Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  The 83-foot cutters 83401, renamed USCG 20, and the 83402, renamed USCG 21, were two of the sixty Coast Guard cutters sent to England to serve as rescue craft off each of the invasion beaches during the Normandy Invasion.

  The cutters of the United States Coastguard Service are boats about 80 feet long. Their engines use high-octane petrol which is the most volatile and inflammable of fuels. This is a fact well appreciated by their officers and men, but they have never been known to allow the knowledge to set any limit to their service or to the dangers which they are prepared to face.

  So it was with Lieutenant Clarke. His cutter was in the vicinity when a British landing craft carrying high-octane petrol in to the beach was hit and blew up. The burning spirit spread at once over the surface of the water and made it literally a sea of flame. Although he fully appreciated the danger to his own craft, with the same volatile fuel in her tanks and engines, Clarke drove his cutter through the flames and rescued the survivors of the landing craft. For this service Lieutenant Clarke was subsequently decorated with the DSC by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord.

  It would be difficult to find an instance of bravery to rival that of Paul Kozub, Motor Machinist’s Mate, First Class, USNR. Kozub was serving in a landing craft which was damaged by mines and mortar fire and had to be abandoned while it was still 160 yards from the shore line. He helped to get the wounded ashore and to tend them despite heavy fire from the enemy. Then he saw another landing craft disabled 150 yards off the beach. There were bodies to be seen on the after part of this landing craft, and Kozub saw that there was movement among them. Some of the men were only wounded, yet they would surely have been drowned if they had been left, for the tide was rising rapidly over the wrecked landing craft. Kozub searched about on the beach under withering fire until he found a line. With this round him he plunged without hesitation into the water and succeeded in rescuing the wounded men from the landing craft despite the surf and the machine-gun fire of the enemy. For this act of extreme gallantry Paul Kozub was decorated with the Navy and Marine Corps Medal.

  USCG Rescue Flotilla, cutter No. 1 was under the command of Lieutenant Commodore Alexander V. Stewart Jr. Here it is typing up against an LCT(S), which itself is by the side of a much larger vessel from which the photograph was taken.

  While the work of the landing craft in bringing the troops and their equipment into the correct positions on the beaches was being carried out with such determination and skill, the organisation of the beaches themselves was proceeding apace. This was a matter of tremendous importance. If the beaches had not been properly organised they would have quickly become “bottlenecks” in the system of supply and reinforcement to the troops who had fought their way inland. Moreover, the beaches would quickly have become choked with men, equipment, vehicles and stores, thus impeding further unloading in addition to presenting valuable and vulnerable targets to the enemy. The task of organising the beaches would have been difficult enough even if there had been no enemy opposition whatever.

  The officers and men who had to control the beaches were landed with the first wave of the assault. They had to begin their work from “scratch” under fire and be prepared for an ever-increasing flow of men, vehicles and stores. The officers in charge of reinforcements had to be shown the way to the units they had to join. The drivers of vehicles had to be guided. Landing craft had to be shown where to “touch down” in the sectors which had been cleared of obstructions. The moment landing craft had been unloaded they had to be got away from the beaches to make room for their successors of the following waves. Landing craft which had “broached to” in the surf or which had been so damaged that they could not put back to sea had to be hauled out of the way by tractors or pushed out of the way by bulldozers. Notices and direction posts had to be put up. Above all, efficient communications had to be established at once with ships and with the headquarters of military formations fighting their way off the beaches and inland.

  The task of organising the beaches was one demanding an instantaneous grasp of a rapidly changing situation, tireless energy, and almost unlimited patience, coupled with tremendous driving force. It was a task which, in the initial stages, fell almost entirely upon the Royal Navy Beach Commandos, although the army beach parties were soon on the scene to lend a most welcome and efficient hand.

  In planning “Operation Neptune” the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief had given great thought to the problem of organisation on the beaches, and this was well repaid by the way in which the Royal Navy Beach Commandos dealt with their manifold problems. They worked under the direction of a Naval Officer in Charge of each beach. On the British and Canadian sectors these officers were:

  SWORD beach Captain W. R. C. Leggatt, RN

  GOLD beach Captain G. V. M. Dolphin, RN

  JUNO beach Captain C. D. Maud, DSO, DSC, RN

  In the Royal Naval Beach Commandos there were many officers and men who were specially trained signalmen and wireless operators familiar with military as well as the naval technique of signalling. Some of these were attached to the military beach parties, and it is for this reason that one sometimes saw, say, a Sub-Lieutenant of the RNVR wearing the “RN Commando” flash on the shoulder of his khaki battledress, below his RNVR shoulder-straps, and below that the coloured insignia of a corps or division of the British Army.

  D-day drew to a close with the armies of liberation firmly established inland from every beach assailed, and with more men, vehicles and stores being constantly landed on every beach. In that day an average of over 21,000 men had been landed an four of the five beaches—the exception being OMAHA beach where the rate of landing had been slowed down by the bitter opposition and the long struggle for the beach. On that day, too, 3,200 vehicles and 2,500 tons of stores had been landed on one beach alone JUNO beach, where the Canadians had been landed. Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay’s determination to land the maximum in the minimum of time was being amply fulfilled, and three successes had already been scored—the invasion armadas had not been bombed in their ports of assembly; they had not been attacked on passage; and they had not met crippling opposition on the beaches. “Operation Neptune” was going “according to plan.”

  The Front page of The New York Times, 6 June 1944. With Britain being on war-time double-summer-time, the East Coast time was six hours behind, enabling the press to achieve a same-day scoop.

  CHAPTER V

  THE ROYAL MARINE COMMANDOS

  Landing under fire in a seaway—Battle for the Langrune-sur-Mer strongpoint—Battle for the Lion-sur-Mer château—a long march through enemy-held territory—The battle for Port-en-Bessin—The struggle east of the River Orne.

  Royal Marine Commandos played a most important part in the assault on Europe. They were allotted various tasks, all of them exceedingly difficult of achievement, but they achieved them all, although unhappily they suffered heavy losses in so doing. Of the major tasks which fell to them in what may be termed the initial coastal phase of the invasion two were concerned entirely with primary naval requirements, while another was of importance to the navy as well as to the army. To the Royal Marine Commandos goes the honour of having reduced and destroyed one of the worst of the German “hedgehogs” of defence along the coast of the Bay of the Seine, and also of having captured the first French port to fall into Allied hands.

  All four of these feats of the Royal Marine Commandos during the initial coastal phase were entirely separate operations. It is convenient, therefore, to consider them one by one, while bearing in mind the fact that they were all in train at the same time. Nor must it be forgotten that these Royal Marine Commandos, once put ashore, were dependent upon themselves alone, although they did, in fact, get assistance from naval bombardment an from the military authorities in the areas in which they operated.

  In the SWORD area—that on the eastern flank of the Allied landings, the Canadians were to land on the Bernières—St Aubin-sur-Mer beaches and press on inland at the
ir best speed. The Third British Infantry Division were to land in the Lion-sur-Mer—Ouistreham area and were also to press inland as fast as possible. These two military forces would therefore leave a gap along the coast some 5 or 6 miles in length, and any enemy coast defence in this area which had not been destroyed by our bombardment or which subsequently “came to life” would thus be by-passed. The Royal Marine Commandos were to clear this coastal strip and liquidate any German positions or defences encountered.

  To this end 48 Royal Marine Commando, under Lt-Colonel J. L. Moulton, RM, was to land at St Aubin-sur-Mer and clear the coastal fringe eastward through Langrune until they met 41 Royal Marine Commando, under Lt-Colonel T. M. Gray, RM, who were to land at Lion-sur-Mer and advance westward in the coastal area. It was planned that the junction of these two Commandos should take place a little to the west of the fishing village which rejoices in the name of Le Petit Enfer. That area was to live up to the name of the village it contained.

  The troops were thoroughly “briefed” for their tasks before leaving England, but in the interests of security this was done using maps with bogus place names, and the real names of the objectives were not revealed to them until after they had embarked for the voyage to Normandy.

  Both 48 and 41 Royal Marine Commandos crossed the English Channel in LCI(S)—(Landing Craft, Infantry, Small). These small craft are far from ideal for a sea voyage in weather which left a great deal to be desired. All the men were heavily laden with packs and equipment, and they also took with them some bicycles, motor cycles and hand carts.

  Canadian troops ashore on 6 June 1944 at ‘Nan-Red sector’ (Saint-Aubin-sur-Mer). This beach was the objective of the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment, 8th Brigade 3rd Canadian Infantry Division on the morning of D-Day, with support from Shermans of the Fort Garry Horse (10th Armoured Regiment).

  Canadian troops plod ashore, some with bicycles.

  The six LCI(S) with 48 Royal Marine Commando on board began to close the shore at St Aubin-sur-Mer at about 7.30 a.m. As the craft drew in towards the beach it seemed as if the landing was to be unopposed, for there was no sign of life from the enemy.

  Suddenly, however, when the craft were within a few hundred yards of the beach, the German strongpoint at St Aubin-sur-Mer opened fire with machine-guns. This strongpoint was almost directly ahead of the port wing craft. This machine-gun fire seemed to be the signal to other strongpoints and batteries, for in a moment or two the landing craft were also under mortar and shell fire. The landing craft replied to this fire with their Oerlikon guns, and some 2-inch mortar smoke shells were fired by the craft carrying the headquarters personnel, but the smoke did not prove dense enough to afford much cover. The landing craft carrying Z Troop was hit amidships, but struggled on towards the beach.

  Worse was to follow. Two of the six landing craft struck underwater obstacles while still 150-200 yards off the shore. The obstacles held them and they were unable to get free and go in to the beach. These two craft carried Y and Z Troops, and the Marines of these two troops had to swim for the shore. Many of them, even strong swimmers, failed to master the very strong undertow and were drowned, while others were carried far down the coast. Troop Sergeant-Major Travers, for instance, was carried far to the eastward and succeeded in reaching the shore over a mile away only to find himself right under the guns of the German strongpoint at Langrune.

  Marines of 48 (RM) Commando coming ashore from landing craft at St Aubin-sur-Mer on Juno Beach, 6 June 1944.

  The landing craft carrying the headquarters also struck a submerged obstacle, but she was close in to the beach before doing so, and the troops which she carried were able to wade ashore. The men of the three other troops—A, B and X Troops—also had to wade ashore as the ramps of the LCI(S) proved useless in the seaway. Either they were shaken loose by the sea or their outboard ends floated, making them impossible for heavily laden troops to negotiate.

  Other craft in the vicinity were quick to come to the rescue of the Royal Marine Commandos in the LCI(S)’s which were stranded on the obstacles offshore. One LCA (Landing Craft, Assault) under a stout-hearted young Leading Seaman, made two trips to the beach, landing men of Z Troop. A number of men of Y Troop, however, fell victim to one of the most infuriating episodes which can ever have happened. About 50 men of this troop were rescued by an LCT (Landing Craft, Tank) from their own wrecked craft, only to find that the LCT was under orders to proceed at once to England—so to England those Royal Marines had to go, despite their energetic protests. To their bitter disappointment at “missing the party” was added the realisation that their Commando was now not up to strength. As a result of this, and the losses sustained by both Y and Z Troops, these two troops were amalgamated into one after reaching the shore.

  Once ashore, the men were sheltered against the enemy’s small arms fire so long as they kept close under the sea wall and the low earth cliff on the landward edge of the beach, but any movement away from this shelter was promptly greeted by machine-gun fire. At the same time the whole beach area was under constant German shell and mortar fire. The beach was a shambles. It was narrow and was congested with tanks, self-propelled guns, and other vehicles. Some of them were trying to find a way to move inland. Others were wrecked. The strip of sheltered ground under the sea wall and earth cliff was a jumble of men from many different units, among whom there were many dead and wounded.

  Within a few minutes, however, reconnaissance revealed that there was a gap in the minefield along the shoreward side of the beach. This gap was only about 200 yards to the westward, and the Royal Marines infiltrated through this gap singly and in small groups and reached the appointed Assembly Area a short distance inland. This Assembly Area was fortunately fairly quiet.

  The Marines mustered in the Assembly Area and contact was made with the Canadians and orders were then given for the advance to the eastward to begin. B Troop moved straight to the beach defences immediately to the east of St Aubin-sur-Mer. B Troop was soon able to report their section of the beach defences cleared of the enemy, and X Troop was sent ahead to clear up the next sector of the beach defences. Meanwhile, an advance guard formed of men of A Troop moved eastwards a short distance inland and this occupied the inland portions of the village of Langrune without incident.

  Langrune-sur-Mer, however, contained a German strongpoint on the sea front which was well designed and strongly held and gave 48 Royal Marine Commando a great deal of trouble.

  For their strongpoint the Germans had selected a block of houses and buildings between the sea front road and the parallel street next inland, and between two adjacent streets running down to the sea front. The sea wall itself was surmounted by concertina barbed wire and backed by trenches dug in the sea wall road. Both approaches along the sea front road were blocked—the wide road from the west by a mass of wire and mines stretching for fifty yards, and the narrow road from the east by anti-personnel mines.

  To the westward the next road inland was blocked by a concrete road block with mines and barbed wire. At each of the two cross roads where this street intersected the two streets running down to the sea front there were machine-gun posts, centrally placed so as to be able to fire down any of the intersecting streets. These machine-gun posts were sunk in the roadway, had concrete cupolas, and were connected to the adjacent reinforced buildings of the strongpoint by underground passages. The other defences consisted of machine-guns and 5 cm anti-tank guns in emplacements firing to seaward, a number of mortars, and snipers and grenade throwers. All the buildings had doors and windows bricked up, and the easterly road running down to the sea front was blocked by a concrete wall 5 feet 6 inches high and 4 feet thick. This was backed by trenches. The whole length of the wall along the road parallel to the sea front was faced and topped by tangled concertina barbed wire.

  The Langrune-sur-Mer strongpoint was, in fact, a very tough nut indeed, for all the fixed weapons were well-sited and gardens and streets gave these and the snipers good fields o
f fire.

  X Troop of 48 Royal Marine Commando, having cleared their sector of the beach defences immediately to the westward of Langrune-sur-Mer, tried to advance into the village along the sea front road and that running parallel to it some 50 or 60 yards inland, but they soon found themselves held up by machine-gun fire from the area of the cross roads. This was, of course, one of the westerly defences of the German strongpoint. Unable to work their way eastward they began to work round inland and then tried to attack towards the sea along the westerly street leading to the sea front, but were again held up by machine-gun fire from the cross roads.

  For the sake of simplicity in describing the ensuing battle this street will be alluded to as “Street No. 1,” and the easterly street leading to the sea front as “Street No. 2.”

  When Lt-Colonel Moulton received the report that X Troop had been unable to make headway, either to the eastward along the lateral street or along “Street No. 1,” he decided to ask for a naval bombardment to encourage the Germans to “keep their heads down” and to follow this without delay by two probing movements.

  The naval bombardment was duly carried out by LCG’s (Landing Craft, Gun), and was lifted at 3.30 p.m. The Royal Marines at once began to advance towards the sea front, X Troop down “Street No. 1” and B Troop down “Street No. 2.” Both X and B Troops reached and crossed the railway, but both were then met by machine-gun fire from the cross-road positions, sniping down the streets, and mortar fire from the gardens.