Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  X Troop in “Street No. 1” very soon ran into thickly sown mines. The troop lost a number of men as a result of these mines and the machine-gun fire from the cross roads ahead of them, and they consequently did not succeed in progressing far down the street.

  B Troop succeeded in making slow progress down “Street No. 2” and by 6.15 p.m. they were only about 50 yards from the machine-gun post at the cross roads. At that time, however, Captain Perry, the Commanding Officer of this troop, was killed by a sniper. Second-Lieutenant Rubinstein at once took over command and pressed on slowly to within 20 yards of the cross roads and machine-gun position. Here, however, B Troop reached the edge of a cleared area, where the Germans had demolished a building in order to give themselves a better field of fire, and the Royal Marines met such intense cross-fire as well as fire down the street that Second-Lieutenant Rubinstein had to report that he and his men were held up and unable to advance farther.

  At this stage in the proceedings one Centaur light tank of the Royal Marine Armoured Support Regiment was sent to back up each troop. The one which reinforced B Troop in “Street No. 2” did a good deal of damage to the houses around the cross-roads, but its high explosive shells could make no impression on the anti-tank wall across the street on the far side of the cross-roads or upon the reinforced buildings immediately to the eastward of it.

  Under cover of this tank fire B Troop again attacked. Some men actually succeeded in getting across the cross roads and into two of the damaged houses on its north-west corner, but they could not get across the anti-tank wall or into the reinforced buildings east of it. Meanwhile a steady flow of stick grenades came over the wall, but these did surprisingly little damage. Since they could make no progress, however, the Marines were withdrawn from the two houses on the north-west corner of the cross roads, and the troop began to consolidate in the demolished buildings on the south-west corner of the cross roads. By this time the Centaur tank had run out of ammunition and had withdrawn. It had been replaced by another, but this ran into a mine and broke a track about 30 yards short of the cross roads. This tank blocked the street and made it impossible for another tank to come up, but it did provide some shelter up the street from the machine-gun post at the cross-roads.

  At 9 p.m. Lt-Colonel Moulton received information that a German counter-attack from landward was to be expected at dawn next day. This news placed him in a most awkward predicament. Two troops of the depleted force of 48 Royal Marine Commando were heavily committed in the battle for the Langrune-sur-Mer strongpoint; all his men had been fighting throughout a long day after a long and rough sea passage and a landing under heavy fire which had been anything but dryshod, officers and men were consequently very tired, and if a strong counter-attack should come from landward they would be between the counter-attacking enemy and the Langrune-sur-Mer strongpoint. It was not a pleasant prospect, but it had to he faced. Lieutenant-Colonel Moulton disengaged B and X Troops from the attack on the strongpoint and consolidated the whole remaining force of the Commando in the outskirts of the village, covering all approaches from landward. There the Royal Marines snatched such brief rest as they could consistent with watchfulness and instant readiness for the threatened counter-attack. Fortunately, the counter-attack never materialised. The Germans must either have been too preoccupied with the general situation or unwilling to accept the opportunity which was offered to them.

  Next morning—that of D plus 1—the battle for the Langrune-sur-Mer strongpoint was resumed at 11.30 a.m., by which time all danger of a German counter-attack from landward had passed.

  This time Lieutenant-Colonel Moulton concentrated his attacks on the cross-roads of “Street No. 2” and the lateral street between the railway and the sea front. He was determined that the anti-tank wall should be demolished so that a tank could reach the sea front, and he had arranged for the support of an “M.10” Special Anti-Tank gun to breach the anti-tank wall and the reinforced buildings.

  First the minefield on which the Centaur tank had been wrecked the previous day was counter-mined by a “Bangalore Torpedo,” which detonated the mines. (A “Bangalore Torpedo” is a long tube filled with explosive which can be pushed into a minefield or barbed wire entanglement and then fired.) The wreck of the Centaur tank was then moved and the “M.10” got through. Little further trouble was experienced with the cross-roads machine-gun post, and the “M.10” began to hammer away at the concrete anti-tank wall.

  For an hour and a half the special anti-tank gun hammered away at the concrete anti-tank wall, and at the end of that time it had exhausted all its ammunition. The wall, however, was by that time far from being its former self, and the top half of it had been breached. Having fired all its ammunition the “M.10” then withdrew, and its place was taken by a Sherman tank of the Royal Marines Armoured Support Regiment. The Sherman then “had a go” at the wall, but it still proved to be an anti-tank obstacle.

  At this stage A Troop advanced over the cross-roads and secured two houses on either side of the wall. Under the protection afforded by A Troop in these houses, B and Z Troops came up armed with picks, shovels and explosives. They further demolished the wall, blew up a house, and used the rubbish from this to build a causeway over the remains of the wall for the Sherman tank and to fill up the trenches on the sea side of the wall. No praise can be too high for the men who devoted themselves to this task with battle raging all round them.

  Thus the Sherman tank was able to cross the obstacle at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon. It reached the terrace along the sea front, but while turning to go along this it ran a track into a communication trench. The tank was ditched and immobilised, but fortunately it was in such a position that it could rake the sea front with machine-gun fire.

  Meanwhile A Troop had been fighting its way westwards from the No. 2 Street cross-roads, through the houses along the north side of the street. These houses were, in fact, part of the German strongpoint. It was a house-to-house struggle, entailing breaching the walls between one house and the next or one garden and the next, but the Royal Marines made rapid progress despite the difficulties and the continuous mortar fire, sniping and grenade throwing.

  The Germans, faced with the progress of A Troop through their southern defences, with their northern defences swept by machine-gun fire from the Sherman tank and their eastern defences largely demolished, decided to surrender.

  The battle of the Langrune-sur-Mer strongpoint was over. It had been difficult and costly, but it had long been appreciated that the reduction of such strongpoints, prepared over a term of years and usually manned by picked German troops, would constitute one of the major difficulties in the initial stages of the invasion. Thirty-one German prisoners were taken in the Langrune-sur-Mer strongpoint. The arms captured included a 5 cm anti-tank gun, three machine-guns, a “Bazooka” type gun, several 5 cm mortars, an anti-tank rifle and a number of small arms. Inspection of the strongpoint demonstrated the thoroughness with which the Germans had built these prepared positions. The trenches and gun emplacements and mortar pits were lined with concrete, and ranges and other data were painted on the walls of the gun emplacements and mortar pits so that fire could be directed against any point without any German having to expose himself. Outlying positions such as the machine-gun posts on the cross-roads were connected to the main strongpoints by underground passages. It is not without interest that the Royal Marines who finally reduced this “fortress” in the built-up area had been trained for such fighting in the ruined streets of the most-bombed areas of London, as had many other men of the Royal Marine Commandos.

  It will be remembered that the plan was for 48 Royal Marine Commando to advance eastwards from St Aubin-sur-Mer and meet 41 Royal Marine Commando, advancing westwards from Lion-sur-Mer, in the neighbourhood of Le Petit Enfer.

  Lieutenant-Colonel T. M. Gray, commanding 41 Royal Marine Commando, had decided to divide his Commando into two forces. Force I, consisting of P and Y Troops was to be under his command and
would assault the known German strongpoint in Lion-sur-Mer. One company of the South Lancashire Regiment was to be available to support this force if necessary. Force II, consisting of B and X Troops, was to be commanded by Major D. L. Barclay and was to drive straight for the château to the west of Lion-sur-Mer—suspected of being a German strongpoint or headquarters—and capture it.

  Forty-one Royal Marine Commando crossed the English Channel in five LCI’s (S) (Landing Craft, Infantry, Small). Shortly before 8 a.m. on D-day a signal was received that the beaches at which the Royal Marines were to land were not under fire. They may not have been at that time, but by 8.30 a.m., at which time, the craft were approaching the beach, it was painfully evident that no such happy state of affairs existed. Shells and mortar bursts were seen to be crashing down in unpleasant profusion on the beach, which was littered with dead and wounded and with burnt-out tanks and vehicles. Shells also fell around the craft, close enough to cause damage but fortunately causing no casualties.

  The LCI’s “touched down” at 8.45 a.m. about 200 yards from the surf line and, unhappily, about 300 yards to the westward of the correct beaching position, where the enemy fire was not so intense.

  P Troop, commanded by Captain B. J. B. Sloley, moved quickly to the eastward immediately on landing and got clear of the beach in a few minutes. Five minutes later A Troop, led by Captain C. N. P. Powell, DSO, followed, and these two troops moved inland to the first lateral road to await the other two troops. Eventually about a dozen men of X Troop arrived. They had had a bad time disembarking and on the beach and their commander, Captain H. E. Stratford, MC, and about 25 others had become casualties. The majority of the men of Y Troop arrived, but they reported that Major Barclay had been killed.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Gray then decided to push on with the force at his disposal, and P, Y and A Troops accordingly moved into Lion-sur-Mer. Civilians in the village stated that the Germans had left at about 7 a.m., so Lieutenant-Colonel Gray ordered P Troop to occupy the strongpoint, followed by Y Troop.

  Soon after this contact was made with B Troop, and it was learnt that the Commander of the Troop—Captain H. F. Morris—had become a casualty on the beach.

  In Major Barclay, Captain Morris and Captain Stretford, the intended Force II had lost its commander and both troop commanders. In these circumstances Lieutenant-Colonel Gray decided to take the intended Force II, consisting of B and X Troops, under his own command.

  No sooner had Lieutenant-Colonel Gray effected this change of plan than news was received that the enemy were still in parts of Lion-sur-Mer. P Troop reported that it was held up by snipers and machine-gun fire from houses on each side of the German strongpoint, and the South Lancashires also reported that the strongpoint was holding them up. The information given by the civilians had proved incorrect. The Germans had not left; they had merely been lying low.

  The situation was not easy. Supporting fire from the Royal Navy could not be called for as one of the wireless sets for this purpose had been destroyed on the beach, when all the signalmen attached to the Forward Bombardment Officer had been wounded, and the only other wireless set had been damaged. P Troop was held down, and the South Lancashires were having casualties from machine-gun and mortar fire.

  In these circumstances Lieutenant-Colonel Gray ordered B Troop, under Lieutenant Sturges, up the road towards the château to make contact with the South Lancashires and outflank the strongpoint, while Y Troop was sent to back up the South Lancashires and assault through them if possible. Y Troop was supported by three tanks which had just arrived.

  Y Troop moved up behind the tanks and were within 100 yards of the strongpoint when the Germans opened fire with a 50 mm anti-tank gun. At almost point blank range this gun knocked out all three of the tanks within five minutes. At the same time heavy mortar fire came down on Y Troop, whose commander, Captain P. T. H. Dufton, was killed, and a number of other casualties inflicted.

  B Troop also came under heavy mortar fire and shell fire from an unidentified mobile gun. This troop suffered casualties and was forced to report that it had been held up before making contact with the South Lancashires and could not advance unless some fire support was given in the neighbourhood of the château; but no support of any kind could be given, as all 3-inch mortar ammunition had already been used against the strongpoint.

  Just after 1 p.m. A Troop reported having reached the houses immediately south of the strongpoint, but being under mortar and rifle fire from their left flank. Captain C. N. P. Powell, commanding A Troop, had been wounded. At the same time B Troop reported that the Germans were counter-attacking on the left flank with about 60 men supported by an infantry gun and mortars.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Gray was quick to realise that this counter-attack might become general, in which case the situation of the Marines and South Lancashires, heavily committed and pinned down as they were, would became desperate. He accordingly made a difficult but courageous decision and withdrew all troops to a line east of the Lion-sur-Mer strongpoint.

  In the early afternoon the situation improved. A jeep with a wireless set enabled contact to be made with the naval ships offshore and a bombardment by destroyers of the strongpoint and the château was arranged, At the same time strong army reinforcements were sent, a battalion of the Lincolnshire Regiment and a battalion of the Royal Ulster Rifles being detailed to complete the perimeter round the strongpoint and château.

  The bombardment by destroyers lasted from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m., during which time there was intermittent shell and mortar fire from the enemy.

  Next morning—D plus 1—three Heinkels with Spitfires on their tails suddenly swooped out of the clouds and dropped, or jettisoned, three sticks of bombs. As luck would have it all these bombs straddled the headquarters of the Royal Marine Commando, which had been set up in an orchard. They killed the Forward Bombardment Officer and two men and wounded Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, the chaplain, and nine men.

  Soon after this unhappy incident the Lincolnshires and 41 Royal Marine Commando successfully reduced the strongpoint and the château, and that evening the remainder of 41 Royal Marine Commando pushed on to Luc-sur-Mer and made contact with 46 Royal Marine Commando. It had originally been intended that this Commando, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Hardy, should carry out raids on the enemy batteries at Houlgate or Benerville to the east of the River Orne. They had been embarked in two LSI (Landing Ships, Infantry) and, in view of their special task they carried specialised equipment such as climbing stores, demolition charges and pistols rather than battle equipment. They were consequently under a handicap when the raids on the batteries were cancelled and they were told to land at Luc-sur-Mer in an infantry role on the morning of 7 June—D plus 1.

  The landing of 46 Royal Marine Commando, in contrast to those of 48 and 41 Commandos, was successfully carried out without casualties at 9 a.m. The first task was the capture of the German strongpoint at Le Petit Enfer. This was known to be formidable, but naval gunfire and tank support was available and an attack in three waves from the westward by the Royal Marines successfully reduced the position and led to the capture of 65 prisoners.

  One of the most important tasks allocated to the Royal Marine Commandos during the assault on Normandy was the capture of Port-en-Bessin.

  Port-en-Bessin lay just at the western limit of GOLD area, where the naval component commanded by Commodore C. Douglas-Pennant landed the 50th Northumbrian Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General G. C. Bucknall. To the west of Port-en-Bessin lay the American OMAHA area, and Commodore Douglas-Pennant had attached to his force some squadrons of American LST’s (Landing Ship, Tank) commanded by Commander L. F. Teuscher, USN, one group of American LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tank) commanded by Lieutenant-Commander W. Leide, USNR, and a squadron of American LCI(L)’s (Landing Craft, Infantry, Large) commanded by Lieutenant-Commander W. T. Patrick, USNR, as well as a Canadian flotilla of LCI(L) commanded by Lieutenant-Commander L. S. Kyle, RCNVR.

  Port-en-Be
ssin is the port of Bayeux and a railway terminus. The harbour is sheltered by two long curved breakwaters, and the port itself lies at the north of the Dromme river in a deep cleft between two high hills. It was known that Port-en-Bessin was very strongly defended against frontal assault from seaward. It was for this reason that the capture of this important place had been entrusted to 47 Royal Marine Commando, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Phillips. The Royal Marine Commando had been trained for this task in the Dorset hills.

  The plan was to assault the Port-en-Bessin defences from the landward side and thus take them in rear. It was realised that in order to do this the Royal Marines would have to make their way through about ten miles of enemy held territory after having been landed on a beach to the eastward of Port-en-Bessin. For this reason all weapons and supplies had to be carried on the back—the average weight carried by each man being 88 pounds.

  The Commando was to land from fourteen LCA’s (Landing Craft, Assault) close to the westward of Le Hamel, but when the flotilla was off Le Hamel it came under shell fire from a German strongpoint in that village—this was a strongpoint which caused trouble until late in the afternoon of D-day. This shell fire, coupled with the fact that no activity could be seen on the beach, where there were a number of burning tanks, led to the decision to beach farther to the eastward.

  Thus 47 Royal Marine Commando landed at 8.25 a.m. about one and a half miles to the east of Le Hamel. The final run into the beach of the LCA’s was made exceedingly dangerous by the rough sea and the mined obstacles off the beach. Four of the fourteen LCA’s struck these obstacles and were blown up about 400 yards from the beach. Many of the men in these craft were able to struggle ashore, but in most cases they lost their equipment in the process.