War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  In an infantry or armored division, relief of the division or immediate replacements are vitally necessary as soon as seventy-five per cent of the riflemen have become casualties.

  Always capture the highest terrain feature in your vicinity at once, and stay on it.

  Prisoner of war guard companies, or an equivalent organization, should be as far forward as possible in action to take over prisoners of war, because troops heated with battle are not safe custodians. Any attempt to rob or loot prisoners of war by escorts must be strictly dealt with.

  Whenever officers enter a prisoner of war cage, all prisoners of war must come to attention.

  IV

  Command

  Use of Codes: The decision as to whether to use clear or code radio or wire communications is very easily reached on the following basis: if the period of action is shorter than the period of reaction, use clear; otherwise use code. By this I mean that if you tell a combat team to attack at 1000 and your experience shows that the enemy cannot react to the information until 1100, use clear; and so on for higher units.

  Judging Reports: When you receive reports of counterattacks, find out who sent them—that is, the size of the unit which sent them. A squad occupying a position will report an enemy section approaching it as a counterattack, but such a counter-attack has no material effect on a division or a corps.

  Night Attacks: Soldiers must be taught to move and fight at night. This is becoming more and more imperative, and it does not mean to make an approach march at night. It means to conduct lethal operations in the dark. To do this, previous and very accurate daylight reconnaissance is desirable and limited objective attacks are essential. In addition to the usual reserve following such an attack, a second reserve should be at hand to move up after daylight in case the enemy counter-attacks.

  Timely Thoughts on Supply: Reasonable study and a consultation of the almanac will avoid situations in which, through lack of forethought, heavy clothing, etc., have not been ordered in time.

  Similarly, a knowledge of the tactical situation will insure that gasoline and ammunition are asked for in time. The Combat Service and not the Supply Service is responsible for failure to get such things.

  In wet weather it is vital that dry socks come up for the soldiers daily with the rations. These socks should be wool, or an analogous thick material treated so it will not shrink.

  With the advent of almost unlimited motor transport, it is foolish to load soldiers down with blankets, etc. This is particularly true in wet and cold weather. The answer is to see that light bedrolls go up to the ammunition distributing point prior to dark, where they are picked up by units and used during the night, rolled up by the men, and left to be picked up again by rear units. This sounds wasteful, because the bedrolls cannot be accounted for, but it is much cheaper than pneumonia.

  The fighting soldier should carry nothing into battle except what he wears, his ammunition, his rations, and his toilet articles. When he goes back, he should get new uniform, new underclothes, new everything.

  The two-bag system (“A” and “B”) with which we began this war is utterly foolish, because by the time the “B” bags get up, many of their owners have become casualties.

  In landing operations and river crossings where men lose their clothes or become very wet, assorted sizes of uniforms, complete with helmet, belt, shoes, underclothes, etc., should be provided for twenty per cent of the command and should arrive with the second echelon of the landing. This insures that those who have lost their clothing are immediately reequipped with a minimum of cluttering of the supply lines.

  The chief purpose of the General and Special Staffs is to insure that the troops get what they want in time. In battle, troops get temperamental, and ask for things which they really do not need. However, where humanly possible, their requests, no matter how unreasonable, should be answered.

  Supply and administrative units and installations are frequently neglected by combat commanders. It is very necessary to their morale and efficiency that each one be inspected by the senior general of the unit with which it is operating.

  Length of Attack: Infantry troops can attack continuously for sixty hours. Frequently much time and suffering are saved if they will do so. Beyond sixty hours, it is rather a waste of time, as the men become too fatigued from lack of sleep.

  Marching at Night: Marching at night in the proximity of the enemy is not economical. It is better to halt two hours before dark, see that the men are fed, their socks dried if the weather is wet, and the vehicles serviced and made ready for the next day. Then start before dawn. Except under very favorable circumstances of terrain, and where very thorough daylight reconnaissance has taken place, night attacks by armor are not economical.

  Look Before Changing: In the old Navy of sail there was a custom that the new Officer of the Deck did not call for any change in the setting of the sails for one half hour—that is, for one bell after he took over. The same thing might well apply to commanders and staff officers who take over new jobs in war. They should wait at least a week before they make any radical changes, unless and except they are put in to correct a situation which is in a bad way.

  Don't Delay: The best is the enemy of the good. By this I mean that a good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week. War is a very simple thing, and the determining characteristics are self-confidence, speed, and audacity. None of these things can ever be perfect, but they can be good.

  Reports: In war nothing is ever as bad, or as good, as it is reported to Higher Headquarters. Any reports which emanate from a unit after dark—that is, where the knowledge has been obtained after dark—should be viewed with skepticism by the next higher unit. Reports by wounded men are always exaggerated and favor the enemy.

  Identification: Legible unit signs in the clear are more valuable than dangerous, and they should be placed where they can be seen.

  Sand-Table Exercises: by staffs up to and including corps or army, even on the most rudimentary type of sand table, are extremely helpful prior to an attack.

  General Officers: There are more tired division commanders then there are tired divisions. Tired officers are always pessimists. Remember this when evaluating reports. Generals must never show doubt, discouragement, or fatigue. Generals should adhere to one type of dress so that soldiers will recognize them. They must always be very neat.

  In cold weather, General Officers must be careful not to appear to dress more warmly than the men.

  Commanders and their staffs should visit units two echelons below their own, and their maps should be so kept. In other words, Corps Commanders or their staffs should visit Division and Regimental Command Posts; the Division Commander should visit Regimental and Battalion Command Posts; the visits above referred to are for command purposes. What might be called inspirational visits should go farther up. The more senior the officer who appears with a very small unit at the front, the better the effect on the troops. If some danger is involved in the visit, its value is enhanced.

  When speaking to a junior about the enemy confronting him, always understate their strength. You do this because the person in contact with the enemy invariably overestimates their strength to himself, so, if you understate it, you probably hit the approximate fact, and also enhance your junior’s self-confidence.

  All officers, and particularly General Officers, must be vitally interested in everything that interests the soldier. Usually you will gain a great deal of knowledge by being interested, but, even if you do not, the fact that you appear interested has a very high morale influence on the soldier.

  In my experience, all very successful commanders are prima donnas, and must be so treated. Some officers require urging, others require suggestions, very few have to be restrained.

  A General Officer who will invariably assume the responsibility for failure, whether he deserves it or not, and invariably give the credit for success to others, whether they deserve it or not, will achieve out
standing success.

  In any case, letters of commendation and General Orders presenting to the command the glory and magnitude of their achievements have a great influence on morale.

  Corps and Army Commanders must make it a point to be physically seen by as many individuals of their command as possible—certainly by all combat soldiers. The best way to do this is to assemble the divisions, either as a whole or in separate pieces, and make a short talk.

  When a unit leaves your command, if its performance at all justifies it, a letter of farewell and commendation to the unit should be sent.

  During battle, it is very important to visit frequently hospitals' containing newly wounded men. Before starting such an inspection, the officer in charge of the hospital should inform the inspecting General which wards contain men whose conduct does not merit compliments.

  Generals and their principal staff officers should keep diaries.

  Avoid the vicious habit of naming the next superior as the author of any adverse criticism while claiming all complimentary remarks for yourself.

  Inspections: When a unit has been alerted for inspection, do not fail to inspect it and inspect it thoroughly. Further, do not keep it waiting. When soldiers have gone to the trouble of getting ready to be inspected, they deserve the compliment of a visit. Be sure to tell the unit commander publicly that his unit was good, if such is the case. If it is bad, tell him privately and in no uncertain terms. Be sure to speak to all enlisted men who have decorations, or who have been wounded, and ask how they got the decoration or how they were wounded.

  Infantry and Armored Divisions: The chief difference between infantry divisions supplied with tanks and armored divisions is that, in the infantry division, the purpose of the tanks is to get the infantry forward. In the armored division, the function of the infantry is to break the tanks loose. In the infantry division, the tanks use their guns to facilitate the advance of the infantry. In the armored division, and tank uses its gun to break through to a range where it can use its machine guns. It is therefore of vast importance that two, instead of one, co-axial machine guns be placed in the mantle of all tanks.

  Air-Ground Co-operation: The effectiveness of air-ground co-operation is still in its infancy. Air and ground commanders must be constantly on the alert to devise, and use, new methods of co-operation.

  Fire Power: There can never be too many projectiles in a battle. Whether they are thrown by cannon, rockets, or recoilless devices is immaterial. The purpose of all these instruments is identical—namely, to deluge the enemy with fire. Nor is it necessary that these projectiles be discharged on the ground.

  Issuing Orders: The best way to issue orders is by word of mouth from one general to the next. Failing this, telephone conversation which should be recorded at each end. However, in order to have a confirmatory memorandum of all oral orders given, a short written order should always be made out, not necessarily at the time of issuing the order, but it should reach the junior prior to his carrying out the order; so that, if he has forgotten anything, he will be reminded of it, and, further, in order that he may be aware that his senior has taken definite responsibility for the operation ordered orally.

  It is my opinion that Army orders should not exceed a page and a half of typewritten text and it was my practice not to issue orders longer than this. Usually they can be done on one page, and the back of the page used for a sketch map.

  Commanders must remember that the issuance of an order, or the devising of a plan, is only about 5 per cent of the responsibility of command. The other ninety-five per cent is to insure, by personal observation, or through the interposing of staff officers, that the order is carried out. Orders must be issued early enough to permit time to disseminate them.

  Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

  Avoid as you would perdition issuing cover-up orders, orders for the record. This simply shows lack of intestinal fortitude on the part of the officer signing the orders, and everyone who reads them realizes it at once.

  In planning any operation, it is vital to remember, and constantly repeat to oneself, two things: “In war nothing is impossible, provided you use audacity,” and “Do not take counsel of your fears.” If these two principles are adhered to, with American troops victory is certain.

  Maps: In my opinion the use of large-scale maps by senior officers is distinctly detrimental, because by the use of such maps they get themselves enmeshed in terrain conditions.

  Putting it in general terms, Army and Corps Commanders are not so much interested in how to beat the enemy from a tactical standpoint as in where to beat him. The where is learned from a careful study of road, railway, and river maps. The question of the tactical means to be used by divisions in securing these points is, of necessity, studied from large-scale maps. However, the size of the map used does not continue to increase as the size of the using unit diminishes. At the level of the regiment, a map should be sufficiently large and accurate to assist the commander in selecting his Observation Posts and Command Post and his general line. For the rest, he should rely on personal reconnaissance on the ground. From the battalion down, the use of maps is of no value and is frequently fraught with great danger. I have never seen a good battalion commander direct his units from a map. I have seen many bad battalion commanders indulge in this pusillanimous method of command.

  Staff Organization: The Headquarters of higher units —that is, Corps and Army—should be arranged by sections as follows: the Forward Echelon consisting of the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, Secretary of the General Staff, G-l, G-2, G-3, Engineers, Field Artillery, Anti-Aircraft, Signal, and Co-operating Air. Also subsections of the Provost Marshal, Special Troops, Headquarters Commandant, and liaison representatives from G-4, Ordnance, Medical, Quartermaster, and G-5 Sections. Where circumstances require, this Forward Echelon can be divisible into an advance Tactical Headquarters consisting of the Commanding General, Forward Echelon Chief of Staff, and a small operation section of G-2, G-3, Engineers, Field Artillery, and Signal. In this Advance Section it is desirable but not necessary to have a liaison group from G-4.

  The Rear Echelon should be under the command of G-4 and contain G-5, Chemical Warfare, Finance, Medical, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal, Engineers, Adjutant General, Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, Special Services, and Chaplain.

  Wherever circumstances permit, and accommodations warrant, all three echelons should be together. The Rear Echelon must be in one place and within easy driving distance, not to exceed three hours, of the Forward Echelon. Ample wire communications between the Forward and Rear Echelons must exist.

  Headquarters Arrangements: All Headquarters, from Regiment up to Army, should be laid out on the same general plan so that any visitor who finds himself at the Message Center will know in which direction to go to find any section.

  Trucks arranged for sleeping accommodations for General and Senior Staff Officers save much time and promote efficiency. In addition, in the Forward Echelon there should be three large office trailers—one for the Commanding General and Chief of Staff, one for the G’s, and one for the Secretary of the General Staff and the clerks and stenographers, so that paper work and planning may be carried out during inclement weather.

  A ruined building is better than a good tent for offices, dining room, and kitchen. In any staff office, or trailer, the telephone should be placed near the principal map, so that the officer consulting the map may talk over the telephone at the same time he scans the map. It is a strange commentary on human weaknesses that the Third Army, in occupying its twenty-third Command Post, placed the map and telephone on opposite sides of the room.

  In my opinion, generals—or at least the Commanding General—should answer their own telephones in the daytime. This is not particularly wearisome because few people call a general, except in emergencies, and then they like to get him at once. At night the phone of the Commanding Gener
al should be answered by an Aide, who should have means of buzzing either the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff, depending on for whom the message is intended. It is very important that a stenographer or a stenographic reporting machine be constantly on duty, so that the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General will have a written transcript of any telephone messages. This is particularly important when they receive or issue orders by telephone. This record must show date, time, place, and the two speakers. Adherence to the foregoing will save many mistakes and prevent much acrimonious discussion.

  In every type of Headquarters there are, during each twenty-four-hour period, two peak loads. During these peak hours all officers and enlisted men should be present During the slow periods, the maximum number of officers and enlisted men should be absent eating, sleeping, or exercising. Many officers have, to my knowledge, destroyed their future usefulness by being too conscientious at the beginning of a campaign and being always at their desk. This must not be done and they must take exercise.

  A secretary for the General Staff, with a competent Deputy Chief of Staff, is a vital necessity to see that the subsections and sections of the General and Special Staffs do not get too independent and issue contradictory orders. The Deputy Chief of Staff is the bottleneck through which these orders must go.