by Ian Hughes
Theodosius’ decision to send the foederati to attack first and so bear the brunt of the casualties is usually taken to be partly a ploy to weaken their power and so make it easier to deal with them after the battle had been won.50 This is assuredly a mistake, as it assumes that Theodosius was confident of winning, which, in the circumstances, is impractical; if anything, he was in a very weak position facing a very strong foe. It is unlikely that he would risk his entire future – and that of his family – in an attempt to weaken political rivals. This is not really acceptable, being as it is an uncritical reiteration of the opinions of Zosimus, amongst others.
It is far more likely that Theodosius’ strategy of all-out attack was forced upon him by circumstances. He would have been unable to deploy his own army fully thanks to Arbogast’s skilful deployment, and the Eastern army needed space to descend from the narrow pass and time in which to fully deploy. As it was, Arbogast had ensured that this was impossible without fighting. Without the room to bring up troops from the rear, Theodosius had to attack with the troops stationed at the front of the army’s column of march: the foederati and other auxilia.51 Their failure to force the enemy back reinforced Theodosius’ belief that Arbogast had the upper hand, since our sources now show him desperately praying to God for help.52 This is not the action of a man so convinced that he is going to win that he will waste troops in an attempt to weaken their political importance. Although the end result would in reality weaken the Goths, it was not intentionally so.
With the repulse of the Goths, the armies settled down for an uneasy night, with the Eastern army’s morale low due to the defeat and their poor circumstances. On the other hand, the Western army and Arbogast appear to have believed that the battle was won; with the enemy unable to deploy properly the West was able to bring greater forces to bear on a limited front, so ensuring that there would be no escape – especially as Arbogast now sent troops to occupy strategic points in the pass to trap Theodosius where he was.
Overnight, the situation changed. The men Arbogast sent to cut Theodosius off instead deserted to the Eastern emperor, allegedly swayed by the emperor’s persuasive arguments.53 Seeing their defection as a good omen and a sign that God was with him, Theodosius renewed the battle on the following day. He attacked early in the morning, taking Arbogast by surprise, since he believed Theodosius to be surrounded and without hope.54 Theodosius’ confidence was to be further reinforced. After fighting had begun, a local wind, the Bora, began to blow from behind the Eastern forces towards the Western army. As the Eastern army advanced, large amounts of dust was disturbed and this was blown into the defenders’ faces. Legend has it that the wind was so strong that it blew the defenders’ missiles back at them, which is possible as it has been measured at around 60 mph. Confused and unable to see properly, the Western army wavered and broke. Punching through the centre, Theodosius’ men reached the enemy camp, where Eugenius was captured and later executed. Seeing that he had lost, Arbogast fled. Realising that his position was hopeless, Arbogast finally committed suicide rather than be captured by Theodosius.55
The battle was over. It had lasted for two days of intensive fighting. Both sides had taken heavy losses, but for the West it was a disaster. It is likely that the losses suffered during the three battles of Siscia, Poetovio and Frigidus were greater than those suffered by the Eastern Empire at Adrianople. The need to rebuild the army in the following years would prove to be too great a strain for the Western Empire to bear. However, immediately after the battle such a conclusion would have been unthinkable. Theodosius had reunited the Empire under one ruler, who had now proved himself capable in war and a strong leader not afraid of reorganizing the Empire where it failed to meet his standards.
Ancient writers saw the battle as of tremendous importance. Obviously, given Eugenius’ support for paganism and the presence of pagan standards in his camp, the victory was seen as a vindication of Christianity and showed God’s support for Theodosius – especially when Christian writers wrote about the eclipse and the effects of the Bora.56 After the battle it was clear that there would be no more pagan emperors and that paganism was on the decline. Slowly, the senators of Rome began to adopt Christianity and pagan religions and traditions were neglected and slowly fell from favour.
Stilicho’s part in the battle is unknown. The sources do not mention him in any way or form, instead focusing upon Theodosius, the foederati, and the death of Bacurius. It is logical to assume that during the first day he played little part in the battle except in ensuring that the retreat of the foederati and auxilia did not break the army’s morale. However, it is likely that during the second day he played a more effective role, leading his men and deploying some of the troops following Theodosius’ orders. He may even have helped formulate the plan of attack along with Theodosius and Timasius. It is unlikely that the level of his involvement in the battle will ever be known with any certainty.
Prior to returning to the East, Theodosius made arrangements for Honorius to take over as emperor in the West. He had already been made Augustus prior to the campaign and it made sense for the boy to take command of the West. It would be unlikely for any further internal trouble to arise since the West had now suffered three defeats in rapid succession to Theodosius: possible usurpers would be wary of making the same mistake again. Furthermore, Ambrose, the powerful Bishop of Milan, wrote pleading with him to be merciful to the defeated.57 However, the problem then became one of who to trust as ‘guardian’ for the youth until he became old enough to shoulder the burden of sole rule.
The individual would need to have experience of military command, since although internal threats would be small, the German tribes were still pressing on the frontiers and likely to invade, especially as they had contributed forces to Eugenius’ and Arbogast’s failed attempt to keep the West. If a single person was to be installed, he had to be trustworthy. He would be given the title of magister militum, and Arbogast had already shown how the individual could become so powerful that he could dominate the ruling emperor. Once he had made the appointment, Theodosius could think about returning to Constantinople. Before that could happen, he became seriously ill.
Chapter Three
Command in the West
Despite his illness, Theodosius did not intend to remain in the West. Groups of Huns had invaded Thrace and crossed the Caucasus, and a band of Marcomanni were devastating Pannonia, so his presence was needed in the East.1 He fully expected to recover and return to Constantinople, and as a consequence he needed to arrange affairs so that his son Honorius, who was only eleven, would become secure in his position as Augustus of the West. Recent history had shown that placing a minor under the control of a military leader could result in complications, so Theodosius’ decision could decide the ultimate fate of his son. Yet realistically his choice was limited. He would be unwilling to place his son in the hands of the Western generals he had just defeated. His options were restricted to Eastern generals.
9. Barbarian attacks on the East.
One option was Timasius, Theodosius’ magister equitum et peditum during the campaign in the West. He was certainly an experienced and capable soldier – probably more so than Stilicho. However, he may have been seen as less trustworthy, especially as he is described as being ‘an experienced soldier but insolent and proud and a heavy drinker’.2 Theodosius did not need a leader who would arouse resentment in the West and result in the need for a third civil war.
It is possible that, had he lived, Richomeres would have been a possible choice. Beginning his career in the West, he had transferred East after surviving the battle of Adrianople and had been appointed comites et magister utriusque militiae in the East. He was placed in charge of the cavalry for the war against Eugenius but had died before the campaign began. Since he was the uncle of Arbogast he could be expected to sympathize with his nephew’s predicament. Richomeres’ appointment to lead the Eastern forces can therefore be seen as a sign of strong trust and an expect
ation of loyalty from Theodosius. Whether this would have resulted in him being installed as comites et magister utriusque militiae in the West is clearly a different matter, but remains a distinct possibility.
Richomeres’ replacement for the war in the West was Stilicho, who had already shown in Thrace that he had at least some military capabilities. It is also possible, though unproven, that he had further displayed his abilities during the campaign against Eugenius. Yet above all there was his marriage to Serena and his inclusion within, and assumed loyalty to, the house of Theodosius. The nature of Serena’s adoption meant that Stilicho would never be able to claim the throne for himself as a legitimate heir to Theodosius, and it is likely that Theodosius assumed that Serena, as his favourite, would keep a check on Stilicho’s ambitions and continue to support her ‘brother’ during the coming years. In theory, Stilicho had the military ability to protect the West during Honorius’ minority and was loyal enough to surrender the primacy when Honorius reached maturity.
As a result of his deliberations, there was only one choice and Theodosius made it: in October 394 Stilicho was installed as comes et magister utriusque militiae praesentalis in the West.3 Theodosius sent Timasius, the magister equitum et peditum, back to the East to help deal with problems in Asia Minor, since he is next referred to as being in Pamphylia in 396. With him went the men rendered unfit by the battles they had fought.4 At the same time Theodosius appointed the Goth Gainas as commander of the Eastern troops remaining in Italy.
Theodosius also used the time in the West to reorganize the civil appointments. He placed trusted men in positions of power, for example Basilius was made the new praefectus urbis Romae. He also made a symbolic gesture to the Roman Senate by appointing the young brothers Olybrius and Probinus, Christians of the house of Anicii, to be joint consuls. At this time the post of consul was still important and treasured, so the appointment of two very young men demonstrates the political awareness of Theodosius. It clearly demonstrated that members of the Senate were still important – as long as they were Christian.5
As he was making these new appointments Theodosius’ health took a serious turn for the worse. An earlier bout of illness had alarmed the emperor and, in preparation for the worst, he reaffirmed Stilicho as ‘parens principum’ (‘parental guardianship’) of Honorius. This was not as guardian or regent in the modern sense, but as the senior member of the imperial family with the moral right and responsibility to care for the young emperor.6 Accordingly, the title parens will be used in order to avoid confusion with the modern terminology.
It should be noted that at no point was there doubt over the ‘inheritance’ of the Empire: Arcadius and Honorius did not succeed Theodosius.7 Arcadius had been joint emperor since 383 and Honorius since 393. In theory, the three emperors had been equal. In reality, due to their youth, Theodosius had kept the reins of power firmly in his own hands.
The death of Theodosius
While still in Milan, on 17 January 395 he died of oedema (dropsy: the retention of fluid in organs), possibly a symptom of heart disease. He was forty-nine years old. Bishop Ambrose of Milan gave a panegyric on the man he had humbled, praising him for the suppression of both heresy and paganism. Finally, Theodosius was taken in pomp to Constantinople and buried on 8 November 395. He was to be the last emperor who, in effect, united both halves of the Roman Empire. From this point on the Empire would be divided between East and West.
Fortunately, once he had been victorious in his campaign against Eugenius and Arbogast he had summoned his daughter Galla Placidia, his adopted daughter Serena and his son Honorius to be with him in Milan. His eldest son Arcadius remained in Constantinople where he had been left as Augustus. All was ready for a simple transference of actual power from Theodosius to his sons, who would rule in name until they were old enough to rule in their own right.
Stilicho claims guardianship of the Empire
However, there was now a twist that has confused, baffled and intrigued historians ever since. Stilicho claimed that, on his deathbed, Theodosius called Stilicho to him and, without other witnesses, entrusted him with parens of both Arcadius in the East, who was about eighteen years old (born c.377), and Honorius in the West, who was ten (born 9 September 384).8 In effect, Honorius was giving him control of the entire Empire, since the title of parens encompassed a power that surpassed that even of the title Augustus.9 His claim was supported by no less a figure than Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, in his obituary for Theodosius as the emperor was lying in state in Milan.
Theodosius is more glorious in this also, that he did not make a will in accordance with public law; he had nothing further to determine as regards his sons, to whom he had given everything, except to place them under the protection of a close relative, who was present.
Ambrose, de Obi Theod, 5.
The truth of the bequest has been debated by historians, without any clear conclusions being reached. In itself this is not surprising, since the entire claim rests solely upon the testimony of Stilicho. In recent years historians have tended to avoid the question.10
It is possible that Theodosius may have made such a bequest. He would doubtless have been aware at the time of his death that his sons were not yet capable of independent rule. Apart from Honorius being too young, they had begun to show signs – especially Arcadius – of the lack of ability that was to be a hallmark of their reigns. In these circumstances, Theodosius desired a strong, dominant political figure that could be trusted to treat his sons in the appropriate manner: memories of Valentinian II would still have caused him anxieties.
However, having accepted that the bequest is a possibility, the nature of the bestowal is detrimental to the claim. There is absolutely no reason for Theodosius making the bequest to Stilicho without witnesses.11 It is doubtless that Claudian describes Stilicho’s claim accurately – there is no reason for Claudian to invent such a story and every reason for him to add witnesses. In fact, Claudian’s panegyric on Honorius quickly turns into a defence of Stilicho’s position.12
When they reached the palace the emperor bade all depart and thus unbidden addressed his son-in-law: ‘Victorious Stilicho, of whose courage in war, of whose loyalty in peace I have made proof – what warlike feat have I performed without thine aid? What triumph have I won that thou helpedst me not in the winning? Together we caused Thracian Hebrus to run red with Getic blood, together overthrew the squadrons of the Sarmatae, together rested our weary limbs on the frozen Danube with our chariot’s wheel – come, therefore, since heaven’s halls claim me, do thou take up my task; be thou sole guardian of my children, let thy hand protect my two sons. I adjure thee by that marriage that makes thee kin with me, by the night that saw its consummation, by the torch which at thy wedding-feast the queen carried in her own hand when she led thy bride-elect from out the imperial palace, take on thee a father’s spirit, guard the years of their childhood. Was not their sire thy master and thy wife’s father? Now, now I shall mount untroubled to the stars for thou wilt watch over them.
Claud., de III Cons. Hon.
In a similar fashion, the support given by Ambrose, as quoted above, may have been simply a recognition of Stilicho’s political supremacy in the West, rather than a belief in his appointment. Ambrose’s acceptance of political and military reality was no doubt echoed by the court officials Theodosius put in place before his illness. They will have believed that retaining Stilicho, a known supporter of Theodosius’ policies, was in their best interest. As a result, they too supported his claims to be parens, at least in the West.
Stilicho’s claim to guardianship of the East will have reflected in part his desire to protect his nephew, since he would certainly have recognized that Arcadius did not have the political or personal strength to rule and that he was likely to be dominated by high-ranking court officials. When Theodosius had left to campaign in the West, affairs in the East had been left in the hands of his praefectus praetorio Orientis, Rufinus. Rufinus was a skilful politician and c
apable of maintaining his power in the East, especially since he had been trusted by Theodosius and had been consul as early as 392. He was also a political enemy of Stilicho. His rapid rise to power had been resented by the military officers, especially Stilicho and Promotus. As a result, Rufinus had arranged for Promotus to be sent from court and made magister militum per Thraciam. It was clear that Rufinus would maintain control of Arcadius and the East unless Stilicho could lay a legitimate case for his own supremacy. The deathbed bequest was an attempt to put such a claim.
Yet in reality the claim was almost certainly false and based upon Stilicho’s concept of what Theodosius would have wanted. It was also an attempt to remove his main political opponent, Rufinus, since an acceptance of Stilicho’s claim would certainly lead to Rufinus’ downfall.13 As it was clearly of great political importance, the nature of the claim, with no witnesses involved, brought a reaction of disbelief in both East and West. Claudian’s repetition of the claim between 397 and 400 may in part have been an attempt to counter the doubts that had arisen.14 However, whether the claim was real or simply wishful thinking on the part of Stilicho is not as important as the effect that it had on his policies. Stilicho’s focus was now to remain on the East.
The reason for Stilicho’s claim is commonly accepted as being his desire to protect Arcadius. Yet there were almost certainly other factors involved. One of these is his experience as a commander under Theodosius. The victory in 388 and especially that of 394, in which Stilicho took part, probably resulted in him concluding that the West was weaker than the East and would struggle to survive without the cooperation and full support of the financially-viable East. The easiest way to arrange this was for Stilicho to become de facto leader of the whole Empire. Unfortunately the claim had the opposite effect; in the long run, the only result of the claim was to divide East and West, which resulted in a ‘deterioration in relations between East and West that never entirely recovered’.15