Unpeople: Britain's Secret Human Rights Abuses

by Mark Curtis

  it would be necessary to deliver some gun attacks on livestock or men outside the villages. Since tribesmen have been regularly firing at our aircraft and have hit several of them, we might be able to claim that our aircraft were shooting back of [sic] men who had fired at us from the ground.29

  The British forces had been authorised by ministers to 'harass the means of livelihood' of villages in order to bring the rebels to submission. There were no restrictions on using 20-pound 'anti personnel bombs' although 'the public relations aspect' of these 'will want very careful handling', the Ministry of Defence noted. Thus the Defence Secretary had asked the Chief of the Air Staff to 'ensure the secrecy of the operation' to use these bombs.30

  The Chiefs of Staff recognised the importance of public relations generally, concluding in a reflective report on operations in Radfan that 'the greatest need is for an early and clear PR policy for such operations to be established in London'. These brutal campaigns are the precursors of current 'information operations', providing important lessons for Whitehall planners over the decades.

  In January 1964, the High Commissioner was given £50,000 to bribe local tribal leaders. He was also provided with £15,000 'to help undermine the position of the People's Socialist Party in Aden', the most important political opposition to continued British rule. Trevaskis also noted that this money would help 'to prevent their winning coming elections'. In July 1964 ministers approved the spending of £500,000 to be used by the High Commissioner 'to distribute to rulers where this would help to prevent tribal revolts'.31

  Oman: Crushing rebellions

  Although many of the circumstances were different, the same basic British interests and policies were evident in British interventions in Oman.

  In July 1957 an uprising in central Oman brought about a collapse in the Sultan's authority in the area and threatened control of the country as a whole. Various tribes defecting from the Sultan joined forces with another tribal leader, Talib, who had landed in the country with an unusual combination of arms supplied from Saudi Arabia and backing from Nasser's Egypt. On 18 July Britain decided on air action against the rebels and the following month ground troops were despatched to join the fighting.

  Just after Britain had begun its military intervention, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan explained to President Kennedy that 'we believe that the Sultan is a true friend to the West and is doing his best for his people'.32 As Macmillan would surely have been aware, it would have been hard to discover a more oppressive regime to whose defence Britain leapt than that of the Omani Sultan's at this time. Literally all resources and political power were in the Sultan's hands. He kept hundreds of slaves at his palace, which he rarely left. There was no infrastructure to speak of and the main city did not even have a public electricity supply until 1971. There were hardly any schools or health care, and diseases were rampant.

  'There is quite a lot to be said for a reasonably efficient feudalism', Britain's political resident in the Gulf, Sir Bernard Burrows, had commented a few months before the uprising, referring to the Gulf generally where Britain supported similar regimes. Burrows also noted three days after the British decision to intervene that there had been:

  a noticeable swing of general opinion throughout the Sultanate in favour of Talib, who is becoming more and more recognised as the local exponent of Arabism, and against the Sultan, whose popularity is at a very low ebb now.

  Burrows was also aware that 'it was fear of the British that kept' the tribes in the Sultanate on the Sultan's side 'and only the thought that we were coming back which kept them from joining the rebels now'. Thus Britain ruled the country with terror and force in the name of the Sultan.53

  Also instructive are the views of Burrows' replacement, George Middleton. After 18 months of war by the British against the rebels, he told the Foreign Office that 'this is yet another instance of our appearing to back an unpopular, undemocratic and selfish potentate'. He added:

  The condition of the people is miserable, the Sultan is unpopular, there is no central administration . . . and, under the present regime, not a great deal of hope for the future. . . What surprises me, is not that there is still a rebellion [in the central areas] but that there are not half a dozen similar uprisings in other parts of the country.

  However, Middleton's views were countered by his political master Julian Amery, the Colonial Minister. Amery said that the Sultan's record is 'on the whole a good one' since 'he has been loyal to the policy of cooperation with Britain' and has given Britain 'important facilities to the RAF at Masirah and Salalah', towns in Oman. Also, he was an opponent of Arab nationalism and 'the only Arab ruler who gave public support to the Suez expedition' just over two years earlier.34

  Britain had to intervene since 'successful defiance of the Sultan . . . is likely to have a snowball effect' throughout Oman and other parts of the Gulf, the Foreign Office stated. Bombing would 'prevent the infection spreading' elsewhere in the Gulf 'by showing our friends there that we mean business'.

  Defending the regime at all seems morally repugnant in itself; but British actions in the war surpassed even this. Officials in Bahrain, Britain's key diplomatic post in the region, noted that the purpose of British 'air action' in support of the Sultan was 'to show the population the power of weapons at our disposal' and to convince them that 'resistance will be fruitless and lead only to hardship'. The aim was 'to inflict the maximum inconvenience on the population so that out of discomfort and boredom they will turn' against the rebels.35

  The British bombed water supplies and agricultural gardens – civilian targets and therefore war crimes. In a memo written on 21 July 1957, Charles Gault in Bahrain noted that the Sultan had agreed to air attacks on date gardens which, with attacks from cannon fire, 'would deter dissident villages [sic] from gathering their crops'. He also noted that 'it also appears possible to damage water supply to certain villages by air attack on wells'. This was later described as 'denial of water supply to selected villages by air action'.36

  The following year Burrows wrote that 'shelling of mountain villages continues intermittently and is having success in denying the use of the village [sic] and cultivation'. He also noted a recent 'air attack on water supply' of villages in the plains around Saiq and Sharaijah, two Omani towns at the foothills of the Jebel mountain, saying that 'shelling has already rendered cultivation . . . hazardous' in these areas.

  Burrows also mentioned that he had advised against similar attacks against the villages of the plains in this area last summer 'on the grounds of adverse political effect' since 'such attacks would have become widely known'. But now 'circumstances have somewhat changed since then'. Villages on top of the mountain of Jebel Akhdar 'are in a somewhat different position' since 'what happens there does not necessarily become widely known throughout the country'. Therefore, Burrows approved of an 'attack on water supply at Said and Sharaijah' and argued for 'rocket attacks on water channel and tanks'.37

  In April 1958 Macmillan approved British 'attacks by rocket on water supplies', although he failed to approve a proposal from the Defence Minister to bomb 'cultivated areas'. In August 1957 the Foreign Secretary had approved air strikes without needing to give warning. At the same time, the Foreign Office noted that 'we want to avoid the RAF killing Arabs if possible, especially as there will be newspaper correspondents on the spot'.38

  By October 1957, British and local troops had recaptured the main centres of population while Talib and about 50 rebels then climbed the Jebel Ahkdar mountains and mustered the support of some of the hill tribesmen. At this time the Foreign Office was saying that Burrows, the political resident in Bahrain, 'has recommended that the three villages concerned . . . should be warned that unless they surrender the ringleaders of the revolt, they will be destroyed one by one by bombing'.

  Yet the government initially decided against bombing the villages on the mountain since 'world opinion at that time was very flammable'. Instead, an alternative was approved in February
1958. The British commander in Oman noted in a later report that the British forces lent two 'medium guns' to the Sultan's forces and 'with these, manned by his own men, he could blast the top of the mountain where and when he pleased, without publicity or odium affecting HMG'. However, this strategy failed: the guns did 'insufficient damage', as the 'daily rate of fire' was restricted by the cost and availability of ammunition.

  So in March 1958 Britain authorised 'the rocketing and bombing of suspected rebel hideouts' on the mountain and the main routes leading up the mountain. This soon involved air attacks on supply routes, gunning the mountain top and 'air attacks to deny waterways and proscribe cultivation outside inhabited areas', according to the British Commander.39

  Fighting continued through the summer and the rebels on the Jebel mountain remained undefeated. In November 1958 it was agreed to deploy the SAS to take the mountain. Their actions in this campaign have contributed to the legendary portrayal of the SAS as superhumans. However, it is in part the terrible violence inflicted by the British beforehand, including these unreported war crimes, that explains the success of the SAS.

  The assault on the mountain began after British officials had recognised that Talib and another rebel leader wished 'to have peace to live in their villages' and that, even though British officials could not be sure of the leaders' seriousness to negotiate a peace, their conditions 'would at least represent the basis for negotiation'.40 Not for the last time in the Middle East, Britain instead pushed for the military solution. The SAS were deployed without the agreement of the Sultan; the Sultan was barely consulted on British operations in the war generally, suggesting that it was really a British as much as an Omani war. In January 1959, the rebels were quickly defeated.

  The British Commander's report at the end of the war stated that 'great pains were taken throughout the Command to keep all operational actions out of the press' – a strategy aided by the Sultan's complete ban on visas for reporters. 'Throughout the whole campaign', the report noted, 'a game of bluff and deceit was carried out, which at times was far from pleasant'.41

  The war solved little. As the Foreign Office observed in July 1959, there was no political settlement in the interior and the crushing of the rebellion 'provided no more than a breathing space' for the Sultan. The long term problem' lay in the 'continued disaffection of large parts of the interior towards the Sultan', which he was not interested in addressing. The Sultan 'spends nearly all his time inaccessibly' at his palace while 'hardly any of his ministers can be regarded as even moderately competent'.42

  Five years later, a rebellion broke out in the province of Dhofar. The rebels proclaimed the liberation of Dhofar in 1965; they were later to receive the support of Egypt, Iraq and South Yemen (once the British had been forced out of Aden in 1967), and rename themselves the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). In response, the British embarked upon another military intervention that lasted until 1974.

  The Dhofar uprising was 'an indigenous rebellion against the repression and neglect' of the Sultan, the Foreign Office later said.43 Even by 1970 it was forbidden to smoke in public, to play football, to wear glasses, shoes or trousers, to eat in public or to talk to anyone for more than fifteen minutes. The poverty and repression that lay at the root of the uprising here, as with those in North Yemen and Aden, were well recognised by British officials. Bill Carden, the British Consul General in Muscat, for example, noted that 'apart from the few who work for the RAF, for the American oil company and for the Sultan, Dhoafris have no means of earning a reasonable livelihood in their country'. Meanwhile, the many who go abroad see 'the unfavourable comparisons between the great amount which is done for the people there and the very little done for them in Dhofar'. Carden noted that 'the Sultan has for too long had too many repressive measures' such as forbidding people to buy bicycles or radios without permission.44

  By August 1967 Oman was exporting around 10 million barrels of oil a year, with prospects to increase this level massively. The manager of Oman's Petroleum Development Corporation (PDO) was British, and probably the second most powerful man in the country after the Sultan. Shell had an 85 per cent interest in Omani oil. Almost all of Oman's income was generated from oil; the revenues were paid directly to the Sultan, who released a proportion for the exchequer.

  'If the Omani rebel movement were to succeed', Britain's political resident in Bahrain commented, and if 'the territory where the oilfields lie were to be separated constitutionally from the coastal area near Muscat where the terminal is situated, the oil company might find itself in great difficulty'.

  By 1972 Foreign Office minister Patrick Jenkin was saying that 'success in Dhofar is essential for the Sultan' (i.e., Britain):

  If he fails there and loses his throne as a result, there is little doubt that stability in the Gulf area would be seriously affected, with consequent risk to our substantial commercial interests.45

  Britain crushed the Dhofar rebellion and also removed the Sultan, who had by then become a liability, in a coup in 1970. The files on this coup remain classified. The beneficiary of the coup, the Sultan's son, Qaboos, remains in power today as Britain's leading ally in the Gulf.

  TABLE

  BRITAIN AND GLOBAL

  DEATHS

  The following table gives figures on the estimated number of deaths in the post-war period for which Britain bears significant responsibility. I have divided these into four categories of degrees of responsibility:

  Direct responsibility British military and/or covert forces have played a direct role.

  Indirect responsibility Britain has provided strong support (through trade, arms exports, aid and/or diplomatic support) for allies engaged in aggression or killing.

  Active inaction Britain has specifically helped to block international action to halt killings. (This is distinct from 'turning a blind eye', which would include many other cases.)

  Others A solitary case, that of the Idi Amin regime's state terror.

  Estimates on the number of deaths in any conflict always vary, often very widely. Where there is no footnote, I have used the most commonly cited estimate.

  The overall figure is between 8.6 million and 13.5 million – or around 10 million. Of these, Britain bears 'direct responsibility' for between 4 million and 6 million deaths.

  This figure is if anything likely to be an underestimate. Not all British interventions have been included: some, such as those in Oman in 1957–1959 and 1964–1974 have been omitted because of lack of data. In the category of 'indirect responsibility', I have excluded many repressive regimes backed by Britain throughout the post-war period; I have tended instead to focus on those cases described in this and previous books. I have also not included the many millions of deaths recorded annually in developing countries from easily preventable diseases and other consequences of poverty. As a major shaper of world order, Britain bears significant responsibility for the global economic system, yet it is impossible to calculate the British share in this blame.

  The figures generally refer to the number of 'enemy' deaths rather than total deaths, where it has been possible to disaggre- gate the estimates.

  Finally, I do not pretend this is a fully scientific analysis – the criteria for inclusion, the extent of British responsibility and the estimates on numbers of deaths are of course all open to interpretation. Nevertheless, it gives a reasonably accurate reflection of British responsibility for a very large number of deaths in the post-war world.

  DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY

  Year Conflict Estimated number

  of deaths Britain's role

  2003 Invasion of Iraq 10,000–55,0001 British forces played

  secondary role to US in

  military operations

  2001 Bombing of

  Afghanistan 15,000–25,0002 Ditto

  1999 Bombing of

  Yugoslavia 1000 British forces played

  secondary role to US in

  military o
perations as

  part of wider NATO

  campaign

  1998 Bombing of Iraq 600–1,6004 British forces played

  secondary role to US in

  military operations

  1991 Gulf war over 100,0005 Ditto

  1982 Falklands 655 British military fought

  Argentina

  1961–1973 War against

  South-east Asia 2,00,000–3,000,0006 Britain privately backed

  US strongly, regularly

  supported it publicly but

  also played several direct