Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  Alaric’s rebellion

  Once he had decided to attack the Empire, Alaric moved towards Constantinople. In this he was acting with the knowledge that the majority of the Eastern forces usually stationed in the Balkan provinces and at Constantinople would be unable to defend the city, as they were currently in Italy with Stilicho. As a consequence, he advanced to the walls of the city unopposed.

  The attack could hardly have come at a worse time for the East. There appear to have been bands of Huns and Marcomanni still at large in Thrace and Pannonia, and the Huns described earlier as crossing the Caucasus were now ravaging areas from Armenia and Mesopotamia to Syria (Map 9). Moreover, with the main Balkan armies still in Italy with Stilicho, Alaric’s arrival outside the walls of Constantinople resulted in the capital finding it difficult to defend itself.

  However, it is unlikely that Alaric intended to mount an assault on Constantinople. Firstly, the walls were high and easily defended, even by the few troops remaining in the capital. Secondly, he did not want to capture the city but to pressure the government within to give him a legitimate, high-ranking post – which would be unlikely to happen if he had just attacked and sacked the capital.

  In one respect, his arrival did have major repercussions. According to Zosimus, in an attempt to save the city (and himself) Rufinus had a personal meeting with Alaric and allegedly gave him permission to ravage the Balkans and Greece as long as he retreated from Constantinople.17 Although the allegations of treachery are doubtless false, such a meeting is likely to have led to rumours of treachery. Furthermore, those estates in the area belonging to Rufinus remained suspiciously undevastated, although this is more likely a political ploy on Alaric’s part than evidence of bribery and corruption from Rufinus. It is probable that Rufinus arranged to pay Alaric a subsidy to retire from Constantinople.18 However, the idea that Rufinus and Alaric cooperated in order to oppose Stilicho, as is sometimes suggested, is extremely unlikely.19 Alaric would only have collaborated if Rufinus had given him the post he desired.

  Having been paid by Rufinus, it was not in Alaric’s interests to remain stationary outside the city walls as it was clear that no command was to be forthcoming. Moreover, no doubt all of the available supplies had been taken into the city and so the area outside would not support his forces for long. Accordingly, he retired from the city and moved into Macedonia, a move which would maintain the pressure on Rufinus’ government, since it was in no position to restrict his activities.

  Stilicho moves against Alaric

  With the East under attack from several different directions, it was clear that Stilicho had the only forces available to move against Alaric. Accordingly, early in 395 he made arrangements for the safety of the West, accepting the submission of the Franks on the Rhine and their continued defence of the area from attacks across the Danube.20 He may not have needed to pacify the other Germanic tribes on the river at this time, since they had only recently taken part in the defeat at the Battle of the Frigidus and so would have been wary of attacking without evidence of weakness.

  With matters on the borders satisfactorily concluded, Stilicho moved East, taking both armies to confront Alaric. The move has sometimes been seen as an early indication that Stilicho had designs on Illyricum, wishing to reverse the allocation of 379 when Gratian gave it to Theodosius to help in the wars with the Goths.21 However, no such claims were made in the poetry of Claudian and nor do Stilicho’s actions actually show any desire to control the prefecture. Only later in his career did Stilicho become aware of the importance of Illyricum and attempt to take it for the West.22 Claudian’s ten political poems between 395 and 404 all interpret events in Illyricum as problems for the Eastern government and fail to make any claim to Illyricum by Stilicho for the West.23

  If Stilicho was not attempting to annex Illyricum, then his actions in chasing Alaric still need an explanation, and this can be found in Claudian’s poetry and by analysing Stilicho’s behaviour. It is highly unlikely that Stilicho was using Alaric’s revolt as a pretext to moving close to Constantinople before marching into the city and ousting Rufinus. Given the time scale and the distances involved (approximately 1,000 miles between Milan and Constantinople), there is no clear evidence that he was even aware that Arcadius and Rufinus would not accede to his claims to the guardianship of the whole Empire.

  Even had he known about their decision, it is more likely that Stilicho simply wanted to put pressure on Arcadius and the Eastern government. By defeating Alaric Stilicho would become the ‘hero of the hour’ in Constantinople and so gain immense political prestige. He would also highlight the inability of Rufinus and the Eastern government to protect itself in times of crisis. On the other hand, had he entered Constantinople with the combined armies, there was a distinct possibility that he would lose control of at least some of the Western troops, who would then go on to ravage the city as ‘revenge’ for the losses at the Frigidus. Such a loss of control would obviously weaken any influence he gained in the East due to the defeat of Alaric.

  Furthermore, he could not be sure of the loyalty of the Eastern troops to his cause, since they were not under his direct command, instead being led by Gainas. As we shall see, Gainas had his own political agenda, quite separate from Stilicho’s, and this may already have been becoming obvious.

  One aspect of Stilicho’s decision which has received little attention is the possibility that at least part of his decision to confront Alaric was because of Alaric’s betrayal. Most historians have tended to forget that it was Stilicho that had ‘defeated’ Alaric when Stilicho was magister militum per Thraciam, and it had been arranged for Alaric to serve in the Frigidus campaign. Stilicho may have been influenced in his decision to march East by the desire to punish Alaric for repudiating the agreement of 393.

  There are two final facets of the campaign that have not been considered. From a purely military point of view, the Battle of the Frigidus was a catastrophe for the West. Not only had they lost many men in the fighting, but the morale of the Western army had received yet another blow, now having lost three times in succession to the forces of the East under Theodosius. It made sense for Stilicho to lead the combined armies against Alaric. It would serve several different purposes. Firstly, it could help to unite the two forces were they to fight against a common enemy, so reducing the animosity between the armies of East and West. Secondly, the morale of the Eastern army was high. In contrast, that of the Western army would have been low following their defeat. Taking part in a victorious campaign would help restore the morale and fighting efficiency of the Western troops. A third factor is that faced by all Roman leaders throughout the history of the Empire: the need for a victory to help cement power.24 Stilicho was attempting to run the Empire in the West, and here the traditional measure of success was defence of the frontiers and prevention of usurpation: political success could depend upon victory in battle over barbarians.25

  Finally, one of Stilicho’s aims was to bring the military system under his personal control.26 There was no better way of achieving this than of leading the combined forces in a united and victorious attack against Alaric. Success would have helped cement the loyalty of all of the troops to Stilicho, resulting in any political opposition thus being weakened. At all times throughout the life of the Empire successful emperors had acknowledged that the loyalty of the army was paramount.

  Therefore, those historians who claim that Stilicho was aiming to march in and conquer the East are almost certainly wrong, and are probably following Rufinus’ belief that Stilicho was marching against him. For Stilicho, Illyricum belonged to the East. His reason for ‘invasion’ at this time was to defeat Alaric, to improve the morale of his army, and to put pressure on the ‘ineffective’ Eastern government to accede to his claim as parens principum.27

  With some or all of the above considerations to the fore, Stilicho marshalled his forces and moved into Illyricum. As he passed through Noricum and Pannonia Stilicho left troops to act as gar
risons to hold the frontier should barbarians on the Danube seek to attack whilst the Empire was in turmoil. Advancing deeper into the Balkans, he confronted Alaric in Macedonia and, when Alaric retreated, Stilicho pursued him to Thessaly. According to Claudian, somewhere in the valley of the river Peneus Stilicho managed to surround Alaric (Map 11).

  The recall of the Eastern forces

  At this point yet another incident occurred that has aroused debate amongst historians. According to Claudian, Stilicho was on the point of destroying Alaric when orders arrived from Arcadius in Constantinople, demanding the return of the Eastern contingent of Stilicho’s combined army.28

  11. Stilicho’s first campaign in Illyricum, AD 395.

  In the Claudian version of events, Rufinus persuades Arcadius that he does not need Stilicho as his guardian, both because he is of age, and because Arcadius has Rufinus himself to guide him:

  Let him leave Illyria, send back his Eastern troops, divide the hosts fairly between the two brothers, and do not be heir to the sceptre only but to your forces.

  Claud. In Ruf. II 162–5.

  In this way, according to Claudian, Rufinus arranged matters so that the Eastern army was recalled right at the point where victory was assured: Stilicho was frustrated at the very moment of his triumph and unwillingly dispatched the Eastern forces back to Constantinople before retiring to Italy. Consequently, Alaric was freed from attack and went on to ravage yet more territory in the East.

  The quotation not only describes how Rufinus frustrated Stilicho’s campaign against Alaric; it is possibly the source for the claim made earlier that Rufinus persuaded Arcadius that Stilicho had designs to take control of Illyricum.29 However, this makes too much of the reference to ‘Illyria’. It is much more likely that Rufinus used the argument that a refusal to issue the order would mean that Arcadius, although old enough to rule on his own, would always be a pawn to Stilicho’s king. Furthermore, Rufinus was extremely afraid of Stilicho: Stilicho had claimed guardianship of both East and West and, according to Zosimus, gave every sign of being ready to accomplish his ends by force if necessary.30 As a final note, it should be remembered that in this decision Rufinus would have had the backing of the Senate in Constantinople. The Senate in Rome possessed special privileges of long standing, many dating back to the period of the Republic. The Senate of Constantinople had no such connection with antiquity and so were prepared to defend their rights against domination by Stilicho and the West.31

  Many historians have accepted the story more or less at face value. They have gone on to note that although Stilicho did not have the right to keep the Eastern forces once they had been recalled, he should be blamed for not destroying Alaric prior to returning the troops to the East. Others have claimed that the story is a fabrication, made by Claudian to cover Stilicho’s failings as a general.32 However, these theories tend towards the extremes, either accepting all of the Claudian version or none of it. Yet there would appear to be a middle way.

  To analyse the last point of view first, it is unlikely that the story is a literary device to cover Stilicho’s inabilities. As was seen earlier, there was probably friction between the troops of the East and West.33 Accordingly, Cameron claims that Stilicho was losing control of his troops and this is why he could not mount an attack on Alaric.34 In order to prevent loss of face, Claudian then invented the story of Arcadius’ demand for the return of the troops.

  This is highly unlikely. The military commanders of the combined armies would expect such an order to be common knowledge. If the order was an invention, then the whole military establishment would have been questioning the legitimacy of the claim. Such doubt would have seriously undermined Stilicho’s credibility and it is highly unlikely that he would have countenanced such a risk. Therefore, it is probably safe to assume that the order was actually issued by Arcadius.

  On the other hand, although the order was issued, this still leaves areas of uncertainty.35 These revolve around the continuing problem of using Claudian as the source for events. There are parallels between the claim here and the similar claim used to explain why Stilicho did not bring the barbarians to battle in 393.36 There is also the need to explain why, if he was on the verge of doing so, Stilicho did not defeat the Goths before sending the Eastern troops to Constantinople.

  The major factor is that the composition of Stilicho’s forces may have made him cautious about forcing a battle. It is almost certain that many of the regular units of the Roman army at this time included Goths. To use these in a strategy of manoeuvre is one thing: to force them to fight against troops they had recently fought alongside and who were also probably their kinsmen was quite another matter. Furthermore, both the Eastern and the Western forces may have been unhappy at being forced to fight alongside each other having so recently faced each other as enemies. As a further point, this division might have been encouraged by Gainas for his own purposes.

  As a consequence, it is unlikely that Stilicho was preparing to launch an attack against Alaric as he did not have either the troops willing to fight Alaric or the confidence in his men to launch such an attack. It is more likely that he was using manoeuvre and the threat of battle as a way of inducing Alaric to negotiate another treaty. It is during these manoeuvres that the order from Arcadius arrived.

  Stilicho did not have any option but to obey Arcadius’ written orders. Not only did Stilicho not trust his troops to face Alaric in battle, but even if he did it would have taken too long to launch an attack. Any long delay would play into Rufinus’ hands, as it could easily be interpreted as a hostile move by Arcadius. Furthermore, Stilicho wanted to become the guardian of both East and West. If his first act for Arcadius was to disobey a straightforward command, there would be little chance of the emperor bowing to his wishes.

  It is with this in mind that a little-known piece of evidence from Zosimus needs to be assessed. According to Zosimus (following Eunapius) Stilicho persuaded Honorius to allow him to return the troops to the East, ostensibly to help with the invasions that had happened since he had travelled West with Theodosius.37 Although the text is confusing and conflates the campaigns of both 395 and 397, there is enough evidence to suggest that Stilicho was aware of the distress of the East and recognized that Arcadius had need for the troops Stilicho had under his command. As a consequence, when the order arrived, he immediately dispatched the troops as required.

  As a last point, it would appear that his wife, Serena, and the rest of his family were still residing in Constantinople following the funeral of Theodosius. Although not as pressing as the other reasons already outlined, part of Stilicho’s decision to return the troops may have been based on fear that his family may be seized and held as hostages.

  On the other hand, the return of the troops may also have been a political gamble on Stilicho’s part. He would have known that Rufinus had little military ability and therefore would have known that Alaric would not be faced by the Eastern army led by Rufinus. Moreover, if Rufinus did not trust Stilicho, still less did he trust those military men of ability still in the East, since he had already argued with both Timasius and Promotus. Therefore there would be no military attempt to defeat Alaric and the perception of the Eastern government as weak and ineffectual would be increased.

  It is also likely that Stilicho knew of Gainas’ ambition, and he may also have known that Gainas would remove Rufinus at the earliest opportunity. Yet Gainas did not have the political support to take the place of Rufinus. Once again there would be political chaos in the East, and this would leave a political vacuum that Stilicho could hopefully use to his advantage.

  Stilicho could wait, both in the knowledge that the political situation in the East was extremely unstable, and also that at a later date he would probably still be obliged to deal with Alaric on behalf of the Eastern government and so be seen as the saviour of Constantinople. He may also have hoped the gesture would help his position, as Arcadius could interpret it as Stilicho being willing to act as a s
upporter rather than an overbearing leader.

  As a final point, part of the difficulty with modern interpretations of Stilicho’s decision to return the Eastern forces is the inability of modern historians to recognize that their perceptions of ancient warfare may be false. The assumption that ‘victory’ was founded on ‘total defeat in battle’ is anachronistic. Although valid earlier in the Empire, the method was no longer the modus operandi following the defeat at Adrianople. One of the foundations upon which Stilicho was to build his rule (see below) was that he continued to follow Theodosian policy, militarily as well as politically. Although Theodosius had attempted to fight a pitched battle in 379, he had been defeated. After that he had resorted to manoeuvre and blockade to defeat the Goths. Accordingly, Stilicho had spent the majority of his adult life following the concept of avoiding defeat in battle.38 There were only going to be two exceptions to this, and in both of them the quality of the forces he deployed was high and the quality of the opposition was relatively low – especially when compared with Alaric and his men.

  Despite the (equally anachronistic) claims of Claudian, there was never really any likelihood of Stilicho utterly defeating Alaric in 395. Stilicho would have been extremely reluctant to risk everything by committing himself to the uncertainties of battle. At best, Alaric would have been cornered and forced to negotiate.

  Stilicho withdraws to Italy

  With only the demoralized army of the West Stilicho would not have felt confident in his ability to defeat Alaric in battle. After all, although the foederati had been defeated and taken heavy casualties at the Battle of the Frigidus, they had been on the winning side. In contrast, the forces he now controlled had suffered a heavy defeat at the same battle. In the circumstances, Stilicho may have felt it unwise to risk battle. Also, if Claudian’s wording of the order is anywhere near to being accurate, he had received a direct command to leave Illyricum and return to Italy. Stilicho’s first response to any imperial order was to obey. Throughout his career he appears to have always followed the legitimate commands of the ruling emperors, relying on persuasion to ensure that those commands followed his own wishes.