Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  Stilicho managed to achieve a balance between men that he knew and who had served under Theodosius and new appointments made from within the Senate in order to maintain the goodwill of that body. It further helped to integrate the Senate at Rome, which consisted of many of the richest men in the West, with the court at Milan.

  Stilicho’s second major concern was the poor state of the army.21 Between 387 and 394 the Western army had suffered three major defeats at the hands of Theodosius, two against Magnus Maximus and one against Arbogast and Eugenius. As if that was not enough, in 388 – when Magnus Maximus had taken large numbers of Gaulish troops to Italy to face Theodosius – the Franks had invaded across the Rhine. They had attacked the provinces of Germania and Belgica before retiring across the frontier. A Roman counter-attack had defeated some Franks who had remained at large in the Empire, but when the army had crossed over the Rhine it had been defeated by Marcomeres and Sunno, the leaders of two Frankish cantons.22 The cumulative effect of the repeated defeats will have seriously eroded Roman morale and confidence.

  Shortly after these defeats Arbogast had become head of the Western government and he had agreed a treaty with Marcomeres and Sunno, who may also have had hegemony over other tribes in the area. Early in his rule Arbogast had led the Western army into Frankish territory to ensure their cooperation and loyalty, and then prior to the civil war in 394 Eugenius had also led a campaign along the Rhine before he faced Theodosius in battle. Again, this had been to ensure that fear restrained the Franks from attacking whilst Eugenius and Arbogast were facing Theodosius.23 The military displays may have been a success, since there is no evidence of an attack by the Franks in 394 or 395. However, the overall result of the campaigns of Arbogast and Eugenius was an increase in tension on the frontier. If the frontier was to remain stable, this could not be allowed to continue. When he was free from the threat of invasion by Alaric, Stilicho gathered his army and led a campaign along the Rhine.

  Details of the campaign are sparse, but, according to Claudian, the attack was effected at maximum speed, possibly in order to catch the tribes unawares:

  Descending from the river’s source to where it splits in twain and to the marshes that connect its mouths he flashed his lightning way. The speed of the general outstripped the river’s swift course, grew as grew Rhine’s waters.

  Claudian, Stil I, 198–200

  The impression is reinforced by the claim that Stilicho set out ‘with the moon yet new’ but returned ‘or ever it was full’.24 There is further a description from Orosius, as outlined by Gregory of Tours, which has Stilicho ‘crushing’ the Franks and travelling around Gaul ‘as far as the Pyrenees’.25

  Although no doubt the descriptions are embellished, it would appear that Stilicho’s movement was surprisingly swift: the speed of the campaign caught the tribesmen by surprise. There is no evidence in any of our sources for fighting between the Romans and the tribesmen, yet Marcomeres was ‘arrested’ and exiled to a villa in Tuscany. Sunno escaped, but then reappeared amongst his own tribe, claiming sole rule and declaring that he wanted vengeance against his brother’s captors. Unfortunately, his people did not agree and killed him.26 As a final piece of evidence for the quality of the campaign, according to Claudian the tribes along the Rhine offered their children as hostages and begged for peace.27

  For Claudian, the main aim of the campaign was securing recruits.28 Stilicho’s shortage of recruits is supported by the laws issued against deserters.29 There is no doubt that this was – probably – the major purpose of the campaign. One of the overriding factors in the last decades of the Western Empire was the shortage of recruits. However, as he was still insecure, Stilicho was unwilling to antagonize the Roman senators and major landowners by ordering them to release men from their estates for the army. Instead, the senators gave money and this was used to levy German recruits. In fact, Claudian was able to profit from this, using it as a way of winning support for the recruitment of barbarians from a conservative class who were, as a whole, unhappy with using ‘barbarians’ in the army.30 Yet to a competent general, there would be other considerations to be taken into account.

  Stilicho still wanted to defeat Alaric in battle. In order to achieve this he would need to muster as many troops as possible. As a consequence of these deliberations, Stilicho concluded that a successful campaign along the Rhine would intimidate the barbarians into submitting and make it less likely that they would attack across the frontier. As a further result, Stilicho would be able to withdraw extra troops from the Rhine frontier for the coming campaign.

  The claim that Stilicho was ‘desperately scraping together armies of half-trained, half-reliable Germanic troops to counterbalance the Visigothic “allies”; denuding frontier defences well below the danger level; and ignoring the fears and miseries of many provincial populations’ may apply to his later years, but is not yet appropriate.31 He had ensured that, for the near future at least, there would be no trouble along the borders with the Germanic tribes.

  One other factor may have been included amongst the reasons for the Rhine campaign. In the previous decade the army of the West had suffered many defeats. One of the lessons learned by the Romans was that if your army was defeated in a major battle, one of the best ways of restoring morale was to win a series of lesser skirmishes and so get the men used to achieving victory again. Stilicho was confident enough in his abilities to lead such a fast campaign in the West. Although the campaign did not include any fighting, the mere fact that a threat was enough to overawe the barbarians would have been a welcome change to the troops. This morale boost was especially needed as it is certain that Stilicho still wanted revenge on Alaric for his ‘desertion’ of the Roman army. To face Alaric, who appears from his early reputation to have been considered a formidable foe, Stilicho would need his men to be confident of victory.

  397

  At the start of the campaigning season of 397 Stilicho gathered his army, which was now composed of his regular forces plus the Germanic troops recruited in 396, on the Adriatic coast – probably at the main fleet base in Ravenna.32 At the same time, ships were ordered to assemble to transport the force across the Adriatic. In a short space of time Stilicho was ready to move, but was held back by personal considerations. Bishop Ambrose was mortally ill and Stilicho was concerned enough about the welfare of his most powerful supporter to wait on developments before moving.33 When Ambrose finally passed away in early April 395, Stilicho was finally free and set sail for Greece.34

  There have been claims in the past that Stilicho was intent from the first upon annexing the whole of Illyricum at least from the East, and that the invasion of Greece was an ‘attempt to wrest territory from the East’.35 There is no validation of this theory in the sources, nor in an analysis of Stilicho’s actions. He was simply following his primary instincts, attempting to protect both halves of ‘his’ Empire from the ravages of Alaric as well as putting pressure on the government in the East. If he could defeat Alaric he could show that he was more effective than the ministers in Constantinople and this would show to Arcadius that he would be better off with Stilicho as guardian. Furthermore, he still had not forgiven Alaric for his ‘treachery’ in rebelling in 395, and he accordingly sought to re-establish his supremacy over the Gothic leader. Finally, a quick victory would enable Stilicho to enrol Alaric, or at least the troops he commanded, in the much-depleted Western army.36

  The invasion

  Stilicho set sail with the fleet and landed at Corinth, which Alaric had already sacked.37 It is probable that Stilicho expected and received a welcome from the Greeks, since he was coming to save them from barbarian oppression. Upon his arrival, Stilicho wasted little time and advanced on Alaric. Alaric quickly withdrew. Unlike the campaign of 395, Claudian attests that this time there was fighting between the forces of Stilicho and Alaric.38 The fact that Alaric was forced to withdraw suggests that Stilicho’s men had the better of these encounters, although the claim by Claudian concern
ing the large numbers of Goths killed in battle is doubtless an exaggeration to flatter Stilicho. Within a short time Alaric had been trapped on Mount Pholoe in Arcadia.39

  13. Stilicho’s campaign in Illyricum, AD 397.

  It is at this point that the situation once again becomes blurred by contradicting sources. There are two major variations on what happened next. Claudian claims that Stilicho was – for the third time – on the verge of defeating Alaric when he was ordered to leave Greece, this time by Arcadius following Eutropius’ advice.40 However, there is a different tradition as reported by Zosimus (quoting Eunapius) of Stilicho once again losing control of his troops and so allowing Alaric to escape.41 Added to this there is one further, minor, complication: there is the need to account for Eutropius’/Arcadius’ decision to declare Stilicho hostis publicus (public enemy). This final piece of evidence is obscure but vital.

  In the main, historians have tended to follow one of these two traditions.42 Yet a close examination of the debate suggests that both traditions contain an element of truth. Furthermore, it is possible to amalgamate the two traditions into a single version that includes the key elements of the story. This allows acceptance of both traditions, and indicates that the ancient sources are merely giving a version of events that reinforces their own, prejudiced, view of Stilicho. Any evidence that is contrary to the story they want to tell is simply ignored – a sin of omission rather than an outright falsification.

  As a result, what follows is an attempt to fit the different accounts into a single chronological narrative, explaining the political actions and the relevance to the sources as the story unfolds. However, it should be remembered at all times that this chronology is not secure and the events described are thus open to different interpretations.

  The campaign

  In early 397 Stilicho landed in Greece. Unfortunately, this was not part of his jurisdiction and by acting in this way he was certain to arouse the enmity and fear of Eutropius in Constantinople. In fact, it is probable that this sort of event is exactly what Eutropius may have been guarding against when he ceded Western Illyricum to Stilicho early in 396. Once he had learned of Stilicho’s landing, Eutropius knew that Stilicho was intent on fighting Alaric again. This would seriously damage the ongoing negotiations to bring Alaric into the mainstream of the Roman military command structure in the East. Therefore, Eutropius played on Arcadius’ fears and so secured an order for Stilicho to leave the area and return to his own ‘dominions’. The idea that Arcadius could be coerced into sending such an order is not surprising; after all, there were centuries of imperial tradition which demanded that ‘internal’ politics should take precedence over ‘external’ enemies. Even though Alaric was inside the Empire, he was not as yet part of the bureaucratic and military inner circle. Therefore, it is highly likely that Arcadius, under the prompting of Eutropius, actually did send an order telling Stilicho to leave Greece. Claudian might be exaggerating on some aspects of the order, but the claim is not entirely a fabrication.43

  However, there was now a major difference between events in 395 and those in 397. In 395, Stilicho accepted the order to return the Eastern army to Constantinople and himself returned to Italy. With his new, entirely ‘Western’ army to support him, Stilicho must have decided that, this time, he would force Alaric to submit before returning to Italy. As a consequence, his forces attacked Alaric and, in a series of small-scale battles, forced him to retire northwards. Again, in describing the number of Gothic dead Claudian exaggerates the facts, but there is no falsifying of evidence.

  When it became clear that Stilicho was not following the emperor’s orders, fear and tension grew in Constantinople. Apart from ruining the ongoing negotiations with Alaric, Eutropius would have interpreted the attack as part of a long-term plan whereby Stilicho would first defeat Alaric and then arrive in Constantinople expecting to be installed as the parens of Arcadius. Furthermore, Eutropius had recently organized the dismissal of two Eastern generals, both of whom may have been allies of Stilicho.44 He simply could not afford to allow a victorious Stilicho to enter the city.

  Accordingly, Eutropius again worked on Arcadius’ doubts and fears. This time, Arcadius was persuaded to declare Stilicho hostis publicus.45 This ensured that there would be a hostile reception for Stilicho in Constantinople should he advance on the city having defeated Alaric. Again, this followed in the tradition of seeing internal rivals as the major threat to an emperor’s rule. The theory also gives a plausible reason for such a drastic pronouncement. It instantly put pressure on Stilicho to leave Greece, as well as indicating clearly to Alaric that Stilicho’s attack was not endorsed by the Eastern government. As a final note, Stilicho lost the houses, goods and lands that he held in the East, since as an enemy of the state they were forfeit. They were probably confiscated by Eutropius.46

  The declaration created a major obstacle for Stilicho. Apart from everything else, it was probably expected that the declaration of hostis publicus would be shortly followed by a declaration of war.47 He would be unable to claim to be acting in Arcadius’ best interests if his actions caused the opening of hostilities between Honorius and Arcadius. Unfortunately, his plans now received a second setback. Having blockaded Alaric and begun the act of starvation he appears to have settled down to await the inevitable. In fact, Zosimus goes further than this, claiming that:

  He forced the barbarians to flee to Pholoe, where he could easily have starved them out had he not devoted himself to luxury, comic actors and shameless women …

  Zosimus 5.7.2.

  The delay gave Alaric time to act. He used a portion of the spoils taken in Greece to bribe some of Stilicho’s troops to allow him and his men to escape. This concept also helps to explain the reference in Claudian to Alaric’s attempt ‘to corrupt the Roman army with gold’.48 Furthermore, once it was perceived that Alaric’s camp was deserted, Stilicho lost control of his forces, who attacked and pillaged the now empty camp.

  Such a loss of control is not in itself surprising. Stilicho’s regular forces were being supplemented by contingents of northern barbarians, raised following his expedition along the Rhine in 396. It is easy to forget that the troops supplied would not be serving as regular troops in the Roman army under Roman discipline. They would tend to serve en masse, in separate units under their own leaders. This allows us to accept Zosimus’ account that Stilicho lost control of his troops, although the suggestion that this was due to his own lax habits is probably a device to show him in as bad a light as possible.49

  Stilicho had now received a double blow. Firstly, he must have realized that his federate troops were not as loyal as he would have hoped and could not really be trusted in a pitched battle. As a result, his confidence in victory over Alaric would have been severely damaged. Furthermore, he had now been deprived of a major reason for the campaign by being declared hostis publicus in Constantinople. There was little chance of his being accepted into the capital as a hero and so being able to take control of the East. As a result, Stilicho decided to leave the East to deal with the problem of Alaric and retired to Italy.

  The declaration of hostis publicus by the East immediately had severe repercussions for both Stilicho and Illyricum. As they retired, Stilicho’s troops plundered those areas of Greece through which they passed.50 Although perceived as Stilicho losing control, there are two actual motives for these attacks. By declaring Stilicho hostis publicus Eutropius as a by-product also declared all of Stilicho’s followers to be hostis publicus at the same time.51 Although possibly an attempt to undermine the loyalty of his troops, the declaration backfired.52 When this information reached the Western troops, they immediately felt aggrieved that the government they were trying to support had instead turned against them.

  The second factor was the manner in which Stilicho had launched the campaign. By mounting a rapid seaborne assault, he no doubt hoped to take Alaric by surprise, allowing him to quickly achieve contact with the Gothic forces and so catch them unpr
epared for either battle or siege. Unfortunately, to do this Stilicho had relied – quite naturally – on political support from the Eastern government and on the territories in Greece for supplies. It is unlikely that he had transported enough provisions across the Adriatic to maintain a prolonged campaign. As a result, when he was declared hostis publicus the Greek cities which had been supporting the war withdrew their aid. He quickly began to run short of supplies. Naturally, the troops, already aggrieved at being declared enemies, were only too willing to take the supplies needed from the country through which they passed en route back to the fleet, before sailing for Italy.53 In the meantime, taking with him the majority of the spoils captured in Greece, Alaric retreated to Epirus, where he continued his depredations.54

  The interpretation given here gives a clear and understandable reason for the end of Stilicho’s campaign in Greece without the need to interpret Stilicho’s decision to retire as being made after the conclusion of a treaty with Alaric.55 Furthermore, neither is there the need for Stilicho to have learned about Gildo’s rebellion in Africa and so been compelled to return to Italy to deal with the situation, a claim which is chronologically difficult to maintain.56 Instead, the proposed explanation gives a reasonably simple passage of events that takes into account all of the known factors and sources.