Stilicho: The Vandal Who Saved Rome

by Ian Hughes

  Conclusion

  Stilicho was an able, if not gifted, general. Unfortunately, he was born into an age where offensive tactics were no longer feasible due to severe manpower shortages, and as a result he had little training or confidence in offensive rather than defensive warfare. Towards the end of his life he appears to have gained in confidence and become more willing to take the initiative and launch attacks when circumstances were favourable. Unfortunately, this was too little and too late. Moreover, he was forced to rely on barbarian troops, the employment of which caused opposition in both the Roman army itself and amongst the politicians at court.

  Politically, he was wise enough to ally himself with two of the most gifted men of the age: the politician Symmachus and the orator and poet Claudian. Stilicho was extremely unfortunate that these two influential figures died within two years of each other (Symmachus in 402 and Claudian in 404) and there were no individuals of like stature with which to replace them. Without their support political opposition to Stilicho began to unite, eventually leading to the rise and short-lived dominance of Olympius. Yet the fact that Olympius was overthrown so quickly, particularly when compared with Stilicho’s longevity, highlights the fact that Stilicho had a high degree of political ability. This was especially with regards to his political image. He made the most of having Symmachus representing him in the Senate and having Claudian as his mouthpiece to the wider Roman world. In this manner he ensured that those facts and interpretations which he wanted to promote gained the widest audience possible. Politically, Stilicho was master of the West until after the influence of Symmachus and the poems of Claudian began to fade.

  Throughout the period 395 to 406 Stilicho defended the West to the best of his abilities. There can be little doubt that it was only the pressure from the Senate in Rome that compelled him to put the defence of Italy before that of Gaul or Britain, and that this political pressure resulted in his reluctant declaration of war on the East when he sent Alaric into Epirus. On the whole, his record is one of an honourable man whose support was given to the family into which he had married, and that this was only compromised when he recognized the irreconcilable need of the West to be put before the unity of the Empire. Overall, the time of his dominance was one in which the West was allowed to recover a little from the ravages of civil war. Unfortunately, circumstances dictated that he would not be allowed the time or resources to complete his vision for the West.

  Yet in one aspect of his dominance he failed. Although it is possible to see Stilicho’s survival as the result of his mastery of propaganda, maybe Stilicho’s greatest failure of all was his inability to convince others of the military realities in the West and the need to either allow him to collect the recruits necessary to rebuild the army or the taxes to allow him to recruit and deploy large numbers of mercenaries.21 In this he failed and so ensured his own downfall.

  Notes

  Introduction

  1 Salway, 1993, 291.

  2 O’Flynn, 1983, 57.

  3 Cameron, 1974, 135–6.

  4 Heather, 1994, 5f.

  5 Honoré, 1987, passim.

  6 Deferrari, 1981, xx.

  7 Deferrari, 1981, xx.

  Chapter 1

  1 For a more detailed examination of the changes in the Roman Army, see Nicasie, 1998, passim.

  2 Possibly during the reign of Galerius or Diocletian.

  3 For example, in 306 Crocus (a king of the Alamanni serving under Constantine I), and after 316 Bonitus (a Frank, possibly praepositus legionis, also under Constantine).

  4 Soc. 4.33.1–4; Soz. 6.37.6f: 12f.

  5 Amm. Marc. 16.12.23f; Burns, 2003, 336.

  6 Heather, 1994, pp. 12–33.

  7 For a more detailed discussion of the issues, especially concerning the Sântana-de-Mures/ Cernjachov culture, see Kulikowski, 2007, Chapter 3 (43–70).

  8 Examples of recent research re-appraising the Huns include Heather 1991 and Randers-Pehrson 1983; for a more traditional view, E A Thompson 1948.

  9 Heather, 1991, 135.

  10 Heather, 1998, 98.

  11 See Heather, 1994, 182, for the view that the Goths adopted Arianism only as part of the condition of their entry into the Empire.

  12 Or maybe had been deployed in a concealed position ready for a swift attack – a tactic much used by the Goths; Todd, 2004, 43.

  13 For example, see Eunapius of Sardis, fr. 60. 1.

  14 The commonplace idea that Theodosius was recalled from Spain after the Battle of Adrianople is probably mistaken. The small amount of time between the Battle of Adrianople and Theodosius’ acclamation as emperor suggests that Theodosius was already in the vicinity when the battle took place. Instead, Errington proposed (Errington, R M, ‘The Accession of Theodosius I’, Klio 28 (1996), 438–53) that Theodosius was sent for before the battle and was thus a strong, readily available candidate for the throne following the death of Valens: Mitchell, 2007, 85.

  15 Cameron, 1993, 138.

  Chapter 2

  * All dates are AD unless otherwise stated.

  1 Claud., de Cons. Stil. I.

  2 Father a Vandal, Oros. VII 38; father a cavalry officer, Claud. de Cons. Stil. I: his mother Roman, Jer. Ep. 123. 16. Ferrill claims that he fought at Adrianople, although the veracity of the claim is uncertain.

  3 For a summary of current thinking, O’Flynn, 1983, 15.

  4 Claud., de Cons. Stil. I.

  5 Lydus, Mag. 3. 53.

  6 Claud., Laus Serenae, 179f.

  7 O’Flynn, 1983, 16.

  8 Kulikowski, 2007, 164.

  9 comes sacri stabuli, Claud. Laus Serenae, 190-3: comes domesticorum, CIL VI. 1731 (http://compute-in.ku-eichstaett.de:8888/pls/epigr/epiklergebnis_en), where he is styled comiti domesticorum et stabuli sacri. It should be noted that opinion differs as to whether these titles were held separately or jointly. See O’Flynn, 1983, 16 f and 157–8, note 14.

  10 Zos., 5.34: for discussion see O’Flynn, 1983, 17 and 157, note 13.

  11 Burns, 1994, 148.

  12 On the proposals, Zos. 4.37.

  13 Zos., 4.38–9.

  14 Philos., HE, 10.8.

  15 Zos., 4.45.3; Amm. Marc. 25.6.13; 31.10.18. It should be noted that Halsall, 2007, 190. n.17 accepts the ‘rebellion’ of 391 as a possibility, but notes that it is no means a certainty due to the ‘garbled’ nature of the sources.

  16 Zos., 4.45–8.

  17 Liebeschuetz, 2004, 54.

  18 Liebeschuetz, 2005, 263. n. 1.

  19 Theoderet, V. 18.

  20 On the dating of Claudian’s account, Kulikowski, 2007, 161.

  21 Claud., Get. 524–5; VI. Cons. Hon. 104–8.

  22 On the turmoil, Halsall, 2007, 194.

  23 Claud., VI. Cons Hon. 105.

  24 Jordanes, 29.146

  25 On Jordanes’ claims, see Heather, 1991, 31, n.47: Halsall, 2007, 189.

  26 For a full discussion of these topics, see Heather, 1994, 187–98.

  27 Zos., 4.53.4.

  28 Zos., 4.53.3–4.

  29 Examples of sources that claim he was murdered: Zos. 4.54.3; Soc. 5.25; and Oros. 7.35. Uncertain about events: Soz. 7.22.

  30 A more detailed discussion on the army and its ranks is included in Chapter 4.

  31 CIL VI 1730 (comiti divi Theodosi Augusti in omnibus bellis atque victoriis) and CIL VI 1731 (socio bellorum omnium et victoriarum, adfini etiam divi Theodosi Augusti): PLRE I, 854.

  32 Zos., 4.51.

  33 Cod. Th. 7.9.3.

  34 Claud., de Cons. Stil. I. 94–6; in Ruf. 1. 314–22; 350–1; III Cons. Hon. 147–50.

  35 E.g., Cameron, 1970, 55, where Stilicho’s martial abilities are downplayed because he did not fight and win a major battle.

  36 Liebeschuetz, 1998, 52.

  37 Zos., 5.5.4: Kulikowski, 2007, 164.

  38 Liebeschuetz, 1998, 54.

  39 For a detailed account of the arrangements, Zos. 4.55f.

  40 The use of different titles suggests that there was no structure to the
Roman military hierarchy, as claimed by some modern commentators. See Chapter 4.

  41 Eun. fr. 59; Zos. 4.56.1: see also Liebeschuetz, 2004, 54.

  42 20,000 men, Jordanes, Getica, 28.145: ‘a large number’, Soc. 5.25.

  43 Zos., 4.57.3; Joh. Ant. fr. 187.

  44 For example, Socrates (5.25) does not enter into detail and is an extremely simplified account, with the battle being decided very quickly in one day. Zosimus (4.55f) gives a more detailed account, but even this is comparatively brief and does not include detail we should like.

  45 Williams and Friell, 1995, 132.

  46 Sozomen, 7.24.

  47 Zos., 4.58.2; Soz. 7.24.

  48 Zos., 4.58.3.

  49 Or. 7.35.

  50 Following Zosimus, 4.58: Oros. 7.35.19. This is usually compared to Tacitus, Agr. 53. 2, where at the Battle of Mons Graupius Agricola allegedly placed the non-Roman auxilia to bear the brunt of the battle and so save Roman lives.

  51 Sozimus’ claim (7.24) that it was Theodosius’ vanguard that attacked the opposition supports the theory that Theodosius was compelled to use the troops at the front of the column, without regard to strategical or tactical niceties.

  52 Soz., 7.24 ‘he fell prone upon the earth, and prayed with tears’. Soc. 5.25, ‘he cast himself in great agony upon the ground, and invoked the help of God in this emergency’.

  53 Oros., 7.35.16; Soz. HE. 7.24.5.

  54 Zos., 4.58.

  55 Zos., 4.58; Fasti Vindobonenses priores no. 522.

  56 For example, Paulinus, Vita sancti Ambrosii, 31; Oros. 7.35; cf. a pagan perspective, Zos. 4.58. See also Oros. 7.35.

  57 Amb., Ep, Ex Coll. 2, 6: Ex. Coll 3. 3.

  Chapter 3

  1 On invasions, Cameron 1970, 38.

  2 Eun. fr. 70; quoted in PLRE I, 914.

  3 On the dating of the appointment, Cameron, 1970, 38. On his titles, see below.

  4 cf. Liebeschuetz, 1994, 150.

  5 Cameron, 1970, 31–2.

  6 O’Flynn, 1983, 46.

  7 O’Flynn, 1983, 45–6.

  8 Bequest made without other witnesses; Claud, Cos III Hon, 142 160: deathbed bequest; Zos. 5.4.3; Olymp. fr.2.

  9 O’Flynn, 1983, 16.

  10 For example, O’Flynn (1983, 15) neatly sidesteps the issue, merely noting that the claim was questionable but that the support of Ambrose ‘lent it an air of respectability’. Ferrill (1991, 90) states that Stilicho was hoping that Arcadius would acquiesce in his becoming guardian for the East thanks to the family ties, and suggests that Stilicho would have been surprised by Rufinus’ challenge to his authority. Ferrill (1991, 89) also claims that Stilicho’s control of the combined armies – since both armies were now in the West after the battle of the Frigidus – ensured his claim would succeed in the West, and further implies that a similar claim would be expected to succeed in the East. Williams and Friell (1994, 143) postulate that Stilicho ‘took the wish for the deed and, in effect, sensibly seized power’, suggesting that they don’t believe the bequest to be real and that Stilicho was not the legitimate guardian of the West; a better phrase might have been ‘assumed the position to which he had been appointed’. Finally, in the Cambridge Ancient History (2004, 113) although the claim is ‘undocumented and unofficial’, it remains ‘plausible’ as it was obvious that Theodosius wanted a united empire under his dynasty.

  11 Claud., Cos III Hon. 142 160

  12 Cameron, 1970, 42–4.

  13 Although it should be noted that Ferrill suggests that Stilicho hoped for Arcadius’ acquiescence and that Rufinus was not expected to challenge his authority (Ferrill, 1991, 90).

  14 In 397, Ruf. II. 4–6; in 398, IV Cons. Hon. 437–8 and Nupt. 307-8; and in 399, Eut. II. 599f; 400, Stil. II. 53f. See Cameron, 1990, 49–50.

  15 Cameron, 1974, 134–5.

  16 O’Flynn, 1983, 19.

  17 O’Flynn, 1983, 18-23.

  18 O’Flynn, 1983, 23.

  19 Norwich, 1988, 116–17.

  20 On the dates, Oost, 1965, 1–3.

  21 Chron. Pasch. 385.

  22 Liebeschuetz, 1998, 93–4.

  23 E.g., Helio, magister officiorum, 414 and following; Eutropius, praepositus sacri cubiculum from 395.

  24 For more on the meanings of these terms, see the discussion on titles and treaties in Chapter 4.

  25 Amm. Marc. 17.8.3–4. For this use of the term, see Goldsworthy, 2000, 215. See also Burns, 2003, 321.

  26 O’Flynn, 1983, 16.

  27 Matthews, 1998, 254–5.

  28 Matthews, 1998, 255.

  29 For a discussion and evaluation of the letters, see Matthews, 1975, passim.

  30 Olymp., fr.44; Soc. 5.14.5.

  31 PLRE I, 868.

  32 Matthews, 1998, 268. However there is little, if any, evidence to support his view that Symmachus had any resentment towards the ‘half-Vandal generalissimo’.

  33 Marcianus, PLRE I 555-6; Symm, Ep. III. 33: Flavianus, PLRE I, 345-6; Symm. Ep. IV, 19; V37. Flavianus was reinstalled as praefectus urbis Romae (prefect of Rome) by June 399.

  34 Matthews, 1998, 265–6.

  35 Matthews, 1998, 253.

  36 cf. Matthews, 1998, 268.

  37 Matthews, 1974, 73f. – esp. 75.

  38 Matthews, 1974, 68–9.

  39 cf. Matthews, 1998, 270.

  40 See Williams and Friell, 1994, 143; Claud., de Bello Gild. 305–6.

  41 PLRE I, 251.

  42 Matthews, 1998, 259.

  43 PLRE I, 149.

  44 PLRE I, 671–2

  45 Claud, Panegyricus de Consulatu Flavii Manlii Theodori (Panegyric on the Consulship of Flavius Manlius Theodorus).

  46 Claud., de Bello Gild. 305–6.

  47 Jones, 1966, 208.

  48 Matthews, 1998, 255–6.

  49 Matthews, 1998, 264: Cod Th. VIII. 5.54 (April 395).

  50 see Chapter 5.

  51 Cameron, Av. 1993, 126.

  52 O’Flynn (1983, 14–15) claims that Theodosius held Rufinus in higher esteem than Stilicho, based largely upon the fact that Rufinus was given a consulship in 392. However, this may simply have been a matter of seniority, since in 392 Stilicho had only just arrived within the higher echelons of rank and prestige.

  53 PLRE I, 746–7, 778–9, 876–8.

  54 Liebeschuetz, 1998, 52: 338, n. 8.

  55 Claud., in Ruf II, 76; Chron. Minor, 650. 34.

  56 PLRE I, 778–81; Joh. Ant. fr.188, 190; Eun. fr.62, and 63; Oros. 7.37.1.

  57 Zos. 4.51.1–3.

  58 PLRE II. 440-444; CAH 113.

  59 PLRE II, 410; Zos. 5.3.2.

  60 Chron. Pasch. The marriage appears to have been relatively happy, since they had five children between the marriage and her death in October 404.

  61 Zos. 5.3.

  Chapter 4

  1 For a full discussion on the size of units and the problems of dating any changes, see for example Nicasie 1998, 23f. and Southern and Dixon, 1996, 29–33.

  2 As an earlier example, in Alexandria Caesar’s Legio VI had less than 1,000 men left of its original ‘paper’ strength of approximately 5,000 men (Caesar, Alexandrian War, 69), and in the Civil Wars his legions average less than 3,000 men (Caesar, Civil Wars, 3.6 and 3.89).

  3 There is still dispute over the strength of the Roman army, both before and after the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine. Jones (1966) sees the pre-Tetrarchy army as c. 300,000 strong (p. 32) and the post Tetrarchy army as 435,000 strong, (p. 266), following John Lydus (p. 213). Agathias, writing in the sixth century, gives the figure of 645,000 for the fourth century army, which is probably far too high: Cameron (1993) accepts the figure of c.400,000 (p. 34–5). Heather (2005) leaves the question open (pp. 63–4).

  4 Jones, 1966, p. 32.

  5 Annual conscription Southern and Dixon, 1996, pp. 43–4; deserters and enlistment Cod. Th. 7.18.1f.

  6 There appears to be some confusion over the use of riparienses/ripenses and limitanei: see Nicasie (1998, p. 19–22) and Southern and Dixon (1996, p. 36) for a clar
ification. For the sake of ksimplicity the traditional separation into river- and land- frontier forces respectively has been used.

  7 Elton, 2004, 204f.

  8 Elton, 2004, 216.

  9 palatina: from palatium, ‘palace’.

  10 E.g., the Balkan campaigns of Valentinian I against the Alamanni; Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 41.

  11 See Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 57.

  12 Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 47.

  13 Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 47: Not. Dig. Or . XI. 6. 10; Oc . XI. 7.

  14 Not. Dig. Oc . XLII. 46–70.

  15 Elton, 2004, 131.

  16 Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 48: Liebeschuetz, 1991, p. 9.

  17 Elton, 2004, 135.

  18 Olymp. fr.7.4.

  19 Proportion, Elton, 2004, 152.

  20 c.f. Elton, 2004, 138–40.

  21 Christie, 2007, 569.

  22 Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 14

  23 E.g. Jones, 1966, p. 32; Southern and Dixon, 1996, p. 14.

  24 It is possible to compare these ideas with several passages in Procopius, which, although of a later date, may have a bearing on the matter. Procopius gives numerous examples of both Justinian and his generals giving commands of units to members of their bodyguard – primarily, of course, Belisarius. In this way Belisarius could gauge the effectiveness of the individuals as well as giving them command experience in situations where inefficiency would not necessarily lead to disaster. This was especially the case during the siege of Rome, when Belisarius rotated command of sallies against the Goths between members of his personal bodyguard: e.g. Proc. 5.27.4; 5.27.11.

  25 E.g. Cowardice, Amm. Marc. 24.3.1–2 and 27.2.6–7; Proc. 8.16.19–20. Generals unable to fulfil duties and only serving for status and money, Lib Or. 47.28-9. Valens unhappy with his subordinates, Zos. 4.22.4. See further Southern and Dixon, 1996, pp. 174–5. It should be noted, however, that modern ‘staff colleges’ have had similar experiences of producing low-quality officers.