War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  At the Army, Corps, and Division level, the Forward Echelon of each staff should have a staff meeting, or briefing, daily, as early as the Headquarters under consideration can obtain the information for the day. In my opinion this time varies as follows: Division—one hour after dawn; Corps—two hours after dawn; Army—three hours after dawn.

  One officer from each staff section of Corps and Army should go to the front daily and visit corresponding officers of the next lower echelon. However, he should also collect general information not normally applicable to his branch or section. Anything of vital moment obtained during his visit he will report to the Chief of Staff immediately on his return. If it is not vital, he will bring it up at the staff conference the next day. The Commanding General or the Chief of Staff must visit part of the front daily after the briefing.

  The Commanding General, or the Chief of Staff of the Tactical Air Command operating with an army, should be present at all staff conferences and planning meetings. If this is not done, the maximum co-operation with this powerful arm will not be obtained. The A-3 must work with the G-3 and the A-2 with the G-2.

  Staff officers of inharmonious disposition, irrespective of their ability, must be removed. A staff cannot function properly unless it is a united family.

  Decorations: It is vital to good morale that decorations get out promptly and on an equitable basis. There should be in every Army and Corps Staff one member of G-l Section whose duty it is to prod divisions and attached lower units to get citations out. He should further see that they are properly written. When time permits, there should be a citation writers’ school attended by officers from Corps, Army, and Division G-l sections.

  Casualty Reports: Similarly, there should be an administrative school attended by officers from Division, Corps, and Army, where special attention is given to Casualty Reports, etc. In order to know constantly the situation, two sets of Casualty Reports, both enemy and our own, must be kept. One is based on factual reports, the other on estimates. The one based on factual data usually lags from two to three weeks behind the estimated one. However, if properly made, the estimated report will be within two or three per cent of the factual report.

  Equality of Punishments: The Judge Advocate and the Inspector General should make checks and see that the schedule of punishments accorded for analogous crimes in each unit below them is generally the same, so that a general level and equality of punishment will exist through the Army.

  V

  General

  One of the great defects in our military establishment is the giving of weak sentences for military offenses. The purpose of military law is administrative rather than legal. As the French say, sentences are for the purpose of encouraging the others. I am convinced that, in justice to other men, soldiers who go to sleep on post, who go absent for an unreasonable time during combat, who shirk in battle, should be executed; and the Army Commanders or Corps Commanders should have the authority to approve the death sentence. It is utterly stupid to say that General Officers, as a result of whose orders thousand of gallant and brave men have been killed, are not capable of knowing how to remove the life of one miserable poltroon.

  Uniforms: The purpose of the uniform is to provide the soldier with something he can wear which makes him look like other soldiers, and which is warm or cool according to circumstances. In my opinion, the proper uniform for the American soldier is the helmet with liner, and olive-drab wool shirt and trousers, the trousers cut reasonably narrow at the bottom, and combat boots. When weather becomes cool in the fall, the weight of the shirt and trousers can be increased up to twenty-six- or thirty-ounce cloth. At the same time, the soldier should be issued heavy underwear and socks (all wool) and a forty-eight-inch woolen muffler which he can wear around his neck, around his head at night, or around his stomach.

  In zero or sub-zero weather the soldier should, in addition, be issued an overcoat of the trench-coat variety with a liner, but without a belt, and provided in front with a muff in which he can thrust his hands so that he can use his gun trigger without the necessity of removing his gloves.

  Use of Sight: The peep-sight is not adapted to warfare, since it is inefficient in the dark, or in a bad light. I have met only three or four officers, out of hundreds questioned, who have ever seen a soldier set a sight in battle. Therefore, our rifles should be equipped with two open sights—one for a range of one hundred yards, one for a range of three hundred yards. This will insure that the soldier shoots low and will correct for the fact that in the excitement of battle he always takes too much front sight.

  Gun Slings: The same officers whom I questioned on the sight informed me that they had never seen a gun sling used, except on two occasions by snipers, as an aid to firing. Therefore, the heavy and expensive leather gun sling should be dispensed with and a cloth sling, used solely for the purpose of carrying the piece, should be substituted.

  Mortars: Infantry mortars should be provided with an illuminating device for night firing.

  Red Cross Marking: Ambulances should be painted white all over, except for a large Red Cross on top, sides, back, and front.

  Attached medical personnel with front-line units should have a tabard covering the whole chest and back as far as the belt. For combat this should be white with a large Red Cross back and front. When approaching combat and white would be too easily seen from the air, the reverse side of the tabard, olive-drab, with a small red cross, is worn.

  Air Attacks: We know the effect of our attacks on the enemy’s means of signal, rail, and road communication. We must therefore contemplate similar attacks upon our means of communication, and think how we can get on with those means limited or destroyed.

  Where possible, it is best to request the Air to cut railways far from cities and to cut them at three points, because this entails great delay in getting to the center point from either direction. It also makes it necessary to move the repair crews over considerable distances, and forces them to work at points from which they can more easily be attacked from the air; because out in the country there are, as a general thing, no anti-aircraft guns.

  After-Action Reports: As soon as an operation starts, a group composed of officers from G-2 and G-3 should start the compilation of the After-Action Report which should be organized on a-calendar month basis, so that each month is a complete entity. At the termination of hostilities, the data thus secured can be re-edited on a campaign basis. This report must contain copies of orders, letters of instruction, maps, etc.

  Guards on Trains: Railroad trains, carrying rations, or fuel, or other articles with a sales value on the black market, must be guarded, and any persons attempting pillage must be shot and the fact published.

  Dead and Wounded Casualties: In order to evaluate properly the effectiveness of enemy fire, more information than that now obtainable on the subject of casualties is necessary. At the present time, we know only the number of casualties and the type of wounds of those reaching the hospitals, but even in their case, we do not know on what part of the battlefield they were wounded. We have no knowledge of how, or where, battle deaths occurred. In collecting wounded, a method should be prescribed which would show that a man was hit in the vicinity of such and such a point. The Graves Registration personnel should state what type of missile caused death. No medical experience is necessary. Anybody who has seen a few wounds can tell a small-arms wound from a fragmentation wound. This information should be made of

  record. The location of both types of casualties could be secured through the issue of sketch maps to Medical and Graves Registration personnel. The purpose in collecting the foregoing information is that, if we know what causes our casualties and where they occur, we can take steps to avoid them.

  Overhead Cover: Owing to the certainty that, in the next war, the enemy will have proximity fuses, we must contemplate the necessity of providing all mechanized combat weapons, including artillery pieces, with overhead cover.

  Replacements: When the curre
nt infantry division has lost four thousand men, its offensive value is zero, because ninety-two per cent of these four thousand men are riflemen and there are less than four thousand riflemen in a division. The same fact applies, with slightly less emphasis, to armored divisions. Therefore; every division must have a replacement battalion organic in the division. In an infantry division, this replacement battalion should contain fifteen per cent of the rifle strength of the division, and five per cent of all other, including company officers. There should be a company for each infantry regiment, and a company for all others.

  A similar unit in an armored division should contain ten per cent of the rifle strength of the armored infantry, ten per cent of the personnel strength of the armored battalions, and five percent of all others, including company officers.

  During a campaign, the returned wounded will occasionally produce a state where the strength of the replacement battalion is over the percentages recommended, but one or two days of battle will invariably correct this situation. It is vital to morale that men return to their old units without loss of rank.

  American Ingenuity: The Americans, as a race, are the foremost mechanics in the world. America, as a nation, has the greatest ability for mass production of machines. It therefore behooves us to devise methods of war which exploit our inherent superiority. We must fight the war by machines on the ground, and in the air, to the maximum of our ability, particularly in view of the fact that the two races left which we may have to fight are both poor mechanics but have ample manpower. While we have amply manpower, it is too valuable to be thrown away.

  Loyalty: There is a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and much less prevalent.

  In terminating these remarks, it is sad to remember that, when anyone has fairly mastered the art of command, the necessity for that art usually expires—either through the termination of the war or through the advanced age of the commander.

  —————

  1

  Probably there is nothing original in what I shall now put down, because war is an ancient subject and I, an ancient man, have studied and practiced it for over forty years. So, what appears to me as original thought may be simply subconscious memories.

  2

  Concerning the soldier

  The soldier is the Army. No army is better than its soldiers. The soldier is also a citizen. In fact, the highest obligation and privilege of citizenship is that of bearing arms for one’s country. Hence it is a proud privilege to be a soldier—a good soldier. Anyone, in any walk of life, who is content with mediocrity is untrue to himself and to American tradition. To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and in his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and to his superiors, and self-confidence bom of demonstrated ability.

  There has been, and is now, a great deal of talk about discipline; but few people, in or out of the Army, know what it is or why it is necessary.

  When a man enters the Army, he leaves home, usually for the first time, and also he leaves behind him the inhibitions resulting from his respect for the opinion of his parents and his friends; which inhibitions, unknown to himself, have largely guided his existence. When he joins a unit and lacks this corrective influence, 317

  3

  Barrack-Room Ballads, “The Young British Soldier.”

  EARNING MY PAY

  The responsibilities of an officer are quite analogous to those of a policeman or a fireman. The better he performs his daily tasks, the less frequently does he have to take direct action.

  Looking back over my rather lengthy military career, I am surprised at the few times when I have, so to speak, earned my pay. Perhaps, however, the fact that I have had to take drastic action so seldom indicates that, in the interim, I did my duty.

  The following episodes stand out in my mind as occasions on which my personal intervention had some value.

  I

  The Cadets of the Military Academy have, on a few occasions, taken upon themselves the dubious responsibility of being supercritical of officers through what is known as a “Silence.” This act is performed when the officer whom they consider to be in error enters the Mess Hall. All Cadets come to attention and do not move or speak while he is there. I have always been opposed to such acts, as, to me, it is very close to mutiny.

  On one occasion, when I happened to be in command of the Battalion and had marched it to lunch, the officer in charge entered, and I immediately saw that a “Silence” was about to be perpetrated. I felt that the Cadets were misinformed upon this officer and, in any case, I was against “Silence.” I therefore called the Corps to attention and marched them home without lunch. The officer, who was somewhat young and inexperienced, criticized me for my action until I explained why I did it

  II

  During the summer of 1914, I happened to be the only officer on duty at Fort Riley, Kansas, when one of the colored soldiers was accused of having raped a white girl in the neighboring town. It was rumored that the inhabitants intended to lynch this man. Naturally I am opposed to rape. However, I felt that it was my duty as an officer to see that the soldier of the United States Army was not lynched. I, therefore, informed the leading citizens that, if any such attempt were made, it would be over my dead body. As a result of my stand, the man was not lynched, and, later, was proven not guilty.

  III

  During the border troubles in 1916,1 was on duty in charge of a patrol of twenty men at Hot Wells, Texas. My mission was to protect from attacks by the Villistas some forty miles of the Southern Pacific Railroad, over which Carranzista trains were operating. Hot Wells was the center of my sector. I sent a sergeant with half my command to the west and took the remainder to the east, having previously telephoned the Commanding Officer of the 13th Cavalry that I would take over to include a certain bridge. As we approached this bridge in the dark, the point came back and reported to me that he heard voices on the bridge speaking Spanish. I therefore presumed that the Villistas were mining the Bridge. It has always been my belief that a surprise attack is correct. I therefore formed my group in line and gave the command, “Raise pistols, Charge!” Just as we got under the very shadow of the bridge, we ran into a wire fence and had to stop. At the same time a number of rifles stuck over the top of the bridge. I challenged with much profanity, demanding who was there, and was greatly relieved when a voice replied, “Patrol, 13th Cavalry.” They had missed the bridge where they were supposed to stop and were in my bailiwick.

  This instance convinced me of the value of adhering to a plan.

  IV

  During the operations of the American Punitive Expedition in Mexico in 1916-17, General Pershing had his advance Command Post, consisting of himself, Major Ryan, and myself, with four soldiers, at a place called El Cobre. Late one evening General Pershing dictated an order to Major Ryan, which I was to carry to a squadron of the 13th Cavalry at Saca Grande. This message was to the effect that the squadron would proceed to the vicinity of a ranch called Providencia and search the mountains to the west. When he wrote the order, General Pershing was looking at the mountains to the west which I was morally certain he desired to have searched.

  To deliver this message, it was necessary to drive for about an hour and a half in a broken-down Ford, using headlights, over roadless country full of Villistas. I then secured a horse and, after riding all night in very bad weather consisting of rain, sleet, hail, and snow, joined the squadron. When we arrived at Providencia, the Major assembled his captains and started to issue orders to search the mountains to the west of Providencia. Now, Providencia is in a valley with mountains on both sides, and General Pershing’s Command Post was east of the mountains to the east of Providencia. I therefore told the Squadron Commander that he should search the mountains to the east. He showed me the written order and said, “Do you tell me to violate this written order?” I said, “I do.” He made some uncom
plimentary remarks concerning me, but stated that he would carry out the order. We searched all day without success, finally returning over the mountains to General Pershing’s Command Post.

  The Major sent for me and we rode to the Command Post, where the Major stated that: “This young so and so had caused him to fail in his mission.” General Pershing said, “Whatever Lieutenant Patton ordered you were my orders.” Then, turning to me, he said, “What orders did you give?” I stated what I had done, and he said, “You were perfectly correct.”

  At that time the difference between a Second Lieutenant and a Major was much greater than the difference between a Second Lieutenant and a full General today, so that my act, in my opinion, took high moral courage and built up my self-confidence, and was correct.

  V

  Shortly after the preceding incident, General Pershing sent me to deliver a message to General Howze. The only information we had as to General Howze’s whereabouts was that he had passed through the Providencia Ranch. I reached the ranch with an automobile just at dark, and chanced to meet there a pack train of the 7th Cavalry. I secured two soldiers and three horses from the packmaster and started to look for General Howz. At that time it was still light enough to follow the tracks of the squadron. When we had proceeded a short distance, we met a patrol of the 10th Cavalry, who urged me to go no farther because they assured me that the woods were full of Villistas. However, I continued, and finally came, near midnight, to a place where, at the top of a divide, two canyons took off from the canyon I had previously been traversing. It was necessary to make a decision. Looking over the ground, I thought I saw a slight reflection of fires in the clouds over the easternmost canyon. I therefore followed this canyon and met a patrol of the 7th Cavalry under General Fechet, then Major, who urged me to go no farther because the canyon was full of Villistas, and he did not know whether or not General Howze had gone down it, and rather believed he had not. However, we continued and eventually found General Howze.