Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  The claim to Illyricum

  The move is usually accepted at face value, being seen as part of a long standing plan to annex Illyricum with little thought for the political implications it had. The primary effect would undoubtedly be the civil war that was almost certain to ensue. Stilicho had seen the armies of the West crushed by Theodosius, so it is certain that this was not an impulsive move, but one whose consequences would have been considered beforehand. Stilicho could not afford to fight a battle against the East; even a victory could be hard-won and leave his army fatally weakened. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Stilicho did not expect to fight a large-scale war. This assumption was probably based upon analysis both of the East’s recent history of dealing with threats and of the political events taking place in Constantinople.

  Since the death of Theodosius, the political leaders in Constantinople had done their best to avoid having powerful generals with large armies free within the Empire to threaten the stability of the regime. The death in 404 of Fravitta had removed the last general in the East with any track record of victory in large battles. Furthermore, the manner of Fravitta’s death reveals a deep political divide between those who wanted rapprochement with the West and those opposed to Stilicho’s involvement in the East. It is more than likely that Stilicho still had supporters in the East who could inform him that an attempt to take Illyricum for the West would not be opposed by military force. They may also have suggested that, as the prefecture was not vital to the East’s survival, its loss would be seen as a small price to pay for the removal of Stilicho from Eastern politics; having declared war, there would be no possibility of him later claiming a role as parens principum should circumstances change in Constantinople.

  Moreover, it would have been obvious to Stilicho that the East was likely to take any measure possible other than declaring war. The East had a record of avoiding war, since a victory for the East would raise the profile of the victorious general, who could then go on to threaten the stability of the regime. Overall, Stilicho may have felt that giving up the claim to parens – which he had no way of making a reality – was a small price to pay for the acquisition of Illyricum.

  Modern commentators have suggested that Stilicho’s desire to obtain control of Illyricum was flawed, since the prefecture was in a poor condition following decades of being plundered and fought over by barbarians and Romans alike. However, this evades any recognition of the desperate condition of the West. It also ignores conditions in those areas of the prefecture under the control of the East.

  The West was becoming increasingly nervous about events in Illyricum. It was now clear that enemies would be free to roam the prefecture, since the East did not take valid measures to stop them. It was also clear from the letter from Honorius to Arcadius that the West would not automatically be warned of these attacks.4 The result was that a surprise attack on Pannonia from inside the Empire had become a real possibility. This was the main reason why Stilicho had decided to maintain Alaric and his forces in Pannonia. They were to protect the area against attack from any quarter. It had finally become clear to Stilicho that Italy was vulnerable without Illyricum and that he would never gain the confidence of Arcadius in Constantinople.5

  Furthermore, according to Sozomen after the ejection of John Chrysostom the ‘Huns crossed the Ister and devastated Thrace’.6 Although this may have occurred after Stilicho had made his decision to annex Illyricum, it does add weight to one further reason for his activities. It was clear that the focus of the Eastern government was elsewhere, and that the people of Illyricum were not going to receive any protection from Constantinople. It is also obvious from the sources that this situation had been ongoing since at least the time of Alaric’s invasion of Italy, when the army meant to protect Illyricum had left for the West. Stilicho’s duty was clear and he was obsessive about doing his duty. He had to control the entire prefecture and bring the population back under the protective wing of the Empire. No doubt he also hoped that by doing so he would gain the thanks of the population, who would repay him by willingly paying taxes and joining the army.

  Conditions in Illyricum

  Most historians attempting to evaluate the condition of Illyricum have concentrated upon the historical sources, and so painted the prefecture as being a war-torn, oft-ravaged area of little military or financial use. However, recent work on the archaeology of the region has shown that this is not the case.7 Although in some areas the frequent attacks may have had an effect on conditions, in many this was not the case. The written record may have tended to over-dramatize the effect of the Gothic invasions and the long-term effects may have been less than previously envisioned.

  The upland regions that were close to the border seem to have suffered the most. Here there was a low density of cities which were, by-and-large, self-supporting communities based upon agriculture.8 From the early fourth century many of these cities declined, being replaced by more defensible hilltop settlements. A number of these were founded on strategic high ground covering ancient routeways, which now began to come back into use.9 This is probably due to the fact that the main Roman roads were the routes most commonly followed by invading armies.

  Yet in some areas this was not the case. In Epirus and Macedonia there had been a large-scale reorganization in the early fourth century, connected with the building of the new city at Constantinople between 324 and 330. The building of a new imperial capital had acted in a similar fashion on the region to that of the establishment of Trier and Milan as imperial capitals in the West. The growth of the new city had encouraged agriculture, and ports in the region as well, as towns on the Via Egnatia had rapidly grown in response to the new-found demand for goods.

  Due to the troubles of the third and fourth centuries many of these towns had been fortified and so had been able to resist the attacks of the Goths after Adrianople. Theodosius’ policy of sending garrisons to important towns ensured that not only were they kept safe from Gothic attack, but the citizens maintained their confidence and loyalty to the Empire. This and the nearby market at Constantinople ensured that, for some areas at least, the late fourth and early fifth centuries were times of economic success. This is, to some degree, reinforced by the presence of imported pottery from Africa.10 Although these matters are only just becoming clear to modern archaeologists and historians the fact that large areas of the Prefecture were thriving would certainly be clear to Stilicho. By conquering Illyricum Stilicho would be able to tap directly into the Eastern coffers by taxing the goods taken from the diocese to Constantinople.

  The tax revenues from Illyricum would be a welcome boost to the imperial treasury. Since the West already had to pay to maintain Alaric and his troops in Pannonia to protect against attack, the annexation of Illyricum would add little to the financial burden. Alaric could be promoted to magister militum per Illyricum and simply move with his men to act as a garrison for the whole prefecture rather than just the Diocese of Illyricum (Pannonia). The small extra expense of his promotion and the cost of the expansion of his forces to a more suitable size would be more than covered by the taxes raised in the prefecture.

  The move would also allow for recruitment of men for the army from the area, which was of vital importance to Stilicho. The other areas in the West from which he could recruit were Africa, Italy, Sicily and southern Gaul. Although the possibility of recruiting from northern Gaul and Britain should not be discounted, by this late date it is more than likely that attempts to recruit in these areas were either ignored or avoided, since the population would rather fight to defend their homes than be taken to defend Italy, so leaving their homes unprotected.

  Yet the main sources of available manpower in Africa, Italy, Sicily and southern Gaul were the vast estates of the senators who did all in their power to stop their people being taken into the army. Illyricum offered a manpower resource not dominated by the Senate. In this way Stilicho could fulfil the Senate’s desire to be defended by Romans and not barbar
ians without coming into conflict with them over the need to conscript men from their lands. The Illyrian and Thracian provinces remained good recruiting grounds and the army of the West was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. One of the major differences between East and West in these years was that, whilst the West slowly sank under the financial and military pressure, in the East the shortfall in revenues would be made up by Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt, whereas the recruits lost from the Balkans would be found in Eastern Asia Minor.11

  There is one further commodity that would have interested Stilicho and for which Thrace was later renowned: horses. Procopius notes in his history of the Vandalic War that Belisarius waited on the coast of Thrace, where ‘the general received as a present from the emperor an exceedingly great number of horses from the royal pastures, which are kept for him in the territory of Thrace’.12 Although it is uncertain whether the province could have maintained large herds of horses in the late-fourth and early-fifth centuries, mainly due to the constant warfare in the region, it remains a distinct possibility and is a further reason for Stilicho’s desperation to seize the Prefecture of Illyricum. Alaric had escaped from Pollentia thanks to his large cavalry force and Stilicho will have wanted to extend his own mounted arm so that this situation would never arise again.

  Once the army had been expanded, and especially the cavalry arm, then Stilicho could begin to make more of a presence in Gaul, and possibly even in Britain. An expanded army in the hands of a general who had proved his competence against Alaric and Radagaisus would cause the enemies of the West to pause and reconsider before attacking.

  Finally, there is one further reason for Stilicho’s desire to take control of Illyricum.13 It was clear to everybody that his position as magister was unassailable, yet whilst Alaric remained only a comes and was confined to a small part of Illyricum, he was likely to remain a problem, always on the lookout for weaknesses with which to gain more power from the government. The only solution was to give him the post of magister of a specific prefecture. However, all of the prefectures in the West were taken, and giving him one of these was unacceptable, as it would give him too much power and make him practically uncontrollable. In the circumstances, it is feasible that Stilicho believed that giving him his old post of magister militum per Illyricum would satisfy his desires, since between 397 and 401 he had remained quiescent in the post for four years until events in the East forced him to move. At the same time such a post would confine him to the margins of Western politics, again in a similar way to his earlier position at the Eastern court.

  With these considerations in mind, there is little doubt that the acquisition of Illyricum was vital for the West. It would provide the manpower to allow the West to become proactive, rather than remaining reactive and so allowing enemies to gain confidence and increase their attacks. It would also remove Alaric as a political nuisance whilst retaining his service for the West should the need arise. Politically, it would relieve Stilicho of much senatorial pressure by removing their main bargaining counters: the supply of money and recruits. The invasion was to proceed.

  Yet the decision almost certainly caused further unrest in the Senate. Stilicho, the actual head of the Western government, had failed to deal with barbarians in the traditional manner, instead recruiting them into the army. Now he had decided to lead these same barbarians against his fellow Romans in the East, who had earlier behaved as Romans should and massacred the barbarians who were at large in Constantinople. Stilicho’s standing in the Senate continued to decline. Yet it remained an undercurrent, since as yet there was no individual who could act as a focus for all of the people now opposed to Stilicho.

  As part of the preparations, Honorius now gave Alaric the rank of magister militum per Illyricum and he was ordered to advance into Epirus when the campaign season started. Once there, he was to wait until Stilicho arrived with troops from the Italian army.14 The combined force would then forcibly annex the whole of the prefecture of Illyricum for the West. It is likely that Stilicho believed that such a show of force would provide a sufficient display of military strength to force the East to give the prefecture to the West without a fight.15 It should be remembered that in the years following his defeat in 402 there is no doubt that Alaric had recovered at least some of the losses suffered at Pollentia and Verona. In this he had no doubt been helped by the fact that despite the defeat he had remained powerful enough to obtain an official position within the Western army.16 The combined armies would be a formidable force.

  To ensure the smooth running of the newly regained province, Jovius was made praefectus praetoriano Illyrici and set out to join Alaric. Finally, possibly in order to prevent news of his activities reaching the East, Stilicho ordered that all ports in Italy were to be closed to Eastern traders; much of the information gained about other peoples was garnered from listening to the reports of merchants, as well as from spies posing as merchants.17

  The events of 401 and 402 may have played on Stilicho’s mind. It was clear that once he was engaged in Illyricum there was a danger that the Vandals, Alans and other tribesmen that had been settled in Raetia and Pannonia after their defeat in 402 may seize upon Stilicho’s absence to invade Italy. With this in mind, it is possible that it was now that Stilicho created the last comes rei militaris that he was to appoint, that of Italy.18

  19. The invasion of Illyricum.

  This individual would be in control of a large force to deter a revolt of the settled barbarians or attacks from across the Danube.

  But not everything went smoothly. There appears to have been a reaction in Rome to his demands. An edict was issued by Honorius on 22 March 407 exempting those who had risen to the rank of military tribune or provost of the liability of supplying military recruits.19 This edict was issued as a direct response to political pressure on Honorius; it was almost certainly a reaction to Stilicho bringing pressure to bear on military officers in an attempt to enlarge the army prior to the Illyricum campaign.20

  As a final note, it is certain that Stilicho had learned from his previous experiences. Unlike in 397, this time he would have a large fleet ready to transport the troops across the Adriatic. Furthermore, the campaign against Alaric had ended in embarrassment, partly due to the speed with which it was launched. This time, enough supplies to maintain the army for as long as necessary would be gathered, ready to be shipped across at the start of the invasion.

  The army would need a place to embark and a suitable place to land. Although it is not stated in the sources, it is probable that the army for the expedition was gathered at Ravenna, although Brundisium remains a possibility. The aim was almost certainly to sail across the Adriatic to land at Dyrrachium.

  Alaric had been ordered to march south, and it will have been expected that his forces would have taken control of the city early in the campaign. Furthermore, as he continued to march south, he would have acted as a decoy to any Eastern resistance. Hopefully, the Italian army would have an unopposed landing in a captured city.

  There can be little doubt that the political stance of Stilicho early in the year, and the growing rift that was growing between East and West, alarmed the Eastern court. Even more so as this rift encompassed not just the senior officials but also the two emperors. The danger of conflict was great. They made immediate provision for the defence of Illyricum. A law was issued in Constantinople. Addressed to Herculius, the (Eastern) praefectus praetoriano Illyrici, it orders him to construct defences in Illyricum (that is, the Dioceses of Macedonia and Dacia, which were in Eastern hands), obviously in the belief that the East was in danger of attack from the West.21

  The invasion of Illyricum

  According to his orders, in early 407 Alaric marched with his troops to Epirus, so declaring war on the East, and there awaited the arrival of Stilicho with the Western army. It was the end of a remarkable phase in the life of Alaric; he had gone from magister militum per Illyricum with the East, to invader of the West, to defeat by the West, to
comes of Pannonia and by sheer endurance he had been raised, although this time by the Western government, to be magister militum per Illyricum once more. However, his tenure of the post was to be short lived. Prior to his departure for Illyricum, and whilst based in Ravenna, Stilicho was dismayed to receive the information that Alaric had died.22 It has been suggested – probably correctly – that this was a ruse by Stilicho’s opponents to delay, if not postpone, the attack on the East.23 The subterfuge was at least partially successful. Unsure if, in the circumstances, he should carry on with the invasion, Stilicho delayed and only then received a letter from Honorius forbidding him to go.24

  The nature of the letter is clearly stated by Zosimus when discussing later events. According to this passage Serena had caused the letter to be written, ‘since she wished to maintain the accord between the two emperors’.25 Although in some respects a reasonable request, since the two emperors were her adoptive brothers, one aspect of this does not ring true. Surely both the emperor and Serena had known the plans long before sending the letter. It is more likely that the letter was, at least in part, a political manoeuvre. Stilicho had declared war on the East by sending Alaric to Epirus. The fact that Honorius, under the promptings of Serena, sent orders to Stilicho cancelling that attack suggests that the move was intended both to halt the war and appease the East. In effect, the order implied that Stilicho had overstepped his authority and declared war without the emperor’s consent; therefore, the war had stopped before it had begun and the West was relieved of the need to fight in Illyricum. The real message, also reported by Zosimus, appears to have been transmitted in a separate letter received at the same time and this conveyed a completely different message: barbarians had crossed the Rhine into Gaul.26