Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses

by Mark Curtis

  In October McLean visited Saudi Arabia as a personal guest of the King, who called on Britain to provide aid to the Royalists, especially 'air support. . . if possible openly, but if this is not possible, then clandestinely'. McLean also visited Yemen to meet with the Royalists, including Prince Hassan at his headquarters, to assess the situation and delivered a report of his visit to Defence Minister Peter Thorneycroft. By early November, Saudi arms and money were flowing to the Royalists and by mid-November the Foreign Office had produced a policy paper outlining the options open to the government, including covert aid.11

  In early December, McLean again visited Yemen, where the Imam's forces informed him of the need for arms and ammunition. On returning to London, McLean met the Foreign Secretary, urged British aid and began canvassing the Cabinet for support. McLean was carrying a letter from al-Badr to the Prime Minister asking for support for the Royalists who were disappointed with the lack of aid so far forthcoming from Britain. At the same time, the High Commissioner in Aden said that 'we ought now to be considering definite steps to ' reinsure ourselves with' the Royalists.12

  When the British ambassador to Egypt, Sir Harold Beeley, met Egyptian President Nasser's persotial adviser, Mohammed Heikal, the latter accused Britain of several aspects of involvement in the fighting in Yemen, notably supplying fighter aircraft to Jordan. Heikal told Beeley that McLean was advising the Royalists, that he had visited the Kings of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, both of whom were now intervening in Yemen. He also said that the Jordanian Air Force Commander who had defected to Egypt 'asserted that his orders, which involved attacking targets in the Yemen, had been given to him personally by King Hussein in the presence of a British Air Advisor'.

  Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home was initially against backing the Royalists. On 7 January 1963, McLean's intelligence report was assessed by the Cabinet's Overseas and Defence Committee, which advised the Cabinet not to recognise the new regime, arguing that Britain could not give direct support to the Royalists and that any operation had to be at arm's length.n

  In late February British positions in the Federation of South Arabia were attacked by Yemeni tribesmen and at the same time Egyptian troops began an offensive into the Royalist-held mountains in Yemen. Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys and Julian Amery urged retaliation and Macmillan appointed Amery his Minister for Aden with a remit to organise covert British support for the Royalists, working from his office at the Ministry of Aviation.

  McLean visited Yemen for a third time on 1 March 1963. Shortly afterwards a Royalist delegation visited Israel, following which unmarked Israeli planes made flights from Djibouti to drop arms over Royalist areas. By early March, the files confirm that Britain was already involved in supplying arms to the Royalists, via Sherif bin Hussein, the tribal leader in Beihan in the federation.14

  On 1 March the governor in Aden, Sir Charles Johnstone, had proposed withholding arms supplies for two to three weeks since there was now a danger that any arms supplied would fall into Republican hands and could be 'attributed to British support". He also berated his political masters in London for having refused repeated requests for 'additional supplies to Royalists made by me' in November, December and February. If these supplies had been granted, he added, 'the Royalists would never have got to their present low ebb' in the fighting.

  In mid-April 1963, McLean asked the Foreign Secretary for immediate support, and the Saudis stepped in with a small supply of arms and ammunition. According to Dorril, several million pounds' worth of light weapons, including 50,000 rifles, were secretly flown out from an RAF station in Wiltshire. To mask their true origin, they were landed in Jordan for onward transportation via Beihan. By the end of the month, the Royalists had regained some of their lost territory.15

  At a meeting in late April 1963 – involving MI6 chief Dick White, McLean, SAS founder David Stirling, ex-SAS officer Brian Franks, Douglas-Home and Amery – Stirling and Franks were told there could be no official SAS involvement and were asked to recommend someone who could organise a mercenary operation. According to Dorril, they approached Jim Johnson, recently retired commander of 21 SAS, and Lt. Col. John Woodhouse, commander of 22 SAS. McLean, Johnson and Stirling were introduced by Amery to the Royalist Foreign Minister, Ahmed al-Shami, who wrote out a cheque for £5,000. The SAS men operated through Stirling's Television International Enterprises company, which set up a cover organisation, Rally Films. The Saudi prince Sultan financed the project with gold bullion. French mercenaries were also recruited, along with SAS volunteers given temporary leave from official duties.

  The office of the adjutant of 21 SAS volunteers (TA) in London was used as a clearing ground for the British mercenaries, who, according to the organiser, were paid £150 a month by the Foreign Office and the MoD. In Aden, Tony Boyle, the aide-de-camp to the Aden governor, evolved a system for passing mercenaries through Customs while Sherif Hussein organised a network of safe houses in Beihan from which operations into the Yemen could be launched. As the traffic increased, officers were seconded to the staff of the Federal Regular Army.16

  The proposed Yemen operation was the subject of fierce debate in Whitehall but the Prime Minister was eventually persuaded to support the operation and instructed MI6 to aid the Royalists. An MI6 task force was set up which then coordinated the supply of weapons and personnel. This was organised by John da Silva, formerly head of Ml6's station in Bahrain.

  In October Macmillan resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by Douglas-Home. The new Foreign Secretary, Rab Butler, was opposed to covert support for the Royalists. By December 1963, the new Prime Minister reported that Egypt had so far suffered 10,000–12,000 casualties in Yemen.

  British actions continued as SAS officer Jonny Cooper engaged in intelligence activities against Egyptian forces and his team trained the Royalist army. In February 1964 Cooper and his men prepared for their first clandestine air-drop of supplies, codenamed MANGO, with the discreet backing of MI6 and the CIA. Arms and ammunition were parachuted into drop zones manned by Cooper's team, who guided the planes in by radio.17

  In a memo to the Prime Minister in March 1964, Butler wrote that the Egyptian and Yemeni assertion that supplies for the Royalists are being introduced from the Beihan area [in the federation] has been mentioned in the latest report to the Security Council by U Thant and we have not been able to give an effective reply since we know that this is in fact true.

  Butler drew the distinction between aiding the Royalists in Yemen on the one hand – which Britain should not support, in his view – and, on the other hand, aiding activities in the federation and 'across the Yemen border' to prevent subversion. He supported the High Commissioner in Aden's calls for 'a selective system of unattributable retaliation in the Yemeni frontier area for sabotage, mine-laying and so on in the federation'.18

  Defence Secretary Thorneycroft called for Britain to organise 'tribal revolts' in the frontier areas, 'deniable action . . . to sabotage intelligence centres and kill personnel engaged in anti-British activities', including the Egyptian Intelligence HQ at Taiz, and 'covert anti-Egyptian propaganda activities in the Yemen'. He also argued for 'further assistance' to the Royalists including 'either money, or arms or both'.

  By April 1964 the British had already authorised mine-laying (called Operation Eggshell), issuing arms and ammunition to tribesmen in the frontier area (Operation Stirrup) and sabotage in the frontier area (Operation Bangle). A plan 'for the instigation of a revolt in the Beidha area', just inside the Yemen border, had been approved by July at the latest. Three hundred thousand pounds had been released for this purpose, but Egyptian counter-action was preventing the revolt from getting off the ground.

  Acts of 'subversion in Yemeni territory against individual targets' were being carried out, however, 'under the control of British officers within the federation', according to an MoD memo. These officers 'can hand out arms and money in installments [sic] according to the local situation and in proportion to the successes ac
hieved'. Operation Rancour was the codeword given to 'current covert operations to exploit [sic] dissident tribes up to 20 miles into Yemen to neutralise Egyptian subversive action against Aden'.19

  An extraordinary top-secret document in the government files went even further. Entitled 'Yemen: The range of possible courses of action open to us', it considers 'assassination or other action against key personnel' involved in subversion in the federation, 'especially Egyptian Intelligence Service officers'. It also outlines 'action to stimulate a guerrilla campaign' in the frontier area by supplies of arms and money and 'non-retaliatory sabotage' including in Sana'a. It suggests 'closing our eyes' to Saudi arms supplies to the Royalists and undertaking ' "black" pamphleteering' in Republican-controlled areas of Yemen and '"black" radio broadcasts' from the federation.20

  Foreign Secretary Butler gave this paper to the Prime Minister, commenting that '1 should perhaps say' that some of the options 'may involve more political risk' than others:

  For instance, the assassination of Egyptian intelligence officers would no doubt involve a greater chance of discovery and retaliation than supplying the Royalists with money.

  As these options were being debated in private, on 14 May 1964 Prime Minister Douglas-Home lied to parliament:

  Our policy towards the Yemen is one of nonintervention in the affairs of that country. It is not therefore our policy to supply arms to the Royalists in the Yemen.21

  In July Thorneycroft recommended that Britain should, together with Saudi Arabia, be 'sustaining the Royalists during the coming months' by providing arms and money to the 'Royalist tribes'. At the time, the Saudis were asking Britain for £2 million over one year, a quarter of which was for arms. The files also refer to the need for a British decision on whether to agree 'to another proposal to supply rifles' to two tribes for attacks inside Yemen. A detailed plan was submitted to the British in July by Sherif Hussein and Royalists in Yemen calling on Britain to supply 11,000 rifles and £600,000.

  At the end of July ministers took the decision to promote 'further measures' to support the Royalists, meaning to 'give all necessary facilities' to the Saudis to secure arms from Britain. Britain's ambassador to Saudi Arabia then met Prince Feisal and told him of Britain's willingness to provide arms to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen but said London could not provide overt aid directly to the Royalists.22

  In the summer of 1964, Prime Minister Douglas-Home was faced with opposition from his Foreign Secretary to direct aid to the Royalists, while the Defence Secretary and others argued for precisely that. According to Dorril, Dick White, the head of MI6, won the new Prime Minister over to supporting a 'clandestine mercenary operation'. The go-ahead for full support for the Royalists was sanctioned in the summer of 1964.

  In 1964, 48 ex-servicernen were employed as mercenaries, including a dozen former SAS men. M16 officers provided intelligence and logistical support, while GCHQ pinpointed the location of Republican units. MI6 operatives also coordinated the crossing of tribesmen over the border from the federation into Yemen where they tracked Egyptian army officers. 'In what turned out to be a dirty war, MI6 officers "manipulated" the tribesmen and helped "direct the planting of bombs" at Egyptian military outposts along the frontier, while garrison towns were "shot up" and political figures "murdered"', Dorril notes.23

  One letter in the government files was written in August 1964 by Colonel Michael Webb, a mercenary who claimed to have recently retired from the army, to Julian Amery. Webb said that he has been fighting with the Imam's forces for the past few weeks and his cover was as a freelance journalist. He had kept the British embassy 'fully informed of my movements and given them all the information I have obtained'.

  The following month a note to the Prime Minister recommended the supply of bazookas and ammunition to the Sherif of Beihan 'for use by a dissident group in Taiz' [Yemen]. At the same time, Stirling, Boyle and Royalist Foreign Minister al-Shami met in Aden where they were joined by an MI6 officer and drew up plans for establishing a regular supply of arms and ammunition to the Royalist forces. This would be undertaken either by parachute or overland from Saudi Arabia and Beihan, or via the Yemen coast.24

  The election of the Labour government of Harold Wilson in October 1964 seems not to have upset the covert operation. Dorril notes secret RAF bombing in retaliation for Egyptian attacks on camel trains supplying weapons to French and British mercenaries. As part of an arms deal with Saudi Arabia, Britain agreed a contract worth £26 million with a private company, Airwork Services, to provide personnel for the training of Saudi pilots and ground crew. Airwork also recruited former RAF pilots as mercenaries to fly operational missions against Egyptian and Republican targets along the Yemeni border. By 1965 MI6 was chartering aircraft with discreet pilots and had obtained the agreement of Israel to use its territory for mounting operations.

  Following a ceasefire declared in August 1965, the Britishbacked mercenaries reverted to supplying medical aid and maintaining communications. By late 1966 the war had restarted and the fighting had reached a stalemate 'but the British were still running an extensive mercenary operation in Yemen with those recruited said to be paid £10,000 per annum' by a mysterious centre in London run by Stirling.

  British air operations continued into 1967, according to the files. A Foreign Office note of March 1967 states that the British pilots were recruited by Airwork to fly the five Lightnings and five Hunters already supplied by Britain and that 'we have raised no objection to their being employed in operations, though we made it clear to the Saudis that we could not publicly acquiesce in any such arrangements'.25

  After Egypt's defeat by Israel in the 1967 war, Nasser decided to pull troops out of Yemen, and in November Britain withdrew from Aden. Yet files of March 1967 refer to ongoing 'covert operations in South Arabia' and to 'Rancour II operations'; most files related to this have been censored. One exception is a June 1967 paper saying that 'Rancour operations in the Yemen have been extremely successful' in driving the Egyptians back from parts of the frontier and tying them down, It then recommends that these operations should continue after the independence of South Arabia (i.e. South Yemen). These could be undertaken 'using as a cover the military mission' for South Arabia, or 'alternatively the new embassy could provide the cover'.26

  Despite the Egyptian withdrawal the civil war in Yemen continued. In 1969, two mercenaries from the private firm Watchguard were killed while leading a band of Royalist guerrillas in the North. Al-Badr had fled to England where he died, and in March 1969 the Saudis cut off their supplies to the Royalists. A treaty was signed, ending hostilities, the country was reborn as North Yemen. Two hundred thousand people had died.27

  Aden: The Radfan revolt

  The basic British goal in Aden had been outlined in March 1964 by Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, the High Commissioner, in a set of proposals which would grant South Arabia independence but which would also 'ensure that full power passed decisively into friendly hands' and 'which would leave it dependent on ourselves and subject to our influence'.

  Much of the population refused to cooperate and Britain soon had to cope with a full-scale revolt, not only among politicised groups in Aden but also in a corner of the federation called Radfan, which broke out in 1964.

  The Middle East Commander-in-Chief, Lt. Gen. Sir Charles Harington, recognised that the Radfan tribesmen 'have been eking out a poor and primitive existence for hundreds of years' in a situation where 'there is barely sufficient substance to support the population, families seldom making more than £50 a year profit'. 'Therefore', he wrote, 'the temptation and indeed the necessity to look elsewhere for aid is understandable' – which is what many people did, turning to offers from Egypt and the new Republican government in Yemen. Harington also noted that if Britain 'had given more financial help' to the Radfanis in the past 'the temptation to go elsewhere for the price of subversion might have been avoided'.28

  Britain resorted to brutal methods against civilians to crush the Radfan rebel
lion. In April 1964 one minister, Duncan Sandys, called for its 'vigorous suppression' and that the British Commander-in-Chief be authorised 'to use whatever methods are necessary' for success while seeking to 'minimise adverse international criticism'. Action should also include authorisation for the High Commissioner to pay 'personal subsidies' (i.e., bribes) 'to key members of the federal council', i.e., in the Federation of South Arabia.

  Air strikes against the rebels were approved in May and Trevaskis suggested sending soldiers to 'put the fear of death into the villages' controlled by the rebels. If this wasn't enough to secure submission, then