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Some people went down: Kahtany, 29 October.
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They said, ‘Go back!’: Saadi, 1 November.
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He said that he didn’t: Alsaai, 2 November.
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Some people on the boat: Kahtany, 29 October.
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What are you doing?: Saadi, 1 November.
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Vessel disable the steering: Testimony of Brigadier Silverstone before CMI, 4 April 2002, p. 329 onwards.
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A number of people . . . The sorts of children . . . : Comments from Ruddock, Howard and Reith can be found at www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3WJ10xGkas. For timing, see Senate CMI majority report, Chapter 4.
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Clearly planned and premeditated: www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3WJ10xGkas.
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These people are criminals: cited Borderline, p. 28.
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who did what happened in New York . . . quaint: Dark Victory, pp. 194-5.
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How many . . . are sleepers?: Borderline, p. 134.
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We shouldn’t make assumptions: Dark Victory, p. 201.
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There is a possibility: Disturbing Practices.
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There’s something to me incompatible: www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3WJ10xGkas.
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Most likely unrepairable: Sitrep HMAS Adelaide 110002ZOct01, Senate CMI majority report, Chapter 3.
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We turned a lot: Saadi, 1 November.
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I think we’re going to lose this one: Banks testimony (CMI) 4 April 2002, p. 294.
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The worst – or most feared – order: Banks testimony (CMI), 25 March 2002, p. 187.
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The soldiers told us: Saadi, 1 November.
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The ocean was dark!: Kahtany, 29 October.
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The weight of the engine: Saadi, 1 November.
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I was particularly proud: Banks testimony (CMI), 25 March 2002, p. 165.
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ASYLUM SEEKERS THROW: Daily Telegraph; ‘BOAT PEOPLE THROW: Melbourne Herald Sun; CHILDREN OVERBOARD: Sydney Morning Herald.
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Any civilized person: cited Clyne, ‘Words Excusing Exclusion’.
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It was clearly: Children Overboard: View from the Sea on Sunday, Channel 9, 29 August 2004.
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This kind of emotional blackmail: Weller, Don’t Tell the Prime Minister, p. 2.
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There are those who wish to breach: To Deter and Deny: ABC Four Corners, 15 April 2002.
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Should boat people: ‘Words Excusing Exclusion’.
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At 9.30 a.m.: Banks testimony (CMI), 25 March 2002, p. 166.
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You may want to question: www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3WJ10xGkas.
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there was a clear misrepresentation: Banks testimony (CMI), 26 March 2002, p. 202.
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The whole show was wrong: Don’t Tell the Prime Minister, p. 20.
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An interpreter came in: Saadi, 1 November.
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Some Iraqi people said, ‘Don’t go!’: Kahtany, 29 October.
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It was a cargo plane: Alsaai, 2 November.
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We were in the middle of a jungle!: Saadi, 1 November.
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Soldiers: Alsaai, 2 November.
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Mister, where are we? . . . There was nothing there: Saadi, 1 November.
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We’re going to live here? . . . cried and cried . . . Every day we killed maybe five: Kahtany, 29 October.
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Everyone got sick: Saadi, 1 November.
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The Department of Immigration: ‘Experts Claim Malaria Risk for Asylum Seekers on PNG Island’, ABC News, 19 February 2002. ‘Detainees Struck Down by Malaria’, Sydney Morning Herald (22 December 2001). Australia’s Latest Refugee Policy: Cages, Armed Guards, and Imprisonment on a Remote Island’, Independent (7 February 2002). The President of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Professor Richard Larkins, was unequivocal: The responsible course of action is to immediately evacuate the detention centre.’ (‘Australia’s MDs Throw Support behind Asylum Seekers’, Canadian Medical Association Journal 14 May 2002; 166 (10): 1325.).
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The courts here in Australia . . . It was at about this time: Interview with Philip Ruddock, Sydney, 28 October 2008.
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In September 2001: Australian Government Fact Sheet 81, 2009: Australia’s Excised Places’.
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Over the next four years: Still Drifting, p. 7.
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In September: CMI, Chapter 10.
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unmitigated bribe: ‘Phantom Aid Never Leaves our Shores’, Sydney Morning Herald (28 May 2007).
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Australia has taken its own policy: By Invitation Only, p. 70.
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an attempt by Australia: No Safe Refuge, HRW, p. 11.
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Not consistent with: The Australian (2 August 2002).
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Typical were the governments . . . anti-terrorist fight: No Safe Refuge, p. 10.
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shamelessly manipulated xenophobic fears: HRW World Report 2002: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons.
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excessively harsh . . . unprecedented: HRW World Report, 2002.
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‘Surely there are better ways’: ‘UNHCR Head Condemns Politicization of Issue’, UNWIRE, 2001. ‘It is hard to see,’ agreed the Economist, ‘[the Pacific Solution] as anything but a populist attempt to gain votes’ (cited, Howard’s Race).
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a sharp upsurge in Liberal popularity: Commonwealth Election 2001, Bennett et al.
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The atmosphere changed: Interview, Liberal Party adviser, 2 November.
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there goes the election: Interview with Kim Beazley, Canberra, 7 November 2008.
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We can’t take a trick . . . we’re competing: Howard’s Race, p. 224.
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Whatever you hear: ‘Overboard incident “never happened”’, The Australian (7 November 2001).
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All hell’s broken loose . . . The Prime Minister wants . . . In my view . . . I think the best you can say: Interview with Mike Scrafton, Castlemaine, 2 November 2008.
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In my mind there is no uncertainty: ‘Senate Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence’, p. 18.
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Nobody rang my office . . . at no stage: ‘Scrafton Evidence’, p. 19.
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I have not received . . . I’d make it public: ‘Scrafton Evidence’, p. 20.
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My understanding: ‘Scrafton Evidence’, p. 19.
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lying through his teeth: Despite discrepancies in his evidence, Scrafton later took – and passed – a polygraph examination, then challenged the Prime Minister to do the same. Howard refused to participate in such ‘gimmicks’. As had been the case with the CMI Inquiry before it, the inquiry into the Scrafton evidence was controversial: Liberals viewed it as sour-faced politicking after a catastrophic election defeat.
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This is fantastic! . . . We had the most dramatic: Interview, Beazley, 7 November.
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Yeah. We were going to win . . . From our point of view . . . No: In
terview, Beazley, 7 November.
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Were they found to be refugees? Interview, Ruddock, 28 October.
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I thought that if I told them: Interview, Saadi, 1 November.
3: The Wedding Party.
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We did not start this war: US Department of Defense news briefing, 4 December 2001.
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What are you doing? . . . It’s you: Interview with Abdul Malik, 8 March 2010.
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She’s good, a perfect match . . . On the afternoon of. . . It was a great moment: Interviews with Haji Abdul Khaliq (Malik’s brother), Haji Mohammed Anwar (Malik’s uncle), Haji Khalifa Sadat (Deh Rawood district governor), Haji Saheb Jan Agha (Malik’s neighbour), Khalifa Jan Mohammed (Popalzai tribal chief, Deh Rawood) and Jan Mohammed (former governor, Oruzgan) – all conducted in March 2010.
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Nine months earlier: ‘Seeking a Blend of Military and Civilian Decision Making’, New York Times (24 October 2001); Air Power against Terror, America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Benjamin Lamben, National Defense Research Institute, 2005.
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origins of the SPECTRE programme: For general history of the AC-130s, see the Spectre Association’s excellent website: wwwspectre-association.org. The 16th Special Operations Squadron also have information at www.canon.af.mil. Current and former AC-130 operators were specifically instructed not to co-operate with research for this book.
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Masirah Island: Charles Miller, ‘Low, Slow and Deadly’, National Review Online, 18 October 2001. Masirah, Oman at www.globalsecurity.org, etc.
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With regret I have to say: Woodward, Bush at War, p. 103. The CIA officer was Cofer Black. Numerous Soviet generals warned of the dangers of an Afghan invasion. They’re wolves, these people,’ General Alexander Lebed told the Washington Post (‘Soviet Generals Warn of Sea of Bloodshed’, 19 September 2001), noting that for every town razed by the Soviet military ‘perhaps one mujahedin was killed – the rest were innocent’.
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The Soviets introduced: PBS Frontline, Campaign Against Terror, 8 September 2002.
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If you do go in, don’t stay: Interview, Face the Nation, 18 November 2001.
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initial success, followed by: Speech at Virginia Military Institute, 17 April 2002.
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He said to Franks: Interview with a senior UK diplomat who declined to be named, 21 March 2010.
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It became clear not immediately: Interview with Ambassador James Dobbins, 3 March 2010.
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The idea that Afghans: Dobbins, After the Taliban, p. 103. ‘Washington’s setting geographical limits on ISAF,’ writes Dobbins, ‘was my first exposure to a mind-set that excluded local security as a post-conflict mission for US forces.’
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The rhetoric from Washington: Interview, Ambassador Robert Finn, 3 March 2010.
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I was told to take . . . No Bondsteel . . . So I concluded from that: Interview, General Dan McNeill, 24 February 2010.
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It can’t be a lie: Interviews, Abdul Malik, Abdul Khaliq, Mohammed Anwar, March 2010.
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(ODA) 574: For a great account of the mission, see Eric Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying For (HarperCollins, 2009).
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We were told . . . They were filtering . . . When more Americans: Interview, Abdul Malik, March 2010.
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When President Karzai started: Interview, Jan Mohammed, March 2010.
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People were very optimistic . . . We were pretty sure: Interview, Abdul Khaliq, March 2010.
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America is a very developed country: Interview, Jan Mohammed, March 2010.
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undisclosed location: www.canon.af.mil.
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SPECTRE: These slogans, and more, can be viewed at wwwspectre-association.org.
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three aircraft and three crews . . . 1,300 rounds . . . 225 missions: www.canon.af.mil.
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Extremely competent: Interview with anonymous US Special Forces officer, 16 February 2010.
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Angel of Death: ‘Mark’ of ODA 595, PBS Frontline, Campaign Against Terror (8 September 2002).
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clandestine AC-130 strike: 9/11 Commission Report, p. 135.
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It would kill everything: Interview with Michael Scheuer, 26 March 2010.
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It looked like nothing was happening: US Department of Defense press briefing, 27 November 2001.
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Jack Straw ridiculed: Kampfner, Blair’s Wars, p. 143.
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Bin Laden was there: Interview with CIA officer, 14 March 2010.
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Marginalized: White House Press Conference, 13 March 2003.
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the heart of the Taliban: Special Forces officer, 16 February 2010.
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I knew him when . . . We would put up a cigarette . . . I went into hospital . . . Come and join: Interview, Haji Mohammed Anwar, March 2010.
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They will be helping them: Carlotta Gall, ‘Seeking Mullah Omar in a Land of Secrets’, New York Times (22 May 2002).
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Norway, Germany, Australia . . . : Details of Special Forces operations in the valley come from Anonymous, Hunting Al Qaeda, Chapters 8 and 9.
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CONOP: Hunting Al Qaeda, p. 99 displays the plan.
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Details of the first Deh Rawood operation come from Hunting Al Qaeda.
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The groom never stays: Interview, Abdul Khaliq, March 2010. Details of the rest of the preparations come from Abdul Malik’s family.
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Tela Gul’s uncle: ‘On the Hunt for Mullah Omar’, TIME (5 August 2002). Confirmed by family members.
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three raids: ‘Seeking Mullah Omar in a Land of Secrets’ (op. cit.).
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Operation Full Throttle: Hunting Al Qaeda contains an account of the various errors of the operation. An alternate view is reported by a Special Forces officer ‘John Andersen’ in his piece Afghan T&A in Hans Halberstadt’s War Stories of the Green Berets. Both accounts agree that the operation was compromised; both contain versions of the ‘would you like to have some tea’ incident. A final, official, summary (‘US Military Report Says Taliban Hid Guns in Civilian Areas’) was released by the Pentagon on 8 September 2002.
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All accounts of the bombing itself are from interviews with those present, apart from those of Laik, Nassema and Ahmed Jan Agha – all of whom were quoted in the Press at the time.
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They blindfolded us . . . They asked if we knew Mullah Omar: Interview, Abdul Bari, March 2010.
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At least one bomb was errant: Andrew Buncombe and Kim Sengupta, ‘Scores Killed by US Bomb at Afghan Wedding’, Independent (2 July 2002); Luke Harding and Matthew Engel, ‘US Bomb Blunder Kills 30 at Afghan Wedding’, Guardian (2 July 2002).
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It does seem as though: NPR, Talk of the Nation (2 July 2002).
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the result of anti-aircraft artillery: ‘Scores Killed by US Bomb at Afghan Wedding’ (op. cit.).
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I read in the paper: Luke Harding, ‘No US Apology over Wedding Bombing’, Guardian (3 July 2002).
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there isn’t any reason: Marc Herold, Crashing the Wedding Party, 8 July 2002.
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Taliban and al-Qaeda manuals: US Department of Defense news briefing, 2 July 200
2.
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Something was fishy: War Stories of the Green Berets.
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Describe for me: Interview, Dan McNeill, 24 February 2010.
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Why do you assume there was a wedding party?: Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, p. 117. Wolfowitz believed that the victims were Taliban fighters dressed as partygoers.
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Let’s not call them innocents: US Department of Defense news briefing, 21 February 2002.
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All the evidence suggests: Wolfowitz and Dr Abdullah, press briefing, Kabul, 15 July 2002.
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cleaned the area: Dumeetha Luthra, ‘Draft Report Indicates US Cover-up of Afghan Wedding Attack’, The Times (29 July 2002).
A History of the World Since 9/11 Page 38