Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  Finally, as with the Roman army there were a number of other weapons that appear to have been used in limited numbers, according to the personal taste of the warrior. Amongst these are axes, clubs and ‘warhammers’, yet it should be remembered that none of these weapons were common.26

  Defensive equipment

  Helmets

  Metal helmets were extremely expensive and beyond the means of the vast majority of warriors, being restricted to the wealthier nobles and comitatus. What little evidence there is suggests that they were similar to the spangenhelms and ridge helmets used by the Romans. As a cheaper alternative, Ammianus mentions the use of leather helmets which, whilst imperfect, would no doubt be an improvement on going bareheaded.27

  Body defences

  At this point in time it would appear that those few individuals who could afford armour wore either mail or scale styles. However, as mentioned above, these were extremely expensive; they are rarely found in burials, suggesting that they were considered valuable heirlooms rather than items for deposition.28 However, it is possible that these items slowly became more common as time passed. Yet the process was slow; one of the greatest rewards for a German leader would be acceptance as a Roman officer, and the possible access to Roman arsenals for himself and his followers. This was to become an increasingly common occurrence.

  Shields

  The shields used by the German tribes appear to have been mainly round or oval in shape and could be anywhere from around sixty centimetres to one metre in height (two to three feet), probably based on personal preference.29 The traditional hexagonal shape associated with the German cavalry employed within the Empire during the first centuries BC and AD was still in use, but this was to a lesser degree than the other styles. Although other styles of shield are depicted on monuments, in general they appear to be variants of the oval or octagonal styles and may have been relatively uncommon.

  In the mid-to-late twentieth century and earlier there was a form of shield known as the ‘coffin’ shield that was traditionally assigned to the Goths. Although this is now firmly fixed, it has proved impossible to find any examples in either the sculptural or archaeological record. It is possible that some of the monumental evidence was interpreted as proof of the existence of these shields but that these examples have since been re-interpreted as stylistic conventions caused by the problem of perspective. As a result, although it is has proved impossible to determine whether these forms actually existed, the likelihood is that they did not.

  11. A small selection of Germanic shields, showing some of the shapes used other than round or oval (after Czarnecka: not to scale).

  It is interesting to note that during this period there was a change in the shape of the shield-boss on Germanic shields. The metal ‘boss’ was used to cover the hole in the shield made by the hand-grip. Before and after the period of the ‘migrations’ the boss was usually a simple dome shape. During the migration period, although the dome shape persisted there was a change to a more pointed shape of boss (figure 10). Warriors would always have punched with the shield when opportunity arose, but the earlier and later dome-shape of the boss implies that the shield retained a more important role as a defensive item. The change in boss shape to a ‘point’ suggests that the shields were now used in an offensive capacity for punching, implying that for a short period of time during the ‘migrations’ Germanic warriors adopted a more aggressive attitude to warfare.

  Aims and the timing of attacks

  It is difficult to judge the feelings of the German peoples towards the Empire. Obviously, with its standing army of trained troops it was a dangerous opponent that at any time could launch major assaults on tribes that had broken the peace or who were considered a threat. In effect, it was an armed camp full of warriors.30

  However, when the Empire was weak, or when it was already engaged and its attention was focused elsewhere, it was tempting to launch an attack across the border with the intention of gaining plunder: to the subsistence farmers of Germania, the items that could be collected in a successful raid could have been far beyond their hopes of acquiring in peacetime. Furthermore, any leader who led a successful raid would gain a large amount of prestige, as well as having goods and captives with which to reward his followers. As a result, the neighbours of a canton that had launched a successful raid would be tempted to launch an attack of their own to maintain their social standing: should their neighbour become too powerful, he could easily lay claim to their own lands.

  Yet this does not complete the barbarian vision of the Empire. The people of the Empire had a standard of living, especially amongst the higher echelons, that was unheard of in Germania. Furthermore, in the previous four hundred years there had been many examples of German warriors who had entered the Empire and risen to high rank, gaining along the way comparatively fabulous wealth. The Empire was ‘a land of opportunity with great ease of living’.31

  The availability of goods that they could not otherwise obtain accounts for the large number of raids and attacks launched against the Empire by German cantons. Yet there was always going to be the problem of when in the year to launch these assaults. The majority of Germanic raids appear to have taken place in winter.32 Examples include the invasion of Italy by Alaric in 401 (Chapter 10) and the invasion of Gaul in 406 (Chapters 13 and 14). It would appear that the Germanic tribesmen did not mind the harsh weather, since as farmers at this time of year they had little to do agriculturally. Furthermore, the harvesting of foodstuffs in late summer and autumn resulted in them having provisions to supply them during their attacks.

  Strategy and tactics

  The main strategy in Germanic warfare when attacking the Empire was the hit-and-run raid. These raids were intended to take captives and plunder before making as rapid an exit as possible from the Empire. There does not seem to have been any long-term strategy to Germanic attacks until after the Battle of Adrianople, and this concerned mainly the aims of the Germanic peoples already within the Empire. Therefore, the strategies these peoples followed will be dealt with on an individual basis when these events are covered in the text.

  Germanic tactics were also limited, mainly due to the nature of their forces. With little training and little coordination, their tactics on the battlefield could not become too convoluted, as the troops would easily become confused. As a result, in battle the infantry formed a single line with the cavalry on the flanks. As at the Battle of Strasbourg, the cavalry could be supported by infantry and one flank could rest on difficult terrain, in this case a wood.33 Furthermore, Strasbourg also shows ambushes were a possibility when the circumstances suited. In this case, the right wing was deployed in the wood, waiting for the Romans to advance before charging them in the flank.

  However, the main attack was nearly always delivered by a mass infantry charge along the line. The bravery and physical strength of the German infantry could result in a breakthrough – again as happened at Strasbourg – but if the conflict became one of a long, drawn-out battle relying on attrition, then the Romans with their superior training, weapons and armour, usually had the advantage.

  When defeated many of the Western Germans simply fled as best they could, but the Eastern Germans, such as the Goths, adopted the wagon laager of the nomadic peoples to the East. This gave them a secure place to which they could retreat. Furthermore, it acted as a military camp and could be used as a fortification if needed – as happened at Adrianople and later in Greece.34

  As has already been noted, their inability to build siege engines resulted in their being unable to capture cities unless by stealth or treachery. As a result, they had to resort to blockade and threat. When circumstances were favourable, as after the victory at Adrianople, these tactics could work. If the circumstances were unfavourable, such as when cities were strongly defended, they tended to bypass them to reach softer targets, such as villas.

  Conclusion

  In conclusion, it would appear that there were very few changes in
tactics or strategy between the first-and the fifth-centuries. However, the fact that many individual Germans took service in the Roman army no doubt had the effect of very slowly transforming their organization and outlook. Unfortunately, the nature of any such transformation is not documented by the Romans, who believed that they were facing the same type of foes as their ancestors had faced under Augustus and Marcus Aurelius.

  Chapter Six

  The Campaign in Illyricum, 395

  According to Zosimus, when Stilicho took military command of the Western Empire he was in control of Italy, Spain, Gaul and Africa.1 It is noticeable that Zosimus does not record him as having command over Britain or Illyricum. The omission of Britain is easy to explain. Zosimus, following Eunapius at this point, was writing after Britain had ceased to be part of the Empire and so, anachronistically, he omits Britain from the list of provinces allotted to Stilicho. The exclusion of Illyricum, however, is different. Until the battle of Adrianople, Illyricum was part of the Western Empire. Only after that defeat was Illyricum allotted to the East, in order that Theodosius should have an undivided command and so be better able to face the Goths. Although at first a success, the measure would prove to be a cause of dispute and increasing tension between East and West during Stilicho’s lifetime. In theory, the region was the responsibility of the East, but it was unimportant when compared with the rest of the Eastern Empire. Therefore, whenever the East was threatened, the Prefecture of Illyricum became of secondary importance. This left the West open to attack across the Julian Alps by any enemy who crossed the Danube. As this was where the Goths had been settled, the issue was to remain of primary importance to the West.

  Yet tension between Stilicho and the court in the East did not originate with Stilicho claiming Illyricum. When he had left on campaign Theodosius had apparently taken the imperial treasury with him, both in order to pay the troops and to help ease his way in the West once victorious. Claudian unwittingly shows that Stilicho had either kept, or had been accused in the East of keeping, this wealth for himself:

  All the wealth collected here by Theodosius or received by him after the war is Stilicho’s alone, and he has small mind to restore what he has once acquired.

  Claud., In Ruf II, 156, a speech attributed to Rufinus

  It is probable that Stilicho kept the money for as long as possible, and until the charge became widespread. Only then did he dispatch a large proportion of it to the East, ensuring that his acts were adequately publicized by, amongst others, Claudian.2

  As was stated in the previous chapter, one of Stilicho’s first actions as leader in the West was to dismiss many of the barbarian foederati who had fought for Theodosius at the Battle of the Frigidus. In many respects this was a sensible decision; Stilicho was in control of both the Western army employed by Eugenius and the Eastern army now led by Gainas. It is possible, although our sources neither confirm nor deny this, that there continued to be friction and sporadic outbursts of localized fighting between the two groups. It is also likely that any friction centred around the foederati, as these were not a part of the Roman disciplinary structure. Of more immediate concern, the presence in Italy of these two large armies was probably stretching the resources of the region to the limit. In the circumstances, disbanding the allied troops was a quick way of easing the logistical burden, as well as helping to reduce tension.

  There can be little doubt that the majority of the foederati and other allies that were dismissed were unhappy with their treatment. Despite the heavy losses they had sustained during the first day of the Battle of the Frigidus, they had been released without any form of reward for their bravery. Coupled with the lack of rewards was the feeling amongst the foederati that they had been used. Roman sources claim that Theodosius had sent the foederati into battle first in a deliberate attempt to weaken them.3 There can be little doubt that this theory was also common amongst the Gothic forces and as a result they were filled with anger and contempt for the Romans.

  An added twist was the fact that Stilicho had disbanded the foederati in the middle of winter. They were ordered to take the direct route back to their homes. Unfortunately, this was the route that had previously been taken by Theodosius on his way to Italy and it is probable that most of the food in the area had already been consumed.4 As their journey progressed their supplies began to run very low.

  Alaric and his forces

  Alaric was one of the leaders of the foederati making the journey back to the East. Unlike the majority of his troops, Alaric had been rewarded after the Battle of the Frigidus, probably being given the title comes rei militaris (count of the military), but this was not enough. Like most barbarian leaders, he desired a high rank in the Roman army which would give him command of regular troops as well as of his own followers.5 This would bring him into line with other barbarian leaders serving in the army. No such appointment was offered.

  As a consequence, Alaric decided to ‘rebel’, or at least make a nuisance of himself, by ravaging the surrounding countryside. This would have the dual purpose of putting pressure on the Eastern government to offer him a post and of allowing him to feed his hungry followers by plundering local Roman communities.

  When analysing the course of Alaric’s rebellion there are two related problems. One is that we do not know the source of his manpower and the other is that we have no idea of the size of his forces. Without knowing one it is impossible to know the other.

  The main question concerning the origin of Alaric’s army is whether the majority of the Gothic peoples who had been given land in 382 now joined Alaric. Unfortunately, no ancient source gives us specific information on which to base our theories. As a result, some historians see the bulk of Alaric’s army as being a mixed force of no fixed origin that combined after the Battle of the Frigidus, whilst others see it as the warriors and families of the settlers of 382.6 It is easy to sympathize with one modern authority when he states that the question is incapable of resolution.7

  The ‘mixed-force’ theory is based upon the fact that once Alaric had declared a rebellion, he will have been joined by many non-Goths who were keen on opposing the Roman Empire. As the army moved deeper into the Balkans, many disaffected individuals opted to join Alaric; the riot at Thessalonica – for which Ambrose had made Theodosius do penance – was still recent and may have been symptomatic of long-standing unrest in the area.8 Furthermore, federates of other nationalities that had been released by Stilicho may also have opted to join Alaric. However, the core of the army remained those Gothic foederati who had decided to fight Rome again and it was they who gave the new group its tribal identity.9 The difficulty with the hypothesis is that the relatively small number of Goths in the army should in theory have resulted in them losing their Gothic identity, which remained strong. Therefore, there must have been many Goths with Alaric from the beginning.

  The opposite ‘Goths of 382’ theory is based upon the fact that Alaric’s troops were almost invariably called ‘Goths’. As a result, the hypothesis is that between 395 and 408 the majority of the forces commanded by Alaric was made up of the Goths who had been settled in 382.10 This hypothesis suffers from two main problems. One is that he was joined later by federates settled in Pannonia, which may have included Goths settled either before or after 382.11 The possible presence of Goths who were not settled in 382 weakens the proposition. Alaric’s ‘Goths’ could be named after the Pannonian recruits, not the settlers of 382.

  Furthermore, the proposition treats the Goths as a single body with a single aim. However, as was seen in Chapter 2, Theodosius’ request for troops from the Goths in 395 had clearly demonstrated the deep divisions in Gothic society into pro- and anti-Roman factions.12 Moreover, the sheer number of independent Gothic groups at large either inside or on the fringes of the Empire in the years 395–400 is hard to understand if all of the Goths settled in 382 had joined Alaric.13

  The solution to the dilemma lies with Jordanes. He writes that much later there were trib
esmen in Moesia who were known as ‘Gothi Minores’ (‘Lesser Goths’), possibly in an attempt to distinguish them from the ‘greater’ Goths of Alaric.14 This leads to the conclusion that Alaric’s rebellion split the Goths. It is almost certain that the main core of Alaric’s forces were Goths that had settled in 382 and had opted to rebel. Yet Alaric was not followed by all of the Goths. Many, especially those with young families, opted to remain on the lands granted in 382 and became the Gothi Minores of Jordanes.15 The increased size of the rebellion later attracted those non-Goths attested as being part of Alaric’s forces, who were to remain a minority and allow the Goths to keep their identity.

  As the size of his forces grew the rebellion quickly became a serious problem for the Roman authorities. Yet in an unforeseen twist, the increase in size now began to put pressure on Alaric. He desperately needed a high-ranking post within the Roman infrastructure in order to reward and protect his enlarged band of followers. However, given the context one point needs to be borne in mind: this was a revolt of a Roman military commander against the government in order to obtain concessions, not of a barbarian against Rome. Alaric was setting the trend for many of the later barbarian generals in Roman service

  The new Gothic army was forced to rely on its military abilities to survive. The main hope for their survival lay with the political and military abilities of Alaric. Yet the Goths were hampered by one major factor: being formed of disparate groups, it would be much easier for the Romans to use political manoeuvres to divide the Goths and so defeat them in detail. As a result, Gothic success or failure depended upon their cohesion and sense of solidarity. As time passed, a large part was played by their being – for the most part – Arian Christians. The fact that they were surrounded by Catholic Christians who thought of them as heretics and unbelievers meant that Arianism acted as a spur for them to retain their cohesion.16