And more importantly are we to conclude that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally unbalanced local despot?

  You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but search for a
way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes involved, directly or indirectly, in military disputes and then stimulates the reaction of the other, so that which should be of local concern is turned into a Soviet-American confrontation.

  As I have said, I believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted without restraint to that respect, and the Soviet Union says it is the United States. An agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a solution. We must find a way to terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both our countries in these disputes and avoid spreading such involvement. . . .

  This is the goal of the proposal I made last October and I want to encourage the parties to the conflict to find political solutions while both our countries support the process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war material into the area of conflict.

  There are many points upon which we still disagree and we will probably never reach agreement on some of them. Nevertheless, I’m convinced the critical problems can be solved if we approach them in a proper manner.

  I have the feeling we are gradually finding some additional points upon which we can agree and I hope that by concentrating on practical solutions we can give greater momentum to the process.

  I feel we have to speed up the negotiating process if it is to occur and I hope you will instruct your delegation in Geneva, as I have instructed ours, to roll up their sleeves and get seriously to work.

  When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your letter of January 14, I made a statement welcoming them. Our study of that message will shortly be completed and when it is I will be responding specifically to the points you made in it. Nancy joins me in saying our best regards to you and your wife.

  Sincerely,

  Ronald Reagan

  February 6, 1986

  Two weeks later, on Presidents’ Day, while Nancy was away on a speaking trip in Texas, I decided to try again and sent Gorbachev a seven-page, handwritten letter with a set of new proposals that I hoped would bring the still-deadlocked Geneva talks off dead center while responding to his proposals. Below are excerpts from this letter: