Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  Although Gibbon in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire described him as ‘the great Stilicho’, later historians similarly followed Olympius’ official policy and condemned Stilicho for his actions. More recently, however, there has been a swing of opinion, probably influenced by attention being focused upon Olympiodorus, who praised Stilicho and blamed his downfall on the ‘inhuman plotting’ of Olympius.7 The result has culminated in a more sympathetic perception of Stilicho’s plight, although many still believe that Stilicho and Alaric reached an agreement early in their careers. However, the latest historians have attempted to rehabilitate Stilicho, claiming that his only fault was that of ‘idealism’.8 Yet the change is not complete; he is still seen as a barbarian general more concerned with doing deals with other barbarians than with defending the Roman frontiers.9

  Alongside the recognition of Olympiodorus’ viewpoint has been an increased analysis of all of the other relevant sources. One major example of this is the still-repeated comment that following the invasion of Gaul by the Vandals, Alans and Sueves in 407 the Rhine frontier collapsed due to Stilicho’s neglect.10 Yet a comparison of the Chronicle of Prosper and that known as the Gallic Chronicle of 452 shows that this is not the whole story. The Chronicle of 452 damns Stilicho as a traitor for allowing the destruction of Gaul. However, Prosper, who was writing earlier and may have suffered personally from the barbarian attacks, did not perceive the invasion of 406 in such apocalyptic terms. Unlike the later chronicler, he does not see the invasion as ‘events that had transformed the world’.11 This implies that contemporaries did not perceive the invasion across the Rhine as a major event, and so Stilicho’s failure to deal with it is not a major fault. Only later were attitudes to Stilicho to change, probably influenced by the rhetoric and propaganda emerging from Ravenna.

  This opinion is supported by a close scrutiny of the events. Shortly after the invasion across the Rhine Constantine III crossed to Gaul and quickly re-established control using only the readily available British and local Gallic troops. If there had been no revolt in Britain, there can be little doubt that Stilicho also would have quickly overcome the invaders. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any other major invasions occurred in the West until the attack of Attila the Hun in 451. The expansion of the Franks, Burgundians and other tribes into the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Roman forces later in the century is a different phenomenon and should not be interpreted as a collapse of the frontier under Stilicho.

  As a consequence of this hypothesis, it is clear that Stilicho was simply following well-established imperial priorities by first attempting to eliminate the usurper before deploying the combined army to defeat the barbarian invaders. However, it must be accepted that in part at least this was forced upon him by the swiftness of Constantine’s movement to Lyon. In effect, Constantine protected the invaders from Stilicho’s intervention.

  As a result of these reinterpretations, attention has been focused on more large-scale issues, with the resultant conclusion that ‘the accumulation of pressure meant that Italy itself fell under direct and indirect threat which coincided with usurpations and civil conquest to produce internal instability’.12 The whole situation was made worse by Stilicho’s ambiguous position as second-in-command. Stilicho’s subordinate position resulted in the opposition being able to focus on controlling Honorius rather than the more momentous decision to depose a ruling emperor; whilst many may have balked at eliminating Honorius himself, Stilicho remained a viable target for their animosity.

  These examples are a clear indication of why, to the vast majority of his contemporaries, Stilicho was no different to any other Roman politician in that his outlook was wholly Roman. In stark contrast to the commonly accepted opinion, it is clear from studying his life that Stilicho was neither a ‘Vandal’ nor a ‘barbarian’. In large part the confusion concerning Stilicho’s conduct is caused by three factors: the perceived political division between East and West caused by Stilicho’s alleged obsession with Illyricum; his claim to be parens principum of the East as well as the West; and his conduct as a general, especially when fighting Alaric.

  Illyricum

  The most prominent atypical quality that Stilicho displayed as a traditional Roman aristocrat was his loyalty to Honorius and the House of Theodosius. Both prior to and following his domination the leading generals of the West tended to be loyal only to themselves, not to the emperor sitting on the throne.13 From his assuming the role of parens principum in 395 until the invasion of Radagaisus in 405 Stilicho’s main aim remained that of preserving an Empire united against foreign attack and internal unrest. Although his methods provoked opposition and at times even threatened to create a civil war, his motives always revolved around his personal view of what was best for the Empire.

  After 405 the situation changed. It was only following the invasion of Radagaisus that Stilicho slowly came to realize that the East would never accept his claim to be guardian of Arcadius or give him any support in his defence of the West. Furthermore, it was only at this point that he finally recognized that the needs of the West were being hindered by the East’s control of Illyricum.

  The decision to invade Illyricum is interpreted as a long-standing plan and Stilicho is usually criticized for it, yet there is no hard evidence to support such a claim. The plan only materialized after Radagaisus’ invasion in 406, and was the major turning point in Stilicho’s life. The fact that such large barbarian forces were again able to penetrate Italy came as a shock both to Stilicho and the Senate in Rome. However, it was almost certainly the defeat of Radagaisus and the absorbtion of 12,000 Goths into imperial service that tipped the balance. Stilicho must have been disheartened by the news that the Senate was unhappy with the enrolment of so many barbarians into the army. As a result, Stilicho was forced to accept that, without the whole-hearted cooperation of the East, the West was doomed as the opposition of the Roman Senate to conscription and taxes resulted in an army that was not strong enough to meet the demands being placed upon it.

  For the first time he was forced to make a choice; his decision was to switch his patronage from the ‘House of Theodosius’ and instead gave his full support to the regime of Honorius in the West. This was signalled by his plan to annex Illyricum from the East by force. This represents a major sacrifice on the part of Stilicho; in effect, he was abandoning his dream of uniting the whole of the Empire under his personal guidance.

  Parens principum

  Stilicho’s decision in 406–7 to invade Illyricum despite his claim to be parens principum is usually interpreted by modern historians within the context of the permanent division of the East and West; indeed, it is often seen as a major cause in that divide. Yet this is not strictly accurate. Only one year after his death the East sent troops to aid Honorius in his conflict with Alaric. The division in Stilicho’s lifetime was not based upon divergent political aims between East and West, but was caused by the personal political strife between Stilicho in the West and his opponents in the East. In reality, the permanent division of East and West took place later, with the dominance of German generals who were determined to eliminate Eastern interference in their ‘rule’.

  Stilicho’s years of conflict with the Eastern court should not be understood in terms of permanent political division, but in terms of the political intrigue attendant on a royal minority – or in this case two – which broke out the moment Theodosius was dead.14 It is not a result of him being a Vandal, nor is it a result of him maintaining an unrealistic dream of political unity between East and West. The dream was feasible, but was halted by the strength of opposition in the East, led by three individuals – Rufinus, Eutropius and Aurelian – who refused to allow their own power to be constrained by an outside force.

  It should also be noted that his claims revolved solely upon his family ties to Arcadius. When it became clear that Eudoxia, herself a family member, was in effective control in the East Stilicho allowed his claim to lapse. Up until 406 it shoul
d be acknowledged that Stilicho was only concerned with the safety of his ‘brother-in-law’ in Constantinople.

  After 406, Stilicho focused solely upon Honorius and at this point the unity of the Empire and peace with the East became secondary to his perception of what was vital to the survival of the West: the taxes and recruiting grounds of Illyricum. That is the reason why he put aside all of his preconceptions and recognized that, far from becoming the guardian of Arcadius, he would have to invade territories claimed by the East in order to give the West a chance of survival. It is certain that Stilicho and his supporters were emotionally attached to a ‘united Empire’, but finally he was forced to the realization that unless he took control of Illyricum the chances were that the West would slowly dwindle away and become dominated by barbarian tribes.15

  Yet this was not the only reason for the decision to invade Illyricum. In part at least it was an attempt by Stilicho to break his reliance upon the Senate in Rome. As long as they maintained their hold on the supply of taxes and recruits, their influence would be strong. With the recruits and taxes of Illyricum Stilicho could finally break free of their domination and so be free to follow his own policies without continually having to refer them for ratification to the Senate.

  Unfortunately, he came to that conclusion too late; before he could absorb the resources of Illyricum and so strengthen both his own position and the condition of the army, usurpers had arisen in Britain and the Vandals, Alans and Sueves had crossed the Rhine. However, although the emergence of a rival in Britain in effect marked the beginning of the end for Stilicho, the barbarian invasion across the Rhine was not seen as vital to the defence of the Empire by contemporaries. Only after the event did historians mistakenly look back and interpret the crossing of the Rhine as an event of imperial significance.

  Yet his focus upon Eastern affairs, which was forced upon him both by his political and especially by his military weaknesses, made him neglect the peoples of Gaul, Britain and Spain. Had he ensured the loyalty of Britain he would have had the resources necessary to defeat the invasion of 406 with ease; with only the armies of Britain and Gaul, Constantine III quickly forced the invaders to come to terms. However, Stilicho would still have had to cope with the narrow outlook of the Western Senate, which resulted in him lacking total political control.

  Generalship

  Yet it is not the decision to invade Illyricum or the invasion across the Rhine or the outbreak of a revolt in Britain that are the main sources of antagonism towards Stilicho. Instead, criticism focuses mainly upon his failure as a general, specifically in his battles against and subsequent dealings with Alaric. There can be little doubt that if Stilicho had displayed the military ability of a Caesar or a Trajan then events would have turned out differently. Unfortunately, he did not: he was trained in a period when such leadership was no longer accepted as the norm in military circles.

  The anachronistic belief of the Roman Senate that all Roman victories should be complete and end in the annihiliation of the enemy has been continued by modern authors up until very recently. This has resulted in the mistaken conclusion that from a very early date Stilicho and Alaric had reached a secret agreement.

  The claim is unfounded. Shortly after the Battle of Adrianople, in 380 Theodosius made a single attempt to defeat the Goths in combat. He was heavily defeated, losing many men that it was becoming ever-more difficult to replace. Thereafter, he reverted to the accepted military policy of the era: strategy and blockade. This policy was to be followed almost universally after Theodosius, and, with only two exceptions (the Battles of Pollentia and Verona), Stilicho adhered to the method.

  Saul’s attack on Alaric’s forces at Pollentia opened Stilicho’s eyes to the possibility of using aggressive tactics if circumstances allowed. Furthermore, his own conduct following Saul’s death in the battle gave him much-needed self-confidence in his own martial abilities.

  In spite of this, an analysis of Stilicho’s battles reveals that Stilicho was never realistically in a position where he could have eliminated Alaric without the risk of severe military and political consequences.16 The loss of even low levels of manpower would have greatly reduced the army’s efficiency as Stilicho could no longer guarantee reinforcements. Alaric was saved at Pollentia by the survival of his mounted arm, which acted as a threat to halt pursuit of the defeated infantry. After the Battle of Verona, Stilicho could not attempt to destroy Alaric. Due to the speed of his victory, many of Alaric’s troops had defected to Stilicho, as a result of which the ‘Roman’ army instantly had a large proportion of Goths in its ranks. Stilicho was quite rightly unwilling to risk sending these men against their former comrades.

  As a consequence, it is clear that Alaric’s survival had more to do with luck and his own military and political ability, especially with regard to the maintainence of the cohesion of his forces, than with Stilicho’s generalship.17 Where Alaric was concerned Stilicho made only one fatal flaw, which was political; in 408 he failed to recognize how feared and hated Alaric was in Italy. As a result, his attempt to promote Alaric to the command in Gaul proved the final straw in breaking the support of the army. After that there was no chance that Stilicho would survive.

  The army itself was a double-edged weapon. The Roman nucleus of the army was loyal to the emperor and to Rome. They saw themselves as the heirs of the army that had conquered the Empire. Despite Vegetius’ comments, it is clear that when they were led by strong officers who demanded high standards the army was still effective and capable of defeating invading barbarians; although the army suffered a disaster at Adrianople, it is often forgotten that during the battle the troops doggedly fought on even after it was clear that they had lost.

  Although the Roman troops could still be effective in battle, the lack of recruits meant that their numbers were always low. No longer could a Roman commander lead his troops into battle secure in the knowledge that any losses suffered could easily be replaced. The army had become a precious treasure that needed to be preserved and only used when defeat was deemed impossible.

  Politics

  The Senate

  The lack of conscripts was mainly due to the Senate being unwilling to supply the recruits the army needed. There is no doubt that the inhabitants of Italy who supplied legion after legion to face Hannibal in the third-century BC would have found it inconceivable that six hundred years later the same peninsula would be unable to supply the troops with which to defeat Alaric’s forces. The situation severely restricted the options open to the commander of the army.

  Alongside refusing to supply recruits, at every opportunity the Senate avoided paying the taxes needed to train and equip the army. This resulted in the small revenue that was available being used to recruit barbarian mercenaries that were already equipped with the basic equipment and had some experience of fighting. The vicious cycle this created would ultimately lead to Stilicho’s downfall.

  The situation was exacerbated by Stilicho’s own political position. Normally, an emperor would be able to distribute many ranks and titles amongst his supporters in order to encourage loyalty. This included the two posts of magister peditum and magister equitum. However, Stilicho himself occupied these two posts, with the exception of a short period when he appointed a magister equitum to command alongside him, but the experiment does not appear to have been a success and was never repeated. In effect, Stilicho’s position removed the highest level of reward from the aristocracy.

  Coupled with his monopoly of the highest rewards for service to the emperor, Stilicho retained a tight control of appointments and ensured that either they were given to his own supporters, or, where this was impossible such as in the military sphere, he appointed his supporters to the staff of the individual in order to maintain a close watch on their activities. Although this ensured their ‘loyalty’, it also encouraged opposition and it is noticeable that in his final years he was forced to give positions of rank and influence to an ever-decreasing circle of intimates. Th
e narrowing of his support showed that he was losing control of the West.

  The federates

  Apart from his loyalty to the House of Theodosius, the other major atypical quality that Stilicho possessed was his more flexible and pragmatic approach to the problems he faced. He realized that he had no choice but to pay mercenaries to augment his meagre force of regular troops. He also came to understand that he would be unable to protect the West without recruits from Illyricum, but the majority of people in the West did not realize this. Unfortunately, the employment of large numbers of barbarians alienated the Senate and drove many of his early supporters into opposition, including the army.18 At least part of the motive for the uprisings against Stilicho was a desire in the West to emulate the Eastern response against the growth of barbarian power.19

  The attack on the families of the federates was too late and went against political reality. Without the support of barbarian troops, the West simply did not have the ability to deal with barbarian invasions. He must have realized that his policy of using Germanic troops was losing him support, but it may be that he believed that his moral claims were so strong that Honorius could never turn against him.20 In this he was almost correct; only when his own safety was in doubt did Honorius bow to the demands of both the army and the politicians by ordering Stilicho’s arrest and execution.

  Catholic opposition

  The new Catholic majority that had appeared following Constantine the Great’s conversion in the early fourth century was still wary of the pagan minority and heretics such as Germanic Arians. They strongly objected to Stilicho’s employment of such people in positions of power. This was because Stilicho was determined to make use of any able men who would support his policies regardless of their personal beliefs. This was unacceptable to the more militant Catholics and they formed a core around which opposition to Stilicho was able to build. The death of the Catholic Mascezel after his successful campaign against his brother Gildo in 398 no doubt further alienated the Catholic ‘hard core’. There is little doubt that the existence of this opposition group helped to encourage others, such as Olympius, in the belief that surviving the overthrow of Stilicho was a real possibility.