An American Life

by Ronald Reagan

  I am encouraged that you have suggested steps leading toward a world free from nuclear weapons, even though my view regarding the steps necessary differs from yours in certain respects. However, having agreed on the objective and on the need for taking concrete steps to reach that goal, it should be easier to resolve differences in our viewpoints as to what these steps should be. Our initial moves are of course the essential ones to start this process and therefore I believe we should focus our negotiating efforts on them. Of course, if we are to move toward a world in which the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons will be possible, there must be far greater trust and confidence between our two countries than exist at present. We cannot simply wave away the suspicion and misunderstandings which have developed over the past four decades between our two countries. The process of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons can by itself nurture greater confidence and trust. But there will be many in my country, and I believe in yours, who will question the wisdom of eliminating nuclear weapons—which both sides see as the ultimate guarantor of their security—if they see the other’s conduct as threatening.

  This meant, I said, that if we were going to make progress on arms control we had to develop effective verification arrangements and make progress on nonnuclear military issues, regional problems, and human rights.

  The process of eliminating nuclear arms is liable to prove fragile indeed unless we can deal with our competition in a peaceful and responsible way.

  As you know, the United States and its allies must rely today on nuclear weapons to deter conventional as well as nuclear conflict. This is due in large part to the significant imbalance that currently exists between the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As a result, it would be necessary as we reduce nuclear weapons towards zero, that we concurrently engage in a process of strengthening the stability of the overall East-West security balance, with particular emphasis on redressing existing conventional imbalances, strengthening confidence-building measures and accomplishing a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. . . .

  In the defense and space area, your proposal was ambiguous with regard to strategic defense research. I continue to believe that limits on research could be counter-productive and, in any case, could not be verified; therefore, they must not be included in an agreement. Beyond research, as I suggested in Geneva, if there were no nuclear missiles, then there might also be no need for defenses against them. What I am convinced is that some nonnuclear defenses could make a vital contribution to security and stability. With respect to nuclear testing, I believe that so long as we rely on nuclear weapons as an element of deterrence, we must continue to test in order to assure their continued safety, security and reliability. However, as I wrote to you in December, I see no reason why we should not consider the matter of nuclear testing as we move forward on other arms control subjects. I suggested that we establish a bilateral dialogue aimed at constructive steps in this field. I remain hopeful you will take up this offer. . . .

  Then I listed what I thought of as a sweeping package of new proposals aimed at reducing nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons; in the strategic area, it called for a reduction of warheads on strategic ballistic missiles on both sides to forty-five hundred and the number of ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles) on heavy bombers to fifteen hundred,

  resulting in a total number of no more than 6000 such warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles . . . in the INF area, by 1987, both the United States and the Soviet Union would limit their LRINF [longrange intermediate nuclear force] missile deployments in Europe to no more than 140 launchers each (this is in line with my proposal for a staged reduction of weapons) with the Soviet Union making concurrent proportionate reductions in Asia. Within the following year, both sides would further reduce the number of launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by 50 per cent. Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons by the end of 1989.

  Our proposal also called for broad cutbacks in conventional forces in Europe.

  I hope that this concept provides a mutually acceptable route to a goal all the world shares. The goal would be to complete the process as soon as the conditions for a nonnuclear world have been achieved. . . .

  Let me conclude by agreeing with you that we should work constructively before your visit to the United States to prepare concrete agreements on the full range of issues we discussed at Geneva. Neither of us has illusions about the major problems which remain between our two countries, but I want to assure you that I am determined to work with you energetically in finding practical solutions to these problems. I agree with you that we should use our correspondence as a most important channel of communication in preparing for your visit.

  Nancy and I would like to extend to you, Mrs. Gorbachev and your family our best wishes. It is our hope this year will bring significant progress toward our mutual goal of building a better relationship between our two countries, and a safer world.

  Sincerely,

  Ronald Reagan

  Feb. 22, 1986

  80

  AT THE START of 1986, we were getting more and more evidence that the Soviet economy was in dire shape. It made me believe that, if nothing else, the Soviet economic tailspin would force Mikhail Gorbachev to come around on an arms reduction agreement we both could live with. If we didn’t deviate from our policies, I was convinced it would happen.

  Gorbachev was trying to turn things around but not having an easy time of it. Looking at the situation from his viewpoint, I knew he had to be giving high priority to reducing the vast amounts of rubles the Soviets were spending on weapons. He had to be losing some sleep over the vitality of our economy, which was booming after pulling out of the recession, and he must have realized more than ever that we could outspend him as long as the Soviets insisted on prolonging the arms race.

  That spring and summer, I had to make three important decisions that affected our relations with the Soviets:

  In March, Tip O’Neill and some of his loyalists in Congress, responding to suggestions by Gorbachev that we join the Soviets in a moratorium on nuclear testing, mustered an effort to persuade the American people to pressure me to halt underground testing of nuclear weapons.

  Because of security requirements, I couldn’t at the time explain the real purpose of these tests: Although Tip and the others claimed their purpose was to create bigger and better weapons of mass destruction, the real purpose was to test the reliability of our existing weapons and the extent to which they could be trusted to survive the burst of radiation that would be unleashed in an enemy nuclear attack.

  I gave the order to continue the tests.

  The second decision I faced was whether to continue abiding by terms of the SALT II treaty despite repeated Soviet cheating on its restrictions. We knew of dozens of violations of the SALT and ABM treaties, including the Krasnoyarsk radar, which we knew incontrovertibly was intended for use in an antimissile defense. On the question of whether to continue abiding by SALT, Cap Weinberger and George Shultz were divided once again: George favored restraint and abiding by the agreement, believing there was little to gain by not doing so at a time when we were trying to improve relations with the Soviets. “Others, including Cap,” I wrote in my diary after a meeting of the National Security Planning Group in March, “want to give it up. I’m inclined to vote for replacing that informal agreement with our arms reduction proposal now in Geneva: Tell the Soviets we can have a real reduction in weapons or an arms race, but we’re not going to sit by and watch them keep on fudging.”

  To many liberals in Congress, the SALT II treaty, even though it was unratified, had a symbolic importance. It represented one of the few times the superpowers had reached agreement to limit nuclear arms. I understood this symbolic significance. But the treaty was full of holes the Russians were exploiting, and after a while I began saying publicly that because of the Soviet cheating we might end our policy of voluntary restraint—un
less there was more evidence the Soviets were applying restraint, too.

  In early April, Anatoly Dobrynin, after being appointed secretary of the Politburo and head of foreign affairs for the Communist Party’s Central Committee in Moscow, and thus becoming a key adviser to Gorbachev, came to see me. He said Gorbachev was unhappy with my decision to continue nuclear testing and with reports that we might end our restraint in observing the SALT II treaty, and as a result he did not think the time was right yet to set a date for our summit in Washington. I considered this Soviet game playing. After the meeting I wrote in my diary: “My feeling is the summit will take place, if not in June or July, sometime after the election.”

  Here are portions of a letter Dobrynin brought to me from Gorbachev:

  I would like to share with you some of my general observations that I have, and surely, you must have your own, regarding the state and prospects of the relationship between our two countries. I believe, in doing so, one has to use as a point of departure our meeting in Geneva where we both assumed certain obligations.

  I think our assessments of that meeting coincide: it was necessary and useful, it introduced a certain stabilizing element to the relations between the USSR and the USA and to the world situation in general. It was only natural that it also generated no small hopes for the future.

  More than four months have passed since the Geneva meeting. We ask ourselves: what is the reason for things not going the way they, it would seem, should have gone? Where is the real turn for the better? We, within the Soviet leadership, regarded the Geneva meeting as a call for translating understandings of principle reached there into specific actions with a view to giving an impetus to our relations and to building up their positive dynamics. And we have been doing just that after Geneva.

  With this in mind, we have put forward a wide-ranging and concrete program of measures concerning the limitation and reduction of arms and disarmament. It is from the standpoint of new approaches to seeking mutually acceptable solutions that the Soviet delegations have acted in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm.

  What were the actions of the USA? One has to state, unfortunately, that so far the positions have not been brought closer together so that it would open up a real prospect for reaching agreements. I will not go into details or make judgments of the U.S. positions here. But there is one point I would like to make. One gathers the impressions that all too frequently attempts are being made to portray our initiatives as propaganda, as a desire to score high points in public opinion or as a wish to put the other side into an awkward position. We did not and do not harbor such designs. After all, our initiatives can be easily tested for their practicality. Our goal is to reach agreement, to find solutions to problems which concern the USSR, the USA and actually all other countries. I have especially focused on this matter so as to ensure a correct, unbiased and businesslike treatment of our proposals. I’m sure that it will make it easier to reach agreement.

  Now what has been taking place in the meantime outside the negotiations? Of course, each of us has his own view of the policies of the other side. But here again, has the Soviet Union done anything in foreign affairs or bilateral relations that would contribute to mounting tensions or be detrimental to the legitimate interests of the USA? I can say clearly: No, there has been nothing of that sort. On the other hand, we hear increasingly vehement philippics addressed to the USSR and are also witnessing quite a few actions directly aimed against our interest, and to put it frankly, against our relations becoming more stable and constructive. All this builds suspicion as regards to the U.S. policy and surely, creates no favorable backdrop for the summit meeting. I am saying it with no ambiguity in order to avoid in this regard any uncertainties or misunderstanding that only one side should exercise restraint and display a positive attitude. Our relations take shape not in a vacuum . . . The calmer the atmosphere, the easier it is to solve issues which are of equal concern to both sides.

  The issues have to be solved—there is no doubt about it. And above all, this bears on the area of security. You are familiar with our proposals, they cover all the most important aspects. At the same time I would like specifically to draw your attention to the fact that we do not say: All or nothing at all. We are in favor of moving forward step by step and we outline certain possibilities in this regard, particularly, at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

  We maintained a serious and balanced approach to the problem of ending nuclear tests. One would not want to lose hope that we shall succeed in finding a practical solution to this issue in the way the world expects us to do. It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of this matter as it is. The solution thereof carries with it also a great positive political potential. . . .

  It was a desire that we work together in the cessation of nuclear tests and set a good example to all nuclear powers that motivated my recent proposal for both of us to meet specifically on this issue at one of the European capitals. Have another look at this proposal, Mr. President, in a broad political context. I repeat, what is meant here is a specific, single purpose meeting. Such a meeting, of course, would not be a substitute for the new major meeting that we agreed upon in Geneva.

  I do very serious thinking with regard to the latter, first of all with a view to make that meeting truly meaningful and substantial, so that it should enable us to move closer to putting into practice the fundamental understandings reached in Geneva. As you know, I have mentioned some of the questions pertaining to the area of security which are worthwhile working on in preparing for our meeting. I reaffirm that we are ready to seek here solutions in a most serious way, which would be mutually acceptable and not detrimental to the security of either side. Given the mutual will it would also be possible to ascertain other possibilities for agreement in the context of the forthcoming meeting both in the area of space and nuclear arms and on the issues described in other fora. To be sure, we also have things to discuss as far as regional matters are concerned.

  I assume that you are also working on all these questions and in subsequent correspondence we will be able in a more specific and substantive way to compare our mutual preliminary ideas for the purpose of bringing the positions closer together. Obviously, this joint work, including the preparations for our meeting, will benefit from the exchanges of views at other levels and particularly from forthcoming contacts between our Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State. I will be looking forward with interest to hearing from you.

  Sincerely,

  M. Gorbachev

  April 2, 1986

  After our air strikes on Libya two weeks later, a Soviet spokesman described Qaddafi as a heroic and innocent victim of our supposed aggression, and Eduard Shevardnadze canceled a meeting with George Shultz at which they were to choose a date for the summit.

  The tragic accident at the Soviet nuclear reactor at Chernobyl occurred later that month. I sent Gorbachev a letter conveying our sympathies along with my disappointment over cancellation of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting. Excerpts from my letter:

  We have made a good faith effort to set in motion the serious, high-level discussions necessary to prepare for a meeting between us. I regret that it has not been possible to begin them. While there have been positive steps in some areas, we have lost a full six months in dealing with the issues which most merit our personal attention. I hope you will agree that it is time to concentrate on the agenda set forth in Geneva last November. I am prepared to do my part. As I have said, I am eager to achieve tangible practical results at our next meeting. I agree with you that an atmosphere conducive to progress is important. The suggestions I have made, which took careful account of your comments to me on the issues, sought to find a mutually acceptable approach to some of the key issues.

  The atmosphere of our relationship is also affected, of course, by what the two of us say privately. The approach I intend to take in my public statements is to reaffirm my strong personal commitment to achieving concrete progress in al
l the areas of our relationship during the remaining years of my Administration.

  Mr. General Secretary, our recent history provides ample evidence that if you wait for an ideal moment to try to resolve our differences, we are unlikely to resolve anything. We should take advantage of it since it is a time of historic and possibly unique potential. Let us not lose it for lack of effort.

  A few days later, I announced that as long as the Soviets continued cheating on the SALT II treaty, the United States no longer felt bound by it. Frankly, I was just tired of living by the rules and having the other side violate them. At the same time, I continued a policy of moderation in my public statements about the Soviets and I said I believed Gorbachev was sincere in wanting to end the threat of nuclear war.

  Then I made my third important decision: In late July, I sent a sweeping new arms reduction proposal to Gorbachev based on ideas that had been developed during weeks of debate within the administration.

  It called for both sides to scrap all ballistic missiles while continuing research on missile defensive systems, and it said that if these systems proved feasible they would be shared with all nations once all nuclear missiles had been scrapped. “If and when such research should indicate such a defense weapon is possible,” I wrote in my diary, “both of us would observe tests [of the new system] and we would agree jointly that deployment must follow elimination of all ICBM’s and then the defense be made available to all.”

  During the discussions in which the proposal was hammered out, some of our arms control and State Department experts wanted me to hint to the Soviets that we might be willing to trade the SDI for greater Soviet concessions on offensive weapons.