Sudan 1885

by Michael Tyquin

  The Second Battle of Tamai

  At 0300 on 2 April a force of 7188 officers and men, 14 guns, 1111 horses, 171 mules and 1639 camels marched out of Suakin. Outside Suakin, the formation was joined at 0430 by the cavalry brigade and the artillery. Screening the front were two squadrons of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, while four squadrons (5th Lancers and 20th Hussars) covered the flanks and rear. Graham’s entire force numbered over 8600 men, more than twice as many as he had during his expedition the previous year.

  The square reached McNeill’s Zareba at 0900, where it halted so the men could have a brief rest and breakfast. Despite the complete lack of acclimatisation after their long voyage, only three Australians collapsed in the heat. At this time the zareba was still the site of unburied corpses and dead animals from the battle of Tofrek. Most of the men were sick from the stench. Sergeant Butler (A Company NSW Infantry) wrote: ‘Passed McNeill’s Zareba, the sight (sic) of a recent British disaster. Their corpses were laying in all directions and the smell was fearful’.

  At 1030, soon after leaving Suakin, the balloon was deployed in an attempt to reconnoitre enemy strength. With the balloon aloft, Graham could be kept informed of what was ahead of him as he moved forward, but this advantage soon disappeared with the arrival of strong winds, which forced the balloon to be winched down.

  Then, only five kilometres from McNeill’s Zareba, scouts reported large groups of Mahdists. Graham continued to advance until he got to within seven kilometres northeast of Tamai, near Tesela Hill, a feature about 30 metres high running northeast and southwest. A reconnaissance party then seized this feature. This party was equipped with a heliograph, and could communicate both with Graham’s force, and with Suakin, almost 40 kilometres away.

  SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

  Inflating the balloon en route to Tamai Source: The Illustrated London News, May 2, 1885.

  On 24 March the Balloon Detachment (known by the infantry as the ‘Balloonatics’) of the Royal Engineers, under the command of Major James F. Templar, went aloft for the first time in this campaign. Balloons had only been deployed once before, in Bechuanaland in 1884. Filled with compressed hydrogen from cylinders, and tethered to a cart lumbering along in the centre of the square, the balloon drifted up to a height of 120 metres. The observer, using pencilled messages attached to loops of rope that were slid down a cord, could report enemy movement. The challenge for the ground crew was to keep the horse team moving steadily over uneven ground. Any sudden jolts could have caused the tether to break, thereby losing the balloon and its observer.

  Over the following week the balloon was first damaged by being torn on a Mimosa bush when it was blown to the ground, and later it split in two and collapsed. On 24 April, at Tambuk a smaller balloon (christened ‘the fly’) was sent up so that observers could watch the roads leading into the mountains towards Sinkat. Because of their excellent eyesight, Arabs were used as observers. This gave the field commander an effective view out to 45 kilometres.

  HELIOGRAPH

  A heliograph was a small, portable signalling device. It used a mirror with an un-silvered spot in the centre. The sender aligned the heliograph to the intended recipient by looking at the reflected target in the mirror, and moving his head until the unsilvered spot hid the target. Keeping his head still, he then adjusted the aiming rod so that its cross wires bisected the target. He turned the sighting vane, which covered the cross wires with a diagram of a cross, and aligned the mirror with its tangent and elevation screws so the small shadow that was the reflection of the unsilvered spot was on the cross target. This indicated that the sunbeam was pointing at the target. Flashes were produced by a keying mechanism that tilted the mirror up a few degrees at the push of a lever. If the sun was in front of the sender, its rays were reflected directly from this mirror to the receiver. If the sun was behind the sender, a second mirror replaced the sighting rod, to capture the sunlight from the main mirror, and reflect it to the receiver.

  Advancing in a rectangular formation, the rest of the force reached McNeill’s Zareba at 0830. Troops who had been guarding the zareba previously then joined Graham’s column. This brought the force to 8175 troops, and they reached Tesela Hill, to which the enemy had previously withdrawn, at about 1630. There they erected another zareba and bivouacked for the night under a full moon.

  The next morning at 0800, with the cavalry and mounted infantry reconnoitring the front and screening his advance, Graham moved out in this formation:

    •  at the front (Hudson) - The 2nd Brigade (Berkshire Regiment, Royal Marines and 15th Sikhs). The Berkshire Regiment was in line in the centre, with the Royal Marines and Sikhs in columns of companies on the flanks. Mountain guns, a rocket battery, and the ammunition column were placed behind the Berkshires. The six guns of the Royal Horse Artillery were on the right flank;

    •  to the rear (Lyon-Fremantle) - the Guards Brigade, including the New South Wales infantry, in line of column; while

    •  the right front was protected by a squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry; the right flank by the 5th Lancers; the left flank and rear by the 20th Hussars and the remainder of the 9th Bengal Lancers.

  The force moved to Tamai over a series of three ridges, which lay between the village and Tesela Hill. There was little opposition, as the troops fired to their front during the advance. Supported by artillery, the 2nd Brigade under Hudson led and the Berkshire Regiment occupied the immediate high ground. The 15th Sikhs occupied the hills on either flank. The Guards Brigade and the New South Wales infantry supported the 2nd Brigade along the ridge closest to Tamai.

  The Mahdists withdrew to the southwest almost without a fight. However, it was found that the wells were dry, so it was fortunate that Graham had ordered a three day supply to be carried with the main body. It was obvious the enemy was not inclined to fight, so Graham planned a withdrawal to Suakin.

  The new arrivals found the march a challenge, and several more Australians fainted along the way. They had used their personal issue of water quickly, and requests from mates for a drop more were robustly refused.

  “In addition to the supply carried on mules, each unit had a water cart or carts, drawn by mules, at the end of which was a tap which enabled water bottle to be refilled on the line of march if the same turned out particularly distressing or prolonged. These carts were invariably under special guards with instructions that no water was to be drawn except under the orders of the responsible officer in charge of the regimental supply.

  Only on one occasion did I see these orders abused, and that was by the Australian Contingent on the march to Tamai, which was a real corker, and the lesson they learnt was one not to be forgotten, for on reaching their destination they found themselves short… we managed to spare them a drink all round, with the warning they were not to expect the same consideration again – a warning which to their credit they bore in mind.”

  Major (later Sir) Norman Stewart

  General Hudson’s aide, writing of his service at Suakin in 1885.

  The lack of water in the area was well known, and elaborate steps had been taken by the Army Commissariat to ensure adequate supplies and dumps of potable water along the routes of advance. This was one of the reasons behind the decision to build the rail line to Berber. The enemy took every opportunity to deny the British access to wells and oases by destroying them or poisoning the water.

  An attempt by the mounted infantry to seize the village of New Tamai and the wells in the Khor Ghob was repulsed, and they fell back and bivouacked at night in the safety of McNeill’s Zareba. By early evening, however, as the light fell, Graham’s force occupied Tesela Hill. Most of the force camped in a zareba in the small valley between the hills, while one New South Wales company occupied a hill to the north. There was sporadic firing from both sides during the night.

  With nightfall, however, the Mahdists used their usual tactics to creep close to the perimeter of the zareba, seeking opportunity targets illuminated
by campfires. The night was interrupted by rifle fire. British soldiers replied, and a few artillery shells were lobbed into the darkness for effect. The Australians fired no shots.

  AN EYE WITNESS

  Thursday 2 April ‘Reveille at 1.00 am, coffee at 1.30 am, parade fell in at 2. Orders received to join imperial forces who were to march to Tamai to attack Osman Digna. Joined imperials about 3. Hollow square formed, camels, transport in the centre, about 10,000 to 12,000 men present under arms. Advance sounded. Great difficulty in getting water. Intensely hot. Several men fainted. Enemy fired a few shots. Private Roache’s (A Company) rifle went off, bullet passed the major’s ear. Private in the 70th killed by an officer who mistook him for an Arab.’

  Friday 3 April ‘Good Friday. March in hollow square towards village of Tamai. Passed through village which was deserted. Advance face of square someone fired and then the enemy replied. Private Hamson wounded on back near shoulder. Private Downey shot through foot. Several imperial men wounded. Two shells fired into enemy’s position which silenced them. “Retire” sounded. Passing through village of Tamai the huts were burnt. Marched to Baker’s Zareba the scene of a late fight between the English and Arabs. Arabs and camels were lying about just as they had fallen when shot. Several of the men secured curios in the shape of skulls.’

  Saturday 4 April ‘Fell in at 8.00 am and marched to Suakin … Arrived at Suakin 4 p.m.’

  Diary, Sergeant Arthur Butler, A Company

  At 0430 the next day, Good Friday, Graham’s force prepared to go into action. The cavalry escort arrived from McNeill’s Zareba, and rendezvoused with the infantry. Graham’s aim was to seize Tamai and its important water wells, thereby forcing Osman Digna to engage on open ground of Graham’s own choosing.

  As the square advanced the Royal Marines and Coldstream Guards were in the lead, backed by two New South Wales companies. The 15th Sikhs were on the left, and the Grenadier Guards on the right. In the rear came the Berkshire Regiment on the left and the Scots Guards on the right, with the other two New South Wales infantry companies between them.

  British and New South Wales troops pushed into the surrounding foothills, while the Mahdists did their best to block wells and engage the British with rifles. As the ‘square’ rolled on, these skirmishers were subjected to volley fire. Some of the Australians, at a distance in the rear face of the square, were struck by spent enemy bullets. A medic, Private William Learoyd, and two infantrymen, Privates Walter Harrison and Charles Downey, both of No. 2 (D) Company were slightly wounded in this way. Surgeon Major Williams treated them at the scene.

  Osman Digna had ample warning of Graham’s advance, and decided to withdraw, thereby depriving the British of a pitched battle. It would have been suicidal for either the cavalry or the infantry to try to follow the enemy into the heavily scrub covered hills.

  Easter Monday 6 April ‘Orders to march to Handoub. Marched about six miles. Zareba built. Australians were complimented by General Freemantle [(sic) Lyon-Fremantle, commander of the Guards Brigade] on the way they have built their part of the Zareba. All hands turned in fully equipped after posting sentries. Enemy fired shots into camp but none took effect. Fire returned by British.’

  7 April ‘Heard five Arabs killed last night. 3 o’clock half of the contingent fell in with arms slung and with bill hooks and axes to form a Zareba for camels. A and B Company cleared about two miles of road towards Handoub.’

  Diary, Sergeant Arthur Butler, No. 3 (A Company)

  Conscious of his logistics problems, the length of his line of communications and an intact enemy force to his front, and that he now controlled Hashin, Graham decided to withdraw. Tamai was burnt to the ground, along with a large cache of rifle ammunition. Graham’s force withdrew from the area at 1030, and that evening found the infantry back at their campsite at Tesela Hill, while their mounted colleagues proceeded direct to Suakin. Total British casualties were one killed and 15 wounded (including three Australians), and several animals wounded. The number of enemy casualties was never known, but it is unlikely to have been significant.

  Osman Digna’s men had simply vanished into the desert to fight another day. It was a tactic that both frustrated and exhausted a British military machine whose doctrine was based on fixed battles. There was little point in continuing the pursuit in the absence of water supplies, so Graham ordered a withdrawal of the force by alternate brigades.

  The whole affair had been a disappointment both for Graham and his men, particularly the colonials who had come so far to be involved only in a skirmish, and then on its fringes. Even this operation required a massive logistics effort.

  It has been argued that had Graham not delayed at McNeill’s Zareba, he might have had his fight. However heat casualties (men and animals) would have soared, and it is unlikely the wily Osman Digna would have met him in a set piece battle. Graham argued that he had at least ‘shown the flag’, and that this would have had a psychological effect on wavering local tribal chiefs.

  By 4 April the bulk of the force had returned to Suakin, and the New South Wales Contingent to a camp near a redoubt built to protect the start of the railway. On the same day as Graham’s arrival in Suakin, men of the British civilian contractor Lucas & Aird began construction of the railway line.

  Graham diplomatically sent a cable to London praising the soldierly qualities of the colonials. Sydney newspapers greedy for news of the Sudan lapped it up. Dalley, too, seized upon the news, as such cables seemed to vindicate his decision to send the Contingent.

  However, some professional soldiers serving in British regiments were not as generous in their observations. Some thought the colonials were generally poor shots. A Guards officer, Lieutenant Francis Lloyd, wrote home to his wife in April that the Australians were ‘worse than any volunteer regiment and they swagger more’. This refrain about soldiers from Australia would be repeated often over the next hundred years.

  Graham next undertook to achieve his second mission: to open and protect a route for the railway from Suakin to Berber. This meant that McNeill’s Zareba had no further tactical use. It was abandoned on 6 April, and all stores there were returned in a huge convoy escorted by four battalions of infantry.

  ‘The day after we got back to camp was Easter Sunday and we were allowed a day of comparative rest. On the following morning at 4.40 an enormous convoy of baggage camels numbering over 2,000 camels and 1,500 mules escorted by four battalions of infantry, marched out for the last time to the zarebas to bring in all the stores and garrisons, and to a certain extent to destroy the place. With the exception of a few trusses of hay, everything was brought in, the convoy returned to camp shortly after six o’clock in the evening.’

  Major E.G. Perry (RE), “Suakin”, Kegan Paul & Trencher, London, 1886

  Strategically it made sense for the British to win over the local tribes that owned the land along the railway route. While they were still mainly neutral, they were understandably nervous about aligning themselves with Graham while Osman Digna was at large. They had already seen a British force arrive the previous year, only to withdraw soon afterwards. However, Graham could not obtain any firm undertaking from his government to support a long-term presence at Suakin.

  After the second battle of Tamai the priority was to continue construction of the railway, a task delayed since 22 March by the need to deal with the threat posed by Osman Digna. The plan then was to build a zareba eight kilometres out of Suakin on the road to Handoub. This would cover the rail head, which was to be pushed along as fast as possible.

  A Blockhouse near Handoub, facing West. Contemporary Sketch.

  A blockhouse and another zareba were to be built at Handoub, eight kilometres further on, while patrols protected the head of the rail track as it advanced. Handoub was the first halting place on the trader’s route from Suakin to Berber. It is situated at the foot of a low isolated ridge or spur of the Waratab Mountains, which there run down to the plain.

  On the same day
as the British decommissioned McNeill’s Zareba, Graham deployed another force, this time under Lyon-Fremantle. The column consisted of:

    •  the Coldstream Guards;

    •  the New South Wales infantry;

    •  Mounted Infantry;

    •  17th Field Company, RE; and

    •  two 7-pounder guns.

  These troops deployed to a point eight kilometres out of Suakin, where a zareba was built and reinforced the next day by the Scots Guards and two more guns. The colonials were part of a smaller force which reached Handoub and then, by 16 April, Otao, which was occupied without a fight. Three days later a site at Tambuk, seven kilometres further out, was also occupied. The railhead reached Otao on 30 April.

  Scots Guards camp at Otao, April 1885. Contemporary sketch. Source: The Graphic, June 1885.

  During April Graham deployed various units on reconnaissance missions to the villages of Hashin, Deberet, Tambouk and Otao. Apart from the capture of a few prisoners and some livestock, these sorties were uneventful. They did not stop Osman Digna’s followers from cutting telegraph lines and sabotaging the railway, and the enemy kept up their night attacks. On 12 April Graham inspected elements of the New South Wales artillery, then undergoing intensive training drills at Handoub, 20 kilometres northwest of Suakin, and eight kilometres from Otao.