War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  At midnight on the night of December 31, all guns in the Third Army fired rapid fire for twenty minutes on the Germans as a New Year’s greeting. When the firing ceased, our forward observers stated they could hear the Germans screaming in the woods.

  On the second, I learned more about the action of the 11th Armored and found that it was quite bad, and that General Middleton personally had had to intervene to get it straightened out. We planned to put the 17th Airborne through the 11th Armored, except that one battalion of tanks would have to support the 17th Airborne, because that division had no organic tanks. One of the chief defects of an airborne division is the fact that it never has anything it needs after it lands—no tanks, no adequate artillery, no transportation.

  The 6th Armored Division still continued to do well. The XV Corps of the Seventh Army on our right got a heavy attack, but since all the units identified against it were those we had chased across the mud flats from the Moselle to the Saar, I did not at that time consider these attacks serious. Finally, after a long wait, the VII Corps of the First Army started in to attack in the direction of Houffalize with the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions1 and the 83d and 84th Divisions.2 The Germans, I thought, would not react to this attack for several days, but could see no reason for changing the then current disposition of the Third Army. I had had one of my few hunches on the night of January 2-3 that the Germans would attack. I was wrong. The 6th Armored made two miles during the third, while the 87th Division on the left gained a little.

  The 11th Armored held an enemy counter-attack on its left center. Owing to the bad condition of the roads and the failure on the part of Com Z to move the 17th Airborne Division as rapidly as they had promised, it was not able to attack on the third, but was prepared to attack in conjunction with the 101st Airborne on the morning of the fourth.

  1The 2d and 3d Armored Divisions, commanded at this time by Major General E. N. Harmon and Major General Maurice Rose, respectively.

  2Commanded by Major General Robert C. Macon and Brigadier General A. R. Bolling respectively.

  We were delighted to see a SHAEF directive that the Twelfth Army Group would resume control of the First Army as soon as the First and Third Armies made contact at Houffalize. The desire to get to Houffalize was thus one of the important motives for our next few days of fighting. At this time Montgomery had the nerve to get someone in America to suggest that General Eisenhower was overworked and needed a Deputy Ground Force Commander for all troops in Europe and that he, Montgomery, was God’s gift to war in this respect.

  The 17th Airborne, in its attack on the morning of the fourth, got a very bloody nose, and reported a loss of forty per cent in one battalion. Whenever one gets such a report, it indicates that people do not know anything of war. A casualty report of more than ten per cent is seldom true, unless people have run away or surrendered.

  I found Miley, Commander of the 17th Airborne, in Bastogne. While there we had considerable shelling, including airbursts. The flashes of our own guns and those of the enemy in the gathering darkness against the white snowfields were very beautiful, but not too reassuring. In my diary I made this statement of the afternoon of January 4, and it is significant, as it is the only time I ever made such a statement: “We can still lose this war.”

  I have stated earlier in these letters that Bradley did not in any way interfere with the combat of the Third Army. In one case, while he did not order, he did strongly suggest, that, instead of attacking north of Diekirch and cutting the enemy off at the waist, we should put in a new division southeast of Bastogne so as to insure the integrity of the corridor. I let myself be over-persuaded by him in this connection and assume full responsibility for the error of subsequently engaging the 90th Division too far west. Had I put the 90th Division in north of Diekirch, I am sure we would have bagged more Germans and just as cheaply.

  In order to use the 90th Division of the XX Corps to attack through the 26th Division and clean the Germans out of the pocket southeast of Bastogne, it was necessary to procure the services of the 94th Division. I proposed that when the 94th arrived, it would go to the XX Corps and the 90th would then go to the III. As soon as the 26th Infantry Division had been passed through by the 90th, it would then move to the XX Corps to relieve the 94th, which would then go to the XII Corps, so that we could have the new divisions to attack north from Diekirch. This was sort of a grand right and left, but was the shortest way of getting a division in. It is significant to notice the ease with which the Third Army Staff was able to move troops. To them it made no difference whether the division made one or three moves, provided they had a little notice. The operation was delayed a few days because SHAEF would not release the final Regimental Combat Team (one-third of the fighting strength of a division) of the 94th until the 28th Division had closed at Reims.

  On the sixth, I had General Millikin, III Corps, and Van Fleet, who commanded the 90th Division, in with my Staff to work out details for the attack of the 90th through the 26th and along the ridge road to the northwest, south of Wiltz. One combat team of the 26th was to attack on each side of the 90th, while the 3d Combat Team was to relieve the right Combat Team of the 35th and attack north. The combat team of the 35th so released would then help the 6th Armored Division in an attack southeast to make a juncture with the 90th Division on the high ground.

  We planned to support this attack with the fire of more than a thousand guns of 105 mm. caliber or larger. This fire was in two directions, about half the guns firing along the axis of movement of the 90th and the other half firing at right angles to it, so that we would get the advantage of dispersion in range both ways. I was very proud of this idea because it was my own. Furthermore, the guns firing at right angles would put their overs into the ridge northeast of the Wiltz River.

  In order to deceive the Germans as to the movement of the 90th Division, we used a Signal Corps Deception Group at the former Command Post of the 90th, which kept up the radio traffic. Subsequently captured documents showed that this deception worked. The 90th Division did a very clever piece of work in registering in their guns. As they came in they registered, and a similar set of guns from the 26th Division ceased firing. In this way we believe that the enemy was kept wholly in the dark about the arrival of a new unit. Of course, the 26th Division covered the front so that no prisoners from the 90th could be captured. The fact that we received only three counter-attacks, and they light ones, led us to believe that the enemy was withdrawing.

  The left regiment of the 80th Division, attacking through the 26th, captured the high ground in the vicinity of Dahl. This took the pressure off the right of the 26th and facilitated later movements of the 80th Division in a northerly direction. The attack by the 80th was very successful and cheap, for we succeeded in getting five enemy tanks and some self-propelled guns at the cost of two of our divisional tanks.

  General Eddy became worried about an attack south from Diekirch. I did not agree with him, but took the only reserve I had, which was a company of towed tank destroyers, previously used for prisoner of war escort duty, and sent them to the XII Corps. I also had the G-3’s of the 4th Armored (Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Sullivan) and 10th Armored (Lieutenant Colonel J. A. McChristian) make reconnaissance in the vicinity of the XII Corps so that they could deploy their units rapidly.

  Colonel Conklin, the Army Engineer, inspected the road blocks and mines in front of the XII Corps. This was the only time in my service that I used road blocks and mines.

  There was considerable effort on the part of Higher Headquarters to have us attack Houffalize on the morning of the eighth. However, as we were not told about it until about 0900,1 postponed the attack until the next day.

  In driving to Arlon, the Headquarters of the III Corps, to arrange this attack, I passed through the last combat team of the 90th Division moving up for battle. These men had been in trucks for a great many hours with the temperature at six degrees below zero, and were thoroughly chilled. On the opposite side of the
road was an endless file of ambulances bringing men back—wounded men; yet, when the soldiers of the 90th Division saw me, they stood up and cheered. It was the most moving experience of my life, and the knowledge of what the ambulances contained made it still more poignant. On the way up, I met Gaffey and signaled him to follow me.

  The plan for the attack on the ninth of January was as follows: From left to right in the VIII Corps, the 87th, the 17th Airborne, 101st Airborne, 4th Armored; III Corps, 6th Armored, 35th Infantry, 90th and 26th Infantry; and in the XII Corps the 80th Division; in all, nine divisions. Armored, 35th Infantry, 90th and 26th Infantry; and in the XII Corps the 80th Division; in all, nine divisions. Late that evening, Middleton called me to say he felt the 87th and 17th, which had had a pretty bad time the day before, should not attack until the tenth, and the same was true for the 4th Armored. I told him the attack on the ninth would go forward as planned.

  We got continued rumors all this day, and in increasing emphasis, of a German counter-attack at Saar-briicken. The chief reason for these rumors was the fact that it was what the Germans should have done, as the road from Saarbriicken leads through St. Avoid directly to Thionville, Metz, and Nancy. St. Avoid was therefore very important and, in the area of the XX Corps, had the same relative value that Bastogne had in the area of the Bulge. In view of the persistence of these rumors, I called Walker of the XX Corps and told him to prepare delaying positions, and also obtained the final combat team of the 94th Division to close on Thionville.

  The opening attack of the 90th almost ended tragically for General Van Fleet. As he was watching the leading battalion go in, German mortar fire fell around him and the men on either side of him were killed.

  All the arrangements for this attack were made by word of mouth and in very short order, although they were complicated because the guns of General Galley’s division, the 4th Armored, which was now attached to the VIII Corps, had been backing the 35th Division of the III Corps, and we had to arrange to let them back this division during the initial phases of this fight, and then follow the 4th Armored into its new assembly position.

  In spite of our high hopes, the attack did not make more than about three kilometers, except that Combat Command “B” of the 4th, attacking in conjunction with part of the 101st Airborne, got as far as the woods west of Noville.

  It will be remembered that on January 8, I was urged by high authority to attack. At 1030, on the tenth, two days later, I received a direct order to pull out an armored division and put it in reserve south of the city of Luxembourg as a possible counter-measure to the supposedly impending break-through. These two instances, for which Bradley was not personally responsible, indicate the inadvisability of commanding from too far back.

  On receipt of the order, I took General Bradley with me to Arlon, where we discussed with the Corps Commanders which division could be pulled out. The only possible one was the 4th Armored, which at that time had but one combat command engaged. The two Corps Commanders, myself, and the Commanding Officers of the 4th Armored, 6th Armored, and 101st Airborne, met at the Headquarters of the latter division at Bastogne, and, to the accompaniment of quite a heavy enemy concentration, perfected the arrangement for the withdrawal of the 4th Armored and the reuniting of the 6th Armored with the 101st Division. This is another case illustrating the extreme facility with which command can be exercised, provided commanders are willing to get close enough to the front to know and see what is going on. The order to start the 4th Armored was received at 1030. Two combat commands of the 4th Armored started via Arlon on Luxembourg before dark. The counterattack they were destined to repel did not come off.

  On the way back to Headquarters, I visited the 35th, 90th, and 26th Divisions to explain to them that, while the attack on the left must cease, they were to continue. This was quite satisfactory, as they had made fairly good progress this date. On reaching Headquarters, I found a new rumor, dreamed up by Higher Headquarters, that the enemy was about to attack us across the river just north of Trier. It seemed to me then, §nd subsequent investigation has proved me correct, that it was impossible for the enemy to make any such counter-attack. He had no troops available—in fact, his attacks at that time were on a shoestring.

  We lost several carloads of ammunition, reported as three hundred tons, but probably one hundred tons, as a result of a freight train running into an ammunition train south of Arlon.

  On the eleventh of January, it became quite evident that the end of the Bastogne operation was in sight. Anticipating this, I had had a study made of the river lines and road nets in the XX Corps area and drove to Thionville to see General Walker and talk over this study with him. It seemed to me that the enemy could cross the Saar River in three places; first, in the vicinity of Saarburg where he had some bridging and ferrying sites intact. However, the road net was cramped and I did not think he would take the chance. The next possible point of crossing was at Saarlautem through our bridgeheads. This I did not believe probable, first, because he would have to take the western half of the town, which we occupied, and, second, because the bridge was mined by us, and if he started to attack, we would blow it. Finally, Saarbrücken: and this was the place where I would have attacked had I been the Germans. In the town there were seven good bridges, and they had, on the west bank, a bridgehead of from seven to ten miles. The road net to Thionville, and thence to Nancy, was excellent. However, St. Avoid was the critical point, and General Walker was perfectly aware of this fact and had made arrangements to defend it. He had also arranged to blow the crossing over the Nied River so as to canalize any German attack.

  His and my personal solution at the time was to attack Saarbriicken with what we had. In the light of present knowledge, it would have been the ideal thing to do, and would probably have broken the German line completely and much earlier than it actually was broken.

  Due to SHAEF’s worry about the impending German counter-attack, the position of the vicinity of the XX Corps was strengthened. In addition to the 94th and 95th Divisions and the 10th Armored Division, which were at that time in the XX Corps, the 4th Armored Division in the Third Army Reserve could be used, and the 8th and 9th Armored Divisions were both closing, the one in the vicinity of Pont-à-Mousson and the other near Metz. The last two, however, were in SHAEF Reserve.

  The final attack for the VIII and III Corps to take Houffalize was planned for the thirteenth.

  On the twelfth, General Gay visited the corps to co-ordinate their attack plan and also to get a battalion of 155 mm. howitzers, which the XII Corps had loaned to the VIII, returned to the XII.

  General Bradley told me the plans for the use of the Army Group. He wanted the First Army to attack east on Cologne, while the Third Army maintained pressure and really held a defensive flank from somewhere in the vicinity of St. Vith to the junction with the Seventh Army. This plan had the advantage of utilizing the existing breach in the Siegfried Line west of Cologne, which had been made by the First Army in November, and also of using the shortest route. Personally I was opposed to it, as it prevented me from attacking, and I believed that the XX Corps supported by the III or XII could attack straight east through Saarlautem with better chance of rupturing the German Army and capturing the Saar Valley. I still adhered to my theory, that in order to keep the Germans from attacking, we had to attack.

  The attack on Houffalize started on the thirteenth, but the progress was not as rapid as we had hoped. However, the mental attitude of the men was excellent Heretofore they had been somewhat dubious; now they were chasing a sinking fox and babbling for the kill.

  On the fourteenth, Generals Somervell, Campbell,1 Lee, and Plank2 visited me, and we had considerable discussion on equipment. I definitely recommended the cessation of the construction of tank destroyers and the replacing of the tank destroyer battalion in an infantry division by a tank battalion. I also reiterated my request for two co-axial machine guns in each tank.

  On the fifteenth, orders were issued for the XII Co
rps to start its attack north through Diekirch on the morning of the eighteenth. For this attack I assigned the 4th Armored Division, the 87th Infantry Division, together with the 80th, 4th, and 5th Infantry Divisions to the XII Corps. The weather still remained hideously cold.

  I drove to visit the troops attacking Houffalize. At one point we came across a German machine-gunner who had been killed and apparently instantly frozen, as he was in a half-sitting position with his arms extended, holding a loaded belt of ammunition.

  1Major General L. H. Campbell, Jr., Chief of Ordnance, U.S. Army.

  2Brigadier General E. G. Plank, Commanding General, Advanced Section Communication Zone.

  At another point I saw a lot of black objects sticking -put of the snow, and on investigating, found they were the toes of dead men. Another phenomenon resulting from the quick-freezing of the men killed in battle is that they turn a sort of claret color—a nasty sight.

  At 0905 on the sixteenth, the 41st Cavalry Squadron (Captain Herbert Foye) of the 11th Armored Division, covering our left flank, made contact with the 41st Armored Infantry Regiment (Colonel, later Brigadier General, S. R. Hinds) in the 2d Armored Division at Houf-Falize. This restored Bradley to the command of the Twelfth Army Group.

  In the evening we received a directive to send the 10th Armored Division to the Sixth Army Group to aid in the liquidation of the so-called Colmar Pocket.

  On the seventeenth, I personally congratulated Millikin and Middleton on the successful termination of the Bulge. Although we had not driven the Germans back to the line from which they started, we had on that date begun this final operation.

  General Hughes was with me and we visited the 6th Armored, the 90th and 26th Infantry Divisions, and told them that, though we knew they were tired, it was necessary for them to continue to fight. I decorated General Van Fleet and two of his officers with the Distinguished Service Cross. I also saw the 120 mm. German mortar which the 90th Division used in lieu of the cannon in their cannon company. It was a very excellent and light weapon.