Sudan 1885
Page 10
• Artillery;
• Infantry:
– No.1 (C) Company;
– No.2 (D) Company;
– No.3 (A) Company; and
– No.4 (B) Company;
• Ambulance corps; and
• Band (14).
INDIAN CONTINGENT
The 3,000 strong Indian Contingent deployed from India between 22 February and 1 March 1885:
15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment (Sikhs);
17th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment;
28th Bombay Native Infantry Regiment;
9th Bengal Cavalry Regiment; and
F Company, Queen’s Own Madras Sappers and Miners.
In addition there were 6800 contract labourers, camel drivers and other supporting personnel.
NSW Contingent being greeted at Suakin by General Graham. Contemporary sketch.
Each infantryman was issued with 80 rounds of ammunition, and there was a final check of uniform and kit. They disembarked and marched three kilometres in the hottest part of the day to their campsite. There was no acclimatisation period, and consequently several men collapsed on their first route march.
After being officially greeted by Graham, the Contingent settled in with 13,000 British and Indian regulars. The newcomers were soon attached to a brigade group consisting of the crème of the British army: three Guards battalions.
The infantry in the Contingent saw the first action, while the artillerymen were left behind to take delivery of their guns and begin gunnery drills. Drill and training would be the only military activity the New South Wales artillery undertook during their deployment.
‘Bravo Australia! I think this is what we all felt as saw the Colonial Contingent arrive in camp on Sunday, the 29th of March. We gave them a regular hearty reception, and they were cheered all the way along the roads out … The Contingent were a fine looking lot of fellows, and appeared as if they were as fit as possible for work. They all wore the familiar red serge coats … but they very soon changed into kharkee like the rest of us …’
Major E.G. Perry, Royal Engineers, 1886
Graham at Suakin
After reconnoitring the port and its defences on foot, Graham decided to reduce the size of the front that his troops had to defend. Until this time the town had been subjected to nightly attacks by small bands of enemy fighters. They usually succeeded in causing casualties among sentries and patrols. From previous experience Graham was convinced that many so-called ‘friendly’ locals were also responsible for stabbing his men in their sleep.
Therefore Graham had a considerable force under command by mid-March, and more troop and transport ships were arriving every day. This force was larger and better supported than what had been made available to him in March 1884. The British were at last getting a measure of their opponents.
To achieve his first objective Graham would have to make two sorties: one to Tamai; and (after returning to Suakin), another further north along the line of the railway. The Mahdists occupied Hashin, which is situated in thick scrub about 11 kilometres west of Suakin, just north of a 252 metre high feature (Dihilbat Hill), and the possible source of enemy probing on Suakin at night.
Graham’s right flank would be threatened during any advance on Tamai if Hashin remained in enemy hands. He therefore determined to capture the tiny village. Dense prickly scrub over two metres high around the village afforded any defender excellent cover. Troops moving in formation, such as a square, would find the going tough as they negotiated the rough ground.
After a cavalry reconnaissance on 19 March reported the place deserted, Graham deployed a force there the following day to secure a 138 metre high feature (which they called Zareba Hill) with an infantry battalion and two artillery pieces. To escort these troops and prevent any repetitions of the disasters that had previously occurred in the area, Graham deployed a huge force.
The Battle of Hashin
The British and Indian force numbered some 8000 troops (the infantry were armed with both Martini Henry and Snider rifles), together with four Gardner guns and cavalry. By about 0830 three small redoubts had been erected on Zareba Hill. During this time cavalry elements exchanged fire with the enemy. An enemy force estimated to be 3000 strong could be seen on and around Dihilbat Hill. Graham deployed the 2nd Brigade under McNeill to this feature, supported by the Guards and Indian Brigades.
The assault commenced at 0900, forcing the enemy south, and leaving the hill to McNeill’s troops. At the same time undetected reinforcements were arriving from Tamai. Many of the Hadendowa tribesmen made the best use of ground to mount surprise attacks on cavalry units at close quarters. The enemy had turned the tables on Graham.
Having secured Zareba Hill, but now over-extended, Graham broke off the engagement shortly after noon. As his forces withdrew Mahdist soldiers moved in to exploit the situation, and inflicted casualties on the tightly packed Guards square as it moved east to Zareba Hill. All of Graham’s men then withdrew to Suakin by late afternoon.
FIELD FORCE, MARCH 1885
Numbers in brackets indicate known strength.
Commander in Chief: Major General Sir Gerald Graham, VC
Chief of Staff: Major General Sir George Richard Greaves, KCMG
1st (Guards) Brigade: Major General Sir Arthur Lyon-Fremantle
3rd Battalion, Grenadier Guards (840);
1st Battalion, Coldstream Guards (834);
2nd Battalion, Scots Guards (840); and
New South Wales Battalion [attached] (24 officers and 604 other ranks).
2nd Brigade: Major General Sir John McNeill, VC, KCB, KCMG
1st Battalion, Berkshire Regiment (741):
1st Battalion, Shropshire Light Infantry Regiment (837):
2nd Battalion, East Surrey Regiment (832); and
Royal Marine Light Infantry Battalion (625).
3rd (The Indian Contingent) Brigade: Brigadier General John Hudson, CB, Bengal Staff Corps
15th Loodiana Sikh Infantry Regiment (809);
17th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment (843);
28th Bombay Native Infantry Regiment (830); and
F Company, Queen’s Own Madras Sappers & Miners (177).
Column Troops:
Cavalry Brigade: Colonel Henry Ewart, CB
The Composite Camel Corps (518) (mainly from the Guards, with some New South Wales infantrymen);
Mounted Infantry Regiment (209);
9th Bengal Cavalry Regiment (581);
5th Lancers (2 squadrons) (261);
20th Hussars (2 squadrons) (261); and
Mounted Infantry Police (13).
Artillery: Lieutenant Colonel S.J. Nicholson
5/1 Scottish Division, RA (Mountain Battery) with six 2.5-inch guns;
6/1 Ammunition Column, RA;
G Troop, B Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) with six 9-pounders (155); and
New South Wales Field Battery with six 9-pounders (244).
Engineers:
10th Railway Company, RE (125);
11th Field Company, RE (110*, attached to Mounted Infantry);
17th Field Company, RE (105);
24th Field Company, RE (124);
A Company, Queen’s Own Madras Sappers and Miners (174);
Detachment, Balloon Corps (15); and
2nd and 3rd Sections, Telegraph Battalion RE (20*).
* - estimate.
Naval Brigade: (Commander William Domville)
RN/Royal Marine Artillery (RMA) Gardner Gun Battery (33).
Base Support: (Major General Charles Ewart)
Chaplaincy;
Commissariat and Transport Staff:
3rd, 5th, 7th, 12th and 17th Transport Companies;
Harbour Master;
Intelligence;
Medical Staff Corps [2 field hospitals (190), No.1 Bearer Company (69), and NSW Contingent [37]);
Paymaster;
Provost;
Signallers;
Transport;
Veterinary (9 veterinary surgeons and one veterinary officer from the New South Wales Contingent); and
Indian Survey Detachment.
In addition to uniformed members, the force had 6000 baggage camels and 500 riding camels, 2500 camel drivers and 2100 other civilian labourers (including 400 men for railway work).
There was no decisive outcome, but this action did disperse the enemy for a while. British casualties were light, and troops were left to guard a series of defensive works thrown up by engineer detachments, but these were pulled back to Suakin five days later. Graham’s next step was to move on Tamai, in an attempt to defeat Osman Digna and his force in detail.
Graham returned to Suakin late that day, having left a battalion in place guarding a series of redoubts on some key high ground near Hashin. This measure also dealt with the threat to his flanks.
Fort Hashin: Erected as one of a series of forts around Suakin. These small posts allowed sentries to observe the local terrain and to signal enemy activity. This fort was constructed from sandbags and rail track sleepers and has a zareba of Mimosa brush as an outer perimeter defence. Source: http://bluebandmag.demonweb.co.uk/history/Buglers_medals. htm Photo courtesy of Royal Marines Museum.
As Tamai was 22 kilometres to the southwest of Suakin, it was believed the distance was too great to be travelled in one day, so Graham’s next move was to establish a logistics base midway between Suakin and Tamai, key terrain. This would extend the reach of his force and help to meet the constant demand for large quantities of water. One of Graham’s brigade commanders, McNeill, was tasked to undertake this operation.
McNeill’s Zareba
At dawn on 22 March McNeill left Suakin with a massive convoy of over 1500 pack animals (mainly camels), a strong infantry escort (the Berkshire Regiment, the Royal Marine Light Infantry, and the Indian Brigade), and a squadron of the 5th Lancers. This force was supported by two pioneer companies and Gardner guns manned by men of the Naval Brigade. The force, screened by the lancers, advanced in two squares (transport, food, water and ammunition in one), and again the rugged terrain upset its progress.
While McNeill’s force advanced toward Tamai, the field telegraph wagon and signallers moving close to the left flank of the British square unrolled the telegraph wire and covered it with loose soil, so maintaining constant communication with the base in Suakin. The more direct route the force took was west of a road previously used by British troops in the area (and of the remains of Baker’s zareba), but as it wound its way westward, the scrub became thicker and higher, and the rate of advance slowed.
McNeill had to order a halt at Tofrek, just eight kilometres from Suakin, to allow his force to reorganise. Work was immediately started on constructing three zarebas: one to hold 2000 camels, and two flanking zarebas each capable of sheltering one battalion. The Berkshire Regiment, a naval detachment with four Gardner guns, a company of engineers, and a battalion of Royal Marines were to remain there while the Indian Brigade marched back to Suakin with the empty transport, leaving one battalion in another zareba halfway along the route.
The dense scrub reduced the effectiveness of cavalry screens, as there was little visibility. The clouds of dust that any movement caused also did not help. McNeill and Hudson (commanding the Indian Brigade) decided that the deteriorating terrain would delay their advance, so Graham’s headquarters in Suakin was wired for instructions. They were told to push on for a further 10 kilometres, then to encamp.
Brigadier General Hudson and Staff, Indian Contingent.
The Battle of Tofrek
Troops set about cutting down Mimosa and digging a shallow firing trench around the perimeters of the zareba, which was constructed in a series of three joining ‘boxes’. Hudson’s Indian Brigade was deployed in a two rank line, which formed a three-sided square on the northwest perimeter. A key weakness in McNeill’s defensive posture (but one not identified by Graham) was the lack of cavalry, even though largely unemployed/ un-tasked mounted infantry had been left in Suakin. As well, accurate intelligence reports of Mahdists massing to attack McNeill as he advanced were either ignored or not passed to him.
At about 1430, with defensive works only half complete (the southern and eastern perimeters were still largely unprotected), word came of the enemy rapidly approaching in force. The troops (many of whom had piled their arms while gathering Mimosa) were ordered to ‘Stand to’, but were surprised by enemy fighters who managed to swarm over large sections of the zareba. The attack focused mainly on the south and west sides of McNeill’s position. Once McNeill’s force was engaged, Graham was alerted by telegraph of the attack.
One of the zarebas was penetrated, and a surgeon and several medics, who were armed only with sword bayonets, were killed in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. Many other casualties, including those in the engineer companies, were still outside the perimeter. Locally engaged camel drivers were hacked to death as they attempted to flee to Suakin. The Mahdists wrought havoc before they were finally beaten off, with McNeill’s force losing ten officers and 117 other ranks killed and 179 wounded or missing. There were also over 176 casualties among the contracted labourers, while between 500 and 900 irreplaceable camels were destroyed, many caught in cross fire.
The fight, which lasted only two hours, could easily have developed into a rout but for disciplined volley fire and the enemy calling off further attacks. Estimates of enemy casualties were about 1500, about a third of the attacking force.
Graham arrived on the scene of this slaughter at noon on 23 March with three battalions of the Guards and a convoy of 1200 camels. Several hours were spent burying corpses and destroying dying animals. Leaving the Coldstream Guards and the Scots Guards with McNeill, Graham returned to Suakin with the transport and wounded animals on 23 March.
On the next day another convoy of 4435 camels and 818 carts with 36,000 litres of water proceeded to McNeill’s Zareba, and was attacked along the way. A third water convoy sent out on the following day reached its destination safely without meeting any opposition. This may have been because it had a substantial escort of 2100 troops. Another convoy under Graham himself set out on 26 March. It was attacked four kilometres from Suakin, after which there was sporadic fighting. By the end of the month, McNeill’s Zareba was fully protected, and had the required amount of food, forage and water stored on site.
Additional supplies could then be transported to Tofrek, which had a sizeable garrison to defend the logistics base there. Graham used this zareba to launch his attack on Tamai on 3 April, but the action at what became known as McNeill’s Zareba was the last time the Mahdists in this region were engaged in large numbers.
Meanwhile, the railway inched its way from Suakin, reaching Otao (32 kilometres away) by the end of the month. It was unfortunate that the construction of the railway commenced at the hottest part of the year. The climate and logistics problems prevented Graham from following up the destruction of Tamai, leaving Osman Digna and his followers still largely unchecked.
The Battle of Tofrek, oil painting by C.E. Fripp. Courtesy: National Army Museum, London.
The drain on Graham’s force in resupplying McNeill’s Zareba meant that the camp at Hashin had to be shut down, and the troops there redeployed to Suakin. On 26 March it was Tofrek’s turn to be resupplied by a convoy of 580 camels escorted by almost every available soldier in Suakin. Because of its size and slow progress, Osman Digna would have had no difficulty knowing of the convoy. The cavalry in the escort were the first to be engaged,
shortly after 0800. Then, almost an hour later, Graham and the remainder of the escort found themselves in an intense fight.
As the Mahdists made repeated attacks on his square, it could not move forward. It was not until the arrival of two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, which had been called forward from Suakin, that the scrub ahead of the rest of the force was cleared of Osman Digna’s warriors. The square resumed its slow advance to Tofrek, with no further interference.
Osman Digna’s tactics were tying down disproportionate forces for escort duty. Surprisingly, there were very few enemy attacks at night. Such probes could have been extremely effective, given the Hadenowas’ local knowledge and undoubted superiority in using cover and stealth.
For their part the British were also learning. On 27 March Graham’s headquarters issued an instruction on movement over open ground. When advancing in a square, each battalion was to detach ten marksmen and place them just outside the square. Their role was to return enemy fire on command. While the distances covered by escorts were relatively short, the intense heat of the day made even simple tasks and manoeuvres very tiring. Heat illness was being seen in greater numbers, although the overall casualty rate from sickness was still acceptable.
On Monday 30 March another convoy left for the zareba on the Tamai road, but the Australians did not accompany it as originally planned. They were retained for the general advance on Tamai and brigaded with the Guards, though they camped with the British line regiments outside Suakin.
After a series of postponements, Graham announced his long awaited advance into Osman Digna’s territory on 1 April 1885. Then, possibly to accommodate the recent arrival of the New South Wales Contingent, the date was changed to 2 April. Water supplies had been sent to the zareba at Tofrek to sustain this larger force, but Graham’s delay gave the Mahdist forces the opportunity to withdraw from Tamai and Hashin to safer areas in the hills.
Reconnaissance on 1 April by a mounted party, however, found that there was still a sizeable enemy concentration (estimated at between 6000 and 7000 men) at Tamai. Graham left about 3000 men, supported by members of the New South Wales artillery and four mountain guns, to protect Suakin in his absence. The general expectation, even among the more experienced British units, was that there would be a full-scale battle to which Osman Digna would commit the bulk of his force, and allow the British to destroy it in detail.