Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  The aftermath

  On his arrival back in Italy Stilicho assessed his options. It was clear that he needed to rebuild the army as an efficient fighting force – especially as Gildo, the comes et magister utriusque militiae per Africam (count and general of all troops in Africa), had declared for the Eastern court (see next Chapter). In order to do this, what he needed above all were Roman recruits that could be trained to perform under orders whilst maintaining strict discipline. He needed to act to strengthen the army, and he needed the support of the Senate to achieve his aim. At this time the weakness of his own position would have been infuriating to someone who believed himself the rightful parens principum of the unified Empire.

  Eutropius

  Stilicho’s campaign had probably lasted as little as eight or ten weeks from start to finish, yet it had badly upset Eutropius’ plans. Fortunately, the decision to declare Stilicho hostis publicus appears to have appeased Alaric. Following his escape from Stilicho, Alaric had crossed the Corinthian Isthmus – again aided by the treachery of Gerontius, if Zosimus is to be believed – and had moved on to Epirus where, freed from the threat of attack, he was busy stripping the countryside of its resources.57

  With half of Illyricum now being administered by the West, Eutropius continued with his plan to promote Alaric to be magister militum of the much-lessened Prefecture of Illyricum. The plan fulfilled two complementary functions. By allocating Alaric only part of Illyricum, Eutropius could limit the amount of power Alaric would wield. At the same time, placing Alaric and his troops in Illyricum made him a military buffer to the political ambitions of Stilicho. With Alaric an official member of the Eastern military hierarchy, an attempt by Stilicho to attack him again would be a declaration of war on Arcadius. On the other hand, the apparent enmity between Alaric and Stilicho would ensure that they would not combine their forces in an attempt to oust Eutropius from power. At the end of 397 Alaric was made magister militum per Illyricum and probably settled in Macedonia and Thrace. The pay of a magister militum ‘must have been beyond the wildest dreams of avarice for a Goth’.58 In addition, the post may have entitled his followers to the pay and benefits of regular Roman troops.59 Between 397 and 401 Alaric was to retain a low profile in his new post.

  At around this time envoys arrived in Constantinople from the Western province of Africa. The governor, Gildo, offered to change his allegiance from Stilicho and the West to Eutropius and the East. Although this would involve a possible war with Stilicho, Eutropius appears to have agreed to Gildo’s proposal. The acceptance ensured that Stilicho would now definitely not be leading an army into the Balkans for a third time: the food supply to the city of Rome was severed when Gildo changed allegiance and Stilicho would be forced to cope with events that did not include Alaric. With Stilicho’s attention focused on the West, Eutropius was free to act in the East.

  Accordingly, Eutropius led the Eastern army in person to face the Huns in Asia Minor. Within a very short time they had been forced to withdraw back across the Caucasus. Indeed, the campaign was so effective that the Huns were not to threaten the Caucasus again until 425. Eutropius had shown that, despite his political opposition to Rufinus in Constantinople, he was in fact a successor to Rufinus’ policies. He had dealt with affairs in the Balkans without recourse to deploying an army under a general who may gain prestige for defeating Alaric. Furthermore, when he had realized that the Huns could only be forced out of the Empire by a military campaign, he had led the campaign in person. The military hierarchy would not be allowed to gain prestige and power by conducting a successful operation on their own. From this point on he would allow the army to slowly run down.60

  Chapter Eight

  Gildo’s Revolt and the African

  Campaign, 398

  Gildo and his family

  To understand the nature of Gildo’s revolt it is necessary to trace his family’s history back prior to the reign of Theodosius. His father, Nubel, was the King of Mauretania and probably a Christian.1 He had several brothers, including Firmus and Mascezel. Around the year 373 Firmus had led the revolt in Africa that was suppressed in c.375 by comes Theodosius, the father of the future emperor. Firmus committed suicide rather than allow himself to be captured. During Theodosius’ campaign Mascezel supported Firmus, whereas Gildo was part of the forces of Theodosius.

  Gildo is not mentioned again until 385, when he was made comes Africae as a reward for his loyalty to the Emperor Theodosius.2 The trust shown was misplaced, and on the outbreak of civil war between Theodosius and Magnus Maximus in 387 Gildo threw in his lot with Maximus. However, even though he had supported Maximus, following his victory Theodosius left Gildo in control in Africa. Partly this was certainly due to Theodosius’ policy of forgiveness for those who had joined the revolt, but there will have been an element of politics in the decision, since Gildo’s status as a ‘prince’ of the Moors will have helped in controlling the rebellious Moorish tribes.3 As a guarantee of his actions, Theodosius took Gildo’s daughter Salvina back to Constantinople with him. At first she was a hostage. Later she married Nebridius, the nephew of Theodosius’ first wife Flaccilla, as a reward for Gildo’s continued loyalty.4 In this way Theodosius may have hoped to secure Gildo’s ongoing support. Part of the agreement between Theodosius and Gildo may have been Gildo’s acceptance of his brother Mascezel’s presence in Africa, even though the two men had been on opposite sides in Firmus’ rebellion.

  When Theodosius went to war against Arbogast and Eugenius, Gildo did not cut off supplies of grain to Rome, since this would have provoked great resentment against Theodosius in the West. Although it is possible to interpret his actions as being out of self interest, simply waiting to see who was victorious, it is interesting to note that his decision to join neither side nor to cut off supplies to Rome was later applauded by Theodosius; either shortly before, during the course of or shortly after the war, he was made comes et magister utriusque militiae per Africam.5 It is possible that the negative interpretations of his inactivity were related more to the later propaganda of Claudian than contemporary politics.

  Before his death Theodosius arranged matters in the West to his liking. Stilicho was given command of Britain, Gaul, Spain and Africa. It is very likely that Gildo was unhappy about the change in his status; he had gone from being the trusted minister of a distant emperor to being bound to the rule of a man in nearby Italy. In many ways the change was likely to curb the amount of power and freedom of action he had in his province. Moreover, Stilicho was not an emperor and Gildo may have disliked the enforced subservience to a mere ‘soldier’ and fellow official.

  The rebellion

  The evidence for the whole episode is poor, and heavily reliant on Claudian. What follows is an attempt to piece together the fragments in a logical order, paying particular attention to establishing a chronology. Vital to this is an understanding of the slow pace of communications, as one aspect often overlooked when discussing imperial diplomacy is travel times for messengers and the delay in receiving information. Delays in communication placed ‘fundamental limitations … on the ways in which the Empire could function’.6

  The dissemination of news

  The cursus publicus (imperial post) had a normal speed of approximately 80 kilometres (just over 49.5 miles) per day. If it was an emergency, this could be increased to 320 kilometres (just under 199 miles) per day, but this would use fresh messengers on each leg of the journey. If it was necessary for the messenger to arrive in person, the rate would be very much reduced and rely upon the stamina of the individual.7 An example of the speed of news occurs during the rebellion of Procopius in 365. The rebellion was declared in Constantinople on 28 September 365 but it was not until late October or the beginning of November that the news reached Valentinian in North Gaul. Messengers sent by the land route from Antioch to Rome would take not less than one month to cover the 3,000 miles.8

  A further difficulty is that of travelling across the Mediterranean. The winds
that affect the Mediterranean can be extremely strong and tend to blow in cycles. As a result, for example, news travelling from Constantinople to Carthage might travel quickly thanks to the prevailing winds, but when a response was needed the same winds would hamper the return journey. Furthermore, strong and violent winds would halt all sea journeys, since the galleys in use at the time could not traverse rough seas. One example of the problems that could ensue concerns a letter sent by the Emperor Gaius (Caligula) to Petronius, legate of Syria. The ship on which it was carried was storm-bound for three months and only arrived at its destination a full twenty-seven days after messengers which had been sent carrying the news that Gaius had been assassinated.9 Therefore, it should be remembered that although according to Pliny the trip from Puteoli to Alexandria could be expected to take nine days, this may have been in ideal conditions.10 Despite the image normally conveyed, the Mediterranean ‘did not provide a medium of speedy and reliable internal communications for the Empire’.11

  Finally, it should also be noted that there is no clear evidence that the imperial navy was used for transporting messengers; the task was usually assigned to a trader heading in the right direction.12 In these days of powered ships and instantaneous transmission of news, such delays are often overlooked, yet in the past by the time news arrived it could be completely out of touch with events at the source.

  Events

  After Theodosius died, Gildo’s daughter Salvina appears to have remained at court in Constantinople, since her husband was a relative of the emperor and well-placed in the court. The speed of the developments between East and West, especially in relation to Rufinus, resulted in Gildo being slow to act, but once he realized that there was no longer any threat against his daughter, Gildo seems to have slowly begun to assert his independence.

  The first sign of Gildo’s new-found freedom was an attempt to assassinate his brother Mascezel. Unfortunately for Gildo, his brother escaped the attempt and fled to the court at Milan. However, Mascezel’s two sons were not so fortunate and both were killed on Gildo’s orders.

  Gildo immediately recognized that the main source of danger was Mascezel appealing to Stilicho for aid.13 However, by this time he had probably been made aware of the estrangement between Stilicho and the Eastern court following the Greek campaign. Accordingly, Gildo sent envoys to Eutropius in Constantinople offering his service to the Eastern emperor.14 This fulfilled two separate functions. Firstly, by associating his revolt with the Eastern court, Gildo dramatically raised the stakes. Any military attempt by Stilicho to overthrow him could now spark off a civil war between East and West. Secondly, by pledging his personal loyalty to Eutropius he ensured the safety of his daughter, who still lived in Constantinople.

  He sent further messengers to Stilicho in an attempt to forestall the West giving aid to his brother and informing them of his change of allegiance. The messengers arrived in Milan in early winter 397.15 Possibly in an attempt to put pressure on Stilicho, Gildo seems to have reduced the amount of grain being exported to the city of Rome.16 He may have hoped that this expression of his power would deter Stilicho from either helping Mascezel or resisting his attempt to change allegiance.17

  The legal aspects

  At this point it is necessary to investigate some of the legal and political arguments concerning the legality of Gildo’s transfer of allegiance from East to West, since this underpins many of the assumptions made about his motives. It has sometimes been assumed that Gildo was acting within his rights when he offered to exchange his loyalty from Milan to Constantinople, since he had been appointed by the Emperor Theodosius and Theodosius was based in Constantinople.18 Superficially plausible, this actually makes little sense. Before his early death Theodosius had installed Stilicho as parens of Honorius, and entrusted to him the rule of Italy, Spain, Gaul and Africa.19 It is clear that in Theodosius’ opinion Gildo was now subordinate to Stilicho.

  At no point after the appointment of Stilicho was Gildo officially appointed in Africa by Arcadius in Constantinople.20 Therefore, to suggest that Gildo had the right to change his allegiance is unreasonable: the natural consequence of such an assumption is that all governors had the right to change allegiance when an emperor died. There is no evidence of any earlier governor changing his allegiance from West to East or vice versa without the approval of the relevant emperors – unless it was during the course of a civil war or of the rise of an usurper. Both Arcadius and Honorius were legal rulers in their respective halves of the Empire, so Gildo’s attempt must be seen for what it was – an attempt to save himself from the retribution of his legal superior, a man known to be following the policies of the deceased Theodosius. This would almost certainly include a continuation of the status quo in Africa, but this had been shattered by Gildo’s attempt to kill his brother.

  Constantinople

  When Eutropius received the emissaries from Gildo proposing the change of allegiance, it would appear that the overtures were welcomed, at least in essence. By the time that they arrived Stilicho had already been declared hostis publicus and had retired from Greece; negotiations were continuing with Alaric for a peaceful settlement of his desire for an army post, and Eutropius was preparing to lead an expedition in person against the Huns wandering around Asia Minor.21 It was clearly impossible for the East to send any physical reinforcements to Africa, since these were badly needed elsewhere.22 As a result there would appear to have been an agreement whereby Eutropius would send quasi-legal orders to Gildo accepting Africa as part of the Eastern dominions, but Gildo was left to deal with the situation unaided.

  It is possible that Eutropius was quite happy to stir things in the West without actually committing himself to any action; after all, with Africa in revolt and the grain supply to Rome cut, Stilicho would be unable to take any further action in the Balkans or against Constantinople itself. Eutropius could lead the army East in the knowledge that all would be secure for his return.

  Furthermore, there remained the possibility that Stilicho would be toppled from power in the West, in a similar manner to Eutropius’ assumption of Rufinus’ powers. The loss of the African grain supply to Rome was certain to cause political upheaval. The possibility of the removal of such a powerful figure as the joint-emperors’ brother-in-law must have been a serious temptation to Eutropius. He was willing to take the (possibly minor) risk of starting a civil war in the hope that the affair would damage Stilicho in the West.

  In one respect the fact that the East did not take part in the African affair was extremely fortunate. Stilicho’s quick response resulted in the situation being settled before Eutropius could return from his campaign and act upon Gildo’s offer, and an open breach – and probably civil war – was prevented.23

  Rome

  At the beginning of autumn 396 news of the rebellion reached the population of Rome. Reports of Gildo’s defection were quickly followed by a reduction in African exports of grain and the population rapidly became alarmed at the possible consequences of Gildo’s actions.24 Stilicho reacted to the situation with commendable speed, organizing for supplies of food to be transported from Gaul and Spain to compensate for the shortfall.25

  Earlier, in 395, Stilicho had made an ally of Symmachus. An immensely gifted and talented politician, Symmachus, although a pagan, had continued to thrive in ‘Christian’ Rome, being, amongst other things, praefectus urbi Romae (prefect of Rome, 384) and consul (391). Renowned for his honesty and character, he became Stilicho’s voice in the Senate, making speeches and demands that may not have succeeded had Stilicho made them himself. In return, Symmachus could count on Stilicho to reward his clients with valuable offices when he recommended them.

  As the crisis deepened Stilicho made an extremely intelligent political move. He offered to restore the right of senatus consultum to the Senate.26 The senatus consultum was an ancient privilege whereby the Senate was allowed to pass laws. Obviously, during the course of the Empire, this right had been abrogated by the emperors, muc
h to the dismay and annoyance of the Senate.27 Although it was obvious to the Senate that in return their first act was expected to be that they condemn Gildo, they could hardly refuse to accept the return of such an ancient privilege. However, politically it changed the balance of power dramatically in Stilicho’s favour.

  Yet there was a further factor in their decision. The senators themselves had large estates in Africa that would be under threat should Gildo be allowed to transfer his allegiance to the East. Fiscal interests alone made Stilicho and the Senate allies. Yet the concession ran much deeper than at first appears. Being seen as a restorer of the Senate’s ancient privileges, Stilicho made allies of many of the senators. Yet when he had Symmachus convince the Senate to declare Gildo hostis publicus, in effect the responsibility of declaring war upon Gildo moved away from Stilicho and fell upon the Senate.

  The result of this shrewd manoeuvre was that when Gildo began an embargo in late autumn of the supplies needed by Rome, as he did instantly upon hearing of the declaration, the citizens blamed the Senate rather than Stilicho. One further consideration was that Stilicho would need the help of the Senate during the crisis, since the cost of moving and billeting his army in Italy and of preparing for the upcoming campaign would be large.28 Furthermore, it was now clear that an army would have to be sent to Africa to restore the rule of the West. History shows that wars in Africa could be long, drawn out affairs.29 Should this happen again, Rome would be brought to the brink of starvation and Stilicho wanted to be absolved of any blame by the citizens should the war be protracted – or even turn into a further civil war with the East.30 Also, should the army be defeated again it would be seen as the fault of the Senate, not himself. In this context it is interesting to note Claudian’s claim that Stilicho did not lead the army in person out of fear that Gildo would simply retire into the interior and so prolong the war.31 Although usually ignored as being a device simply to excuse Stilicho staying in Italy, it is probable that a major invasion led by Stilicho would have, in truth, resulted in Gildo withdrawing into the interior and signalled the beginning of a long, drawn-out ‘guerrilla’ war, which would be greatly to Stilicho’s detriment.